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BY T. S. SAIDBAYEV  
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# Translation

Islam and Society

By

T. S. Saidbayev



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## ISLAM AND SOCIETY

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#### INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of society, the change of generations, and the renovation of socioeconomic conditions related to the development of science and technology, and the increased conscientiousness, culture, and level of information of the Soviet people have raised the requirements governing all ideological work among the masses. The path "which, if followed, would enable us to upgrade the effectiveness of this work," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, is the "comprehensive approach to the organization of the entire matter of education...considering the characteristics of the various groups of working people" [(Bibliography reference) 66, p 24].

The practical atheistic education of the masses makes the comprehensive, all-round study of the social functions of religion under the conditions of a socialist society necessary. On the basis of the achievements of history, ethnography, social psychology, folklore studies, and other sciences, the religion experts must bring to light the general natural relations and ties between the various aspects of social life and the functioning of religion, and interpret them on a broad conceptual and methodological level. The integral study of the problem of "religion and society" alone will enable us to structure the work on surmounting religious vestiges, comprehensively view the object of atheistic influence, and take into consideration and foresee the nature of the influence of socioeconomic factors on changes in religious feelings, properly determining the immediate and long-term tasks, skillfully selecting the ways and means for atheistic propaganda, and conduct it in a state of close unity with ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination.

In recent years the "religion-society problem" has drawn the attention of a number of Soviet researchers. Let us note, above all, works studying the methodological aspects of the problem as a whole [402, 406, 407, 426, 427, 428, 429, 469, and so forth]. Works have also been written on various aspects of the problem--interrelationships between the individual and society in the light of the struggle against religious ideology [455], interrelationships between religion and social life in the various historical periods of different societies [327], the process of secularization of the socialist society [249], the dialectics of the social roots of religion

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[275], the social functions of religion [292], and so forth. Works have also been published directly related to the study of the problems of "Islam and society": on some characteristics and ways of molding an atheistic outlook among the Tadzhik peasantry [105], surmounting religious beliefs under Tadzhik conditions and achieving a conversion to socialism while bypassing capitalism [286], secularization of the rural population of the Karakalpak ASSR [104], the influence of social progress on changes in the way of life and religious awareness of the population of Uzbekistan [178], and the evolution of Islam in the USSR [103]. Works were written on the general problems of specific sociological study of religion and atheism as a whole and of Islam in particular [110], as well as on the results of specific sociological studies conducted in individual areas [287]. So far, however, no works have been published which, using the principles based on the Marxist-Leninist understanding of religion, would offer a broad analysis of the social functions of one or another widespread religion.

With identical socioeconomic conditions and a single social ideology, naturally, a number of common features exist in the manifestations of all religions operating under the conditions of our country. However, we must not fail to take into consideration also that each religion, in accordance with its historical past and the contemporary conditions of the development of the nations among whose believers it has been disseminated, as well as the characteristics of its specific dogmas and cults, has its own unique features.

Therefore, when we discuss Islam which, in terms of its followers, is the second most widespread (after the Orthodox) religion, we must consider it from a general viewpoint applicable to all religions without, however, applying to it in its entirety the already-existing concepts applicable to other religions. In this case it is a question of the all-round study of the entire variety of religious manifestations in the socialist society. According to Marxist doctrine, people must be the target of the social studies, however, people taken in their factual, empirically observed development process occurring under specific circumstances [20, p 25].

The present work does not pretend to provide an exhaustive study of the entire problems of interrelationships between Islam and society. The author has focused his attention on the solution of a number of main problems such as a sociological study of the reasons for the dissemination and consolidation of Islam on the territory of our country, the functions in the prerevolutionary society, and the stages of secularization of the areas where it is widespread, as well as the social functions of Islam under the conditions of Soviet republics which have bypassed the capitalist way of development. Most of these problems pertaining to Soviet Islamic studies have been insufficiently studied or totally neglected. Some of the views which have been established on individual aspects of the problem demand, in our view, clarification or even revision. That is why the author pays a certain attention also to the elaboration of some methodological aspects of the "Islam and society" problem.

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F. Engels's statement on Christianity, "one could not set aside religion which took over the worldwide Roman Empire and, for 1,800 years, ruled over the overwhelming segment of civilized mankind, simply by proclaiming it a nonsense concocted by frauds. In order to remove it, we must, above all, be able to explain its origin and development, proceeding from the historical conditions under which it appeared and reached its domination.... Here we must answer the question of how did it happen that the popular masses of the Roman Empire preferred this nonsense to all other religions..." [23, p 307].

The Moslems which profess Islam are found among the Uzbeks, Avars, Kirgiz, Tatars, Tadzhiks, Cherkessians, Uighurs, and Chechens. Each of these nations has its own history, distinct from the others. However, it was precisely Islam that turned out to be a religion whose acknowledgment and reverence was accepted by their ancestors. Why was it precisely Islam that was able to push out here the previous religious beliefs? How to explain the fact that it was precisely Islam that became the ruling ideology and that it had a deep influence on the mentality, culture, and value orientations of said peoples?

A study of the reasons for the dissemination and establishment of Islam inevitably leads to the determination of the social grounds for this phenomenon. The answers to the question of why precisely Islam was able to push out the previous beliefs of the peoples who became its followers, rather than the followers of Buddhism or Christianity with their centuries-old history, developed theology, and well-trained clerical cadres, are linked with the study of the characteristics of Islamic dogma and cult, ignoring which would make it impossible to determine to the fullest extent the level of its influence today. Ignorance or unwillingness to take into consideration this specific feature largely leads, in our view, to subjectivism in assessing the level of religious beliefs among the populations of areas where Islam is widespread.

The author does not assign himself the universal task of studying the process of the appearance and establishment of Islam in the light of all the peoples of our country professing it. In each separate case the process took place under unique specific circumstances. His purpose is to study this process from the general sociological viewpoint, and the determination of the common territory. Being of general theoretical significance to a certain extent, this approach makes it possible to compare the history of each nation within the framework of universal history, and to establish differences in the nature of the manifestations of Islam in a specific area.

The author has studied extensively the functions of Islam in the prerevolutionary feudal society, for the proper understanding and interpretation of the functions of Islam in the socialist society and its place in the social structure of this society can be accomplished only by the study of its origins and the role it played in presocialist society. The steady quantitative changes and qualitative transformations, the constant appearance of

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the new and elimination of the old, inherent in a historically developed society, contain also a recurrence of certain qualities and phenomena. One of the development characteristics is the "recurrence at the higher stage of certain features, characteristics, and so forth, of the lower stage," a development which seems to go over pages already covered yet which repeats itself on a different and higher level (negation of the negation) [45, p 203].

Therefore, the contemporary condition of Islam cannot be presented as something entirely new or totally unlike the old. Naturally, however, nor could one speak of an automatic repetition of its former status in society, for such recurrence is relative and maintains a state of dialectical unity with its opposite--the nonrepeatable. Certain functions and features of Islam are repeated within the socialist society but in a new way, following new laws.

The author then traces the basic stages of secularization in Central Asian society following the establishment of the Soviet system. Such an approach to the problem of "Islam and society" is necessary, in our view, for the following reasons: Above all, it proves the vitality of the Marxist understanding of religion, its social origins, and functioning, and the fact that "...religion will disappear to the extent to which socialism will develop. Its appearance must take place as a result of the social development in which education plays a major role" [21, p 470]. A clear example is provided of this fact in the Central Asian Soviet republics where, with the growth of the economy and the political conscientiousness of the working people and their literacy, Islam is gradually being removed from the various realms of social and private life. Furthermore, it is important also to sum up the experience in resolving the religious problem under the conditions of republics which have bypassed the capitalist way of development, as acquired by the CPSU and the Soviet state.

The need to study such problems is created by yet two other important reasons. First, we must take into consideration that with a view to triggering a hostile attitude toward the ideas of socialism and communism and the Soviet system, and to discredit its policy in the field of national and religious relations, the ideologies of anticommunism continue extensively to promote the thesis of the "persecution of Moslems" and of their organizations, particularly in the period of the building of a socialist society, and the "particularly" hostile attitude of the Soviet state toward Islam, and so on. They claim that the secularization of the Islamic areas is the result of administrative rules and pressure on the part of the authorities and is of a superficial, purely external nature. In their view, the Moslems are not susceptible to the ideas of atheism, for they are particularly attached to religion and, allegedly, Islam provides a particular immunity to the influence of various forces. The main objective of anticommunism is to belittle the successes and tremendous changes which have taken place in the lives of the Central Asian nations following the October Revolution and which became the base for their abandonment of religion.

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Under contemporary conditions, when many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, having rejected the colonial yoke and have taken the path of socialist development, interest in the experience of the building of socialism in our country, particularly in the republics of the Soviet East, has become exceptionally great. Such an interest is legitimate, for the socioeconomic living conditions of prerevolutionary Central Asia and Kazakhstan and of a number of Afro-Asian countries at the initial period of the gaining of their independence have a great deal in common. Today the Afro-Asian countries following a socialist orientation are resolving, in many cases, the same problems which arose at the initial stage of the revolutionary changes in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. That is why the study of the historical experience of the transition of previously backward nations in our country to socialism, bypassing capitalism, is of exceptional importance. Addressing the June 1976 Berlin conference of communist and workers' parties of Europe, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized the importance of the study of the experience in the building of socialism under a great variety of conditions. He discussed the need to study and sum up acquired experience, the more so since, in addition to the unique specific features related to national characteristics, it mandatorily includes common features of general interest [70, p 19].

The contemporary noncapitalist development of Asian and African countries is not a repetition of the path covered by the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. However, the existing differences do not lower the value of the Soviet experience which directs the revolutionary forces of other countries toward the proper solution of similar problems enabling them to approach this solution on a planned basis, taking into consideration the sum total of circumstances and confronting forces. The countries with a socialist orientation, said Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, need specific experience in resolving one or another problem which arises in the course of building a new life, and specific ways, means, and methods for resolving it in our country [77, pp 33-34].

An important problem which must be resolved by the developing countries, and which we too had to resolve, is that of religion, its function in society, and the interrelationship between the state and religious organizations, and between believers and nonbelievers. This problem is common also because here it is a question not of religion in general but, specifically, of Islam which dominated in prerevolutionary Central Asia and Kazakhstan and is the most widespread religion in countries with a socialist orientation. Islam has had a major influence on the molding of the official ideologies of these countries. Reverence to Islam in some of them is based on the need to abolish ownership based on exploitation calling for the redistribution of the wealth acquired by a population minority in favor of the poorer majority. In such countries religion continues to have a noticeable influence on all aspects of the life of society and of the believers--economic, political, and spiritual. It is natural that under such circumstances the choice of the proper ways and means for the solution of the religious problem assumes a major significance. The

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experience acquired in the course of the socialist changes in the Soviet republics which bypassed capitalism is of unquestionable practical interest to the developing countries.

The study of the social functions of religion, as a characteristic addition to the theory of noncapitalist development, enables us to predict the future of religion in our country and in many other countries with a socialist orientation.

The study of the social functions of Islam on the retrospective level means, essentially, the study of the laws of the way existing social relations influence such functions and the gradual development of the objective narrowing of the realm of its influence.

The study of the social functions of Islam under the conditions of a developed socialist society holds a leading position in this work. Considering Islam as an element of society, the author determines its interrelationship with the other elements of the social structure. He explains its position in social relations (the need of the people it satisfies and the ways it uses to accomplish this). As we know, to its followers, religion is a general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium and popularly expressed logic [6, p 414], and a "science of life." For this reason, the author also describes the influence of Islam on the outlook and views of its followers and on their life orientation and values as well as on the various aspects of their lives and activities. All this contributes to the determination of the objective and subjective reasons for the existence of the Islamic vestiges, the means to surmount it, and the interrelationship between atheistic and other trends of ideological work.

The initial methodological principle in this study is the Marxist view that religion is not an accidental phenomenon in history, or the result of ignorance and even stupidity but is "nothing other than an imaginary reflection in the mind of external forces which dominate the people in daily life--a reflection in which earthly forces assume unearthly shapes" [22, p 328]. According to Marxism religion is socially based and has held different positions in society at different times.

At the same time, the present situation of religion retains a great deal of what was related to its past role. The experience of the past is a prerequisite, the starting point for subsequent development. This determines the other methodological principle of Marxism--the specific-historical approach--using the work to clarify the contemporary social functions of Islam. The trip into the past, found in this book, pursues the single objective of interpreting profoundly the manifestations of contemporary Islam and to establish and explain their characteristics and try to determine means for surmounting religious beliefs. Historicism, as V. I. Lenin taught, is a structural component of dialectics, a method for the study of phenomena in their appearance and development and their link with specific conditions, a method for clarifying both general and specific features. The lack of a historical attitude toward social problems

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deprives us of the opportunity properly to interpret the nature of facts which reveal general and specific features of phenomena and which lead to emphasis on superficial illustrations, facts, and citations. Marxism, V. I. Lenin emphasized, stems from the fact that the past, present, and future in various phenomena are always dialectically interrelated: the present stems from the past. One way or the other, it is determined by it and is the basis for the future. Since in reality there are no absolute contradictions among the individual ages of the historical process, their separation is equally inadmissible on the theoretical-cognitive level. "The most reliable aspect of the question of the social sciences...", V. I. Lenin wrote, "is not to forget the basic historical link, to consider each problem from the viewpoint of how did a certain phenomenon develop in history, what were the main stages covered by this development and, to consider, from the viewpoint of this development, what has become of this problem today" [38, p 67].

Applying Marxist methodological principles, the author studies the social functions of Islam in accordance with the characteristics of the distance covered by the republics of Central Asia and the conditions of the socioeconomic and cultural development of its nations at the present stage.

In the course of their development the Central Asian peoples avoided an entire socioeconomic system--capitalism--proving, yet once again, to the entire world the tremendous advantages of the socialist system. However, this leap cannot take place without a trace in the life of a nation. It cannot be a simple ascent in a straight line, merely the appearance of something new without the repetition of the old. "We," V. I. Lenin said, "can build communism only on the basis of the sum total of knowledge, organizations, and establishments, and a stock of human forces and means left to us by the old society" [44, p 301]. V. I. Lenin frequently emphasized that there has been no historical case in which a new production method has appeared suddenly, without being preceded by a long series of failures, errors, and recurrences. We must remember that the transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism, "is not ensured by a proper economic foundation and a respective historical and psychological experience" [299, p 216]. "The absence of one or another stage in historical development demands its own 'compensation, a fill-in'" [279, p 14].

The author not only interprets the social functions of Islam on the basis of the general laws governing the development of the socialist society but tries to clarify the specific features of its condition which stems from the characteristics of the noncapitalist way of development of the area it covers. In the author's opinion, this enables us to note the various aspects of a single condition. Whereas the first applies to the general methodological problems of the study of religion, the second enables us to determine development characteristics. Naturally, here we must proceed on the basis of the common aspect of the general and the specific. "The general," V. I. Lenin wrote, "exists only in the separate, through the separate. Everything separate is (one way or another) general. Everything general is (a particle or aspect or essence) of the separate" [43, p 318].

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The specific-historical approach to the study of Islam has an independent value as well in terms of the atheistic education of the working people. Under circumstances in which the party calls for the shaping of a scientific outlook in all working people, the all-round study of the problem of the spread and establishment of Islam and of its function in the past and the present will enable us to bring to light the historical and social base of religion, and the gradual yet steady process of the withering away of its role and influence on society and on the believers. It is impossible to surmount the religious faith in man until he has realized its reasons and seen its earthly origins. Therefore "today the sociology of religion carries out an important function, inspiring the believers to interpret to a certain extent their faith, outlook, perceptions of the world and feelings, converting an object of blind faith into an object of study. It is this, precisely, which is being resolved by the most important task of atheistic education--awakening a conscious attitude toward conceptual problems" [109, p 72].

Historicism in the study of religion assumes particular importance under present circumstances, when young people enter life with an awareness of the reactionary role played by Islam in the past coming only out of textbooks. Historical knowledge alone can shape in the young people a proper attitude toward Islam. Therefore, we must obviously discuss the development of a feeling of historicism among the young people through atheistic propaganda.

The importance of the specific-historical approach increases under contemporary conditions for yet another reason. Our times are characterized by increased reciprocal information among representatives of related ethnic groups on the differences existing among them, not only of ethnic but also of a socioeconomic nature. In our times a trend has been noted toward increased ethnic awareness. Interest in the past of one's nation, its origins, and role of individual components in its history has increased. This "ethnic paradox," manifested against a background of the weakening of ethnic relations, is explained by the fact that the latter are compensated by concepts related to the common historical destinies of the members of each individual ethnic group. "The strengthening of this concept is, in the final account, the result of the nearly comprehensive growth of literacy as well as the radical changes triggered by the scientific and technical revolution in the development of information media (press, radio, television, motion pictures, and so on). It was thus that the necessary prerequisites were created for the increased level of information on the part of the broad masses in many countries concerning the historical past of their nations. Spontaneously developing concepts of this past (such as legends, and other folklore traditions) have begun to be replaced to an ever greater extent by knowledge based on special...research" [148, p 106].

The entire history of the peoples professing Islam is largely linked with a religion which has had a serious impact on all aspects of their life. The concept of the unity between the religious and the national has been

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established in social psychology and of the attitude toward Islam as an age-old attribute of national life and keeper of national values. Claims have been voiced linking with Islam all cultural accomplishments of the nation in the past. Frequent attempts are still being made to present religious faith as a feature of national originality and the nonobservance of religious ceremonies and holidays as betrayal of the legacy of the ancestors, and disrespect for the nation and its culture. All this makes exceptionally topical the exposure of the link between religion and nationalistic vestiges [481, 15 September 1972]. The implementation of this task set by the party is possible only through the adoption of a historical approach to the interpretation of Islam and the definition of its role in ethnic processes and influence on the life of its followers.

Finally, yet another problem of a methodological nature is the extent to which it would be legitimate to study the reasons for the spread of Islam throughout the territory of the country and its social functions by taking as an example a big area such as Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Manifestations of Islamic vestiges in one or another republic or oblast have, unquestionably, their characteristics and specific features. The party press has condemned the enthusiasm for narrow local topics, pointing out that research in the field of the social sciences should cover a broad range of phenomena and reveal patterns or existing characteristics leading to the manifestation of such patterns [241, p 59].

It seems to us that the numerous materials available today on the individual parts of the country are obviously insufficient for developing, on their basis, fundamental works on the social functions of Islam, for quantitative accumulations do not always lead to the determination of a general case. It seems more accurate to us to go from the general to the specific. The study of the reasons for the spread of Islam and of its most important functions throughout the territory of the country or in a big area is not the equivalent, either in terms of assignments or methods, of the study of such phenomena in an individual area or within the history of a single nation. The scientific study of such problems covering a huge area makes it necessary to determine and define the main features and lines of development, and to depict the process in its entirety. It seems to us that, following general theoretical ideas ranging from the establishment of a most general law to the gradual concretizing of the problem within the limits of a separate area or the history of a single nation or nationality, we would find within already known facts a richer content which, with an empirical strict approach to them, would remain concealed should we consider individual features outside the overall system. Following the approach we have chosen, each fact should yield considerably more information, converting into a link within the historical process as we study its interconnection with other facts and phenomena. In turn, this enables us to reveal better the characteristics of the social functions of Islam in one or another area and its role in the fate of one or another nation. We consider this one of the purposes of this work.

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#### THE SPREAD OF ISLAM ON THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR

The establishing of scientifically sound factors in the spread and taking root of Islam on the territory of the Soviet Union is required by a number of considerations.

First of all, a profound analysis of that role which Islam plays in our days in social and private life is impossible without elucidating the aspects related to its past.

Ordinarily believers explain the conversion of their ancestors to Islam by the "will of god" or "grace" which distinguishes their people from others. The "days of the acceptance of Islam" celebrated in certain regions are used for preaching the exclusiveness of the Moslems and for instilling the notion that the ancestors of the given people were destined by Allah himself to be Moslems.

Quite recently the ideologists of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism spread the idea of national exclusiveness, the uniqueness and divine electness of the Moslems, as the "people of the brightest soul and good heart," and of Islam as a "most pure and noble religion." They sought in the Moslems special traits which "elevated them over the people of a different belief"; they deprecated the followers of other religions, and in particular the Slavs, calling them "rank and ignorant," and the "eternal enemies of the Moslems" [435, p 61]. And at present foreign Sovietologists assert the age-old "belonging to Islam" of many peoples of the Soviet Union, using religion as a weapon against socialism.

In Soviet historical and in part Islamic-studies literature, the opinion has been established according to which Islam within our nation was spread due to the Arab and Turkish conquerors who by the force of weapons, fire and the sword imposed their religion, Islam, on the conquered peoples [223 pp 1-165; 216, pp 1-105; 331, pp 1-183; 308, p 94; 404, p 14; 229, p 18; 451, pp 143-144, and so forth]. The thesis of the violent spread of Islam has also been incorporated in textbook, artistic and journalistic literature (see, for example [202a, pp 63-65; 309a, p 85; 439a, p 123]).

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Such a one-sided approach was largely caused by the level of study on the problem. Up to the present no special work has appeared devoted to the problem of the spread of Islam on the nation's territory as a whole, and only several works have been devoted (completely or partially) to the spread of Islam on individual territories [461; 462; 187; 403; 88; 86; 229].

These works rightly emphasize that the reason for the spread of Islam in one or another part of our nation cannot be explained solely by Arab expansion, criticism is made of the routine application of the thesis of the violent spread of Islam (without considering the conditions, the place and the time), and the causality of this phenomenon is explained by socioeconomic conditions. However, the authors of the given works, as a rule, restrict themselves to this correct explanation, without going into it, and in addition some of them reemphasize the violent nature of the spread of Islam [86, pp 20, 24; 298, pp 24-25; 187, p 6], and they exaggerate the significance of certain factors which in our view are not crucial [88, p 8]. And the researchers have completely disregarded the "nonmaterial" factors in the success of Islam, that is, the distinctness of Islam itself as a religion, the commonness of moral standards and the notions of the population in various areas which espouse Islam, and so forth.

Such a situation makes it necessary to attempt to establish the patterns in the spread and taking root of Islam within our nation. Of course, in each specific instance this process occurred under unique specific circumstances. But only having taken the process as a whole is it possible to concretize it within the framework of the history of a specific region, individual nationality or people. In social sciences, as V. I. Lenin emphasized, the most important is to see each phenomenon in the general chain of development, while the isolated facts, if they are taken outside the whole or outside the relationship with one another, do not contribute to an understanding of the whole.

#### Arab Expansion: Ideological or Economic?

The fact that the spread of Islam on the territory of our nation is related to the invasion of the troops of the Arab Caliphate is indisputable. Vast areas of Azerbaijan were conquered by the Caliphate as early as the year 18 of the Hijra (639). Then the Arabs advanced on Dagestan and in 642/643 (according to other data [213, p 151], in 652/653) captured Derbent. In 685/686, the Arabs took Derbent again. At the beginning of the 8th century, a new stage began in the Arab conquests and this lasted almost 100 years.

The first military raids by Arabs in Mawerannahr (Arab. "on the other side of the river" or the lands of Central Asia lying on the other side of the Amudar'ye) date to the third quarter of the 7th century. In 673-674, Arab troops crossed the Amudar'ye, and they captured and laid waste Ramitan and the surroundings of Bukhara.

Two years later, in 676, Arab troops again approached Bukhara and forced the Queen [tsaritsa] to pay an enormous ransom as well as turn over a group

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of youths from Bukhara noble families as hostages. The hostages were sent to Arabia where they were given into slavery [128, p 190]. Mawerannah was finally conquered at the beginning of the 8th century (706-716).

The rapid capturing of significant territories by the Arabs at the very outset of the existence of the Caliphate until recently has been explained by the exceptional devoutness of the conquerors to the new religion, and by their fanaticism and readiness, disregarding all sacrifices, to spread Islam and "die for the faith." Individual scholars have also used this to explain the later military successes of the Caliphate, including the conquering of Central Asia (see, for example [301, p 358; 199, p 3]).

One simply must not speak of the exceptional devoutness of the Arabs to the new religion, particularly in the first several decades of the Caliphate. The basic portion of the Arab troops at that time was made up of Bedouins who, even according to the evidence in the Koran, did not have the confidence of Muhammad. They did not know and could not know the new dogma. When it was a question of the devoutness to Islam, Muhammad equated the Bedouins to the Mecca "hypocrites" and the Medina "saints," and repeatedly addressed angry words against them [260, 4:62, 2:7(8), 3:8(10), 9:68, and others]. The Bedouins were used in the troops as a shock military force, wagering exclusively on their militancy and toughness.

When, after one of the victorious battles, Caliph Omar instructed that the booty be divided depending upon a knowledge of the Koran, a predominant majority of the troops which had most distinguished themselves could not quote a single line from the Koran, and only one was able to pronounce the rote saying: "In the name of god the merciful, the kind" [265, p 127].

During the conquering of Iran and Byzantium, the compilation of the Koran had not even been completed. By that time nothing was said about the dogma and cult of Islam which had been worked out dogmatically. By the moment of the conquering of Azerbaijan and Dagestan, the hadiths themselves had not even been assembled, let alone their canonized collections. Only after the conquering of Central Asia were the four orthodox legal schools (mazhaba) formed and recognized each other, and the theology of Islam per se began to be elaborated. Over this time from the first Arab conquests to the invasion of Central Asia, that is, until the 8th century, Islam had scarcely been able to put down such deep roots that the Arabs left to conquer new areas with a clear awareness of a holy "mission." They were least of all motivated by a desire to put the world under the ideology of Islam, thinking primarily about the capturing of riches which had been accumulated in nearby and distance lands.

In conquering a certain area, the Arabs concluded an agreement in accord with which the conquered persons should pay an enormous tribute. Under the treaty with the King of Khwarizm, the Arabs received 100,000 slaves and as many pieces of cloth. Peace was concluded with Merv for 1 million drachmas (according to other information, for 2 million drachmas) and a large amount of barley and wheat. Very many examples are known when the treaties were

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concluded with a condition of paying enormous amounts of money, and the delivery of slaves, foodstuffs and various goods [see 386, pp 258-279; 152, pp 80-81, 82].

The main incentive for the warriors in the army of conquerors was, thus, the possibility to easily enrich themselves. The booty captured in a war was divided in the following manner: one-fifth was turned over to the treasury (to the prophet, his tribe, to widows and orphans). The remainder was divided among the warriors considering that a horseman received three times as much as a foot soldier [213, p 151]. The warriors in addition received a portion of the in-kind tribute paid by the population of the conquered areas and the money from the treasury. A majority of them did not participate either in farming or other productive labor.

The basic factor in the comparatively rapid conquering of Mawerannahr and other regions by the Arabs must be seen in the political disunity of the conquered lands and in the presence of numerous small mutually hostile states. For example, in Central Asia, by the times of the Arab conquests there were more than 15 feudal states, and this circumstance was skillfully utilized by the Arabs. The conquerors also made use of the contradictions between the Turkic nomads and the settled population of Central Asia. It must also be considered that the Arabs who by that time had annexed many countries to the Caliphate utilized the captured human reserves and material resources for the conquering of Central Asia and thus had great military superiority.

We feel that one of the reasons for the successful military operations of the Arabs was also the presence in Central Asia of many religions which ultimately impeded the unification of the feudal lords for a combined rebuff of the conquerors.

Everywhere for strengthening their positions the conquerors converted the conquered population to Islam and declared the local religions false. For making Islam take root quickly, in individual instances the Arabs released the newly converted from the paying of the head tax (jizya). For the same purposes the houses of the local inhabitants of Bukhara, Merv, Samarkand and other cities were inhabited by Arabs.

All the religions professed by the Central Asian peoples were declared to be false. The Arabs were particularly intolerant of Zoroastrianism. Not only the religious literature but also the secular literature of Mawerannahr was destroyed under the guise of being Zoroastrian.

Thus, Islam was brought into our territory from outside, as a result of Arab expansion.<sup>1</sup> But is this sufficient for explaining how Islam which was the ideology of Arab society at the beginning of the 7th century became separated from its base and transferred to the conditions of other countries, as well as how this religion quickly eliminated the traditional beliefs and became the dominant ideology, having had an enormous impact on the culture

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and history of the peoples which adopted it? Certainly in history many instances are known when the violent spread of one or another religion did not lead to its success, but rather a deformation or distortion of the preached religion occurred. Thus, the attempts to Christianize the peoples of the North were unsuccessful. Regardless of the active missionary activities by the Russian Orthodox Church and the efforts of the Tsarist administration, Christianization (even where it was successfully carried out) was formal and had virtually no effect on the awareness of the population [406, p 68]. The attempt to convert the Kazakhs to Orthodoxy undertaken at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries [434, pp 24-32] ended in a complete failure.

Of course, the wars accompanied by the seizure of vast territories and by the conquering of scores of tribes speaking different languages played a great role in the spread of Islam. In a number of instances one can speak of these wars as the determining factor, for Islam "initially did not know individual missionary activity but rather was spread solely by conquest; the frontiers of the Moslem possessions coincided with the frontiers of the spread of Islam..." [114, p 691].

In spreading Islam in the conquered countries, the Arab Caliphate became established not so much on the religious level as on the political one. The victories sustained by the Arabs over a clearly weak enemy, in this instance, countries politically divided with sharply aggravated social contradictions, contributed to the strengthening of Islam not so much due to a force of arms as due to the psychological effect produced by the actions of the conquerors. To the conquered population it seemed that the support given the Arabs by some supernatural beings was the reason for their easy victories. In addition, the Arabs in the conquered lands seized the property of the pagan temples and turned them into mosques. Such "sacrilege" for which no retribution followed also could not help but shake the belief of the local population in the force of the old gods and strengthen the influence of the new religion.

An explanation of the factors in the spread of Islam exclusively by the military successes of the Arabs leads to a situation where one does not consider the generally known facts of the "peaceful" spread of Islam that is by missionary preaching. This did occur (but after the Arab invasion) both in our country (Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tataria, Bashkiria and the Northern Caucasus), as well as in other Asian and African countries. And at present a "peaceful offensive" (spread) of Islam is continuing in Asia and Africa. Such an approach leads to a situation where the political, spiritual and cultural life of the population in the area where Islam is spreading is derived not from the economic base of society and not from the history of the given peoples, and in this manner the general sociological law of the dependence and patterns of the determining of spiritual culture by the material base is ignored.

In our opinion, we must not exaggerate the importance of the release of new converts from the paying of the jizya (a head tax on nonbelievers) by

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the Arabs, and particularly raise this to the rank of "economic policy" [88, p 7]. As is known, none of the Arab dynasties showed firmness and consistency on the given question, as this contradicted both the interests of the state treasury as a whole as well as the interests of the vice regents [224, vol 1, p 195]. It would be more accurate to assert: "Those who accepted Islam at first *sometimes* (emphasis ours, T.S.) were released from the head tax" [127, pp 150-152].

We are far from the idea of denying the importance of wars in the spread of Islam. The wars waged by the Arab Caliphate had a marked impact on the social development of the captured regions, they were reflected in the balance of social forces, they influenced the development of new social relations, and gave them a new ideological hue and content. However the main factor for the establishing of Islam must be sought in the development level of the new areas of its spread, in the state of their productive forces, and in the aggravation of the social contradictions and property differentiation occurring on the eve of this process.

#### The Spread of Islam in Light of the Marxist Theory of the Transfer of Culture

Marxism, in explaining religion as an illusory reflection of reality, helps to understand religion as a socially caused phenomenon, as "religion itself is devoid of content and its sources rest not in the sky but on the ground ..." [18, p 252].

Islam, like other religions, is a superstructure social system. This means that the genesis, content and change in the religious superstructure "are ultimately determined by changes in the sphere of social life" [426, p 95]. Consequently, in order to ascertain why Islam which appeared in an historic context in a country remote from Central Asia, the Volga and the Caucasus, was able to put down strong roots here, requires, in our opinion, a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic conditions under which this process was carried out, and this process in materialistic sociology is termed the transfer of the superstructure, or here, culture.

On a basis of a concrete analysis of the conditions and results of various instances of historical transfer, materialism has drawn the most general conclusion that this very transfer (both as a possibility and as a fact) is conditioned and determined by the base, and depends upon the nature of the base of the corresponding societies between which this transfer occurs. Precisely the base is the last instance which determines whether or not something is to be accepted at all. This is the basic pattern in the entire problem of the transfer. This is a fact which repudiates the theory of the independence of the superstructure from the base in the transfer of superstructures. If the socioeconomic structures have a qualitative difference there is no transfer and it is completely impossible.

In the instance when it is a question of societies with a similar material base, a transfer is possible of the various parts of the superstructure

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from one nation to another, that is, a transfer of legal and political systems, scientific and philosophical theories, and aesthetic views [194, pp 193-194]. The validity of the general pattern of cultural transfer can be clearly seen in analyzing the transfer of Islam and the spread of it into territories lying far beyond its place of origin.

Soviet historical and Islamic studies contain a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic conditions under which Islam arose in Arabia and subsequently spread to the present territory of our nation. For this reason we will utilize the existing data.

In the literature there is no unanimous opinion on the social nature of the rise of Islam. There are two viewpoints proposed by different authors at different times and having, in the words of I. P. Petrushevskiy, the nature of working hypotheses. According to one of them, the rise of Islam was "a reaction to the acute crisis which engulfed Arab society and caused by the breakdown of kinship and tribal relations, by the undermining of the corresponding moral, ethical and religious forms (polytheistic and fetishistic) and views, and by the incipient emergence of an early class society" [142, p 48]. Consequently, Islam from the very outset was a religion of developing early feudal relations and the ideology of the emergent feudal leaders of Arab society.

According to the second viewpoint, Islam arose as a result of the breakdown of patriarchal kinship relations and the rise of a slaveowning society in Southern Arabia, and only after the conquering of vast territories did this religion gradually develop into a religion of a feudal society.

As a whole the involved problem of the social system of pre-Islam Arabia has not yet been worked out sufficiently. "However, there is no doubt that the society of the Caliphate at the end of the 7th century was already to a very *significant degree feudalized* with the *survival of a slaveowning system*, and the *conquering by the Arabs* of Central Asia the east of Khorasan and the Mawerannahr was carried out by a warrior-feudal nobility which maintained elements of a nomadic way of life, and superimposed the relations inherent to such societies on the relations of a *local feudalized* society, altering and thus accelerating the process of feudalization" [164, p 305].

Let us examine the level of socioeconomic development in the individual territories of our nation during the period of the spread of Islam. By this time in Central Asia the feudal institutions are still in an incipient and largely immature form. We can only judge many of these institutions from indirect data but this does not alter the essence of the phenomenon that settled areas of Central Asia in the 5th-8th centuries had begun the path of feudal relations [224, vol 1, p 161].

This viewpoint is fully shared by many Soviet scholars concerned with the history of the individual regions of the given area [224a, pp 154-155; 217,

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p 103; 216, p 55]. In Azerbaijan prior to the Arab conquest (the middle of the 7th century), feudal relations had also arisen and later on became well established [210, pp 74-77, 190-193].

In Bulgaria (present-day Tataria) at the end of the 9th and the beginning of the 10th centuries, a portion of the population professed Islam, but in the villages there were "mosques and primary schools with muezzins." The acceptance of Islam "aided the strengthening of feudal relations in the country and once and for all shaped the feudal superstructure of society" [222, p 49].

Islam began to penetrate into Bashkiria in the 10th-12th centuries, and by the second half of the 14th century, the Moslem religion was already rather firmly adopted by the feudal nobility. Precisely during this period feudal relations arose on the territory of Bashkiria, and the rise of the Bashkir feudal hierarchy dates to the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th centuries [334, pp 38-41].

The conquering of Dagestan by the Arabs and the Islamization of the indigenous population began in the second half of the 7th century. During "the 5th-10th centuries, early feudal relations were established in Dagestan. The class of feudal lords and the class of the direct producers of material goods stood in opposition to each other" [213, p 144]. Islam had already penetrated the territory of the present-day Kabardino-Balkaria in the 14th century, when the process of the strengthening of feudal relations began here. As is known, in the 14th century, the Kabardino and Adygey [Circassian] princes swore allegiance to the Russian Tsar "upon their faith and Moslem law" [215, p 95].

The development of feudal relations in Checheno-Ingushetia occurred in the 16th-19th centuries, and over such an extended time Islam became established in the different local Chechen and Ingush societies [333, pp 51-68; 298, pp 21-23].

All that has been said here makes it possible to conclude that the historic development of the societies, in occurring independently of Arab society but similar to it, led to the acceptance of Islam as the dominant ideology and served as a definite factor for the transfer of Islam to their soil. The ideology of Islam conformed to the interests of the most diverse social strata of the given societies which found in it what they most required.

The feudal states which were conquered by the Arabs (the Central Asian ones, in particular) were characterized by an outright social and proprietary differentiation. They were headed by rulers called the "kings of kings." "The dikhans were part of the ruling class (the azats or 'freemen,' 'nobles,' or 'nobility'). In the early (and partially in the developed) Middle Ages, the dikhan was a large landowner who ruled an entire area (for example, Bukhara or Chach), a region or large locality. In the sources they are called, correspondingly, 'great dikhans' or simply dikhans. Such

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dikhans possessed great power primarily because large military companies were under their command, and the members of the companies were called chakirs (shakirs)" [164, p 296]. On the same level as the feudal nobility were the officials of the central and local administrations and the merchants. The "workers" or peasants and artisans comprised the basic productive force. There were also slaves of several categories and, as is assumed, dependent persons. The Arab nobility in many instances was closer to the dikhans than they were to their own subjects. This makes understandable statements concerning alliances of some Central Asian feudal lords with the Arabs against others. This explains how the Sogdian (Samarkand) merchants provided loans for an Arab regent for a campaign against Sogd, or how an Arab military leader Kuteiba, during the siege of Samarkand, received help from the Bukharans and Khwarezmians, while the Bukharans, Khwarezmians and Samarkandians, along with the Arabs, conquered Fergana and Chach [126, p 148]. But the people who fought wholeheartedly against the invaders were repeatedly betrayed by their rulers.

As a result of the Arab conquests in Central Asia, a centralized state was formed headed by a deputy of the caliph. But, as in the other conquered countries (in Dagestan and Azerbaijan), the Arabs left the administrative system and exploitation unchanged.

Instances of the removal of local rulers were exceptional. Governing was carried out with their aid, and this was caused by the desire of the Arabs to paralyze the aspirations of the aristocracy for independence, and at the same time to rely on it in the struggle against popular revolts.

The social differentiation which had commenced even before the arrival of the Arabs continued to grow deeper with their arrival. The feudal lords who maintained all their privileges under the conquerors also collected the haraj and jizya from the population for the deputies of the caliph. The local feudal lords continued to extend their possessions at the expense of the poor and unmercifully exploited the peasantry.

Clearly the exploiters were an absolute minority of the population. They needed a force which would impel a majority of society to obey the minority unflinching, and would restrain its will to struggle and a desire for an improvement in their harsh life. Economic suppression forced the suppressed to struggle against the suppressors. The exploiters needed a force which would restrain or paralyze such a desire, which would legitimize and justify the dividing of society into rich and poor, and would provide a conviction that it was impossible to alter the situation. Since the Middle Ages, according to the definition of F. Engels, knew only one form of ideology, religion and theology, and the "old spontaneously arising tribal and national religions did not have a propagandistic nature and were deprived of any force of resistance as soon as the independence of the given tribes or peoples was shattered" [28, p 294], Islam was the sole ideology which justified sharp proprietary inequality and established the inexorability of the existing situation. The centralization of authority was carried out around Islam and the tribes were united.

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The feudal lords were very quick to realize the situation which had arisen as a result of the Arab conquest. On the one hand, the conquerors in many instances did not infringe on their privileges, they involved them in the administering of the state, they relied on them and provided an opportunity for their further enrichment. In accepting the new religion, they at the very outset gained even direct material benefits in that they were freed from paying the head tax. On the other hand, and this is the main thing, they gained an opportunity to justify ideologically their wealth and their predominant position in society, and could be confident that the new ideology would help to strengthen their position (see below). For this reason, as the historians have pointed out, not only in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the Volga, but also in other countries precisely the feudal lords and property-owning strata of the population were the first to accept Islam and in utilizing all their possibilities did everything to spread it more rapidly.

F. Engels has written that "Islam is a religion adapted for the inhabitants of the East, and in particular for the Arabs, consequently, on the one hand, for city dwellers engaged in trade and crafts, and on the other, for the Bedouin nomads" [25, p 468].

The Islamic studies literature has already commented on the leading role of the towns and rich merchants in the spread of Islam in the regions which lie beyond our interests [221, 410, 466 and others]. The same can be said of the spread of Islam in the individual regions of our country. Thus, the sources irrefutably show that in Central Asia, for example, in the 6th to the beginning of the 8th centuries, that is, on the eve of the Arab invasion, the towns in economic and cultural terms had reached a high level of development. Along with the dikhans, the ruling stratum of the population was made up of merchants who possessed enormous wealth and held the same position as the dikhans [212, p 45]. This was related to the enormous scope of both internal city and international trade.

The merchants of Bukhara and Sogd (present-day Samarkand and the adjacent regions) held a special place in international trade, and they were the main intermediaries in trade between the East and West and also controlled trade between the settled population and the Turkic nomads.

The Sogdians and the other peoples of Central Asia even at the end of the last century B.C. and in the first centuries A.D. were taking an active part in trade on the Great Silk Route the terminals of which were China in the East and Rome (more accurately its eastern provinces) in the West.

Not only merchants directly engaged in trade were involved in the trade sphere. Also interested in trade were the numerous artisans who acquired raw materials and sold finished products, as their well being and life depended upon the state of trade, the attitude toward it, and upon the presence of conditions for the development of trade relations. And since trade in Central Asia was carried out by many states and encompassed significant territories, trade caravans required reliable and, consequently, numerous

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guards, camel drivers and other service personnel. Obviously there is every reason to say that to a significant degree the prosperity of the people depended upon the state of trade in which a significant portion of the population was involved directly or indirectly [126, pp 48-108].

All of this could not help but be reflected in the attitudes of the population toward trade and toward involvement in it. Certainly, this was a positive attitude. Ancient Chinese sources in stating that the Sogdians "are skillful in trade," write: "Honey is placed on the tongue of a newborn boy, and glue is put on his palm so that he will keep money sweetly and firmly" [138, vol 2, p 310]. The Chinese ambassador in Samarkand at the beginning of the 7th century stated: "The inhabitants are all adroit merchants; when a boy is five years old they begin to teach him to read and write; when he begins to read, they force him to study commerce; profit is highly valued by a majority of inhabitants." A man upon reaching the age of 20 "leaves for neighboring possessions and visits anywhere a profit can be seen" [112, p 310].

Here we have an opportunity to trace certain common aspects in the historical fate, and in the particular features of the life and habits of the predecessors of many peoples who adopted Islam. Thus, the ancient sources mention the Caucasian mountain people who "did not shun trade and were able themselves to work metal," and entrepreneurship was named as one of the most important traits of national psychology. This was apparent also in trade as the population of the Northern Caucasus mountains conducted lively trade in farming and livestock articles, and products from metals and alloys; they traded with the Greek cities located on the Black Sea coast, and later with Turkey, Persia and the Crimean khanate [158, pp 89-90].

The arrival of the Arabs which was accompanied by the elimination of scores of small feudal states which were squabbling between themselves, and the elimination of the constant threats of raids by nomadic tribes helped to stabilize the life of society, particularly urban life. The formation of a centralized state eliminated the dependence of the merchants upon the will and caprices of numerous "lords," it created favorable conditions for the development of trade and helped to extend its geography. For this reason it was quite natural that the merchants and the circles related to them accepted Islam comparatively quickly and without resistance.<sup>2</sup>

However, it would be clearly insufficient to explain the success of Islam among the mentioned strata of the population solely by this [210, p 108]. We feel that here the question is in the particular features of the teachings of Islam and in its attitude toward trade and the merchants.

On the pages of the Koran, we encounter a repeated exaltation for the engaging in trade [260, 4:38, 64:10]. Certain researchers are inclined to explain such an attitude toward trade by the fact that "the teachings of Muhammad initially were an implement of economic consolidation for the middle merchants..." [442, p 58].

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The Koran sharply condemns usury, but this is done to reemphasize the superiority of the engaging in trade [260, 2:276]. If it is considered that with such a respectful attitude toward trade the Koran in every possible way sanctifies private property by the name of Allah and generally "pays much more attention to the defense of property than to the defense of the individual" [128, p 115], it is not difficult to imagine how impressive the new religion was to the merchants and generally to persons engaged in trade.

Previously a merchant knew that having become rich, he would encounter only hate and condemnation from the persons around, and having been ruined he would not find sympathy among persons who considered this to be the result of personal indiscretion. But now, having accepted the new religion and in living among Moslems, he gained recognition in society, and his profession which had previously not been respected began to be considered virtuous and god-favored. Moreover, the new religion guaranteed him "salvation" in the other world of course under the condition of carrying out certain demands.

And the nomads as well did not remain indifferent to that portion of the teachings of Islam which elevates trade to a cult. The Turks who wandered in the north of course gained only certain benefits from the silk trade, as they were far from the trade routes and the markets. But on the other hand the "southern nomads, the Nushibs, who lived not far from Fergana and Sogdiana (the base points for the spread of Islam.--T.S.), regularly allowed the caravans to pass across their lands, and there was no sense to attack them. They collected a fee for passage, for security, for guides, food and fuel, and they grew rich along with the Sogdians" [175, p 153], that is, they had common interests with the merchants.

Thus, in all probability, not only the town dwellers, the merchants and the artisans, but also the Turkic nomads found fully to their liking the "sober interest, the practical bent and the ideological and philosophical moderation--properties with which Islam was born and which were preserved in it over its entire history" [442, pp 57-58]. Here it is essential to consider that the Turkic nomadic tribes consisted not only of scattered warrior tribes. There were also tribes which on the eve of the arrival of the Arabs, having kept their warrior-like qualities, nevertheless "had tasted the sweetness of peaceful life and gained every opportunity for the development of their nomadic livestock raising, and this in turn led to the rise of an awareness of unity which since then has begun to be called Turkic" [175, p 148] (Islam did not resist this newly arisen ethnic community.--T.C.).

In truth, the Koran very impressively condemns wealth [260, 102:1-5], but it condemns not wealth in general, but rather wealth for the sake of which one forgets God, the judgment day and the duties of a Moslem.

Here one might argue: What is new in this? We can find the same thing in other religions, in particular in the Bible. But the point is that Islam

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considers the wealth of some, like the poverty of others, to be a legitimate state, in truth, if this has been achieved from the religious viewpoint honestly, by a person who gives alms, is god-fearing, prayerful and performs purification [260, 94:5-6, 98:4]. But, of course, it was not particularly difficult for a merchant to show the "legitimacy" of his wealth and be known as an honest man. The Koran left him the opportunity to employ any procedures and utilize any ways for personal success and for increasing wealth.

In the Central Asian society of the period of the Arab invasions, the poor strata which were dependent upon the feudal lords comprised a larger portion of society. These included first of all the numerous small landowners. They tilled the land with their own implements of labor, but they did not possess the main thing upon which the crop depended, namely water. Water had to be taken from a canal which belonged either to a large feudal lord or to the community or state. Such peasants gradually were turned into metayers who did not have their own land as they could not endure the competition from the large landowners.

A certain portion of the society was made up of slaves who were in the most difficult situation.

During the first stage of the spread of Islam, these nonproperty-owning strata of the population saw in the Arabs their liberators from harsh suppression. As is known, the Arabs carried out their campaigns of conquest under the slogan of the equality of all Moslems ("in Islam all men are brothers") and liberation from taxes and slavery.<sup>3</sup>

The idea of the equality of Moslems before Allah was accepted by the naive suppressed people and served as a factor in their acceptance of the new religion. They could not help but be impressed by the fact that now, with the spread of Islam, religious merit moved to the forefront. The worthy was the person who merely professed Islam, who distinguished himself by honest conduct, who followed the profit and his adherents, who knew the fundamentals of Islam well and scrupulously observed all the rules of conduct prescribed by the religion. But little changed in the life and status of the poor metayer, the slave or the peasant who was completely dependent upon the feudal lord, the customary routine of life was not disrupted, but the acceptance of a new religion, which incidentally was very simple in terms of procedural aspects, brought him an illusory feeling of personal significance.<sup>4</sup>

As was already said, the appearance of the centralized state as a result of the arrival of the Arabs also brought a definite improvement in the plight of the masses and stabilized life. The masses, fatigued by the endless military conflicts and constantly in fear for their life, for the life of their families and property, linked a stabilization of social life to the spread of Islam, as well as an escaping from the eternal discords between the rulers of the small feudal states.

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The peasantry, under the Arabs at first (in any event until the beginning of the rule of the Umayyads) began to live actually better, since the Arabs did not interfere into the internal affairs of the newly conquered regions. The accepting of Islam freed them from the paying of the onerous head tax. And the head tax levied by the Arabs on the non-Moslems was lighter and less than the previous taxes paid to the treasury [152, pp 86, 90-91]. Subsequently, these strata which did not realize the awaited easing of their plight comprised the leading force in the mass anti-Arab and anti-feudal movements, but in the first stage of the spread of Islam, they undoubtedly accepted the new religion willingly.

Islam was accepted by Central Asian society primarily because here there was a demand for the ideology of Islam, for an idea conditioned by social development. Precisely this explains the fact that the other regions where Islam spread in the USSR came to Islam only as a consequence of definite social development. But since Arab and Central Asian societies during the times of the spread of Islam were approximately at the same development level, there was a process of the interpenetration of Islam and the local religions. Islam in Central Asia neither in the initial period of its spread nor later was able to fully rid itself of the superimpositions of pre-Islamic beliefs.

The correctness of our proposals on the dependence of the success of the transfer of Islam to new territories upon the commonness of the material base, that is, upon the development level of Arab society and, respectively, the Central Asian societies, is affirmed by the following important example.

Several centuries after the invasion of the Arabs, Central Asia and other regions were subjected to the invasion of the Mongols. As a result of this military expansion, the more developed, progressive countries were conquered by a comparatively backward people. And the consequences of this conquest were that Central Asia in cultural terms conquered its conquerors. The development of the productive forces in Central Asia, its ties with other countries and the high cultural level led to a situation where its peoples defended the uniqueness of their own culture. But the Mongols, on the contrary, were dissolved among the peoples of this region. They were unable to impose their religions and, in addition, lost their own beliefs having accepted Islam which had not become the local religion. They were also assimilated in all other areas.

As an example let us take the relationships of the Mongol conquerors and the conquered Kipchaks who comprised a significant portion of the population of the Golden Horde. The Kipchaks who were on a higher level of cultural development had a great impact upon the turkization of the Mongol population and on the gradual replacement of the Mongol language by the Turkic. The invading Mongols gradually mixed with the Kipchaks, and were assimilated with them and the other Turkic-speaking tribes and nationalities of the territories conquered by them. As a result of the uninterrupted ethnic processes and linguistic mixing which occurred in the 8th-14th

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centuries, the ethnic traits, the language and the social organizations of the Kipchaks and the Mongols had so merged that in the 14th-15th centuries, they began to use a common name for both, the "Uzbek" [456, pp 75-77].

V. V. Bartol'd has pointed out that at the courts of the Central Asian rulers who were the sons of Genghis Khan, there were representatives of the Moslem culture who ruled large areas on their behalf. One such representative after a long stay in Central Asia was appointed the governor of Peking. A cultural advisor from the Moslems held a position even under Jagatai who considered himself to be a zealot of Mongol law and an enemy of Islam. Even under the direct descendance of Genghis Khan (the beginning of the 14th century) in Central Asia the rule of Islam and its culture had been firmly established [115, pp 146-154].

We have taken up in detail the socioeconomic factors involved in the spread of Islam and the common development level of the Central Asian and Arab societies. It would be wrong to proceed solely from this in explaining such an important phenomenon as the transfer of religion. Let us recall the caution of V. I. Lenin who emphasized: "...The desire to seek answers to specific questions in the simple logical development of an overall truth...is the vulgarization of Marxism and a complete belittling of dialectical materialism" [53, p 14].

Of course, for a materialistic understanding of history, the production and reproduction of actual life have been and remain determining. But although the production relationships comprise "the deepest secret and the concealed base of the entire social system," here we must not forget that "the course of the historical struggle is also influenced and in many instances predominantly the *forms* are determined by the various aspects of the superstructure including the political forms of the class struggle and its results such as the state system which has been established by the victorious class after the won battle, and so forth, the legal forms and even the reflection of all these actual battles in the mind of the participants, the political, legal and philosophical theories, the religious views and their further development into a system of dogmas. There is an interaction of all these aspects in which the economic movement as ultimately the necessary makes headway through the infinite multiplicity of random factors" [30, pp 394-395].

Let us take up a number of questions where their posing and attempt at solution can help in a more profound and thorough understanding of the problem. One such question is why precisely Islam met the needs of pre-Islamic societies within the confines of our nation? Certainly this role could have been assumed by other religions, including Judaism and Christianity which had a long history and developed theological views. What role was played by the religions which existed prior to Islam in its spread and establishing? What traits of the dogma, cult and moral standards of Islam contributed to its victory?

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Islam became established in the struggle against the beliefs which existed before it. For this reason it is possible to answer the above-posed questions only if we can shed some light on the question of the pre-Islamic beliefs in the areas where Islam spread.

Let us do this briefly, to the degree that this is needed just for a correct understanding of the problems being examined by us, proceeding from the extensive Soviet literature on the given question [see 112; 116; 119; 125; 126; 164; 180; 385; 388 and others].

The pantheon of pre-Islamic gods of the peoples who accepted Islam was extremely diverse. Zoroastrianism was the religion of a majority of the population in pre-Islamic Central Asia [164, p 318]. Regardless of the fact that the number of the followers of Buddhism in Central Asia was insignificant, its role was felt [164, p 289]. There is an opinion that even the name of Bukhara derives from "wahara" or "Buddhist temple" [212, p 50].

Among the pre-Moslem religions which had spread in Central Asia on the eve of the Arab invasion, Christianity (predominantly of the Nestorian sect) undoubtedly held a prominent place. The Christian communities consisted not only of foreign merchants from other countries and Christians who had fled here from persecutors in Byzantium, but also from representatives of certain Turkic nomadic tribes such as the Ghuzzes and Toguzoghuzzes, and also subsequently certain Mongol tribes [125, p 37]. At the beginning of the 6th century in Samarkand, there was a Christian (Nestorian) bishop, and in the 8th century, a metropolitan, and this shows the significant spread of Christianity in Central Asia [116, p 275]. This is also seen in the traces of the Christian, most probably Nestorian, school detected in Penjikent [263a, pp 34-38]. In the list of Christian sees which were part of the ecclesiastical province centered in the Crimea, in Doros, dating back to the 8th century, there is the Khvalissian, that is, Khwarezmian, see [97, p 284; 421, p 103]. A Christian population also lived within the boundaries of present-day Tashkentskaya Oblast. The Central Asian peoples also worshiped various spirits. Ancestor worship also existed among them. The ancient sources contain numerous references to the existence of "temples of fire" and "temples of the idol" in this region. In Azerbaijan prior to the Arab conquest, Zoroastrianism, magical religions [shamism], paganism and Manicheanism were widely found. In the west of the nation the population professed Christianity.

In Tataria, Bashkiria and the Northern Caucasus, during the period of the acceptance of Islam by their population, pagan beliefs also existed. However, it is essential to emphasize that in the mountains of the Northern Caucasus, long before Islam began to penetrate here, Christianity was significantly widespread. "And many natives here had converted to Orthodox Christianity long before Russia was baptized. Christianity was brought in here directly from Byzantium by merchants and missionaries. There is reliable information that Orthodoxy began to spread in the Northern Caucasus from the 6th century under the Byzantine Emperor Justinian" [86, p 3]. The Phanagorian, Nikopsian, Matrahsian (Taman') and Zihian episcopates existed

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in the Northwestern Caucasus. The latter in the 14th century merged with the Matregs (Taman') and formed an ecclesiastical province. The Cherkessians, Abasins and other nationalities living in the headwaters of the Kuban' and Zelenchuki had their own sacred temples [331, p 184].

There are also reliable reports on the attempts to implant Catholicism in the Northern Caucasus. The missionaries of the Roman pope in the 13th-15th centuries created Italian colonies here, and in 1320, in Kafra, Pope John XXIII opened an episcopate. From 1439, the Adygey had a Catholic archbishop who was located in Matreg (Taman') as well as two bishops [86, p 15].

Science also possesses data showing the spread of Christianity in the other regions of the Northern Caucasus, and in particular in Dagestan and Azerbaijan.

The assertion encountered in scholarly literature that a single state religious organization was lacking in Central Asia, as a consequence of which the "Sogdian clergy was scarcely able to comprise a separate estate of the ruling class" [180, p 46] is repudiated by recent discoveries made in the area. Judging from the documents which have come down to us, in the urban population the clergy occupied an important place, being a part of the ruling classes. The titles of magupat and waganpat (chief priest) show the presence of a clerical hierarchy. There is reason also to speak of the close ties of the clergy with state authority [278, p 112]. The temples and the clergy which performed various functions played an important role in the life of the population, including the role of legal guarantors [127, p 150].

One cannot dispute the original nature of Islam and its difference from other religions. It represents a significant historical phenomenon which contributed much that was new, otherwise it would have been unable to become one of the most widespread religions in the world. But one cannot help but note the syncretic nature of its teachings, ideology and rites. In becoming established, Islam not only suppressed but also assimilated many ideas of the suppressed religions.<sup>5</sup>

One of the important factors in the success of Islam is the following circumstance. Everywhere (that it penetrated) Islam incorporated the local beliefs and merged with them. The flexibility of Islam and its ability to quickly adapt to local rites and beliefs, and its pliancy (in external manifestations and influences) have been noted by many researchers. Islam is like the water which assumes the shape of the banks and the bottom around which it flows [410, p 2; 221, pp 281-286; 466, p 122; 101, vol 1, p 375; 261, p 13 and elsewhere]. Islam (in comparison with other monotheistic religions) more rapidly adapted to the conditions of real life. "In the age of the formation of Arab stedom and the external conquests, it soared not in the heavens but in the world of terrestrial life" [389, p 53]. In individual instances adaptability seemed even the basic dogma of Islam.<sup>6</sup> Also curious is the transformation of the name of God in the

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awareness of the Central Asian peoples. Along with the name of Allah, they also used and continue to use his names of both "hudo" or "huday" (the spirit of the skies among the Turkic peoples who received the Persian name Kудay), as well as Tengri or Tangri (the ruler of the world among the Turkic peoples) [175, pp 78, 80 and 82].

In this regard we would like to make one fundamental comment. In the manifestations of present-day Islam in our country we can see much from the relics of the pre-Islamic beliefs. In existing over a long period of time, they had a definite effect upon the development of Islam and upon its survival and stability. Researchers have rightly noted that these beliefs have shown even greater strength in everyday life than the remains of orthodox Islam [388; 398; 86]. But all of this scarcely provides reason to assert that there are fundamental differences of Islam in the various regions of its spread, or to set the pre-Islamic beliefs in opposition to it, calling them a "popular religion" [388, pp 21-25].

In the first place, the other religious systems which are widely found in the modern world such as Christianity and Buddhism contain numerous elements relating to the distant times, and this, incidentally, has been repeatedly pointed out by numerous Soviet ethnographers and philosophers (see [407; 469]). Religious views develop not only from the reworking of preceding material, but also by the direct incorporation of it in the religious dogma. "For example, Orthodoxy which was widely spread in the Ancient Russian state incorporated many notions and rites of the Slavic paganism, as a result of which such a specific religious belief was formed that certain researchers have even termed it ditheism. In the Russian countryside which even in the 19th century preserved many archaic traits, the old pagan notions in essence continued to live under a Christian veneer. Thus one must not speak about any 'purity' of the Orthodox belief, which has always been so extolled by the Orthodox Church" [407, p 15].

Secondly, Islam itself has borrowed a great deal from the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Arab tribes as well as from Christianity and Judaism. Much has already been written about this. Here we have merely to say that even Allah was at one time the god of one of the tribes, and the Kaaba was a place where 360 idols had been assembled and which previously were worshiped by various Arab tribes and kinship groups.

Thus, the presence of elements of ancient beliefs and rites in monotheistic religions is a universal phenomenon, and to no degree disputes the independence or originality of any religion, including Islam. What is the basis of the dogma of Islam (the five "pillars of faith"), its dogmas and precepts are shared by all Moslems.

Thirdly, in social psychology and in everyday awareness, in contrast to the scientific, there is no division of the various rites and beliefs into the "orthodoxically Islamic" and the pre-Islamic, they are all observed as Moslem ones, and for this reason should be overcome equally. For this

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reason the separating of the obtuse rites and customs which have remained firm in everyday life from Islam and the declaring of them to be the remnants of a "popular religion" impede a real evaluation of religiousness and harm the success of atheistic indoctrination of the masses. Also extremely interesting is the question of whether Islam itself, as a monotheistic religion, represented something completely new for the population of Central Asia which had professed other religions, and what role was played by the latter, that is, did they prevent or contribute to the strengthening of Islam?

- In order to answer this question, it is essential at least briefly to take up the characteristics of the religions most widely found here, and to disclose their relationships with Islam.

Let us begin with Zoroastrianism. This teaching is based upon a belief in a supreme, single god Ahura Mazda, that is, it has monotheistic tendencies. Inherent to it is a dualistic explanation of the world as consisting of two conflicting eternal forces--good and evil--the struggle between which comprises the content of the world process. "The duty of man in relation to the good principle, as a means of individual salvation, is not so much the rites and prayers as the way of life prescribed by Zoroastrianism; the basic implement in the struggle against evil is the 'good word' or 'good deed.' Particular attention is given to multiplying the good material life...and to producing offspring which multiplied the host of the good principle. Asceticism was always alien to Zoroastrianism" [142, vol 9, p 593]. Since Zoroastrianism was the most widely found religion in the areas where Islam spread, for the population of these regions, the idea of monotheism preached by Islam was not new and contributed to the acceptance of the new god, Allah. The followers of Zoroastrianism were "heartened" by the fact that Islam did not impose on its followers the rejection of "multiplying material existence" and an asceticism alien to them.

- Zoroastrianism also was not completely foreign to the Arabs themselves. Its followers, the Persians (the Majuths in the Koran) lived in various regions of Arabia, and by the times of the preaching of Islam, Zoroastrianism was already dominant in the south of Arabia, influencing Islam even in its cradle.

The capturing of Zoroastrian Iran by the Arabs, even before their arrival in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, was one of the important factors in the development of Islam. Here Islam spread in an age when its teachings had not yet undergone systematic elaboration. The Persian clergy incorporated much from the inherited views in it, and gave it many features which were to gain important significance over time.

The influence of the teachings of Zoroastrianism is most noticeable in the eschatology of Islam. According to the holy book of Zoroastrianism the "Vendidad," the soul of the deceased has a different fate depending upon his life on earth, upon the belief of a person and his attitude toward religion. The spirit of all those who carried out all the demands of

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religion goes to paradise, while the dishonest who committed sin go to hell. The same is also true in Islam. The bridge of Sirat is also Zoroastrian. It is thinner than a woman's hair, sharper than the edge of a sword and hotter than flames, and it stretches across hell. Islam teaches that one can reach paradise only across it.

Also borrowed from Zoroastrianism is the daily five prayers, the teachings about ritual cleanliness and, finally, the establishing of Friday as the day of weekly meetings. Many of the hadiths ascribed to Muhammad also contain ideas which have been borrowed from the religious books of Zoroastrianism or are an imitation of Persian models [171, pp 22-23]. All of this ultimately contributed to the rapid establishment of Islam, and eased the pain from the loss of the old, traditional beliefs.

The idea of a prophet is found in Manicheanism, one of the religions widely spread in Central Asia prior to the arrival of the Arabs. This teaching which represents a synthesis of Chaldean-Babylonian, Zoroastrian and Christian myths and is based on the idea of the innateness and insuperability of evil, proceeds from the view that the "evangelical Christ was the false Christ who intervened into the affairs of the true Christ and who did not embody and did not combine the natures of God and man. After Christ was sent Mani-Paraclete (the comforter), the main messenger from the Kingdom of Light. Western Manicheanism merged with Christianity and was viewed by the latter as a Christian heresy [438, vol 3, pp 290-291].

The teachings of Islam have much in common with Christianity and Judaism. This can be seen in how the Koran represents God [59:23, 62:14, 13:27, 7:154, 11:92 and elsewhere], and in the teachings of Islam on Muhammad as the prophet, in the recognition of biblical persons as the superior of the prophets (Adam and the Arabic Adam, Noah and Nuh, Abraham and Ibrahim, Moses and Musa, Jesus Christ and Isaal-Masih, that is, the Messiah), and in many borrowed ideas. The cult of Christ holds a rather noticeable place in Islam. Islam recognizes the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, and the story of this in the Koran has much in common with the Gospels. According to Islam, Muhammad is none other than Paraclete, the coming of whom (in the Gospel According to St. John) is predicted by Jesus Christ. All of this made it easier for Islam to be willingly accepted by the Christians living in Central Asia, the Caucasus, as well as their fellow believers in Syria, Egypt, North Africa and Spain.<sup>7</sup>

The idea of one god was also not alien to the tribes which adhered to other religious concepts. Even in the ancient Indo-Iranian religious tradition, there was a persistent notion of the dominant position of Tabitha, the divinity of fire among the other gods [353a, p 92]. In the Orhon inscriptions dating to the Turkic kaganate (6th-8th centuries), the words "heaven" and "God" are used to designate a supreme diety perceived as the deified sky. This diety is invisible but is involved in daily affairs [399a, p 52].

At last, the time has come to answer the question of why those religions which were professed by peoples which later became Moslem ceased to satisfy

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the needs of the latter and the needs of a developing feudal society. As for Zoroastrianism, Manicheism and the other pagan religions and the numerous tribal beliefs, here the question is clear as they could not become the ideology of a class society or a force capable of unifying numerous peoples. But why in many places did the new religion win out over Christianity which successfully served the feudal societies in other areas? Why, even in individual regions of the Northern Caucasus, where, for example attempts had been made to implant Christianity by force, did it not put down roots and with the appearance of Islam surrendered to it? The question is extremely complicated and for this reason without claiming a full answer, let us take up just several aspects of it.

The English Islamic scholar M. Watt who wrote of the "superiority" disclosed by Islam over Judaism and Christianity in the Near East sees the reason for such a phenomenon in the fact that Christianity "for establishing its universality should deny or at least eliminate traditional solidarity and put the solidarity of a community of the elect in opposition to it." Such a position for Christianity was, in the opinion of M. Watt, shakey even before the appearance of Islam. For this reason the Arabs first succeeded in capturing Egypt and those provinces of Byzantium where the population professed predominantly the "heretical" variations of Christianity (which were professed also, incidentally, by the Nestorian Christians in Central Asia). But in the regions where the population was exposed to the influences of the Roman Empire and Hellenistic culture which put the individual in direct confrontation with the universe, Christianity was more firmly rooted.

Watt drew attention to the fact that nothing was done to adapt the Judeo-Christian traditions to the needs of the population in the Near East. Precisely this task, he writes, was obviously carried out by Islam.

Watt saw this adaptation primarily in the replacement of the principle of individual responsibility before God by a "communalization" of the question of salvation. The fate of the individual and his "salvation" began to be determined not by his own 'service record' but rather by his observance of the rules of conduct in society and by his very belonging to a religious unity [189, pp 146-155].

The Moslem community which appeared after 622 (after the moving of Muhammed from Mecca to Medina), having to a certain degree disrupted the blood and kinship ties, replaced these by economic, political and ideological factors. At the same time, in contrast to evangelical Christianity which decisively demanded that man "quit his home" and depicted belief as a sword which would sever all ties of family and patriarchal belonging, Islam did not demand in an obvious form the breaking with the tribe or the isolating of the individual from the previous kindred, tribal and even national ties. "In Islam it is a question rather of a merging and fusing of various kinship groups, tribes and religious groups into a broader but at the same time ethnically limited community which in no instance coincides with all 'rational humanity.' The concept of kinship is not fundamentally redefined but merely gains a new broader interpretation, according to which property,

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community-corporative and political relationships are put on the same footing as blood ties and are realized with their aid" [442, p 59].

This was reflected in one of the early documents of Islam, a treaty drawn up by Muhammad and aimed at settling the relationships of the inhabitants of Medina who professed various religions: "Believers should not leave unaided in their midst anyone burdened by debts, even if this involves the price of blood or the ransoming of prisoners," and "He who murders a believer (and this is proven) should be killed (only if the nearest relatives of the murdered man do not agree to be satisfied in a different manner), and the Moslems should in common rise up against murder" (quoted in [348, pp 101-102]). As is correctly stressed by the Soviet researcher I. A. Kryvelev, this document offers to the community of believers all those obligations in relation to each of its members which previously were carried out by the tribe, and in particular, the obligation of blood vendetta [264, vol 2, p 158].

The new religion left man "in his home," it did not strike at his attachments and left traditional solidarity in force.

We have seen that both Central Asia and the Caucasus where the Arabs arrived consisted of scores of scattered tribes with the preservation of kinship relations. The awareness of a person was largely not divorced from the family and from a narrow circle of persons with whom he was constantly in contact.

The advantage of Islam in the East can also be traced when the issue is raised of the responsibility of man to God and his attitude toward terrestrial life. Let us examine this notion in more detail.

The history of the first people, Adam and Eve, their creation and fall from grace are virtually identical in the Koran and the Bible. The same notion is repeated that God expels the violators of a taboo from paradise.

However, the Koran and the Bible differ sharply in evaluating the event. According to the Bible, God did not limit himself to expelling the first humans from paradise, but in punishment for the crime committed he doomed Adam to work "with sweat on his face" and Eve "to bear children in agony." This history served as the basis for the Christian teachings concerning the sinful nature of man and his internal predisposition for amoral deeds. Sin, according to Christianity, is transmitted by heredity to all people, and man is obliged all his life to wash away the "first sin of his progenitors." Only in this way can he guarantee himself an other-worldly (transcendent) eternal life. But according to the Koran, after Adam had obeyed, Allah "forgave him and showed him the correct way" [20:120], that is, Islam does not draw harsh conclusions for all mankind from this.

According to Christianity it is more a possibility than a reality to reach paradise. A person, even one who feels himself a base and sinful being

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and does everything for "salvation," and is beset by constant self-accusations, abasement and so forth in no situation has the right to consider himself absolutely just, but should constantly be aware of his guilt. The constant state of man should be the struggle with himself, the suffering for others and a "painful heart." As K. Marx pointed out, a feeling of "human dignity...in Christianity is dissolved in an enticing haze of the celestial kingdom" [6, p 353].

In Islam man is also linked by all ties with God, the sole and eternal creator who gives life and death." But God "in Islam is not only jealous and chastizing, but also both just and merciful, and this provides an opportunity not only for the 'good Moslem' (that is, the person who sincerely believes in the truthfulness of the shahad and performs the rites stemming from it), but also the 'unclean' from among the Moslems (the fasiks) can hope for the bliss of paradise, while the non-Moslems are condemned to eternal torture in hell..." [142, vol 10, p 485].

According to Islam (the Sunni school), the most important is to be a Moslem. If a man sins and he is punished for this in this life or the after-life, then this punishment is not eternal. It is enough to become a member of the Moslem community and ultimately a person will reach paradise.

Such an attitude toward sin, and a guarantee of life in paradise of course are much more attractive for persons who are enterprising and constantly exposed to a spirit of competition and rivalry, as well as for those who constantly test their fate in military valor than a constant feeling of humiliation or fear of the "unknown" inherent to Christianity.

Let us compare a number of other aspects of Islam and Christianity.

Christianity repelled the population of the East (the town dwellers interested in trade and the nomads who also benefited from it) in the fact that it condemned trade as a type of activity. The economic doctrine of Early Medieval Christianity recognized only two sectors of the economy, agriculture and home crafts. According to the Bible, the Lord expelled the merchants from the temple (John, 2:16), and His wrath fell first on them, and they would be the first to disappear on Judgment Day (Sof. 1-11).<sup>8</sup>

A person after death, according to Christianity, is judged for his earthly deeds. The person who has sinned will be eternally tortured in hell, and the just will have eternal bliss in paradise. The same is true in Islam. But while the Christian paradise is described nowhere in detail, and it remains a hazy concept for the believer or more, one might say, a symbol, the Moslem paradise is worked out in detail so as to fully consider the tastes of the dwellers in the East.

Furthermore, one of the main features of Christian piety and an indicator of high morality is the long and repeated fasts such as Lent (49 days), the Saint Peter's or apostolic fast (42 days each), Assumption (15 days), Christmas (11 days) and one-day fasts during the year on Wednesdays and

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Fridays. Islam also has a fast and in addition it is one of the five most important demands of the religion upon a believer. But it is limited to just one month, and the sick and travelers, elderly persons, pregnant or nursing women and those engaged in heavy work are freed from it.<sup>9</sup> In the Moslem traditions the prophet is given words which deny the excessive or going beyond the measure of the legitimate limitations of the fast: "For each piece which the believer puts in his mouth, he receives a divine reward" and "God loves a Moslem who is concerned for his corporeal strength more than a weak man," and "He who eats with noble thoughts (about God) has the same value as the faster who refrains from food." If one considers the hot climate of the East and the lack of water, here also the advantage is with Islam.

In Christianity, the preaching of asceticism, both individual and collective, occupies an enormous place. Christianity encourages man's aspiration for the sake of "moral perfection" and "approaching divinity," to abandon the satisfying of physical needs and to fiercely suppress them with all sorts of self-torture, flagellation, and so forth. In Christianity all of this should help a person escape from himself and disregard vital needs, in brief, all of this is an expression of individualism.

In Christianity monastic asceticism is a form of collective asceticism.

In the original Islam, the idea also prevailed of denying the world, but in line with the change of circumstances, an earthly viewpoint held a significant place in its teachings. This was related both to the developing military actions headed by Muhammad, as well as to the fact that a significant portion of the newly converted Moslems could be held only by the prospects of obtaining in the immediate future tangible and material benefits from belonging to the new religion, particularly attracting them by future enormous plunder. (Of course, all of this does not mean that Islam even at one time doubted the primacy of other-worldly life over the earthly life.)

Certainly, the enormous wealth which came into the hands of the noble, the military leader and the rank and file for the treasury of the Caliphate was not only for the sake of Allah, for the sake of noble aims, or for the sake of "accumulating treasure in the heavens."

The theological works contain "indications of a clear disapproval of asceticism which goes beyond the limits of the normal requirements of the law.... A desire for nonearthly values of course could not be completely eliminated from the ideology of Islam; but this was to share its rule over the minds of the believers with a desire to savor earthly interests as well. For justifying this an appropriate saying of the prophet was composed in a spirit of the Aristotelian golden mean: 'The best of you is not the one who ignores the earthly for the sake of the celestial, and not the one who acts the contrary; the best of you is the one who takes from both'."

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In the old legends, rather often tales are encountered on the excessive asceticism of individual persons. However the moral of these legends does not extol but rather censures asceticism. The words of the prophet condemn people who shirk their worldly deeds for continuous noble deeds.

The legends also do not recognize (as not having importance from the religious viewpoint) corporeal self-abuse or the mortification of the flesh; they also condemn persons who desire to dispose of their property for the sake of piety to the detriment of family and relatives. Islam is sharply against monasticism and celibacy.

If one puts together all the hadiths, then their sense comes down to the view that man, in refusing earthly goods, should not go beyond the legally established standards. It is also essential to point out that all these sayings are usually directly aimed against the life of the Christian ascetics [171, pp 130-133].<sup>10</sup>

If one briefly sums up the attitude of Islam and Christianity toward man, then in referring to V. V. Bartol'd, the following can be said: The Christian, in order to carry out the demands of his faith, should forget himself for the sake of God and his kin; for the Moslem his law demands that among his concerns he forget neither God nor his kin, at the prescribed time he should perform his prayer rite and give a portion of his property to the poor.

And finally, to other circumstances which facilitated, we feel, the path for Islam in the East.

In primitive Islam, ritual took up a great place. An elaborated religious dogma and a clear difference between dogma and ritual appeared much later, in the 9th-11th centuries. In the initial Islam, the leading place was occupied, in our opinion, by rules of religious life and rituals which to a maximum degree considered the interests, habits and traditions of the Eastern peoples. In the words of F. Engels, "Islam, having maintained its specifically eastern ritual, itself limited the area of its spread to East and North Africa which was conquered and newly settled by Arab Bedouins. Here it could become the dominant religion, but not in the West" [23, p 313]. Here one cannot help but note the exceptional simplicity and accessibility of the dogmas of Islam. Suffice it to say that all the basic dogmas of Islam are listed in the following verse of the Koran: "Oh ye who believe! Believe in Allah and His messenger and the Scripture which He hath revealed unto His messenger, and the Scripture which He revealed aforetime. Who so disbelieveth in Allah and His angels and His Scriptures and His messengers and the Last Day, he verily hath wandered far astray" [4:135]. This same list, in a shorter form, is given in another verse [2:285]. Of course, it represented no particular difficulty to master these dogmas. Moreover, the condition for accepting Islam was very simple for an infidel as he merely had to go to the mosque and in the presence of witnesses repeat the formula of belief expressed in the words: "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of God."

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Of the five "pillars of faith" only one (quoted above) relates to dogma, and the remaining four are involved with rites and moral prescripts (the saying of prayers five times a day, fasting, alms, the pilgrimage to Mecca and the Kaaba). And here again we encounter how Islam in every possible way has adapted its demands to the inhabitant of the East, and in every possible way makes it easier for him to carry out its demands. The prayers should preferably be said at the mosque, but if this is not possible, prayers can be said at home, on the street, anywhere that the time of prayer catches the believer. And the believer does not need a priest for "communicating with God." In Islam generally there is no anointed clergy, and anyone who is even slightly familiar with the bases of religion can become such. Before prayers, without fail it is essential to carry out a ritual washing with water, but if there is no water, then it can be performed with sand. We have spoken above of the fast, the third "pillar of faith." We would merely emphasize that there is also much that is "facilitating" in the rules of observing it. The zakat or compulsory alms comprises the fourth "pillar of faith," and consists in the payment by adult Moslems of 2.5 percent of possessions, income from trade, crafts, and so forth. There are also voluntary alms or the sadak (for the poor, dervishes and the mosques) which are of great importance in Islam for the "salvation of the soul" and atonement from sins. The fifth "pillar" of Islam is the pilgrimage to Mecca and the visiting of the temple of the Kaaba. This prescript is only for those who are capable of making it, that is, for well-off persons, and it is not compulsory for poor persons.

As we see, Islam in fact has put specifically eastern ritual in the forefront. The five "pillars of faith" clearly reflect the particular nature of Islam, that is, not binding the believer by complicated dogma, simplicity of rites, the emphasis on "external piety," and attention to the individual, internal understanding of Allah. This largely provided Islam with success everywhere in the East.

One cannot help but quote the statements of the prominent Soviet orientalist Ye. A. Belyayev which affirms the notion voiced by us: "In these, previously Christian lands (the Arab East.--T.S.) in the Middle Ages (after the completion of the Arab conquests) a majority of the indigenous population had converted to Islam. But instances were never observed of the adopting of Christianity by the Moslems (with rare exception) [128, p 152].

The following circumstances also played an important role in the strengthening of Islam in the new regions.

The first is that with the arrival of the Arabs and the establishing of the new religion little was changed in the bases of local life, and this facilitated the ease of its acceptance. The forms of state administration, local traditions and customs were left unchanged, and Islam often assumed various forms, in adapting itself to that base on which it was superimposed.<sup>11</sup>

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The second and very important circumstance is that the standards dictated by Islam largely coincided with the traditional standards of life (the adat) of the new followers of the religion. In the opinion of specialists in the area of Moslem law, in comparing the adat with the shariat, contradictions will not be found between them [307, p 93; see also 450, 451]. Let us substantiate this notion by the following example. In the Soviet Islamic studies literature, the opinion has become established that polygamy was brought into Central Asia by Islam, however numerous historical facts repudiate this assertion (here we are not forgetting that Islam in the name of Allah condoned polygamy).

Polygamy existed among the ancient Huns, in particular (according to Chinese sources). The Hun shanyu Hunane, was married to two sisters, the daughters of a prince, and in addition had several other wives. It is also known that another shanyu of the Huns who ruled in the 8th century B.C. had five wives. The geneological level of the Turks mentions tugu, the elder grandson of the she-wolf Nadulu-shad who had ten wives. Oguz-Kagan (khan), a legendary ancestor of the Turks also had several wives [138, vol 1, pp 47, 96, 98 and 221-222]. The ancient Turkic ruler Vilge-Khan was also a polygamist. This is also evidenced from the burial inscription in honor of his son Kul-Tegin who died in 732 [289, p 39]. Among the Turkic-speaking Khazarian kagans harems also existed in the period when they professed Judaism [342a, p 34].

Also curious on this level is the following: Even in the beginning of the 19th century, polygamy existed among the Yakuts, an eastern Turkic-speaking people who incidentally had never known Islam [377, p 571].

The same can be said also of the custom of a blood feud, the inferior status of woman and so forth.

Thus, predominantly male names are encountered among the ancient Turkic names recorded in the inscriptions, ancient manuscripts and also in the folklore which has come down to us. But the names of women who occupied a position below men on the social ladder remain unknown [138a, p 252]. As a whole 20-30-fold fewer female Turkic names are known than male names [320, p 88].

The following is also of importance for correctly understanding both the reasons for the success of Islam in the new regions as well as its further role in the fates of the peoples of Central Asia. Long before the acceptance of Islam, these peoples were acquainted with the idea of a theocracy or the God-given nature of authority. For the ancient Turks who unified the steppe and Sogdiana in the 6th century, the khan was also the high priest. In speaking of his divine origin, the ancient manuscripts used the epithets of "heaven-like," and "heaven-born," and his selection was considered an act of divine will. It was felt that in all matters he had the approval and grace of heaven [175, p 83; 399a, pp 52, 65-66]. The Sako-Massagetian tribes of Central Asia also felt that the king had been placed

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at the head of society by divine instruction. For them he was not only the carrier of supreme power, but also a priest, that is, the intermediary between the collective of people under him and the world of the gods [353a, pp 102-103; 443a, p 47].

Consequences of the Spread and Establishing of Islam on the Territory of Our Nation

In historical literature caution has already been voiced against the extremes often encountered in a veiled form in evaluating the historical significance of the Arab conquest of Central Asia. It is rightly emphasized that such a complicated phenomenon requires a strictly class evaluation and consideration of the unusually diverse and heterogeneous class and tribal composition of feudal society [164, pp 322-323]. In our opinion, this is the case when it is a question of other religions as well as in evaluating the consequences of the spread of Islam.

The Arab conquest, V. G. Gafurov has emphasized, was primarily a war of conquest waged in the interests of the Arab ruling clique, and brought to the conquered population ruin and violence, the loss of lands and homes, and the prospects of dual suppression by the local aristocracy and by the conquerors. The people who at first saw the conquerors as their liberators subsequently, having felt the consequences of the policy of plunder and suppression, everywhere began to act against the invaders.

But from the viewpoint of the historical perspective, the incorporation of Central Asia as part of the Arab Caliphate ultimately helped to accelerate the development of feudalism here, to consolidate the Central Asian peoples, to weaken isolation and create a centralized state, on the basis and example of which the local Central Asian and Iranian states were subsequently formed [164, pp 323-324]. Islam was an ideology which helped to cement and strengthen this society which represented a higher degree in the development of the productive forces in relation to the previous slave-owning society. This undoubtedly was a progressive phenomenon in the history of the peoples which accepted Islam. Consequently, like other religions, Islam in becoming established in new regions played an indirect positive role for that segment of time [402, pp 22-23; 121, p 19]. But this role, as will be shown below, was not related to the internal, inherent content of religion, but rather was caused by the action of external socioeconomic, political and other factors.

The Arab conquest in the first stage caused great damage to the development of the economy and culture of the region, but after this followed a marked rise in the productive forces and the "greatest cultural synthesis in Central Asian and all the Near East in the 9th-11th centuries" [164, 324].

The consolidation of feudal relationships in Central Asia led to a rise of agricultural production, to an expansion of the area of utilized land, to the rebuilding of destroyed systems of irrigation canals, to the building

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of new irrigation works, and to the wide use of water wheels, and water mills and from the middle of the 10th century also windmills.

The appearance of surplus agricultural products led to the further development of trade and a market economy, as a consequence of which a further rise was observed in the importance of towns in economic life. The gradual development of crafts and the accumulation of artisans in certain centers led to the intensive growth of already existing towns and to the rise of new ones and their flourishing. In the period following the arrival of the Arabs, 20-25 percent of all the inhabitants as a whole lived in the towns of Central Asia, and in certain areas, even more. From 25 to 33 percent lived in the Kashkadar'ya Valley, and up to 40-50 percent in the Merv Oasis [127, p 263]. The same was observed in other regions occupied by the Arabs [152, p 153].

During this period crafts finally became distinct from agriculture, a differentiation of its sectors commenced, and large shops appeared for producing artisan products. There was the development of the smelting of metals, the working of precious stones and the mining industry.

In the second half of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th centuries, secular knowledge developed intensely in Central Asia, and there was extensive translation of books on medicine, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, logic and psychology from the Indian, Persian, Syrian and particularly the Greek languages. Working precisely at this period and somewhat later were the founder of Medieval mathematical science Musa al-Horezmi al-Majum (around 780-830) with whose name are linked the mathematical concepts of "algorithm" and "algebra"; the outstanding astronomer of the 9th century Muhammad al-Fergani; the great physician Abu Ali ibn Sina (980-1037); Firdousi (934--circa 1026); Rudaki and many others [444, pp 101-116].

A number of questions comes up and the solution to them will contribute to a correct interpretation of the fact of whether the flourishing of the economy and culture in Central Asia is to be explained solely by its incorporation as part of the Arab caliphate? What role was played by the Arabs themselves and their culture in the given process? What role was also played in all of this by Islam? Each of these questions requires a thorough and detailed examination, and we will take them up only within the context of the problem being studied by us.

According to the opinion widely found in historical literature, the Arabs during the period of the rise and spread of Islam were a backward people, and in terms of their cultural level were inferior to the peoples enslaved by them [152, p 90] and fearing the influence of local culture, destroyed the treasures of other peoples [224a, p 55]. Attention has already been drawn to the one-sidedness and incorrectness of such an approach [164, p 303].

In 1853, in a letter to K. Marx, F. Engels wrote: "Where the Arabs lived a settled life, in the southwest, they were as civilized a people as the Egyptians, Assyrians, and so forth.... This also explains much in the

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Moslem invasion" [31, p 219]. The scientific achievements of recent years have fully substantiated the correctness of F. Engels, as the South Arabian tribes in antiquity had their own powerful states and had an unique culture which had achieved great heights (see [342, p 260 et seq.; 280; 281]).

In light of the present-day scientific achievements we can see the baselessness of the notions of the Arabs as just nomads. There is reason to assume the existence of two types of economies, settled and nomadic, among them in the past. The Arabs, at least the Nabataeans who lived in Southern Palestine and Northern Arabia, were able to till the land well, and built complicated irrigation works. Some of the canals built by them were up to 12 meters wide. Construction trades developed widely in the Nabataean cities, and on their basis an unique phenomenon arose, the Nabataean architecture. There were professional physicians among the Nabataeans. Even in the 4th century B.C. on the shore of the Dead Sea the Nabataeans mined bitumen by the open-pit method and sold it to Egypt where it was used for preparing mummies. The Nabataeans were able to mine and smelt iron and copper. Before the 4th century B.C. or even earlier they took an active part in the spice and perfume trade which was carried out from Southern Arabia and through it from India (possibly, also from Malaya and Indonesia), and they traded in Egypt and Italy. The terminus of the Great Silk Route was located precisely in Nabataeus, and the port of Petra was one of the most important and significant centers of world trade in those times.

Proof of the high cultural development level of the Nabataeans is the presence of a written script in the early years A.D., and this writing became the basis of the Arabic script which spread along with Islam over the enormous territory from the Atlantic Coast of North Africa to Indonesia and has existed up to our times [see 461].

A developed economy and culture were also found the kingdoms of the Hassanids and the Lakhmids located in the northwest and northeast of Arabia and under a strong influence of the leading states of those times, Iran and Byzantium. The population of these kingdoms possessed high irrigation and construction techniques, and were able to smelt and use bronze, copper and ore for their own needs, and made extensive use of the technical achievements of neighbors in artisan production.

The successes of the Arabs were also significant in the area of astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, urban development and architecture, as well as applied arts.

It is essential to emphasize that even in the 8th century B.C., there was an Arabian (Southern Arabian) alphabet which developed up to the 6th century A.D. Northern Arabs also had a written language (Aramaic which was close to Arabic). The dating of the earliest Northern Arabian inscription in the Arabic alphabet goes back to the beginning of the 4th century.

The very rich poetry written in the Northern Arabian language also shows the high culture of the distant Arabs.

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And long before the time of Christ, inhabitants of the Arabian shores journeyed to the coasts of Western India. By the period of the rise and spread of Islam, an extensive network of Arab trade colonies existed in Gujarat, Kankan, Malabar, on the Maldiva and Laccadive Islands, in Ceylon and Indonesia. "The ocean voyages of the Arabs, in leaving the historical scene, left traces which now, when the system has been discovered in this phenomenon, can be raised to a single source and thus interconnected. The external difference of these traces should not conceal the inner similarity. The development of navigation in the Old World followed in these traces. The experience of the Arab captains in the Mediterranean were of substantial help to Henry the Navigator in improving the outfitting of Portuguese ships. The jib which was introduced by the Arabs was one of the most important technical conditions in the age of the great voyages and discoveries. Arab naval terminology, and in particular astronomical names, was incorporated in the European vocabulary, in enriching it significantly. The data of the Arab pilots and the maritime charts made it possible for the West to gain a clear and accurate notion of the eastern seas and lands" [464, pp 152, 158].

It must also be considered that prior to their appearance in Central Asia the Arabs had conquered Byzantium and Iran, nations of ancient eastern culture, and undoubtedly had experienced their beneficial influence. The culture of the Arabs also incorporated the accomplishments of the Greek, Syrian, Egyptian and Indian cultures. With the arrival of the Arabs in Central Asia, the Arab language became widespread and well established, and this was a scientific, progressive language for those times which contributed to the exchange of the cultural advances of many peoples. All of this contributed to the ascent of Central Asian culture and science in the 9th-11th centuries.

However, it must not be thought that Central Asia was a remote province of the Arab caliphate which imbibed only what arrived from the cultural centers located in Damascus and Baghdad. Individual bourgeois scholars ignore the role played by the peoples, in particular the Central Asian ones which accepted Islam, in the development of Arab-language medicine, mathematics, astronomy and other sciences in the Early Middle Ages, and they ignore that many great scholars of the Medieval Moslem East were not Arabs.

In order that the high culture could be actively received, assimilated and, most importantly, developed creatively, as was the case, the very peoples of Central Asia had to possess a firm historical cultural foundation, and be on a high level of cultural development. Precisely their developed cultural traditions existing before the arrival of the Arabs brought about the flourishing of Central Asian culture in the Arabic and post-Arabic periods. Otherwise, as we have written above, there could not have been the transfer of the high culture to the Central Asian soil. And if the great scholars from Central Asia in their works were able to rise high above the intellectual level of their times, this occurred precisely because they succeeded in fully synthesizing all the cultural achievements acquired before them

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and to provide a new impetus to cultural development. "Great ideas never arise out of nothing, from nowhere, or by just the 'divine gift' of the creators. They, like people, have their own biographies, their own progenitors, and their own genealogical trees with roots reaching into the distant past.

"Ultimately they are the fruit of all previous culture, they are hatched by the centuries-long course of spiritual work, by the struggle of millions of opinions and viewpoints, by the clash of passions and interests, and by the 'cross-fertilization' of the most diverse spheres of activity. By numerous invisible impetuses, their internal, cumulative development is directed and oriented by the movement of socioeconomic processes, by the demands of one or another social formation, and by the 'spirit' of a certain historical age" [156, p 7].

In particular it has been established that the ancient farming tribes which inhabited Central Asia at the turn of the 3d-2d millennium B.C. had their own calendar which designated farming jobs, as well as definite mathematical and astronomical knowledge. This can be seen from the traces of a very ancient natural observatory discovered in the area of Saymaly-Tash. The ancient farmers had a notion of the motion of the sun, they knew the days of the spring and autumn equinox, and they also knew the four sides of the world (north, west, south and east). With envious accuracy corresponding to the modern agroclimatic handbooks, the ancient farmer noted on his calendar the number of calendar days needed for the complete cycle of the maturing of grains (barley or wheat), some 84 days [168, pp 190-193, 202].

In the Zeravshan Valley 4,000 years ago the indigenous population was successfully engaged in silk raising. Digs in recent years have shown that long before the time of Christ, complicated irrigation works had been built here. In this the ancient irrigators employed primitive automatic devices based upon the mechanical laws of statics and dynamics. Certain of these methods which were in use in the distant past have been taken up by modern hydraulic construction workers [472, 5 February 1973].

In Sogdiana, on the eve of the Arab invasion, there not only existed developed writing, but also literacy was widespread, and there was an organized system of school education. Children began to be taught to write at the age of five. Written sources show the practical focus of the instruction. It is even assumed that the schools taught not only the mother language but also foreign languages.

Not only were religious books written in the Sogdian language, but also medical, mineralogical and astronomical works. Fragments have been found translated into the Sogdian language of the famous Indian collection "Pancha-Tantra" which in later literature is known under the name "Kalila and Dimna," Aesops fables and other works [127, pp 119-120].

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The development of the productive forces in the post-Arab period is related to the transition of Central Asia to a qualitatively new socio-economic formation, feudalism. Marxism-Leninism has established the presence of a close link between the cultural development of society and social production and a specific historical nature of their relationships. K. Marx pointed out that in investigating the ties between spiritual and material production "first of all it is essential to view this very material production not as a universal category but rather in a definite historical form" [17, p 279].

And what was the role of religion in the cultural development of the peoples which professed Islam? Modern Moslem scholars link all Arab civilization and the Renaissance with the dominance of Islam, and they derive the flourishing of science from the encouraging attitude of Islam toward knowledge and teaching and to education. They link the achievements of great minds to the study of the Koran, the hadiths and the interpretations which "provide completely sufficient food and material for reflection and conclusions" [204, No 8, 1971, pp 21, 27-28, 100]. Unfortunately, in individual works by Soviet scholars, Islam is given a decisive role in the cultural development of the nomads of Arabia, and the decisive changes in the historical fate of the peoples of the Near and Middle East and the defeat of the two mighty empires, Byzantium and Iran, are directly linked to the rise and spread of Islam (see [439, pp 30, 33]).

We feel that the reason for the flourishing of the culture of the Central Asian peoples in the 9th-11th centuries must be seen in the opposite, in the fact that at that time Islam had not succeeded as yet in gaining control over spiritual creativity and turning all sciences into the servants of "theology." The absence of the dominance of moribund thought which was completely subordinate to religion made it possible to science to develop and this science focused on the values which were contradictory to Islam. The culture of that period exalted the triumph of reason, being based on the possibility of man to understand new unknown aspects of the life of society and nature, and placed a high price on the earthly calling of man. Certainly at that time there were conflicts between science and religion which often ended with the victory of the latter, but Islam had not yet acquired that force which it gained somewhat later.

Islam, as a religion, did not create and could not create the artistic forms and aesthetic standards which were uniform for the entire enormous territory on which its followers lived and who had great differences in traditions, sources of culture and conditions of life. Each people which professed Islam had an unique culture which was independent of its influence. Science acquired the greatest development precisely where the domination of Islam was less felt and where the elements of culture were most independent of its control.

Still awaiting study is the problem of why the countries of the Near East and Central Asia which in the 9th-11th centuries attained the highest level

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of cultural development for their times (on the scale of all mankind), which served as the cradle of world civilization and provided an enormous impetus for the development of science and culture in Europe, subsequently fell behind in their development. Of course, for this there are many factors, but one can say with confidence that one of them resides precisely in the dominance of Islam. Proceeding from its own internal content, Islam contributed to the preserving of stagnant socioeconomic relations, and to the cultural backwardness in the areas where it was spread, and objectively played a reactionary role in the history of the peoples which professed it.

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>It is impossible to view the islamization of the areas captured by the Arabs as a sudden all-encompassing process. Islam became established gradually and unevenly. A portion of the population in these regions continued to profess their old religions in parallel with Islam. This process lasted for a long time. In Central Asia, in the opinion of V. V. Bartol'd, the dominance of Islam was established not earlier than the final conquest of the land by the Arabs, about the middle of the 9th century, that is, 150 years after the beginning of the conquest of the Mawerannah.

<sup>2</sup>It must be considered that in the Sogdian city, where there was no clear delimitation between the dikhans, the landed aristocracy, and the merchant class, the former, in having a direct link with urban trade and deriving great gain from it, also were interested in the development of trade, and the attitude of Islam toward trade was also to their liking [470, p 15].

<sup>3</sup>It is curious that there were slaves among the first Moslems who accepted Islam even during the period of the "revelations" of Muhammad in Arabia. This, in the opinion of the researchers, is explained by the hate with which their masters, the wealthy of Mecca, persecuted Muhammad who was against the unjust greed. For the slaves Muhammad was cast in the role of a friend and defender, and they viewed the "day of terrible judgment" predicted by him as retribution against their masters. According to the legends, the first martyrs of Islam were the slaves who were the first to accept Islam [339, p 19].

<sup>4</sup>In describing the local population of Algeria in a letter to Laura Lafargue (13-14 April 1882), K. Marx noted: "This was a very striking spectacle. Some of these Moors were dressed pretentiously, even richly, while others in what I as an exception would venture to call blouses, which at one time had the appearance of blouses made from white wool, but now had been turned into rags and tatters but in the eyes of a true Moslem, such things, success or failure in life, do not create differences between the children of Muhammad. *They have absolute equality in social dealings*, a completely natural thing; on the contrary, only when demoralized do they begin to realize that this exists..." [14, p 258].

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<sup>5</sup>The same situation is obvious in relation to Christianity as well. In being established as a state religion, Christianity destroyed all that was related to paganism, including museums, academies, cultural monuments, the temples of ancient gods and, of course, its priests, scholars and philosophies. But at the same time it assimilated the ideas of the evanescent world. "Christian dogma grew up on Judaic monotheism and messianism and on the Egyptian eschatology which was spread throughout the East and West. The Christian religion also reflected the philosophy of Plato and his idea of the good which became the source of the idea of a transcendent god. One can also point to the platonic dualism of the body and soul, to the teachings of Plato on the immortality of the soul which gave rise to the corresponding notions in the system of the views of Christianity." One can also point to the "teachings of the Stoics and to their concept of the 'logos' as the prototype of the Christian 'logos.' and to the concept of virtue created by them and which lay at the basis of Christian morality.

"Thus, Christian dogma in its origin was based not only on the ideology of the peoples of the East, that is, the Egyptians, Jews and Babylonians, but also on the ideology of the peoples of the West, the Greeks and Romans" [453, p 122].

<sup>6</sup>The members of the Hausa tribe from the Western Sudan, for example, perceive the dogma "there is no other god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger" proceeding from their animistic beliefs. For them Allah is the supreme spirit by whose "permission" numerous spirits which populate all living and inert nature are active, and the local cult rights are based on the belief in these spirits. The population turns to Allah only to evoke the rains and for combating threatening natural phenomena.

The believers from another tribe, the Songhais, along with Allah, assumed the existence of another supreme "local god" without paying it any special deference. The cult of Muhammad was not developed among them. A similar picture can be seen in the religious life of other peoples of the Western Sudan (481, No 1, 1951, p 96].

<sup>7</sup>However, it is not merely a question of the traces of the ideas of Judaism in Islam, as certain authors feel [264, pp 165-166], but rather of different variations of the same common Semitic history. F. Engels, in describing the Bible, wrote that "it is an inscription of the ancient Arabic religious and tribal traditions altered due to the early separation of the Jews from their neighbors, the tribes related to them but which remained nomadic. The circumstance that Palestine on the Arab side was surrounded by a desert, the land of the Bedouins, explains the validity of the account. But the ancient Arab inscriptions, the traditions and the Koran, as well as that ease by which all the genealogies become clear, and so forth--all of this proves that the basic content was Arabic, or more accurately, common Semitic" [32, pp 209-210].

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<sup>8</sup>It is worthy of note that the position of the church on these questions changed with the development of economic relations, with the breakdown of a barter economy which did not depend upon the attitude of the church to these problems. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) no longer condemns trade activities, and sees nothing sinful in them. The profit obtained from trade carried out for social interests, he feels, if it is moderate is completely justified. In truth, he supported only a moderate profit, but where is the limit of moderation? The amounts of income (profit), replied Thomas Aquinas, should correspond to the social status of a person, and social divisions are established by God himself.

In the Middle Ages the churches simultaneously became centers of trade and the organizers of fairs which attracted enormous numbers of people. With the development of bourgeois society, Protestantism became established within the heart of Catholicism, and proceeding from the economic law of capitalist accumulation, Protestantism developed a religious and moral view of acquisitiveness as a duty of the Christian and the aim of his life [465, pp 83-85; 426, pp 75-76].

According to the comment of A. V. Lunacharskiy, the church at a certain stage "to the highest degree favored trade which ultimately gave rise to substantial capital, that is, that social value which killed off feudalism and the church" [72, p 291].

<sup>9</sup>In a number of instances a person is released from fasting under the condition of compensation in the future or expiatory alms.

<sup>10</sup>However, one must not overlook the following comment by the same author: "...It is important...to emphasize that hardly any of these statements would actually belong to Muhammad himself.... With all the attention toward worldly demands and with all the indulgence which Muhammad demanded for himself, as is clearly seen in many places of the Koran, he showed the greatest respect to the actual aspects, to the penitent, supplicants and fasters, with one, possibly, exception: celibate life. Undoubtedly, standing closer to his thoughts are the statements in which abstention from everything worldly is represented as a high virtue by which the love of God is gained. It is all the more important for us to become acquainted with how the antiascetic philosophy brought to life by the external conditions of Islam gained expression in the statements and judgments and how they were reinforced by the authority of the Prophet" [171, p 133].

<sup>11</sup>Researchers see in this a reason for the easy acceptance of Islam in other regions of Asia (see [466, pp 122-123]).

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#### ISLAM IN PREREVOLUTIONARY CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

Religion is not merely the offspring of the ignorance or stupidity of people, or a random phenomenon in human history. It is socially determined and is tied to definite developmental stages of human society. This is the essence of the Marxist understanding of religion. Any religion "is nothing more than a fantastic depiction in the heads of people of those external forces which rule over them in daily life, a reflection in which earthly forces assume the form of nonearthly ones. In the beginning of history, the forces of nature were primarily the objects of this reflection, and with further evolution these went through the most diverse and varied embodiments among different peoples" [22, pp 328-329]. Religion in a distorted manner reflects the social impotence and suppression of people and the objective contradictions of social life.

The social, political and spiritual processes of life generally, all social and state relations, all religious and legal systems, and all theoretical concepts, the founders of Marxism emphasized, can be understood only when the material bases and the basis of the corresponding era will be understood, and all the rest is derived from them.

Islam, as one of the phenomena and elements of feudal society, was closely linked to its other elements, and above all, the feudal method of production. For this reason it is very important to examine Islam not in isolation from society, but rather in studying the entire structure of society.

V. I. Lenin, in describing the sociopolitical system of Turkestan and the Bukhara and Khiiva khanates, pointed out: "...The most important characteristic trait of these lands is that precapitalist relations still prevail in them"; the peasantry which comprised an enormous majority of the population in these lands was exploited "not only by merchant capital, but also by the feudal lords and the feudal-based state" [44, p 244].

In essence feudalism in Central Asia did not differ from European feudalism (for details on this see [467, pp 47-48]). But the feudal relations in Central Asia, as everywhere in the East, had specific manifestations both in form as well, to a certain degree, in content. F. Engels drew attention to this. In a letter to K. Marx of 6 June 1853, he pointed out

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that the key to understanding the East was the absence of private ownership of the land, and the presence of state ownership of it here. Such a situation was dictated by the particular features of farming in the East, as it was basically irrigated farming and required the carrying out of irrigation work on a scale which private farms could not carry out [32, p 221].

In Central Asia the lands actually belonged to the state which, in the words of V. Porshnev, acted as a "single giant landowner" [346, p 33]. The emirs and khans, the supreme feudal lords, disposed of the lands without restriction, they presented plots of land to their loyal clerical and secular feudal lords, while those out of favor at any time could be and were deprived of the right to use the lands.

In the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, land ownership served as an implement of the economic and political dominance of the large landowners (a minority of the population) and the exploitation of the peasantry (an absolute majority).

The dekhans (peasants) in both khanates were deprived of the main thing, land, and were feudally dependent persons exploited directly by both the feudal lords and the feudally based state (through the *amlak* form of ownership). For example, in Bukhara the peasants had bits of land from 0.25 to 4 desyatinas in size. Some 86.9 percent of the peasants in Zeravshan possessed precisely such plots [479, p 33].

The dekhans who could not support themselves on the piece of land belonging to them were forced to hire themselves out as hired hands to the feudal lords, receiving paltry payment for their labor, or they became chairikers, persons who rented plots of land and were personally dependent upon their owners. Those who worked their own plots also were in a difficult economic situation. In addition to the *haraj* which, according to the shariat, should comprise one-tenth of the crop, and which in actuality approached one-half of the crop, they were forced to pay other state duties which were collected in the cruelest manner (for the persons who supervised the water system, a tax on straw, a tax on the garden and the orchard, a tax on a certain number of oxen, and so forth). In addition, the peasants had to carry out a number of obligations which took their toll on their farm. They had to support the troops quartered in the given area, feed traveling officials, transport them without charge, and so forth. As a total, in the Khiva khanate there were up to 25 types of different fees and taxes (permanent and extraordinary), and in Bukhara up to 55 [314, Vol 1, p 176].

Simultaneously with the feudal suppression, the peasantry was also exploited by merchant capital. Some three-quarters of the cotton produced in the Bukhara khanate, for example, was purchased by an army of small buyers, the *tarazidors* (commission buyers) who gave the peasants an advance for the cotton crop of the next year. The peasant who was forced to sell the still ungrown crop ahead of time at a deliberately low price, often fell into complete dependence upon the buyer and was ruined, and often was completely deprived of his land. In the prerevolutionary years in the Bukhara khanate such peasants made up 25 percent of the rural population.

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The dekhans produced a surplus product which was sufficient for meeting the needs of the ruling class, but not sufficient for ensuring rapid expanded reproduction. Here they were interested in the results of their labor, since the exploiter, as a rule, left the workers all the necessary product. The dekhans had livestock, tools, planting stock, reserves and farm buildings, everything, with the exception of land. For this reason in a feudal society there was no need to coerce the dekhan in the production process. Under conditions when the dekhan was personally dependent upon the feudal lord, coercion was replaced by noneconomic compulsion. V. I. Lenin in his work "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," gave the following description of noneconomic compulsion: "If the landowner did not have direct authority over the individual peasant, he could not force a person supplied with land and running his own farm to work for himself. Consequently 'noneconomic compulsion' was required, as Marx said.... The forms and degrees of this compulsion could be the most diverse, starting from the status of a serf and ending with class inequality of the peasant" [53, pp 184-185].

After the establishing of the protectorate of Tsarist Russia over the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, capitalist relations began to penetrate the territories of the latter, with a few capitalist-type enterprises appearing. The proletariat in these khanates was small. On the eve of the October Revolution, on the territory of present-day Tadzhikistan, the total number of workers did not exceed 300 persons, and by 1914, they were just 0.2 percent of the population [93, p 46]. The number of hired workers was not more than 5,000 persons, while the peasantry comprised 82 percent of the total population of the khanate. In the Khiva khanate, the peasants comprised an even larger portion of the population [228, p 110].

The regions of Central Asia directly annexed to Russia (Turkestan) represented typical colonial borderlands which in terms of the level of socioeconomic development lagged significantly behind not only the countries of Western Europe and the central regions of Russia, but also many nations of the foreign East.

The Tsarist government was not interested in the harmonious development of the productive forces in the kray, and considered Turkestan a supplier of raw materials, mainly cotton needed for Russian industry. For this reason, the decisive economic sector of the region, agriculture, developed in a one-sided manner.

The capitalist commodity-monetary relations which penetrated into the economic life of the region as yet were unable to shake the feudal foundations and were apparent chiefly in the sphere of the market, in the form of commercial and usury capital. In the economic life of the Central Asian village, feudal landowning and the feudal forms of the exploitation of the work of the dekhans remained predominant. Feudalism adapted to the spreading capitalist relations which penetrated agriculture and to the conditions of capitalist commodity-monetary markets, but remained basically unaffected. No less than two-thirds of the planted area in Turkestan was concentrated

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in the hands of the well-off strata. The small patriarchal dekhan farm remained the basic form of organizing agricultural production, and the peasantry remained the largest class and the basic object of feudal and capitalist exploitation. The given process was accompanied by a further deepening of the poverty and ruin in the countryside, and the depriving of the dekhan masses of land.

The impoverished position in which the peasantry of Turkestan found itself had to be recognized also by the tsarist officials who were far from wishing to exaggerate things. Thus, in one of the documents signed by the chief of the Dzhezakskiy District in 1905, we read: "The population of this district is extremely poor, it lives on pennies gained by hard labor which has become even harder over the last 10-15 years.... The population does not have permanent stocks of materials, and lives off only the harvest of the given year....

"For the 270,000 inhabitants in the entire district there is not even a hundred bullock carts; good horses are found only among the better-off natives and here there are very few of them; many of the inhabitants do not even have a donkey; the population lives in poor saklias [a type of dwelling] and yurts, and not every inhabitant has a yurt, and only as a rare exception does a family have two yurts.... The difficult economic situation of the population sometimes reaches such degrees that the population of certain volosts by spring remains completely without grain and lives off alms, while the poor inhabitants feed off the roots of wild plants.... Often in the settlements it is impossible to find not only grain but even barley for the horse...." [446, p 71].

Industry in Turkestan developed very slowly, basically by small enterprises involved in the primary processing of cotton and cottonseed, as well as the mining of minerals. The enterprises were small, equipped with backward technology, and had a small number of workers.

In the towns, as before, there was a survival of merchant-artisan production and craftsmen who in terms of their number far exceeded the industrial workers and produced approximately as much product as all the factory and plant manufacturing industry (with the exception of the mining and cotton ginning industry) [329, p 105]. The small national working class which was just beginning to arise was subjected to cruel exploitation. Some 70-80 percent of the skilled labor was provided by Russian workers, while the representatives of the indigenous nationalities were employed in operations not requiring a high skill. But even when having the same skill as the Russian workers, the national workers received a wage that was 30-40 percent lower. Their daily earnings with a 14-hour day did not exceed 30-40 kopecks a day, and this was scarcely enough for a semistarvation existence. A majority of the local workers was made up of completely illiterate and profoundly religious persons who scrupulously observed all the rites and prescripts of Islam. Their self-awareness was very little developed [235, pp 52-53].

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At least two-thirds of the planted area in Turkestan was concentrated in the hands of the well-off classes. According to the data of 1917, 51 percent of all the peasant farms owned 98,022 desyatins of land (up to 1 desyatina per farm), and this was 9.8 percent of all the tilled land in the region. At the same time, 1 percent of the farms had 158,589 desyatins of land, or 16 percent of all the tilled land [378, p 59].

Thus, in prerevolutionary Central Asia Islam existed under the conditions of states with a complex social structure, under the conditions of a feudal society which were characterized by a "low degree of development in the productive forces of labor and the corresponding limitation of human relations to the confines of the material process of the production of life, and hence, a limitation of all their relations to each other and to nature" [8, p 89].

In studying the question of why the workers which comprised an absolute majority of the population obeyed the small exploiting minority and what paralyzed their will to struggle, although the economic conditions of life constantly urged this, we inevitably arrive at the notion of the importance of such a factor as religion in the life of prerevolutionary Central Asia. "All and any suppressing classes," wrote V. I. Lenin in the work "The Collapse of the Second International," "require two social functions for protecting their rule. These are the function of the scourge and the function of the priest. The scourge can suppress the protest and indignation of the suppressed. The priest should pacify the oppressed, and describe for them the prospects (this is particularly conveniently done without guaranteeing the 'feasibility' of such prospects...) of the mitigation of hardships and sacrifices with the survival of class rule, and thereby reconcile them to this rule, scare them off of revolutionary actions, sap their revolutionary mood, and disrupt their revolutionary determination" [47, p 237].

Islam in the past was precisely such a force, although not a material one which was actively involved in the life of society, in balancing purely material forces and influencing their change and evening out. Islam in all the ages did not passively "reflect" its base, the feudal society, but rather actively served and helped it, in protecting it against the threatening social forces.

Researchers have noted several different functions performed by a religion in a society: integrative, regulative, communicative and compensatory [100; 292; 469]. Other works have focused on the illusory-compensatory, philosophical, regulating and integrative functions of religion [317; 426; 429].

Consequently, one can speak of a system of functions for religion as a social phenomenon in society. But we would point out that none of its functions is represented in a "pure" form, outside of a relationship or reciprocal complementarity with other ones. Thus, the integrative function of religion largely helps to carry out the compensatory functions,

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and the integrative function is particularly noticeable in studying Islam of the prerevolutionary period. The integrative function, in turn, is supplemented by the regulating role of Islam, since precisely the law based on religion and encompassing literally all aspects of human life aided the integration of economic, political and spiritual life of society by Islam. The communicative function of Islam, most starkly manifested in the actions of the Moslem community which imposes its will on all parishoners and members of their families, helped to implement all its other functions.

We share the viewpoint according to which it is essential to differentiate the main function of religion and the auxiliary and nonessential functions. The criterion for isolating the main function of religion is: 1) the universality of this function; 2) the fact that it should be specific for a religion and should separate the religion from other forms of social awareness and operate as its specific difference. Having applied the given criterion to a study of the social functions of religion, Prof. D. M. Ugrinovich feels that the illusory-compensatory function is the social function specific for religion. In any social system, he points out, under different historical conditions religion has always performed and does perform the role of a particular (illusory) compensator for human weakness and impotence. In emphasizing this, he has in mind not individual human weakness, but rather social weakness, the weakness of mankind which still in practical terms has not been able to master the natural and social forces. As for individual weakness (physical and spiritual), the latter by itself does not give rise to religion, although in many instances it does contribute to the assimilation of religious beliefs by an individual [426, pp 98-99].

The validity of such an assertion can be affirmed from an analysis of the social functions which Islam performed and does perform.

#### The Illusory-Compensatory Function of Islam

The illusory-compensatory function of Islam, like religion generally, consists in the religious "compensation" for reality (K. Marx) and religious consolation (V. I. Lenin). The essence of this function of religion has been clearly formulated in the definition of K. Marx of religion as the "opiate of the people."

In what manner did Islam in the past succeed (at least apparently) in eliminating the contradictions existing in true reality between the suppressed absolute majority and the suppressing absolute minority?

Islam, like other religions, carried out this mission largely due to the main and determining factor running in two directions. On the one hand, Islam proceeds from the actual existence of unreal, mystical or divine forces. On the other hand, it offers a faith in the real opportunity of man to establish either directly or indirectly a "personal contact," a

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"tie," or "relationship" with Allah, and to seek from him help for oneself and relatives and punishment for others.

Islam does not restrict itself to what links man with Allah, but rather establishes, explains and regulates the "relationships" between them. It always has explained and does explain the really existing world, it judges it and controls not the apparent but rather the real relations between people both on a level of the microworld and the macroworld. Without a religious interpretation of these nonreligious relations between people, Islam could not carry out its functions in human society, primarily the compensatory function, it would lose its attractiveness for people and cease to be viable.

Precisely this particular feature of Islam objectively led the working masses away from the class struggle and away from solving the problems related to progress in social life, directing their energies at a "understanding" of Allah and at focusing all thoughts and efforts on attaining paradise in the eternal afterlife [415, pp 248-249].

Islam considers virtue for the Moslem to be not so much his faith or his attitude toward God as how he, in rejecting any manifestation of independence in terrestrial life, has obeyed the will of the deputies of Allah on the earth. He may not grasp the fine points of religious teachings and he may not delve into its depths, but he is obliged unconditionally to obey what in the name of God has been put down in the Koran and the other "sacred" books.

Social inequality, Islam teaches, is a matter of the workings of Allah himself who "has favored some over others in provision" [260, 16:73], "apportioned among them their livelihood in the life of the world," and "raised some of them above others in rank that some of them may take labor from others" [260, 43:31]. Society, according to Islam, is divided solely into believers and nonbelievers. And believers cannot be divided into any classes and there are no contradictions between them. The poor should be satisfied with what they have and not covet the wealth of others: "And strain not thine eyes toward that which We cause some wedded pairs (families.--T.S.) among them to enjoy, the flower of the life of the world, that We may try them thereby" [260, 20:131].

Patience and submissiveness are the greatest virtues. The submissive and patient can expect reward in heaven, while the impatient and the assertive will find the abyss of hell [260, 2:148]. The teachings of Islam on predestination also played an important role in blunting the social awareness of the workers. God, according to Islam, has predestined the fate and conduct of each man, and all is set down ahead of time for him (see [260, 9:51, 13:39, 2:213, 4:81, 14:4 and others]). Man cannot either alter or prevent anything. Even a desire to somehow change fate, according to Islam, is sinful and blasphemous. Allah gives a fate to each man: "And for every man we have fastened a bird to his neck" [260, 17:14].<sup>1</sup>

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In the Koran we read: "Say: naught befalleth us save that which Allah hath decreed for us" [9:51]. "Allah effaceth what He will, and establisheth (what He will), and with Him is the source of ordinance" [13:39]. Each person receives only what is predestined by fate, and man is not in possession of himself [7:188], and he is not given to know what is good for him or what is bad: "But it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not!" [2:213]. All the good carried out by man comes from Allah, and all the bad from man himself [4:81]. Here "Allah sendeth whom He will astray, and guideth whom He will" [14:4]. In the Koran there are also other verses which could be interpreted as aimed against blind fatalism and which allow the possibility of human free will (see [246; 339 and others]).

The teachings of Islam on the aim and sense of earthly life has a preparation for the afterlife also has played an important role in the fulfillment of the compensatory function by Islam in society. Man, according to Islam, is a "pilgrim," for whom the aim of the journey is naturally much more important than the vicissitudes of the path. The Koran demands that earthly life be viewed as temporary and unreal: "Know that the life of this world is only play and idle talk" [59:19], and only a "matter of illusion" [57:20]. All that is given to man in this life is unreliable and temporary, and only "what is Allah's is better and more lasting" [28:60]. "The comfort of the life of the world is but little in the Hereafter" [9:38]. For this reason, the Koran teaches people "ye have charge of your own souls" [5:104].

Death, according to Islam, is the only thing that we know for certain that it will not pass us by. There are no exceptions, no surprises, and all paths lead to it. All that man does is merely preparation for death, a preparation starting from the moment that man first cried:

"Our life is only a short crossing taking up one hour or one day, and it is useless to struggle in trying to extend it even one day or one hour."

"Earthly life is deceptive, eternity is better."

"Death is merely moving from one house into another."

"This is not disappearance but rather rebirth."

"In the same manner that the eggshell breaks when the chick is ready to hatch, so the time comes for the soul to part from the body."

"Death is the disappearance of matter and not the soul."

"Death is merely a change of state. The soul begins to live independently. As long as it is in the body, it held in the hand, it looked with the eyes, it heard with ears, but it and only it recognized the essence of things."

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"On the day of my death, when my tabut<sup>2</sup> is carried in, don't think that I will regret this world."

"Do not cry and do not say it is a pity, it is a pity. Curdled milk is to be more regretted."

"When you see me being lowered into the grave, this does not mean that I will disappear. Really do the sun and moon disappear in leaving the firmament?"

"You consider this death, but it is birth. The grave looks dark, but it liberates the soul."

"Does the seed not sprout when it is scattered on the ground? Why then do you doubt the human seed?"<sup>3</sup>

The perfect man, Islam teaches, is the one who constantly remembers Judgment Day and limits himself in much, particularly in satisfying his desires and feelings and in using earthly goods. Among the people there were widespread various sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and encouraging self-denial, such as: "Hell is concealed behind satisfactions, and paradise behind deprivations and torments."

Also current were legends similar to the following one. Abdul-Kadir Gilani, the founder of the Sufi order of the kadiriya, each time a child of his was born, four times performed the burial rite over it. In explaining this action, he said that he acted thus with the child in order that the love for it would not remove the love of God from his heart [239, p 61].

Both the social and the political sense of the Moslem teachings on paradise and hell is rather simple. What can a man achieve by his weak forces on the earth in comparison with the goods he will receive for his patience and submissiveness in paradise? Does it make any sense to fight against evil, if earthly life is just this brief instant?

Over many centuries the Moslem clergy used the idea of a blissful paradise and a fiery hell in the interests of the exploiters, for deceiving the workers. "The person who works and is in need all his life," wrote V. I. Lenin, "is taught patience and humility in earthly life by religion, in consoling him with a hope for celestial reward" [57, p 142]. In the hands of the clergy, paradise was a lure for the disenfranchised and unhappy who suffered under heavy suppression, while hell was for intimidating those who showed even the slightest dissatisfaction with their difficult plight.

The social teachings of Islam thus represent an integrated and ordered system aimed at distracting man from the struggle against suppression, social inequality and reconciling him to the exploiting system.

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In what manner did Islam succeed in achieving this? What helped the success of its teachings among the workers? How can one explain the conversion of a religious ideology into a "material force" capable of influencing the relationships of two hostile forces? By the spontaneous nature of social progress, by class suppression, by exploitation, by anarchy and the competition inherent to a society divided into hostile classes, was V. I. Lenin's answer to these questions, in disclosing the mechanism of the determination of religion by material relationships. All of this, he pointed out, gives rise to a negative psychological state of the masses, that is, a fear, suffering, a feeling of impotence, concern for tomorrow, and solitude which, in turn, comprise the nurturing soil for religiousness. "Fear created the gods," as V. I. Lenin quoted the words of the ancient poet. And he continues: "fear of the blind force of capital which is blind, for it cannot be anticipated by the masses of people and which at each step in the life of the proletariat and small farmer threatens to bring him and will bring 'sudden,' 'unexpected,' and 'accidental' ruin, death, degradation into a pauper or prostitute, and a death by starvation--here is the *root* of modern religion which first of all and more than anything else should be kept in mind by the materialist, if he wishes to remain a materialist of a prepared class" [50, p 419].

A predominant majority of the workers in prerevolutionary Central Asia was engaged in backward agriculture, they were constantly forced to struggle for their existence, and were in eternal fear for tomorrow. The dekhans felt the violence and despotism, the arbitrariness and injustice on his own skin. He made do with extremely primitive agricultural equipment, and any industry, and any ability and experience acquired over the centuries did not help him. Often he was virtually helpless in the struggle against natural phenomena. And for this reason faith in Allah and his omnipotence represented a universal "means" in this struggle.

Under the conditions of the lack of any hope for an improvement in real life, Islam assumed the function of a "triumphant compensation" for the real world [6, p 414]. Islam shifted into the afterworld the believer's problems of life, his needs and aspirations, his hope for deliverance, and thereby diverted them from the struggle for an improvement in the real conditions of life. In resolving actually existing conflicts, Islam eased the mental state of the believer, and gave him an illusory consolation, and unnoticed by the workers, in a veiled manner, protected the interests of the exploiters. "God," said L. Feuerbach, "is the aspiration of man for happiness which has found its satisfaction in fantasy" [437, p 772].

The particular features of the feudal and patriarchal way of life in those regions where Islam had spread made an impression on social psychology, morals and morality. The judgment made by F. Engels on the surviving vestiges of feudal relationships and morality characteristic for ascendant capitalism helps to understand both the social and the personal life of people in prerevolutionary Central Asia. At that time life passed "self-contained and separate" within the village. The peasantry "rarely knew how to read and even more rarely to write, they scrupulously attended

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church, they did not engage in politics, they did not instigate conspiracies, they did not reflect...and with piety instilled since childhood listened to the reading of the Bible.... But on the other hand in spiritual terms they were dead" [34, p 245]. According to the definition of Engels, such a way of life was "vegetative" and "cozy," but "unworthy of man."

Prerevolutionary Central Asian society was static; it responded to all the changes in the surrounding conditions, as is seen from the example of the life in the region after annexation by Russia. But as a whole, the conditions of existence in the Central Asian community were such that they did not allow serious changes. Life in the community was organized on the basis of an unchallenged obedience of the established rules which regulated the relationships between people, and on the basis of written and nonwritten legislation.

Evidence of the loyalty to the traditions of ancestors can be found not only in the use of the experience of previous generations as embodied in material culture, but also the full repetition of their spiritual life, including the attitude toward religion and the observance of its rights and prescripts.

The standards of life in a society are reflected in the moral concepts and axioms dealing with the rights and duties of individuals. Good is what does not contradict the established traditions or the corresponding demands of Islam, while evil is anything that contradicts them. Precisely this viewpoint was used to judge actions, and quite naturally, few dared to break with the established traditions and oppose them.

Everything that existed outside the framework of established order and did not conform to the already existing was considered abnormal and suspect. Each person should dress, eat, walk, talk and so forth in a manner not to distinguish himself from others. And most importantly, few dared to dispute the established. There was a certainty that one must proceed in this manner and precisely in this manner, otherwise chaos would occur in the world. The notions of people about life and the world were exceptionally narrow and rarely went beyond the commonplace. The members of the community were deprived of an opportunity to see anything unlike their own life and make comparisons. The world which was limited to three or four nearby villages did not help to broaden their viewpoint, to open up other worlds, another way of life, beliefs, and so forth. The mass observance of religious rights and the universal nature of the Islamic holidays helped to strengthen loyalty to the traditions of the past.

There were sharp contrasts in real life including the aristocracy, wealth and luxury of some and the hopeless poverty and destitution of others. However, such a contradiction was perceived by the population which was completely under the sway of religions as a natural state of society. The feudal type of production relations gave rise to a definite system of moral

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views, rules, standards, habits and traditions which objectively contributed to the strengthening of the given relations.

Personal dependence and the religious dogmas and superstitions which ensnared the people doomed them to a narrow spiritual viewpoint. The stability and regulation of economic and everyday life gave rise to an extreme conservatism in moral standards. Patriarchal relations in the family were sanctified by lasting habits and moral concepts. The morality which gave rise to and strengthened this social order helped to make the peasantry "only working machines in the service of a few aristocrats who up to that time controlled history" [34, p 245].

The Central Asian feudal lord in the village was the legislator of orders, he scoffed at the peasants dependent upon him, and showed condescension to all who stood lower than he on the social ladder.

The strengthening of Islam and its permanent influence was also aided by the strong preservation of the patriarchal and barter way of life in the livestock raising areas where, incidentally, more than 40 percent of the Uzbek and Tadzhik dekhans, the Kazakh and Kirgizia Sharua and the Turkmen daikhans lived.

In the regions of nomadic livestock raising, the rich concealed their anti-popular and exploiting essence in the guise of the "elder relative" who worried about the interests of his kinsmen. In this instance the poor found it even more difficult to conceive of the social injustice and abyss which separated them from the rich "relative."

The village elder and the representatives of the inferior administration in agricultural areas at the same time were members of the rural community, they acted in its behalf, and this created an illusion of a commonness of their interests with the interests of the working people.

In prerevolutionary Central Asia, particularly in rural localities, the peoples of all estates and classes, the peasants, the feudal lords, the Islamic clergy and so forth, that is, the exploiters and the exploited, lived, worked and died side by side. If in a peasant family there was an occasion for grief or happiness, the feudal lord did not remain unaffected, and expressed his sympathy or congratulations. And the reverse was true. This close "interwoven" relationship strengthened and honed the power of the exploiters and the "spiritual" fathers. The idea of equality before Allah, and the shown concern for the needs of the dekhans concealed the actual social inequality [235, p 72].

Thus, the rural community subordinated man to external circumstances, and did not elevate him to the master of these circumstances and was a firm basis for eastern despotism....

Within the present-day frontiers of Central Asia, in 1913, the proportional amount of the urban population was just 14 percent [367, p 32]. Artisans

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comprised the basic portion of the urban population. The development of commodity-monetary relations brought about by the penetration of Russian capital did not alter the position of the urban trades in the system of feudal relations. At the beginning of the 20th century, in many regions of Central Asia, trades had still not completely become separated from agriculture, since they did not fully ensure a minimum standard of living for the artisans living far from the commercial centers [179, pp 121-122, 125].

The artisan still did everything by his own hands using primitive implements of labor, essentially without employing any mechanical equipment. He was totally dependent upon the middlemen who often purchased a commodity even before it was produced. The artisan felt totally dependent upon the market. Any rise in prices for raw materials was reflected in the cost of the commodity produced by him and for which the prices had been set previously without considering the market. He also was totally dependent upon the shop master and the guild leaders who controlled not only the material prosperity but also defined his entire personal life. For this reason the artisan endeavored himself to become a master and this firmly tied him to the existing system [20, p 51].

The artisans who produced one or another commodity had their own shop production associations (there were over 30 of them). Each such guild of artisans had its own written charter or risalia (Arab. "treatise" or "argument") drawn up under the leadership of the Moslem clergy which controlled all aspects of the life and activities of not only the guild per se but also its individual members.

The risalias in use in various regions and relating to different trades varied little, since they were all drawn up according to a single pattern [160, p 45].

All risalia without exception contained praise of the Almighty, the promise of earthly and celestial rewards for those who had the risalia and conscientiously adhered to its prescripts, as well as threats directed against those not having a risalia and not observing its instructions. To a significant degree a risalia consisted of instructions concerning those verses of the Koran which should be said in different situations of life and in performing production operations. In brief, they represented a compendium of instructions fully based on Islam and more reminiscent of theological works than purely professional codes of honor, morality and so forth. Each step taken by the artisan, his successes and failures were dependent upon the observance of the risalia.

According to a risalia, the origin of each craft goes back to the prophets honored in Islam as well as to the "local saints." "The sanctity of each trade having its own protector was recognized not only by the artisans themselves but also by other strata of the population." [179, p 141].

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The risalia nullified the social differences between the majority of artisans who did not possess the implements of production and the minority in whose hands were concentrated the primitive implements of production and put them in the positions of the "fathers" and "children," the "children of the single Allah." All of this largely had a decisive influence on the awareness of the workers and contributed to the existence largely of patriarchal relations between the workers and the employers, and to the indoctrinating of submissiveness and acceptance among the latter [sic.].

The risalia of the various artisan guilds led to a disuniting of working people, they prevented them from feeling a commonness of interests, and implanted the Islam-dominated standards of morality and customs among them.

Society moved forward due to the exploitation and poverty of the enormous majority. Under the conditions of the rule of private ownership, the spontaneous differentiation of labor, and its division within the limits of objectively existing forms had a class nature and brought about the alienation of labor, while "the productive forces operated as something completely independent and divorced from the individuals, as a separate world along with the individuals" [20, p 67].

Due to the separation of labor in a feudal society, man was strongly tied to the types of labor activity characteristic for his social group, as he had neither a choice nor an opportunity to break out of the circle of what had already come before him. He had just one prospect of engaging in the same activity as his ancestors namely exhausting physical labor. And he perceived labor as something imposed by external forces, compulsory and forced. And labor for him was not a method of self-affirmation and not an opportunity for the free development of his physical and spiritual energy, but rather what exhausted his physical nature and destroyed the spirit. And in labor he felt not himself but rather divorced from himself [15, p 563].

Alienated labor in a prerevolutionary feudal society in which private property and cruel competition predominated was the foundation also of religious alienation. For the people social development represented an incomprehensible and hostile force, and the social results of their labor, as a rule, did not correspond to the aspirations and hopes of not only individuals but also social groups. "Dissatisfaction with reality, concern for the future gave rise to a desire for phantom happiness and an illusory form of solving real problems. There was a stronger need of society's for phenomena capable of performing a compensatory function" [275, p 76].

The successful carrying out of this function by Islam was largely aided in the fact that it acted in the role of the unifying and cementing factor of society and embodied the entire structure of Central Asian society, while its standards and prescripts became an inseparable part in the daily life of people.

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The Integrative Function of Islam

Over more than ten centuries, Islam under the conditions of Central Asia acted not only as a religious system and one of the forms of social awareness, but also represented a range of institutions encompassing the social life of society, subordinating science, culture and education to its influence, and having a profound effect upon the historical traditions, the moral notions of people and their everyday life.

Islam combines the secular and religious spheres and considers morality and law to be identical. All of this makes Islam "an all-encompassing and total system which claims to satisfy all spiritual needs and on this basis requires from man total dedication and recognition of the right to control all aspects of his life and activities" [142, Vol 10, p 484].

The social ideal of Islam is a theocratic state in which political and spiritual power are concentrated in the hands of religious leaders (for the Islamic theories of state law, see [339, pp 148-152]).

In interjecting religious dogma into politics, Islam declared the dogma to be the determining factor of the state, and made the particular essence of religion into the measure of a state, and gave a religious significance to phenomena having an outrightly secular nature. A person holding one or another position in the administrative system in the eyes of a believer carried out a function determined by religion. Frequently the insulting of such a person or the refusal to carry out his demands was considered to be an insulting of Islam and blasphemy.

The history of the theocratic state on the territory of Central Asia goes back to the beginning of the 8th century, that is, to the times of the conquering of the area by the Arabs. In the area very early on a situation existed where the clergy began to have a determining influence on social life. Here, during the period of the rule of the Samanids (9th-10th centuries) there were clearly distinguishable religious classes, and the clergy even earlier had begun to play a marked role in the state.

An analysis of the Central Asian theocratic states from the beginning of the 20th century has shown that during the time which passed since this, substantial changes had not occurred here. In order to clearly demonstrate this, let us take up in somewhat greater detail using the Bukhara Emirate where the state of affairs would also be typical for the Khiva Khanate.

Researchers have isolated various types of religious positions in society (see, for example [469, pp 86-87]). The Bukhara Emirate was a society in which social ideas and the standards for relationships, groups and institutions were made sacramental. Here religious awareness held the dominant position, and religious activity comprised an indispensable element in all aware activities. Here a complete unification of religious and secular power was achieved.

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The emir (ruler or sovereign) ruled the state and he traced his tribe back to the Prophet Muhammad as can be seen from his title [376, pp 62-63]. It was felt that Bukhara was only one of the parts of a theoretically united Moslem state which was headed by the caliph (the Turkish sultan was such for the Central Asian khanates), although the emir ruled the land not under the appointment of the caliph, but due to an independent right which belonged to him. "He was granted power which was unrestricted except for the commands of the shariat, he was the last and final judge to which those who had suffered from the administration and the courts could appeal, he was the source of those goods and graces which the devout and aggrieved people expected and hoped to receive, and he was also that terrifying element the anger of which brought the end of many people and destroyed their prosperity completely" [376, p 21].

The emir concentrated in his hands all superior state power including political, legal, religious, financial, and so forth. He was the spiritual head of the state, that is, he controlled all affairs related to Islam, and appointed and removed the clergy, both the higher officials, as well as the rank and file including the kazi [qadi] (judges) and the mudarris (the instructors of the medrese).

In the event that a local judge or ruler in one or another area was suspected of abuses, the emir also administered justice. There were instances when the petitioners achieved a revision of a decision previously taken by the emir, although he also had the right by a nod of the head or gesture of the hand to sentence a person to death, and this was carried out without appeal.

The budget of the state and the emir were indivisible, and this in actual terms meant that the entire state treasury belonged to the emir and was spent at his discretion.

According to the shariat which proceeds from the notion that legislation which is based upon the religious authority of the four "roots" (mazhabs) of the fiqh is established by God and cannot be changed, the emir did not possess a legislative function. But under Russian pressure, the emir was forced to approve a number of firmans (ukases). By the emir firman of 7 July 1910, for example, the rules for cotton trade were established. In Bukhara there was no other "legislative body, except the will of the emir, there were no laws, except the religious laws of the shariat, and there were no guarantees for the individual and property inviolability" [449, p 123].

Certain researchers of Central Asia quite rightly have pointed out that the feudal regime and the absence of any representative institutions did not give the worker even any illusion of participation in social life. In his eyes there had been a complete personification of supreme power, and this was identified with the personality of the emir. And the fact that a majority of the representatives of the "simple people" did not see either the ruler himself or even his likenesses turned the carrier of supreme

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power into a certain abstraction devoid of the specific attributes of an individual. All of this helped to instill the idea among the masses that the power of the emir was divine as well as his right to dispose of the fate of his subjects [234, p 77].

Islam operated as the "most general synthesis and the most general sanction of the existing feudal system" [27, p 361]. Religion, in essence, here was the sole propaganda force which had a complete influence on the life of people and a constant effect upon the shaping of social psychology. In the society there was no other ideology to resist Islam, and the clergy acted as the sole ideological force in society. The dogma of Islam was the starting point and the basis of any thought. The system of public education and upbringing, as well as culture were fully subordinate to Islam, and the entire life of each person was under its control. Islam acted under conditions of universal illiteracy, being closely meshed in the structure of state administration, and this undoubtedly strengthened its ideological impact on the population. Quite naturally under such conditions, in the hands of the Moslem clergy politics and jurisprudence, like all the remaining sciences, stayed simple areas of theology and its principles were applied to them. The dogmas of Islam simultaneously became political axioms, and the verses of the Koran gained the force of law in any court.

The following rather curious data provide a notion of what a force the clergy represented in prerevolutionary Bukhara.

Within prerevolutionary Bukhara there lived 100,000 persons, of which there were around 30,000 Moslems over the age of 20. At the same time the city had 360 parochial mosques with superiors, muezzins, servants and washers of cadavers. The clergy, including the teachers of 110 medrese with approximately 10,000 students as well as the parochial schools, numbered over 3,000. This did not include the persons employed in the religious courts. Thus, as an average per member of the clergy there were 30 inhabitants of Bukhara, or for every ten adults over the age of 20 [319, p 165].

Officially in the Bukhara khanate there were three clerical titles or ranks, including urok, sudur and sadr. In the opinion of A. A. Semenov, these titles were only honorary, and they did not entail any definite official duties.

The title of urok was presented to persons who had completed an ecclesiastical school and who for several years had worked in the position of a kazi (judge) or raisa. After this they could (also after a certain time) claim the rank of sudur or even sadr. The sadr was the highest spiritual title and the holder of it could occupy the highest ecclesiastical positions including kazi-kalon (supreme judge), mufti al'am and ahun.

The persons who had the titles of urok and sudur were salaried and paid from the treasury. In addition, the holders of the three clerical titles, along with the secular officials, received the tanho or the right to

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confiscate taxes from two or three or even several score families, and sometimes entire villages. In addition, they forced the dekhans to work for themselves and do corvee labor. The right of the tanho was not hereditary, but by offering gifts to superior officials and sometimes to the emir himself it could be turned into a hereditary one [447, pp 189-193; 243, pp 38, 93; 376, pp 59-61; 404a, p 153].

Both in the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, there was the rather wide practice of presenting fertile lands to the most prominent clerics with the freeing of these persons from the payment of taxes. Thus, in the 1880's, the khan of Khiva made such a "present" to 1,800 persons including a significant portion of Islamic clerics. Subsequently, another more than 4,000 representatives of the clergy were freed from taxes. Land grants to the clergy continued at the beginning of the 20th century as well [424, pp 95-96]. The raising of the scholarly theologians, the lawyers and the teachers of the medrese, the mudarris, to one or another clerical rank was carried out by the emir himself.

In formal terms, the first state figure after the emir was the sheikhul-islam (lit. the "head of Islam"). In the past the person who occupied this position was the head of the Islamic clergy. "During the last years of the existence of Bukhara..., the title of sheikhul-islam was rather more honorary than what was required by the needs of life; it was given by the emirs...at their discretion, and for the greedy representatives of these guardians of the faith and law in no way was an object of particular envy" [376, p 31].

The guardian of the law closest to the emir was the second (after the sheikhul-islam) individual, the kazi-kalon or the supreme judge (the judge of judges). This position was held by the judge of the city of Bukhara. The kazi-kalon was selected and approved by the emir and was a sort of chief for all the judges in the khanate, certifying them to the emir. The following fact shows what power the kazi-kalon had and what unseemly matters he was involved in in using the shariat for his own interests. In 1913, the supreme judge gave a luxurious feast in honor of the emir, and this cost the supreme judge 570,000 rubles.

Along with the persons possessing clerical titles and holding various positions in the religious and nonreligious institutions, there were also various groups of persons surrounded by an aura of sanctity and holding an important place in religious life.

Among these persons were the sayyids or the offspring of the Prophet Muhammad who could trace their origin from the grandchildren of the Prophet, Hasan and Husein, and who added to their name "Huseinis" and "Hasanis," and carried the title of "siyemat-panoh" or "refuge of sayyid merit." The offspring of the first Arab conquerors were called hoj. They represented a solid and rather self-contained group, and held a privileged position in society. There were entire settlements inhabited by the hoj. The members of this group did not allow their women to marry the indigenous population, but the men could freely marry the representatives of

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ordinary Moslem families. The hoj were engaged in religious activities and commerce, and were officials.

The offspring of the first three successors of the Prophet, Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman, were called mirs and carried the title of "Mir" before their name. The mirs and hoj were called "isolat-panoh" or "refuge of noble origin" [376, pp 14, 38, 64-65].

In the regions of the spread of Islam, there were also numerous dervish orders. These were headed by ishans who had numerous murids. The ishans were not only influential religious authorities, but also prominent feudal lords possessing large land holdings and numerous tanho.

The ishans had the strongest effect on the nomadic and seminomadic population of the region. In the past, for example, the seminomadic Uzbeks of each definite tribe (or its subdivisions) were the hereditary murids of the ishans from a certain tribe. In the opinion of B. Kh. Karmysheva, this was the rule. Up to the present, elderly persons, in defining the belonging or closeness of a family to their tribes (or to its subdivisions) proceeded from whether in the past this kinship group was pirdash with them, that is, whether they were murids of the ishans from the same kinship group.

Prior to the revolution, twice a year, the ishan visited the nomad camps and villages of his murids for gifts which his followers were obliged to make to him as if for a feast. The nomads "voluntarily" presented livestock for the feast, and in particular rams a large portion of which were immediately sold by the ishans to the livestock traders [235a, pp 152, 176, 184, 191].

Moslem law or the shariat requires from the believers a respectful and even a servile attitude toward the clergy. The shariat prescribes that in encountering such people "after shaking hands, their hand is to be kissed, and in meeting prominent sheikhs the hand and foot is to be kissed." The "codes of decency" demanded that the Moslem, in encountering a kar (a person reading the Koran out loud) "should render respect to such a person and without passing him, follow behind, particularly if the kar is walking with his teacher or spiritual mentor, and then one must follow them without fail and make certain not to step in their traces as this is indecent" [250, pp 170, 178].

The clergy was a rather close-knit force which even the emir himself had to consider. Repeated instances are known when the emirs, under the pressure of the Islamic clergy, altered the decisions taken without agreement from the clergy, and their attempts to disregard the opinion of the clergy were often without result.

In using their position and influence, and in constantly hiding behind the shariat or law given by Allah himself, the Islamic clergy did not permit anything which could have altered the long established standards of life and notions, and endeavored to nip in the bud anything new which could

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inject any fresh current of air into the stiffling Medieval atmosphere. Here are several examples affirming what was said.

In 1893, a major cholera epidemic broke out in Bukhara. In the summer of 1895, a special group arrived there from St. Petersburg, and its membership included Russian microbiologists and prominent representatives from the various areas of medicine.

The commission, having studied the situation, proposed removing and rebuilding everything that contradicted the conditions of sanitation and hygiene and helped to spread contagious illnesses. The government, as always, when it was a question involving an initiative by the Russians, turned for permission to the ulama or representatives of the clergy. But the fanatic representatives of the clergy supported by an enormous crowd of mullahs and employees of the medrese, raised a terrible cry. They shouted: "We will not foresake our faith out of fear, we know only one lord, the sole creator who sends illnesses and cures them," and they nullified all the proposals of the commission [87, pp 596-599].

Another example. In September 1917, in Bukhara the new method schools were closed down by the government without any justification. To the urgent demands of the Russian residents to open them, the emir replied that "he perfectly recognized all the illegality of such a measure, particularly as the new-method schools had existed for a very long time in the capital, but in the given instance he was completely powerless to undertake anything, as their closure had been demanded by the Bukhara clergy in the person of the supreme judge" [375, p 988].

In the prerevolutionary theocratic states, the Moslem institutions and organizations represented a significant economic force. They possessed waqf, chattels and real estate (in rural localities, canals and other irrigation works, mills and arable land; in the towns, artisan shops, stores, rows of stalls, carvanserais, and so forth), property bequeathed by the ruler or individuals to the mosques, medrese, the residences of dervishes (hanaka), and the graves of "saints." The waqf also included the charitable institutions (hospitals, homes for wayfarers, shelters for the elderly, widows and orphans), and so forth.

Anything bequeathed to a religious institution was considered, according to Moslem legislation, to be its property. This property could not be sold, mortgaged, presented as a gift or turned over to a private individual. In individual instances persons bequeathing some property could impose certain conditions for its use, and keep the right to appoint the persons who would manage this property. But they were deprived of the right to cancel the document of bequest, or to regain ownership of the property bequeathed to the waqf.

A portion of the income earned by all this property went directly to support religious and charitable institutions, and the remainder comprising, obviously, a large portion was distributed between the superiors and

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trustees of the mosques (the mutawallias), the kadias, the Moslem theologians, and the teachers of the medrese [80, Vol 2; 338].

There were also personal or family waqufs, or special institutions for supporting the families of the sayyids, the offspring of respected Sufi sheikhs and other families. In them the title of mutawallia, that is, the controller of the waquf (usually hereditary), belonged to the head of the given family.

In possessing significant lands which often were worked by the population gratis, the religious organizations obtained enormous income, and played a marked role in the economic life of the feudal state. In Eastern Bukhara, the waquf lands comprised 24.2 percent of the total area [163, p 422]. As a whole in the Bukhara khanate, various authors have put from 10 to 20 percent of the land as belonging to the waquf lands. According to selective data, the waquf lands in the Khiva Khanate reached 32 percent [176, p 21]. According to another source, in Khorzma, prior to the revolution the waqfs comprised 23-24 percent of all the cultivated lands [318, p 231].

The large guild of the employees of the numerous medrese was also a support for the clergy of Bukhara. The mood of the medrese officials was widely used in selecting the highest officials, up to the kazi-kalon, for displacing high officials of the khanate who displeased the clergy or for eliminating one or another phenomenon which was undesirable from the shariat viewpoint in the social life of the nation. And hence the desire of the medrese teachers to win the favor of the students and use them in their own interests and the fawning before the mudarris of highly placed officials who understood the shakiness of their position, since a hostile mood on the part of the teachers could ruin their official career. The government was also forced to consider the mass actions of the medrese officials.

In the prerevolutionary theocratic states, the social composition of the Moslem clergy was not homogeneous. Not all its representatives had equal privileges or held the same position in society. We feel it is not completely accurate to assert that the clergy "usually" derived from the privileged groups such as the sayyids, hoj and mirs, and that "many representatives of the clergy such as the mullahs, ishan and kazi" were feudal lords, while a majority of the students in the Moslem religious schools "were sons of rich parents, although children of poor families were infrequently encountered among them...." [235, pp 73-75].

The basic portion of the clergy came, however, from the poor strata of the population who in the society held an intermediate position between the feudal lords, the administrative representatives and the working people. Without being able to study for long years in the medrese and without having influential acquaintances and means for presenting gifts to the emir officials, they could not even dream of the position of a mudarris or of working in the famous mosques which had rich waqufs. Their lot was a humble place of imam in the parish mosque which made it possible to exist just

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comfortably, but did not provide an opportunity to constantly enrich oneself, to purchase new lands, and so forth. We share the opinion [243, p 59] that while the Bukhara feudal officials, along with the higher clergy which even had ranks, could be considered as among the ruling, exploiting class of Bukhara society, the lower clergy, like the students of the medrese, in Bukhara comprised an intermediate social stratum of society. The latter possessed their own plots of land, but they worked it basically by the forces of their own parishoners. They were totally dependent upon the feudal lords and the rich, but themselves did not complain of the absence of daily bread.

We would point out that all of this did not prevent the rank and file clergy from holding the position of the exploiting classes, and actively defend their interests, and not the interests of the class from which it had emerged. In the given instance, here decisive significance was assumed not by its class affiliation but rather its social or official affiliation, its role in the theocratic feudal system. In this society, the exploiting class was limited to just those who had personal power over the producers working for it. And the indoctrination of the masses in a spirit convenient to the exploiting class was a function of the Moslem clergy which in its activities did not go beyond the limits of the ideals and teachings of Islam, the dogmas of the Koran, and the justification and defense of the feudal system. In brief, the activities of the Islamic clergy were determined by the demands of the ruling class, and did not go beyond the limits of these demands. These activities were not and could not be, in their essence, progressive, and could not contribute to the growth of the social activeness of the masses. They were limited merely to the stabilization and strengthening of the existing generation. For this reason, without considering its influence on the masses and the place held by it in social life, it would be difficult to fully imagine the mechanism by which Islam carried out its integrative function. Precisely the imam of the parish (mahalla or district) mosque played the leading role in religious propaganda and in the daily life of the population point.

The strengthening of the impact of the rank and file clergy on the workers was enormously aided by the fact that the clergy lived among the people and differed little from the simple people. The comment of F. Engels that "the free and untrammelled life of the well-fed bishops, abbots and their army of monks aroused the envy of the nobility and the indignation of the people who had to pay for all of this, and this indignation became all the stronger the more striking the flagrant contradiction between the way of life of these prelates and their sermons," and as for the village priests, since they tasted little of the easy life, "the hate of the people for the popes was directed against them only in individual instances" [27, pp 351-352] applies equally to the Moslem clergy of Central Asia, the superior and inferior.

But the specific status of the rank and file clergy in social life contributed to the successful activities of Islam aimed at impeding any

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attempt to rise up against the existing order, and instill submissiveness and patience.

It cannot be said that the mosque imam was the most prestigious member in a city district. In each district, in addition to him, there lived religious figures who were his superior, who were better educated and respected by the population. The mosque imam himself often depended upon the will and desire of the rich parishoners who had an equally strong influence on the minds and philosophy of the parishoners as the imam himself.

But it would be wrong to play down the role of the mosque imam in the city. He was an expert on religious law and its interpreter for the population, particularly the poor part, and he influenced the shaping of public opinion in the district, he condemned or supported the actions of one or another person from the viewpoint of the shariat, and he could do this publically. He was the spiritual leader of the parishoners. He watched over their morality, their observance of the prescripts of the shariat, and condemned violators. In addition, he participated in all family events in the life of the parishoners. He performed marriages, he read prayers for the sick, he was present at weddings and funeral feasts, and so forth. And in all these events the imam was among the most respected persons of the district, although he was not the first in the distributing of gifts. Finally, in a majority of instances the imam was simultaneously the teacher of the local school, and because of this also influenced the adults.

Thus the imam of the district mosque in a city had great opportunities for an ideological influence of the parishoners. And in forcing the people "to the path of truth," he always proceeded from the interests of the ruling class, and used his force and authority for sanctifying the existing system.

A different position was held by a member of the clergy in a rural community (86 percent of the central Asian population lived in the countryside before the revolution). Here he was almost if not the only literate and educated person among the parishoners. Also he had no rival in the area of performing various religious rites, for the lack of even little educated people.

The activities of the imam in the Central Asian village were not restricted to mere religious and ritual limits. He participated directly in managing all the affairs of the rural community, having an important voice in settling all questions, he was involved, without exception, in all the civil matters, and took part in the collection of taxes. The imam was the advisor of the villager on all vital questions, he was the teacher of the children and the "main physician" of the village, as he was able to read prescriptions in the books, and he also made up and sold amulets (tumars) which provided protection against all sorts of illnesses and misfortunes.

Not only because of his position in the religious community but also due to his relative education, the imam had a decisive effect on all the questions

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of his community, he shaped public opinion, and influenced the development of the individual personality. As one of the prerevolutionary researchers wrote, the simple people turned to the imam for all vital questions, "beginning with the purchasing of asses and ending with the marrying of sons, the giving of daughters and the repairing of old samovars" [90, p 3]. The people trusted him, in feeling that in his words and actions he was guided not by his own considerations and did not think them up, but read them out of books which proclaimed only the "truth."

Under the conditions of total illiteracy, there could be no other attitude toward the clergy and their words. The population of prerevolutionary Central Asia lived under conditions when any other sources of information were lacking aside from the living word of the imam who was the only interpreter of a hum-drum life which was exceptionally poor in events, and who held the dominant position in the life of the community.

Only the imam possessed a store of then-existing knowledge about nature and its phenomena, astronomy, medicine, social life, history, and so forth, and the absolutely illiterate people could not help but defer to this. Moreover, in the hands of the imam the written word and the ability to write were weapons of colossal force. Precisely the imam, as a rule, was the only reader and interpreter of the Koran, the creation of Allah. For the Moslems the Koran was not only a "sacred book," but also a focus of knowledge about the world and a defense against everything that could bring evil. The Moslem who was confronted by any important question such as entering a marriage or divorcing a wife, purchasing a house or selling it, leaving on a trip, the starting of sowing and harvesting, and so forth, turned to the Koran, trying to predetermine ahead of time how this would end. For this he should, as the theological books taught, having performed ablution, read the first chapter of the Koran, the "fatiha" and aft-ul-kursi [2:256], and the prayer which was to be read ten times in such instances. After this the Moslem opened the book at random and read the first lines his eyes fell on. If the words of the Koran had a favorable sense for him, he undertook what was planned, and if not refused [363, p 66].

Only a literate person could allow himself to turn to the Koran in such a manner. But since a majority of the population was illiterate, the people wore fragments from the Koran in the form of amulets and purchased various articles such as vessels, glasses and ornaments with imprinted lines from the "sacred book." Such an attitude toward the Koran naturally elevated the imam, the only reader and interpreter of the Koran, in the eyes of the people.

The imam both in the city and countryside did not receive a definite fee for his work. The parishoners paid him proceeding from their ability, from 20 kopecks up to 1 ruble a year. He received a separate fee for performing religious rites: from 20 kopecks to 2 rubles for a burial or performing the marriage rite; a fixed fee was given for a wedding [371, p 8].

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In the Bukhara Khanate, among the various taxes there was also the so-called mushtak ("handful") or voluntary (in actuality compulsory) gift for the clergy and inferior administration. The mushtak was paid in kind, in grain products [340, p 394].

It is also important to consider that "like in hypnosis, the repetition of what is to be suggested intensifies the effect, that is, eliminates the vestiges of resistance to suggestion, so in social life repetition and insistence are a powerful weapon of 'collective ideas'." "Tradition, custom, cult and ritual...all of this in the history of the peoples of the world has been a very effective means for eradicating self-will and arbitrariness, that is, to nip in the bud the negativism of conduct" [345, pp 14-24]. But here the opportunities to introduce something new and to alter the existing orders were null. The authority of Islam and its servants was surrounded by a halo of sanctity. All that related to Islam resided within the confines of exclusive faith. A person accepted the words of the priest without resisting, and without permitting the idea of the necessity or possibility of testing out what was said to him.

What has been said does not mean that the Moslem clergy had the sympathy of the people. The clergy was considered, his advice was obeyed and it was followed realizing that its prayers and the services carried out under its leadership played a salvational role for the community. In brief, the attitude toward Islam was transferred to the priest, as the priest was the servant and transmitter of the teachings of Islam in the eyes of the people. But the Moslem made a clear distinction between the position held by the imam in the community and his personality, that is, between the "holy" and temporal realms. Hence the natural antipathy which the people showed to the Islamic priests. Such an attitude toward the clergy has also been reflected in the folklore, in the numberless sayings and proverbs, parables and tales widespread among the people about "unjust judges" and their misdeeds and crimes. For example: "No one has seen the money of a mullah, the conscience of a judge or the eyes of a mole," "Do what the mullah says and don't do what he does," "Don't look for feet on a serpent and don't ask the mullah to borrow money," "A bad horse is an ambler and a bad man is a mullah," "If the mullah's turban is white, his insides are black," "A donkey will not pass a bullock cart, and a mullah will not go around a Bey," and "Two mullahs are one person, one mullah is a half-man."

The hate and disdain for the Islamic clergy undermined the world the order of which seemed eternally established. But such an attitude toward the clergy caused by its amorality did not necessarily mean a manifestation of antireligiousness. "On the contrary, these feelings existed along with the most profound internal religious drives. Sometimes precisely the force of religious feeling gave rise to hate for the clergy whose way of life objectively undermined the devoutness of the flock. There are numerous examples of how monstrously devoutness and sinfulness, religiousness and illegality, the idealization of sanctity and a rigidity of morals and conduct reaching the point of bestiality at times could coexist" [425, pp 54-56].

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The system of public education played a leading role in carrying out Islam's integrative function in the life of society [133; 201; 230; 325; 373]. An absolute majority of the schools existing in prerevolutionary Central Asia had a fully confessional nature, they were run under the district mosques, and their teachers were professional Islamic officials.

Precisely through the religious schools or maktab (mektebs or maktab-khana) feudal society carried out its indoctrinational function, and introduced into the conscience of the younger generation the demands of Islam, and saw to it that these became the standards of daily conduct and were unswervingly observed. The school in every possible way reinforced the religious notions instilled in the child by the family and the social milieu.

In the schools there were no curricula, the teacher had no notion of any pedagogical systems, and instruction was based not on reasoned assimilation but rather on recitation and rote. In the maktab a great deal of time was devoted to learning the difficult Arabic alphabet.

The main content of instruction was to learn the parts of the Koran and the "Chahar-Qitaba" ("Quatrains") consisting of four parts: the "Hawk" or an explanation of the rules of ablution and anointment; the "Pail" or the admission of faith; the "Kaliknabi" or the accounting of legends, and the "Hamdekat" or excerpts from the shariat.

"The more one lives in this world, the more sins one acquires, and for this reason be concerned now for the afterlife"--this was the sense of another textbook, the "Sufi-Allayara" published in 1910 in Tashkent. Verses of a religious and mystical nature were selected for study in the religious schools and from the works of Hafiz, Fuzuli, Bedil and other famous Eastern poets. The most industrious studied the "Abad-al-Salihin" or a code of decorum in the East completely permeated with the spirit of Islam.

All the books studied in the religious schools were written in the Arab and Persian languages which were incomprehensible not only for the students but also for many teachers. For this reason no wonder that a large portion of the teaching time was spent on learning them. After 6 or 7 years of instruction, the children could only read in a sing-song voice verses that were incomprehensible for them, they knew the letters but could not always read let alone write.

But such a system of education encompassed boys almost exclusively. Only in the cities were there primary schools for girls and these were basically attended by children from the well-off strata, the merchants and the clergy. Exercises were ordinarily carried out in the home of a female teacher, the atun-bi. The number of such urban schools for girls reached approximately one-quarter of the total number of maktab. But in the rural localities, these schools were an exceptional rarity, and for every hundred maktab there were one or two such girls schools, and in the latter there

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were significantly fewer students than in any maktab. The course of instruction in the maktab and girls schools was approximately the same, but in the girls schools they were somewhat less concerned with the Arabic texts (the Koran), and more with religious poetic texts in Tadjik-Persian and Turkic languages. The girls were not taught to write "so that they would not send any love letters" [133, pp 46-47].

After the maktab, the next level of education was instruction in the medrese, the secondary and higher Moslem schools. As a total on just the territory of prerevolutionary Uzbekistan there were over 400 medrese [308a, p 37]. Basically the medrese were concentrated in cities, but they were also found in large villages. Students from all over Central Asia and other regions of the Russian empire as well as from abroad came to attend the Bukhara medrese.

Up to the October Revolution the medrese taught as basic courses the ones which had been established back in the 11th-12th centuries, and reflected the culture of the ancient Moslem world. For example, the textbook of formal logic (the "Shamsia") and the commentary for it had been compiled in the 8th century, the "Akaid" a book containing an account of the principles of the Moslem faith dated to the 12th century, while the shariat, a compendium of religious, civil, criminal and other state and social standards stated in accord with the Koran and the canonical legends was written in the 8th-9th centuries, and so forth.

The "science" studied in the medrese had a close tie to religion. This was emphasized from the very first days the student attended the medrese. The exercises commenced by learning by heart the brief Moslem catechism or "Aval-i-Ilm" ("The Beginning of Science") compiled in the form of questions and answers.

The theological-legal "science" studied in the medrese was based completely on statements of Moslem authorities. It came down to learning the words of the Prophet himself as written down in the Koran; the legends about the Prophet which supplemented the Koran; evidence of persons who had conversed personally with the Prophet; information of persons who personally knew any of the already mentioned persons, and explanations of other persons who lived not later than 400 years after the death of Muhammad.

The students in the medrese gave much less attention to studying the individual books of a "general educational" nature and which provided information of Arab scholars from the age of the flourishing of Islam on metaphysics, cosmography and astrology, and representing collections of fantastic tales on geography, natural sciences and history. For example, one such book asserted that in the world four elements predominated: fire, water, wind and land. Fire, it asserted, was between the moon and the wind, the wind was between the spheres of fire and water, water was between the wind and the earth, while the earth was surrounded by the remaining elements. The entire human race consisted of seven races: Chinese,

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Turks, Europeans, Arabs, Persians, Hindus, and Negroes, in the same manner that there were seven heavens, seven planetary systems, seven parts of the world, seven seas, and so forth.

The medrese turned out persons who were fanatically loyal to Islam and who were the bulwark of Islam and hostile to anything new if in any way it disputed the dogma of Islam. As was pointed out by the well known Uzbek philosopher I. M. Miminov, "natural knowledge which was recognized and developed in the works of Biruni, Ibn Sina, Ulugbek and other scholars was completely unknown not only among the broad masses of people but also by certain scholars...of Central Asia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. An understanding of the most elementary data on natural science was considered the greatest sin, and for this reason the carriers of such ideas were mercilessly persecuted by the clergy" [308a, p 47].

The annexation of Central Asia by Russia led to certain changes in the status of the maktab and medrese. Both in Turkestan and the Vassal Khanates, children began to be instructed using printed textbooks for the Moslem schools and published in Kazan; lithographed textbooks began to be published also in Tashkent. But the maktab and medrese in the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates (right up to the revolution) fully maintained their Medieval orders. In Turkestan the content of education remained essentially unchanged, and lessons in Russian were introduced only in certain (individual) medrese. The only innovation in the traditional maktab was the replacement of a written system of instruction by instruction using a sound method and lithographed primers.

The growth of the national bourgeoisie and the need for persons who possessed real knowledge led to the appearance of the so-called new-method schools. These schools were to provide the students with real knowledge on the bases of arithmetic, history and geography needed for the changing conditions of life. However, the new-method schools encompassed only an insignificant part of the children, basically urban. Suffice it to point out that by 1917, there were just 92 new-method schools which had been counted by the administration in Turkestan. Instruction in them largely remained religious, with up to 80 percent of the teaching time being given to the study of religious disciplines. The mass of new-method school children did not escape the influence of Moslem traditions. The new-method teachers endeavored to show that their students read the Koran and answered questions better than the grinds in the traditional maktab (public examinations were organized). Religious instruction and indoctrination in the new-method maktab were carried out both in special lessons, in extracurricular work, and using articles in readers and texts for penmanship [224, Vol 2, pp 403-404].

And the attitude of the population itself to these unusual schools was not the most positive. Instigated by the clergy which in its majority was categorically against such schools, the population saw in them a retreat from the age-old foundations, and viewed their students and teachers as deviating from the faith.

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In the 1880's there appeared the first so-called Russian-native schools which arose out of the need for translators and workers who knew Russian and the local languages and were capable of working in the state institutions, where, as a rule, office work was carried out exclusively in Russian. These schools taught Russian and arithmetic, within the limits of the first four operations with integers, and the students were given elementary information on history and geography (mainly of Russia) and natural science. Both "native writing" and the bases of the Moslem religion were also not forgotten.

The Russian-native schools certainly played a definite role in spreading Russian reading and writing, Russian language and Russian culture among the indigenous population, and they played a certain progressive role in comparison with the conservative maktab and medrese in developing the cultural life of the Turkestan peoples. But the philosophy of their graduates, according to V. Nalivkin, "in no way differed from the native society surrounding them" [311, p 111]. Moreover, there were insignificantly few of them to have any marked influence whatsoever on the life of the people, let alone for neutralizing the influence of the religious schools.

The attempt by a group of Russian pedagogues to set up a similar school for women was not supported by the tsarist authorities and the only such school opened at the beginning of the 20th century was soon shut down.

These students of local nationalities, as a rule children of wealthy parents, who studied in the Russian secondary general educational and special schools were a "drop in the bucket." For example, in 1896, ten "native" boys (3 percent) and eight girls (2.6 percent) were studying in the women's and men's high schools of the city of Tashkent. In the Tashkent teachers seminary, during the first 25 years of its existence from 1879 through 1904, a total of 415 persons received instruction, including just 65 "natives" [236, Vol 5, pp 68-70].

Thus, right up to the October Revolution itself, public education in Central Asia was totally in the hands of the Moslem clergy. Here it is important to point out that a majority of the graduates from the religious schools were not fully literate and remained semiliterate. The annexation of Central Asia by Russia did not make any fundamental changes in the educational system for the native population.

Literacy among the indigenous population of Central Asia did not exceed 2-3 percent. Prior to the revolution, only two or three women out of a thousand were able to write their names. In Kitabskaya Volost, for example, on the eve of the October Revolution, out of 1,275 women only 1 was literate, and in Vabkentskaya Oblast, out of 1,399, also just 1, and in Karakul'skaya Volost, not even 1. Out of the 23,321 women in Narpayskiy Rayon in Samarkandskaya Oblast, 14 knew how to read and write [231, p 12]. And this was in a period when in the European nations illiteracy was 1-2 percent of the population, and even among the American negroes, 56 percent [357, p 295].

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The integrative function of Islam in the prerevolutionary Central Asian society cannot be correctly understood and explained without an analysis of the role which religion played in the ethnic processes and in the process of the shaping of the nationalities. Researchers are unanimous in the opinion that under the conditions of a feudal society, often religious unity meant more than ethnic unity [148, p 109; 178, p 34; 181, p 46; 324, pp 29-30, and others]. What was the mechanism of the affect of religion on the ethnic? How was the greater importance of the religion over the ethnic manifested in the life of the Central Asian nationalities? Was this always felt everywhere?

A specific feature in the formation of the Central Asian nationalities, without consideration of which it is impossible to explain the relationship of the religious and the national both in the past and at the present, is the following: these nationalities arose out of families and tribes which previously had accepted Islam, and among the Kirgiz and Kazakhs, the process of the forming of nationalities was accompanied by the spread and strengthening of the positions of Islam. Although among the peoples of Central Asia the traits of ethnic commonness (the bases of languages, ethnic territory, the ethnographic specific features of economic life) began to develop in the 9th-11th centuries, due to a number of historical factors, the concluding stage in the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs and Kirgiz dates to the 16th century. The completion of the process of the formation of the Turkmen nationality dates to the 14th-15th centuries, and for the Tadzhik to the 13th century.

During the period we are investigating, that is, on the eve of the October Revolution, the peoples of Central Asia represented types of ethnic communities characteristic for the feudal age and termed nationalities. They were known as completely formed ethnic groups with their own languages, types of economy, particular features of everyday life, material and spiritual culture; they had their own ethnonyms established for their basic ethnic groups, and inhabited territories, that is, they possessed all the specific distinguishing features of an ethnic group.

At the same time inherent to them were all those traits which distinguish a nationality from a nation, including: a multiplicity of dialectal differences in languages and local variations in culture and everyday life, and a duality of ethnic self-awareness, that is, an awareness of belonging not only to a definite people but also to a local, oblast, country or vestigial group. Among the Tadzhik and settled Uzbek farmers there was a country self-awareness as a second self-awareness, while among the Turkmens, the Kazakhs, the Karakulpaks and Kirgiz (nomadic and semisettled) as well as among the seminomadic Uzbeks, with a varying degree of strength, an awareness of belonging to a definite kinship and tribal group survived [191, pp 15-16].

The process of national consolidation and the formation of bourgeois nations which started after the annexation of Central Asia by Russia had not been completed before the revolution. Here capitalist relationships had

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not been able to conquer the feudal system, and here one must see the primary reason for the incompleteness of national consolidation. The national bourgeoisie which had begun to form did not represent a force capable of acting as the carrier of national ties or to establish its economic and political domination. Precisely "the bourgeoisie, due to its industry, its trade and its political institutions, works on breaking up the small, self-contained individual localities which live only for their own interests and taking them out of their isolation, on linking them with one another, merging their interests together, broadening their local viewpoint, destroying their local customs, fashions and views, and from the many hitherto independent provinces and localities, to form a great nation with common interests, morals and views" [23a, p 355].

In prerevolutionary Central Asia, the other basic carrier of national ties, the proletariat, was also very small. The presence of colonial and national suppression and the absence of states with a homogeneous ethnic composition also were an important factor which impeded the formation of bourgeois nations. For example, in the Khiva Khanate there lived Uzbeks who kept sharply separate from the Sarts, the descendants of the ancient indigenous population, and from the descendants of the Deshtikipchak Uzbeks who had preserved their kinship and tribal division, as well as the Turkmen, Karakalpaks and Kazakhs. In the Bukhara Khante there lived representatives of all these peoples, as well as individual small groups of Arabs, Jews, Persians, and others. The population of the Turkestan Governor Generalship consisted of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks and Uighurs.

Among the Central Asian peoples there was no notion of a fatherland, and a feeling of the national unity of their "land" was little developed, and localism was strongly felt. "The concept of a motherland," M. G. Vakhabov has commented, "was often limited to one's own town and village. For example, the Uzbeks in three farming oblasts of Turkestan divided themselves by place of residence as well as along tribal and kinship lines. The traces of former 'autonomy' were still noticeably felt both for the individual villages and towns as well as the 'lands' of the kinship groups and tribes. Each town or village opposed the other as an independent land" [296, pp 155-156].

The fact that in prerevolutionary Central Asia Islam played a definite integrating role in the ethnic processes was a consequence of what has been said.

In the development of national self-awareness, researchers have seen two aspects which are parallel and sometimes outstrip one another and are interrelated: development in depth and in width in spatial terms. Development in depth is the formation of the ideological aspect of national self-awareness, a deepening of an understanding of national ideals, in the relation of national ideals with social ones, that is, conforming to the interests of the entire nation. The development of national self-awareness in depth, the researchers point out, occurred in stages, and the initial

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stage of this process, ethnic awareness, is closely tied to religion [270, pp 23-24].

Under the conditions when the most important factors contributing to the development of national self-awareness in breadth (the development of capitalist relations, the formation of a unified economic market, a single territory, state and so forth) were absent, naturally Islam had a marked impact upon the development and shaping of ethnic awareness. (This was largely aided by the particular feature of Islam as a religion, the specific conditions of its existence, as well as other factors which will be taken up below.)

This was expressed primarily in the fact that the ideal of the individual in all the prerevolutionary Central Asian societies and the notion of people of what the representative of a given group should be, proceeded primarily from the attitude of man toward religion. The nationalities, depending upon the socioeconomic conditions of their everyday life, could impart various traits to their ideal (bravery, entrepreneurship, cleverness, and so forth), but the dominating value inherent to all of them was the belonging to Islam. Precisely the belonging to Islam and the consequences stemming from this (the observance of rites, the legal standards of life, and so forth) held the leading role in the system of social relationships and determined the way of conduct.

Islam was the common value for all, a value which regulated relationships and imposed on them a definite system of duties and precepts common for all and obligatory for all. Islam was that force which facilitated the reciprocal existence of the various tribes, it strengthened their relationships from within, it provided them with an internal link, and mitigated and eliminated the psychic differences between the tribes and ethnic communities, creating an illusion of spiritual unity.

The members of one or another kinship group or tribe were aware, certainly, of their belonging to a specific group, that is, ethnic self-awareness and a notion like "we" and "they" existed among them. But precisely through Islam, in identifying their attitude toward religion and the attitude of other tribes and kinship groups to it, they identified with them, and went beyond the confines of a microgroup. Islam helped to shape the notions of the ethnic community of the different tribes and groups comprising one or another nationality. Affirmation of this was the circumstance that a characteristic trait in the ethnic self-awareness was, on the one hand, a notion of one's ethnic group belonging to Islam, and the conviction that to be a Moslem was a congenital trait, and on the other, the incipient notion of a common origin.<sup>4</sup>

Let us take up our first assertion. The kinship groups and tribes had their own genealogies called shezhere (shajara), and these contained valuable information on their origin, but without fail these traced the beginning of the group back to Muhammad himself or to his descendants, and various miracles related to the conversion of their ancestors to Islam were ascribed to them.

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Thus, according to the shezhere of the Kirgiz, they derived from Erkesh, the standard bearer of Muhammad [84, p 267]. And according to the genealogy of the Turkmen, they derived from Oguz, from whose descendants, in turn, individual Turkmen tribes trace their history. As for Oguz, he was, according to legend, a direct descendent of Adam who was created by Allah. His father Kara-Khan "wintered in the mouth of the Syr River, in the Karakums and in Bursuka." When born, he, according to the legend, for several days refused to nurse, and at night he appeared to his mother in her dreams and said: "Oh mother, become a Moslem. If you do not, even if [I should die], I will not drink your milk." The mother, not wishing her son to die, accepted the unity of God, but did not tell anyone of this. It turned out, their ancestors previously had been believers, but due to the fact that they had gained so much goods and livestock, they forgot God and became disbelievers.

A year after the birth of the child, according to custom, the legend goes on to relate, Kara-Khan summoned his friends and asked them to name the son, but immediately the voice of the boy was heard: "My name is Oguz." The boy who could not yet speak continuously repeated "Allah, Allah." It turned out that the "most-high God even in the mother's womb had made Oguz his favorite and had put his name in his heart and mouth."

When Oguz married, he converted his wife to Islam. The secret was broken. Kara-Khan went to war against his son, but the "most-high God made Oguz-Khan the victor," and Kara-Khan was killed. Oguz-Khan, having become the ruler, urged all to become Moslems, and "those who did not, he persecuted and even slaughtered [while] he sold their children into slavery" [258, pp 38-42].

Among the Turks settled in the southern regions of Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan, there was a popular legend about their mythical ancestor Turki-Tugiane who supposedly lived during the times of Muhammad and once saved the Prophet and his troops from a defeat, and in gratitude for this received His blessing. This legend fully coincides with the legend about the origin of the Uzbeks [235a, p 165].

Islam helped to overcome the "duality of ethnic self-awareness" among the ethnic groups with vestiges of a kinship-tribal ethnic structure and a patriarchal way of life. As is known, they had notions of common origin and historic fates and the integrity of those tribal groups which comprised the given nationality. These concepts reflected in a unique form of genealogical and historical legends, were found among the Turkmen, Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Karakalpaks.

The influence of Islam on ethnic awareness and age-old ethnic processes, in our opinion, occurred also by a different way. As is known, in the past, along with close cultural-economic and political relationships, there also existed both continuous and intensive ethnic ties both within the tribes comprising one nationality and between the tribes belonging to different nationalities. Thus, individual groups of Kirgiz trace their genealogical origin to the Volga-Kama Bulgars, to the Nogai Horde, and they are related

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to the Kazakhs, Sarts and Kipchaks, the Uzbeks and Karakalpaks. All of this contributed to the assimilation of small groups of different origin as part of the Kirgiz tribes [84, pp 33-34]. Similar processes were also observed among other nationalities. For example, the Kazakhs who in the middle of the 19th century had settled among the Uzbeks in Northern Turkmenistan to a significant degree had accepted Uzbek culture. The groups of Karakalpaks who also settled there among the Uzbeks almost fully adopted their culture [153, p 371]. The Turkmen of the Yoychi group in the Salor tribe who from the middle of the 19th century lived in several villages of Pastdargom (Samarkandskaya Oblast) not only recalled their Turkmen origin but also continued to maintain ties with near and far fellow Turkmen. At the same time this originally Turkmen population is considered even among the closest neighbors as Bukharan Uzbeks; they concluded marriages with the Bukharans from settlements of not only Turkmen origin but even Uzbek and Tadzhik [466a, pp 28-29].

Each of the Central Asian nationalities in the process of its formation picked up a great diversity of ethnic components. For example, the Turks played a marked role in the formation of the Tadzhik population; the latter, in turn, played a role in the formation of the early Uzbek tribes. The Lokai Uzbeks included ethnic elements of Kirgiz origin. The latter also participated in forming the ethnic core of the Uzbek Katagan tribe. The Tadzhiks incorporated early Uzbek tribes. At the same time, certain Tadzhik groups derived their origin from Uzbeks. Many instances have been established when individual tribes were completely dissolved in the surrounding population, losing their notion of the particular features of ethnic groups (see [235a]). It is also known that the Kipchaks, as one of the major components in the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks, participated in the formation of many other Turkic-speaking peoples such as the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, Turkmen, Tatars, Bashkirs, Altaians and certain nationalities of the Northern Caucasus (Nogais, Karachais, and other).

In all of this, certainly, the leading role was played by the common cultural life, by the closeness of language dictated by the commonness of socioeconomic conditions, customs, traditions, and so forth. But such processes, in our opinion, would not have been possible without a common religion which acted as the leading integrative force in the formation of ethnic communities from the tribes and kinship groups. This was largely aided by the fact that a predominant majority of the Central Asian Moslems professed the same school of Islam, Sunnism, and belonged to one of its sects (mazhab), the Hanafite. All the Central Asian indigenous nationalities (with the exception of the Tadzhiks) also spoke similar languages. Due to the spread of Islam there was no fundamental break in the linguistic structure of the Central Asian peoples, but the spread of the dogmas and teachings of Islam in the Arabic language had a rather intensive effect on them and led to the appearance of specific turns of phrases and words in their languages. Suffice it to say that the vocabulary of the Persian and Turkish languages is half made up of Arabic roots [106, p 26]. The common writing based on the Arabic script also contributed to the rise of a feeling of unity among the different tribes and nationalities. This script

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arrived among the peoples not having their own writing with the spread of Islam among them.

Thus, the relationship of the Islamic and the national cannot be considered a phenomenon inherent only to the modern times, but rather it goes back far into antiquity. This relationship arose when Islam took up an important place in the ethnic self-awareness, and served as a factor integrating the various tribes, kinship groups and ethnic groups. This relationship was also reflected in the then-forming ethnic psychology, the values of life, and the sets of the developing nationalities, and came to hold a firm place in their daily life.

As an example, take the personal names of the Central Asian peoples which gradually were replaced predominantly by Arabic ones as well as Iranian and ancient Greek ones. In first place, among the most widely found were the names directly related to the ideology of Islam. Particularly numerous were the names related to the 9 "better" or "excellent" epithets ("asma-alhusna") of Allah: Abdukarim ("slave of the Mighty"), Abdulahad ("slave of the One"), Abdulaziz ("slave of the Powerful"), Abdulgafur ("slave of the Forgiver"), Abduljalil ("slave of the Great"), and so forth. Often encountered was the name of Muhammad (Magomet, Mamed and other variations), including all sorts of combinations: Muhammad-niyaz ("gift of Muhammad"), Muhammadi ("follower of Muhammad"), Muhammadkuli ("slave of Muhammad"), Muhammadnazar ("view of Muhammad"). Also widely found were the names of the first Islamic figures such as Ali, Abu Bakr, Asman and others.<sup>5</sup> Also frequent were names related to the component "din" ("faith" or "religion") such as Saifutdin ("sword of religion"), Zainetdin ("adornment of religion"), Dinali ("religion of Ali"), Dinmuhammad ("religion of Muhammad"), as well as the names of the wives and daughters of Muhammad such as Aisha, Harija (Hadicha), Fatima (Patima, Batima, Patma, Batma), and others.

Of course, this does not mean that the Turkic names completely went out of use. Regardless of the exceptional influence on the anthroponymy of the Turkic peoples, Islam nevertheless was unable to fully drive out the old, traditional names. Moreover the strength of Islam's influence on the anthroponymy of one or another nationality was largely determined by the length of its dominance. For example, if one takes the names of the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks and the names of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, among the latter who became Moslems much later, the influence of Islam is less felt. But it can be said with confidence that among all the Central Asian peoples, the pre-Islamic names remained in a minority [320, pp 88-90; see also 162].

It would be incorrect to absolutize the primacy of the religious over the ethnic under the conditions of a feudal society. Islam played an integrative role, in the first place, only among the followers of one religious school; in the relationships of the followers of Sunnism and Shiism or the Moslems and infidels, as we will see below, it played an outrightly disintegrating role. Secondly, the notions of the members of the different kinship groups and tribes on their common origin and religion were not always capable of undoing the kinship exclusiveness and resolve the socio-ethnic contradictions inherent to the feudal system.

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One of the particular features of a late tribe is the "unusual strength of kinship-tribal relationships in the area of ideology and ethnic self-awareness. It also served as a strong factor for preserving archaic traits of social and ethnic structures" [355, p 19]. This was particularly noticeable under conditions when a kinship-tribal or country principle lay at the basis of settlement.

For example, in the Pastdargom region, individual small kinship subdivisions of the Uzbeks, Arabs and Turkmen or persons coming from one locality (among the Tadzhiks, Bukharans and Hoj), although living on lands irrigated by the same canal and in very nearby villages, did not marry one another, and maintained very loose relations. At the same time, for an extended period they continued to maintain contact and conclude marriages with relatives remaining in the homeland. While marriages between Uzbek groups of different tribes were sometimes encountered, marriages of Uzbeks with Arabs, let alone "Ironi" [Iranians] and gypsies, were extremely rarely observed.

Exceptionally rare were marriages of Turkmen with representatives of other nationalities. Also few in number were marriages of Uzbeks with Kirgiz and Tadzhik women, and even more rarely did Uzbek women marry Kirgiz and Tadzhik men. The concluding of international marriages was not approved by the clergy. Among the Uzbeks there was even noted a prejudice against the peoples of the same faith, for example for the Tatars, since it was felt that they had become accustomed to the habits of the "infidels" [153, p 263; 124, p 112; 371, Vol 1, pp 84-96].

For the sake of justice it must be pointed out that the researchers explain such a phenomenon not only by traditions but also by a desire to keep the land among one's own (and among the poor also to avoid paying a dowry by exchanging girls between families).

Another example. In Tashkent, during the prerevolutionary years there lived a significant number of Tatars employed primarily in trade and close to the native residents in language and religion. However they did not go to the mosques attended by the Uzbeks, but had their own parish mosque and, regardless of the "shortage of eligible males" rarely married the "native elements." In 1886-1899, just 52 marriages were concluded by them, including 7 with representatives of the local nationality. The latter all ended in divorce: 6 for the reason of "lack of love," and 1 because of the departure of the husband to Russia.

Islam, thus, "substantially impeded the development of ethnic self-awareness; the awareness of belonging to a definite nationality was overlaid by an awareness of belonging to an ethnically heterogeneous religious community of Moslems" [193, p 24].

The disintegrating function of Islam was particularly apparent in the relationships between the followers of its various schools as well as the Moslems and the heterodox. As is known, in Central Asia, along with the Sunnites and Hanafites, there lived the followers of Shiism and its

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individual sects, as well as Jews and Hindus. According to the statement of Ye. A. Belyayev, "according to the established notions of the Moslems themselves, the followers of all the schools, currents and sects are Moslems" (with the exception of the Wahhabis who do not consider their enemies to be Moslems) [129, p 99]. But this does not mean that a spirit of intolerance, a disdainful attitude toward the followers of other schools, currents and sects, and the dividing into "our own" and "other" were completely alien to the Moslems. The presence of such an attitude can be seen from the example of prerevolutionary Central Asia.

The Shiites were predominantly from Iran, and they as a total in the Turkestan Governor Generalship, and the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates by the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries numbered 55,000 (including 30,000-31,000 descendants of freed slaves and ancient settlers who had become subjects of these states, as well as 24,000-25,000 new settlers and immigrants a predominant majority of whom remained Iranian subjects) [294, p 201]. But the term "Ironi" (Iranian) used here showed not a single ethnic affiliation but rather a religious one. The issue is that Shiism was professed not only by immigrants from Iran, but also by the Baluchis (Belujis) whose homeland was in Afghanistan, and certain representatives of the local nationalities. The Iranians did not have a single language and were divided into two groups: Tadjik- and Turkic-speaking (the former lived in the region of Bukhara and the latter in Samarkand) The representatives of different ethnic groups were brought together under a single religious cover. They freely married one another and comprised a single community; the different ethnic affiliation in the given instance did not play any role, and the religious factor was foremost. In Bukhara and Samarkand the Iranians lived in a compact, more or less separate group, in districts and villages where they made up the majority. Thus, the "Iranians are the Shiite and in this sense means the Shiites opposed to the Sunnites, regardless of to whom this applies" [284, pp 43-45].

This again underlines the integrating role of Islam in the ethnic processes. But this is true as long as it applies to the Shiites themselves. But in the relations between the Shiites and the followers of the Shiite sects, as well as with the Sunnites, religion played now a disintegrating role. As an example, take the relations of the Shiite Iranians and the Baha'is Iranians. Communities of Baha'is existed in Ashkhabad and Merv, and small Baha'i groups were found in Tashkent and other cities. The program of the Baha'is which envisaged the establishing of fraternal love and cooperation between people of different nationalities and religions attracted the poorer Iranians to their ranks, and due to this the number of Baha'i communities was constantly growing. The leaders of the Iranian Shiite communities refused contacts with the Baha'is and obviously prevented the regular members from doing this. The Shiite and Sunnite clergy repeatedly turned to the tsarist authorities with a request to prohibit the preaching of the harmful teachings of the Baha'is [294, pp 207-208].

Now a word on the relationships between the Sunnites and Shiites. The disintegrating role of Islam was noticeably apparent, for example, in the

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historic past of the Azerbaijani, a majority of whom professed Shiism, and a minority followed Sunnism. Small dogmatic and ritual differences between these basic Islamic schools served as the reason for discord which existed for centuries within the Azerbaijani. This discord was not only of a religious nature but also a domestic one. The Shiite Azerbaijani, as a rule, did not enter kinship relations with the Sunni Azerbaijani, and vice versa. The Shiites and Sunnites had their own separate mosques and priests, and from the minbars [?pulpit] of the mosques, propaganda was carried out against the representatives of the other school.

In examining the reasons for the discord which existed in the past among the Azerbaijani, the great Azerbaijani thinker Mirza Fatali Ahundov wrote: "We did not have any unity. The Moslems inhabiting the Caucasus were split into two sects<sup>6</sup>: one-half of them was Shiites and the other Sunnites. The Shiites hated the Sunnites, the latter could not stand the Shiites, and antagonism reigned between them. Neither wished to listen to the other, and where could the unity be?" [102, p 300]. "The Sunni exhausted himself fighting the Shiite, and the Shiite was in a hurry to eradicate the Sunnite," wrote the prominent poet Shirvani [95, p 146].

Another educator, Zardebi, in speaking against the rite of megerramlik, noted that this rite not only maimed the Moslem spiritually and physically, but at times could even end in fratricide, since the Shiites considered the Sunnites to be their mortal enemies. Zardebi related that "in Baku the hostility between the Sunnites and Shiites had reached such a level that the Sunnites arriving at that time in Baku concealed their affiliation." In another article, Zardebi described the murder of a young man by religious fanatics merely because he dared enter the Sunni mosque at a moment when the ahund was criticizing them [166, pp 289-290].

In Central Asia, the Shiites (Iranians) were not set apart from the rest of the population. They were members of the district with full rights, they participated in the weddings of the Sunnites, and invited them to their own [403, p 162]. Instances were also encountered of marriages between them, but, we feel, this was a special case [196, p 69; 466a, p 39]. After the slaughter in Bukhara between the Shiites and Sunnites (1910), such marriages were no longer observed [235, p 114].

This already was a consequence of the religious alienation which existed between the Sunnites and Shiites. In having the same rights as the Sunnites and reaching high positions in the khanates and in the economic life of society, the Shiites nevertheless felt suppression manifested in the impossibility of freely saying their prayers and observing their holidays. "Being Shiites, they were under a suppression, incidentally, that was more moral than material" [144, p 393; 262, p 46].

In the cities the Shiites did not attend mosque and prayed at home, but in the villages the Iranians had their own mosques. There were special buildings (husainie-hona) for holding the ashur, the mysteries devoted to the death of Husain, the son of Ali and grandson of Muhammad. As we have

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already mentioned, the Sunnites also celebrated the ashur, but more moderately [403, p 162].

The disintegrating role of Islam can also be seen in the bloody slaughter between the Shiites and Sunnites which occurred at the beginning of 1910 in Bukhara. The cause of it was the dissatisfaction of the Sunnites for permission given for the first time by the government for the open holding of the mourning of the ashur (megerramlik) by the Shiites, and before this had been celebrated covertly in the houses of the believers. In using this permission, at the start of January the Shiites assembled on the training grounds and in the course of performing the rite engaged in self-flagellation. The Sunnites who were observing the mourning ceremony, and among them were very many students from the medrese, began to laugh at the Shiites and belittle their religious feelings. The Shiites rushed at their offenders and during the fight killed one of them. This immediately became known throughout the city. Fanatically inclined Sunnite mullahs began to call for the massacre of the Shiites. A pogrom of the Shiites began lasting for several days, as a result of which 500 persons were killed on both sides. The population was pacified by Russian army units which were quickly brought into the city.

The slaughter of the Shiites during their religious rite was an open expression of the dissatisfaction of the Bukharans with the group of Persians (Shiites) who were officials in the khanate headed by the prime minister and in whom the people saw as the prime cause of their suppressed status. But the fact that this dissatisfaction acquired a religious character and grew into the slaughter and murder of the followers of the other religious school shows the hostile attitude toward them which existed in the social consciousness.

In an even more difficult position were the followers of Ismailism (a Shiite sect) living in the Pamir (now the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Autonomous Oblast), when their territory was under the Bukhara imir.

In the past the Ismailites lived on the territory of the Kokand Khanate, and after the annexation of Central Asia by Russia they were transferred to the Bukhara Khanate. The Bukharan officials considered them "kafirs" and not belonging to Islam, they equated them with pagans, and for this reason, according to the Koran, they were deprived of any human rights. Precisely this explains those humiliations and oppressions which the Ismailites suffered. If the insulted referred to the shariat, it was explained to him that for him, as a "kafir," the shariat did not exist.

The followers of Ismailism who lived in Darvaz inhabited separate parts of the villages or isolated villages, and their isolation from the remaining population was very strong. For example, in the village of Ravnou, where the Ismailites lived in its upper part, there were no contacts with the inhabitants of the lower districts [408, pp 68-72].

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The representatives of the Emirate in the Pamir carried out a policy aimed at making the Ismailites reject their own beliefs and become Sunnites. In the large villages, they attempted to open Moslem schools and force the population to perform the five-a-day prayers and observe the uraza which, proceeding from their own political considerations, had been prohibited by the Russian authorities. But where the officials of the imir lived nearby, the population was forced to attend mosque and observe the fast [446, pp 113-114].

The Pamir nationalities showed constant dissatisfaction with such a policy of the imir authorities, and sought to transfer their territory to Russian administration (see [208, p 163]). Religious persecution ended only with the incorporation of the Pamir as part of the Turkestan Governor Generalship.

In the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates which were typical Moslem states, up to 1920 the picture described by K. Marx and relating to Turkey could be encountered: "Depending upon the locality and various circumstances, the Turk maybe a worker, a land-renting peasant, a small landowner, a merchant, a feudal landowner standing on the lowest and most barbarian level of feudalism, an official or a military man; but whatever social position he holds, he belongs to a privileged religion and nationality, as he alone has the right to bear arms and the highest-placed Christian is obliged to give way when meeting a Moslem belonging to the inferior level of society" [18a, p 6].

According to Moslem state law, all non-Moslems who were permanent residents of Bukhara and Khiva (Jews and Hindus) were considered among the so-called zimmi. They had the right to profess their religion, to own property, to carry out transactions between themselves and governed by their own procedures, but under the condition of regular payment of the head tax (jizya) which was much higher than the one collected from the Moslems. However, in criminal cases or in business transactions with Moslems, they were subject to Islamic laws. Jews and Hindus could not marry Moslem women or own Moslem slaves. The zimmi could appear on the streets only in a dark and worn garment with a yellow patch and belted with a coarse rope. They did not have the right to ride stallions or geldings (only donkeys and mares), to hold honorary positions, to greet Moslems, and were obliged to respectfully let them pass. Their houses could not be higher than the houses of Moslems. In Bukhara, the districts of the heterodox were located in empty areas unsuited for residence, as they did not have the right to settle in districts where Moslems lived. Whenever possible all the zimmi were settled in individual districts under the supervision of their elders. The heterodox could not perform public actions which would insult the feelings of the Moslems such as drink beer, read the Bible out loud, and so forth [375, pp 981-982]. During the days of the uraza they were prohibited from eating anything in front of the Moslems in order not to arouse among those observing the fast any desire to violate it [87, p 816].

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In the Moslem states there were also other prescripts in effect which prevented relations between the followers of different religions and which put the heterodox in an unequal position in relation to the "orthodox." Thus, in a marriage of Moslems, the "nonbelievers" could not act as witnesses. If one of the "nonbelieving" spouses belonged to a sect the teachings of which were recognized by Islam, then the children should be brought up in a spirit of these beliefs. If one of the spouses should accept Islam, a judge should propose that the other spouse also accept Islam; in the event of a refusal the marriage was to be dissolved. If one of the spouses committed apostasy, the marriage was also dissolved [448a, Book 6, p 7].

With the murder of a "nonbeliever," the total compensation was reduced by one-half. A Moslem could purchase meat from persons who had a "sacred" book, that is, from a Christian or a Jew, and consume it as food, but meat purchased from a merchant who did not belong to such religions could not be eaten [483, No 76, 1909].

V. V. Bartol'd relates a fact unverified by him according to which in the Khiva Khanate, Jews oppressed by the Moslems were forced to abandon their religion; but "if this is so," he wrote, "then this would have happened rather long ago, otherwise the descendants of the involuntary proselytes, after the arrival of the Russians (the unification of Central Asia and Russia.--T.S.) would have returned to their previous faith" [112, p 374]. But the Jews who had become Moslems and who lived in Bukhara "lived very restricted lives, marrying predominantly among their own. They were not linked in their artisan activities even with professional confreres, dyers, who were Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, as well as other Jewish dyers" [404a, p 75]. This, it seems to us, shows a prejudice which had existed over the centuries against the believers of other faiths, and this was not overcome even after they had accepted Islam.

## The Regulative Function of Islam

The fact that in prerevolutionary Central Asia Islam played an integrative role in the life of society was largely aided by its other function, the regulative. In the social and economic life of the area, Moslem law dominated completely. This was the shariat (Arab. "shar" or "path to salvation," "divine law," "prohibition," or "decree") [on the origin of the shariat and an analysis of its sources and individual types, see 308, pp 123-199; 339; 438].

The shariat represented a typical feudal law which openly expressed the class interests of the feudal lords, the rich merchants and the Moslem clergy, and protected them against encroachments by the suppressed majority of society. Fully applicable to it is the Marxist definition which asserts that "law can never be higher than the economic order and the cultural development of society caused by it" [5, p 275].

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Based on the Koran, the "Arabic code of law" [260, 13:37], the shariat was considered established once and for all by Allah himself, and its standards in the view of the Moslems were sacred. The shariat prohibited the creation of new enforceable enactments even by supreme power. "An exhaustive statement of positive Moslem law is impossible, since...there does not exist (and did not exist) any general system suitable for all countries. Since the 'Moslem community' gave way to a multiplicity of Moslem communities, the single Islamic law gave way to a whole series of Moslem laws" [458, p 11].

Moslem law places an equality between sin and crime: a violation of any of its provisions is automatically considered a violation of the will of God as stated in the Koran. For example, it was considered that a person who did not observe the religious feast or who broke with the faith committed not only a sin but also a crime. And conversely, a person who violated the procedures established by the state was considered to have committed a crime against Islam.

The shariat "enslaves not only the actions but even the thoughts and imagination of the believing Moslem," and for this reason people were forced "to live in such a manner that everything, even completely useless details of everyday life, impressed persons around as being in full accord with the requirements of the shariat and ethics" [311, pp 42, 44].

The written "Codes of Decency" based upon the "reliable books of the shariat and tarikat" encompassed, in essence, all aspects of human life without exception, man's relations with other people, not excluding the most intimate which was usually not spoken of out loud.

These codes demanded that the Moslem organize his relations with others proceeding from the standards of the shariat. Decorum required that the Moslems, upon meeting, would greet each other without fail, but demanded that the believers in no way greet the persons who did not carry out the prescripts of the shariat, and even if they greeted the Moslem, not to reply to them.

The entire life of the Moslem, requires the "Code of Decency," should be accompanied by prayer. The Moslem should pray before going to sleep and upon waking up, having had a good or bad dream, upon leaving the house and returning back, upon sneezing and seeing a falling star, in putting on new clothes, having met up with a hot horse or a burial procession, "before turning to the wife with endearments," in falling sick and in dying. A prayer, according to the shariat, can save a man from any harm and he cannot be harmed either by snakes or scorpions. Even if the reciter of a prayer is given poison, "the poison will not have any effect on him." The "Code of Decency" demanded that the believers sleep in a certain position, and spit to the designated side [250, pp 168-169, 171-172, 174, 198]. All of this was reason for M. V. Akhundov to comment on them: "...Ablution should be performed in one way and no other; a prayer should be said in one way and not another; if during a prayer a doubt is born in one's soul

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about the number of bows, then one must act in such a manner and not another...in discharging natural functions, one should not sit facing south, that is, toward Mecca, and the body at this time should rest fully on the left foot, and so forth, and so forth. The fulsome name of 'Shariat Decrees' has been given to this rubbish" [102, pp 65-66].

As has been rightly pointed out by Ye. A. Belyayev, the degree of influence of the standards of family, inheritance and criminal law and the other sections of the shariat corresponded to the level of social development among the Moslems of one or another country. In states and cities where the population lived under the conditions of developed feudal relationships, the standards of Moslem law held full sway, in ensnaring all actions of the Moslem not only from the religious and ritual aspect but also in the personal, family and social spheres of his life and activities. But the lower the level of social development, the more the effect of local customary law survived. Where the process of feudalization was in an incipient stage (that is, in primitive feudal societies), customs survived sometimes for a long time and could have even greater significance than the prescripts of Moslem law [130, p 6].

We can see fully the validity of this comment from the example of Central Asia. For example, among the mountain Tadzhiks in whose beliefs various animistic and magical concepts successfully competed with Islam and the influence of the orthodox Moslem clergy was not so great, the standards of customary law, the adat, were a serious rival of the shariat [244, p 42].

Before the beginning of the 19th century, customary law served as the regulator of relationships among the Turkmen and Kazakhs. With the growth and strengthening of feudal relations (the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century), the adats could not play the role of the sole regulator of social life which was becoming ever more complex. At that time Kazakh society turned to the shariat in the search for new, stricter legal standards, and from the first half of the 19th century it began to play an enormous role in the life of the Kazakhs.

The adat is based on the conviction that everything that was has thus a right to existence. Although customary law recognizes any innovation as an evil, it never remained stationary, but was always very flexible, and primarily due to the fact that it was not written down, it was not in the documents of legal practice and not in the form of laws [307, p 92].

It would be wrong to put the adat into opposition with the shariat, or to consider that its standards had nothing in common with the standards of Moslem law. As was already said, they do not contain standards which contradict one another, since the commonness of many notions and standards from the life of the Central Asian nations and nationalities with the conditions of life in Arab society within which Islam was born gave rise to common notions and standards. For this reason, as we feel, the dominance of the standards of the adat along with the shariat altered nothing in the

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regulatory function of religion, since the standards of the adat were permeated with a spirit of patriarchal relationships and were observed as Moslem ones.

The annexation of Turkestan by Russia involved a series of positive changes in the legal organization of the area. The principle was proclaimed of the election of the kazi and biya courts, and the institution of appeal was introduced for decisions and sentences handed down by these courts (in the khanates, sentences and rulings of the courts could not be appealed). Other innovations appeared in the procedure for conducting criminal cases in the people's courts, including: appeals, imprisonment, obligatory written sentences, and so forth. The local population gained the right on all civil and criminal cases, with the agreement of both parties, to resort to the Russian court. The latter was to be guided not only by local but also general Russian legislation which was undoubtedly more progressive than the shariat [295, p 33].

The kazi and biya courts were deprived of the right to apply barbarian types of punishment provided by the shariat, as well as the right to sentence a person to death or maiming; these sentences were replaced by penalties, holding under arrest or exile to Siberia without any limitations on time. The most serious crimes were judged under Russian laws and not according to the shariat.

The Moslem taxation system (the haraj and zakat) was changed, and types of taxes appeared which were not provided for by the shariat (the taxation of property which could be transferred by the so-called gratuitous method, and various types of fees, and so forth).

Let us examine how all these changes were reflected in the social functions of the shariat courts and helped to alter the way of life of the population which had existed over the centuries.

A change was made in the name of the courts. The "courts of the kazi and biya" after the annexation of Central Asia by Russia began to be called "people's courts."<sup>7</sup> It was felt that the people's court should be elected by representatives of the people, but in a nation where power was held by the exploiters, the court could not be of the people, nor did the judges represent the working people. Regardless of the name of the court, it naturally remained a weapon of the ruling class.

In the elections of judges not the entire population was involved but only the fiftiers or representatives of the inferior administration. The candidates for the position of judge long before the elections had made all sorts of presents to the voters, and even "pledged part of their income from the new position." The fiftiers were least concerned with moral qualities or knowledge or the fitness of the candidates for the high position, and, in the admission of the official body of the tsarist administration, elected the person "who would give more and whose severity was not particularly terrible. Understandably such a system established extortion,

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hostility and other illegalities" [483, No 93, 1911, p 94]. Naturally with such an electoral procedure for the people's courts the power of the well-off classes was predominant, and selfishness and venality were the standard of behavior for the judges.

In formal terms the people's courts were under the administrative authorities and under their direct control. This control was partially carried out by the local prosecutor's office. But actual effective control by the Russian administration over the activities of the courts was never achieved, and they continued to operate as they had prior to annexation by Russia. In the eloquent admission of a tsarist official, "the essential question--the question of supervision over the people's courts (kazi and biya)--was in practice completely unresolved," and "for the Russian authorities unknown" [183, p 42]. The sentences of the people's courts in essence were carried out upon the instructions of the district chiefs. As one of the governor generals of Turkestan was forced to admit, the sentences of the people's courts in many instances were final and could not be set aside "even with a flagrant contradiction of the primitive principles of justice and straight thinking. Thus, the district chief was forced to imprison a defendant for 18 months under a court sentence merely because in a private conversation he had voiced the opinion that Christianity was superior to Muhammadism" [159, p 22].

The representatives of the tsarist administration had little knowledge of the basic provisions of the shariat, and even in instances when the local population turned to them with complaints about the actions of the people's courts, could do little about this. Only shortly before the October Revolution did a number of works appear in Russian translation which to a certain degree satisfied the acute need for materials concerning Moslem legislation. Among them were: "Shariatskiy Sud" [The Shariat Court] by Tsvetkov (1911), "Opyt Sistematicheskogo Izlozheniya Glavneyshikh Nachal Shariata, Primenyayemykh v Korennnykh Oblastyakh Kraya" [Attempt at a Systematic Exposition of the Major Principles of the Shariat Applied in the Native Oblasts of the Region] (1909), and "Shariat" [The Shariat] by N. P. Ostroumov.

The regulation governing the administration of the Turkestan region of 12 June 1886, having left the division of the courts into people's and Russian, introduced substantial changes in their functions.<sup>8</sup>

The category of criminal cases previously subject to review by the people's courts was reduced (frozen) (Article 141 of the Regulation of 12 June). The people's courts were given, without exception, all civil cases and a significant majority of the criminal cases (with the exception of cases involving treason, resistance of the authorities, attacks on the mail and military transports, the murdering of Christians and officials, and cases dealing with robbery), that is, everything that regulated relationships and defined the moral standards of the local population. They were given all cases dealing with crimes and infractions committed by the local inhabitants and not under the jurisdiction of the general court provisions

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of the Russian Empire, as well as all civil cases arising between the local inhabitants under the same court, if these cases were based on documents witnessed by the Russian authorities.

According to official data, in 1907, the local population of the four oblasts of Turkestan (without Zakaspiyskaya Oblast) had 275 people's judges who reviewed 15,000 cases; the nomads had 1,860 individual judges who reviewed 18,000 cases. They predominantly reviewed cases involving theft, the inflicting of wounds and beatings, the abduction of women, pandering, adultery, unauthorized entry, games of chance, sodomy, the non-performance of individual requirements of the shariat, and so forth.

But crimes against the Christian faith, against administrative order, official crimes, violations of the regulations governing state and land obligations, crimes against property and the income of the treasury, against public order, against public peace and quiet, against laws concerning status, against life, health and honor, against property and certain others committed by persons of the indigenous nationality were reviewed by the justices of the peace or the oblast (district) judges of the Russian population. They also examined cases involving crimes and misdemeanors committed by the local inhabitants against Russians or within the Russian settlements; crimes and misdemeanors between persons of different nationalities having separate people's courts, as well as crimes involving accusations against the local inhabitants of using inaccurate weights and scales.

In the area of civil court proceedings, the justices of the peace and the district courts were given the civil disputes and suits between the local inhabitants and persons not belonging to the indigenous population, as well as among representatives of various nationalities having separate people's courts, and likewise cases involving suits based on acts carried out with the involvement of the Russian authorities (Article 143 of the "Regulation Governing the Administration of the Turkestan Region").

But it is essential to consider that the courts established by the Russian authorities, in reviewing cases between peasants, cases involving guardianship, trusteeship, inheritance and so forth, also followed the adat [483, No 61, 1909]. The inferior levels of the administration were chosen according to the adat and shariat as was the case prior to annexation by Russia.

After the revolution of 1905-1907, the question arose of abolishing the local kazi and biya courts and replacing them with general state ones. But the complete abolishment of the people's courts was found to be premature due to the absence of Russians who had a proper knowledge of the language and legal procedures of the "natives" [228, pp 97-102].

It would be incorrect to feel that the people's courts operated in completely ignoring real authority. The military governor, for example, in concentrating military and civil power in his hands, could arrest the representative of the indigenous population for a period up to 1 month, in

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bypassing the people's courts. The district chief and his assistant could arrest natives for disrespect and impoliteness shown to the representatives of the authorities. Moreover, these officials had the right to intervene in the cases of the people's judges even in presiding over civil cases. And there were strange instances involving intervention by the tsarist government in cases related to the shariat. For example, in the papers of the chief of Zakaspiyskaya Oblast, there was a case on the setting of the age of girls after which they had the right to marry. The amusing thing is that on the question of marriageable age for Moslem girls, an opinion was sought from the Holy Synod which with due importance established the age of consent of Turkmen girls, relying not so much on Orthodox views as on the adat and the shariat [417, p 177].

In leaving the shariat and biya courts with certain changes in their functions, the tsarist authorities were hoping that the population would gradually realize the advantages of the Russian justice of the peace, and gradually all cases, with the exception of the clerical, and not even all of them, would move into the hands of the Russian court. Here they proceeded from the indisputable fact of the injustice of the Moslem judges who for the sake of their own gain were ready to bypass any law, and also from the casuistry of the shariat which even provided a frequent pretext for violations. However this hope was not realized as the Sarts (Uzbeks), in the words of N. S. Lykoshin, never used this law, regardless of all the negative aspects of the kazi court [112, p 382]. There were individual instances of a desire voiced by one party to move the case to the Russian court, but "the wrong but prosperous side usually preferred the people's court" [311, p 126]. Suffice it to note that over 3 years, from 1880 through 1882, there were just three instances of the local population turning to the Russian court [183, p 42].

It must be pointed out that the tsarist government, having granted the people's courts the right to apply one or another punishment in many instances, did not determine in which instances the maximum or minimum punishments could be applied. Nor was the very concept of a crime clarified.

This created good grounds for abuses by the people's judges. "The kazi was put in the position of a legislator. At his discretion he determined the criminality or innocence of one or another action; he himself settled the question of the type of punishment for the action considered by him criminal, and also at his discretion determined the minimum or maximum punishment. As a result, for an insignificant crime the poor man was deprived of his liberty, while the rich paid only in money for a grievous crime. Here of important significance was the amount of 'remuneration' received by the kazi from the persons involved in the case. But the most important criterion was the social status of the defendant or plaintiff, the accused or the accuser" [295, p 38].

Moreover, in 1910, a regulation was approved according to which the kazi courts of Turkestan could set punishments for actions not considered criminal under the tsarist criminal legislation.

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Consequently, even after the annexation of Central Asia by Russia, the standards of the shariat continued to prevail in the life of the population. The kazi imprisoned persons for the failure to observe the fast and religious rites. For example, in Samarkand three violators of the fast were sentenced to 3 months in prison.

The "sacred standards of the shariat" were observed particularly zealously for women. In Kokand a woman was imprisoned for 18 months for wearing a European dress. In Margelan, two women were arrested for 3 months for having spent time in the company of unrelated men. Women were condemned for appearing on the street with an uncovered face.

A certain Sultanbayev was condemned to imprisonment for 18 months for the fact that he married for love a woman who had been pledged in childhood to another.

A 13-year-old Uzbek girl, under a suit of a Khiva subject, against her will was awarded to him as his wife and taken off by force to Khiva. She turned to the office of the Turkestan Governor Generalship with the request of setting aside the decision of the kazi. The request of the applicant was supported by a protest from the prosecutor. However, the protest from the prosecutor was disregarded by the tsarist court on the basis that marriage questions of "natives" were under the jurisdiction of the kazi courts [295, pp 39-40].

One of the people's courts in Tashkent sentenced a woman to prison for 18 months for the fact that she had sat with an uncovered face in the company of young persons who were not on the level of kinship which such intimacy would permit. In another case, a woman was condemned to prison for 18 months for having "sat with an uncovered face in the company of unrelated men" [283, p 76]. Also encountered among the cases reviewed by the people's courts were those related to "unauthorized entry into a stranger's house" which was censured by Islam [371, Vol 2, pp 512-513].

Thus, with the annexation of Turkestan by Russia, definite changes followed in the status of Moslem legal organizations. But these changes were not fundamental and in no way involved and could not involve the exploiting nature of Moslem law, the shariat. As before the most important aspects of family life and the rules of conduct for the indigenous population remained under full control of Islam. Nothing had changed in the status of women. Secularization involved only individual aspects of Moslem law (the review of cases involving murder, theft, rape and beatings).

This is why we cannot agree with the opinion existing in legal literature that after the annexation by Russia, in the region "there began...an intensive move by tsarist law against local customs and the shariat standards. Tsarism gradually restricted and in places completely eliminated the local legal standards" [431, p 27], and that tsarism fought "against the old conservative ideology...the religious...organizations of its peoples,"

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as well as against the "ossified shariat standards and kazi courts which were not to the liking of the tsarist autocracy" [308,p 115].

One can scarcely consider as evidence that "the standards of tsarist law (evidently having in mind the standards existing in Tsarist Russia.--T.S.) to favor the Russian and local exploiters restricted the action of the shariat standards," in the fact that by a decree of the local authorities all homeowners, innkeepers, managers, inspectors of factories, plants, offices, trade and industrial enterprises, and others were obliged to report to the police on every arrival and departure within 24 hours, or that a ban was placed on spending the night or residing in public dining places [431, p 30]. These obligatory rules of the Turkestan Governor General as well as the rules directed against participation in "meetings and gatherings," "the parading of a crowd through streets and squares," were approved in 1915-1916, and were aimed primarily at preventing the spread of revolutionary ideas and discontent with the tsarist authorities, and to establish rigid police supervision over "suspects." However in no way did these pursue the aim ascribed to them above.

## The Communicative Function of Islam

The successful performance of the illusory-compensatory and regulative functions by Islam in the life of prerevolutionary Central Asian society was related to another function, the communicative, that is, the ability of religion to serve as a means of intercourse of the people and to unify them. In Islam, due to the social conditions of its existence and particular features as a religion, the communicative function was particularly striking, and in comparison with other religions had a more noticeable impact upon its carrying out of other functions.

The communicative function is manifested primarily through the activities of the mosques, and for this reason we will take up in detail the role of the latter in the carrying out of the communicative function by Islam. While for the Christians the church is a "holy" zone of "peaceful" space, and in entering it, the "believer goes beyond ordinary life, he enters the world of religious significances, symbols, objects and actions, and his attention is involuntarily focused on what is happening in the church" [469, p 75], while in Islam the mosques from the very beginning of their rise were only a place of worship. The mosques, with little exception, were open day and night, and could even serve as a place for sleeping for the homeless, wanderers and wayfarers. They were rarely empty (at least in the towns) in the day, being simultaneously a sort of club and people's home. In the mosque (main) justice was dispatched and scholars, readers of the Koran, writers and philosophers met. Here also it was possible to have a meal and purchase the necessary articles. A small mosque located nearby served as a second home for the believer and provided numerous small services for him and his neighbors. Here it was always possible to find company for conversation. In the morning the night's events were discussed at it, and so forth. But all of this involved only the men (for

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the exceptions see below), as the researchers with sufficient justification called the mosque a "male home" [300, pp 268-269].

We can apply all of this to the mosques in prerevolutionary Central Asia.<sup>9</sup> Here they were located in the most noticeable parts of the cities and villages, and stood out in their architecture, luxury and adornments. Many of them were true masterpieces of art.

Since orthodox Islam prohibited the depiction of God and did not approve of the images of humans and animals, among the Moslems the art of ornamentation and design achieved a great flourishing. Ornament based upon precise geometric calculation, and involved in terms of composition and pattern, filled the arches, walls and domes of the mosques and mausoleums. Arabesques--a particular type of ornamentation (a combination of the geometric and plant)--were produced in infinite combinations. These also incorporated the whimsical Arabic ligature (a letter pattern) with sayings by the Prophet Muhammad, verses from the Koran, and glorification of God, the Prophet and Imam Ali. At the same time the design of the prayer hall was simple, and inside there was nothing which could distract the praying person from the thought about God [188, p 56].

It was felt that the external appearance of the mosque symbolically reflected the various divine names and properties (ism-wa sifat). The internal space of the mosque had a special sense and "was planned in such a manner that nothing would impede the 'word' from being propagated in a harmonious and seemingly infinite space full of peace and equilibrium, where the spirit was present everywhere, and did not consist in any separate ikon or statue, as in other religions" [487, p 20].

In contrast to Christianity which had a centralized religious organization (the Church), each Moslem community operated autonomously and independently (there were no bodies which monitored the activities of the communities), it itself removed and appointed the priests, it regulated their relationships with the rank and file believers, and carried out financial transactions. This is largely explained by the particular features of Islam in which there is no official rite of consecration (the laying on of hands), as was already mentioned in the first chapter.

Each of the Central Asian towns was broken up into residential districts called mahalles or guzars, and these were the basic structural entities of the city. The inhabitants of the district (an average of 30-60 houses), regardless of the degree of their kinship, comprised an unique community within which all their life occurred. The mosque served as the center of this life, since the district coincided, as a rule, with the parish (in large districts there could be two mosques). There were also main mosques (jami) where the five-a-day and holiday services were conducted.

There were mosques in each village and where the villages were divided into districts, correspondingly there were several mosques. For example, in the village of Chinaz, not far from Tashkent, where 179 families lived (224 men,

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225 women, 153 boys and 79 girls), in the four districts there were four district mosques and one main one [371, Vol 1, pp 8-9; 254, p 73].

The bazaars had their own mosques. Here the merchants and craftsmen performed their daily prayers and their shops and booths were located nearby and also these mosques were used by everyone who was at the bazaar by the beginning of the service. This was watched, and all dawdlers were driven in by blows of a lash [404, pp 15-16].

All adult males in the district or the village each morning were obliged to attend the mosque for the first predawn prayer. The imams of the mosque watched attendance, and in the Bukhara Khante there were special officials called rais. The services in the mosques ended quickly. Sermons were not always given and as a rule they were very brief. Such a tradition in Islam goes back to Muhammad who "commanded that they pray long but give sermons briefly" [300, p 259].

The religious community which assembled in the mosque and was headed by the imam intervened actively into the life of the residents of the district or village. The most important decisions were taken at the mosque, and these involved the interests of a predominant majority of the residents as well as the officials, public opinion was shaped, and the deeds of one or another resident were judged.

K. Marx pointed out "that these idyllic rural communities, as innocent as they may seem, always were a strong basis for Eastern despotism, and that they confined human reason to the narrowest limits, making it an obedient tool of superstition, imposing on it the slavish chains of traditional rules, and depriving it of any greatness or any historical initiative" [1, p 135].

The daily standards of life of the people were completely dominated by the spirit of Islam and defined by the shariat. Public opinion which was controlled by the religious community kept a strict eye on their fulfillment by all the population, condemned the actions of the "recalcitrant," and in individual instances requested their expulsion. The fear of public opinion was exceptionally developed among the people, "at least much more than the fear of celestial punishment" [312, p 145]. The very conditions of existence for the residents of the district or the village community also contributed to this. Each such community represented a small state in the state, with its own laws, public orders, and customs dominated by the spirit of Islam, and the mosque was its "brain" (ideological) center.

The belonging to a mahalle community in the towns was determined by residents in the territory of the district. If someone should sell a house, then on the basis of the shariat the members of the community had a preferential right to purchase the house, and the population itself carefully watched this.

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The community contained a number of public buildings which were used in common, and in particular, the mosque and the place for ablutions, and bore the expenditures for their upkeep and repair. The community also supported the service personnel of the mosque including the imam and the muezzin who summoned the faithful to pray (not in all mosques).

The men who attended one mosque and the members of their families maintained close ties outside of it as well, in jointly celebrating all events such as weddings, holidays and funerals. In the event of a dispute with other families, a family which was a member in a community could move, but it took a great deal of effort to become an equal member of a different community. There were instances when one or another head of a family, after a dispute, did not move, but rather began to attend a different mosque, but in order to obtain such an opportunity, he organized a feast for all its parishoners. All the same he remained a "foreigner" here all the more as the community of which he had previously been a member would not leave him in peace.

The life of a community, particularly a rural one, and all its organization had an exclusively patriarchal and stagnant character. The elders who had unassailable authority directed the social and economic affairs of the community and the family. Persons of the middle generation and the youth obeyed them without question, considering their advice and instructions and never planned to violate the existing customs and established traditions. Women had virtually no opportunity to participate in social life [243, pp 159-161].

The ideological unity of all the members of the community was largely founded on a common faith. The economic, commercial, family and other relations between the members of the community were organized on the basis of the standards and prescripts of Islam. The self-contained, stagnant way of life of the community and its uniform national and religious nature which was not determined by Islam but derived from the social conditions and the nature of economic relations largely contributed to this. It has been rightly emphasized that such a "opportunity to establish the necessary minimum of vitally significant ties, without going beyond the limits of the religious association, objectively helped to strengthen and maintain the religion" [292, p 36].

The family played a large role in carrying out the communicative functions of Islam. Up to the October Revolution, the families which numbered from 20 to 50 members survived among the mountain Tadzhiks, in the Khorezm and Khiva oases, among the Karluk Uzbeks, and among the wealthy portion of the Fergana Uzbeks. In the north of the Fergana Valley (Namangenskaya Oblast), and in the most remote areas, individual families were encountered numbering up to 60-70 and sometimes 100 persons [242; 387, p 67; 457, p 138; 312, p 214; 124, pp 23-24],

The vestigial forms of large patriarchal communities survived among the Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks and Turkmen. These were groups consisting of

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several interrelated small families and linked by an awareness of an origin from one, as a rule, not very distant, real predecessor. The members of the family (from 2-5 to 10-15) comprising such a group called themselves the "children of one father," they roamed together, they pastured their livestock together, they helped each other in labor, they aided each other materially, and sometimes prepared food and drinks together, particularly ritual ones, and consumed them in common [83, pp 32-34; 192, pp 80-82; 154, pp 177-178; 394, pp 6-14].

The large and undivided families and the groups of small families were united primarily by a unity of economic interests. The large and undivided families ran a common economy based upon the common ownership of land and had common draft animals. For all members of the family, a common meal was prepared and this was eaten together. In the event that individual family members went out to earn money, the money went to the common family budget.

In the large and undivided families and groups, the head of the family, the father or the elder in the family, had unchallenged authority; in actual terms he disposed of all the property, and allocated work among the family members. In a group consisting of small families, the elder directed all affairs.

The families comprising a kaum (a group of families related by kinship and having a common ancestor) often lived in one district. Each possessed its own farmstead and pasture plot, but they joined together for carrying out many farm matters such as the pasturing of livestock and harvesting, the building of houses, the paying of taxes, the buying of a bride, and so forth.

All the family members through the men were systematically exposed to the influence of their mosque. The authority of the family head was unchallengeable, and the youth were completely subservient to him. He married off his sons and grandsons, he gave his daughters and granddaughters in marriage, without any consideration of their wishes, and did not permit the women and girls to intervene in the managing of family affairs. The prohibitions and restrictions related to Islam predominated in family life, and these often were of a belittling nature which insulted the human dignity of women.

The pressure of the religiously inclined adult family members combined with the external pressure of the community which was also dominated by the spirit of Islam lead to a situation where a person, regardless of his own will, was forced to perform religious rites and prescripts, and maintain external piety.

A component part of religious life in prerevolutionary Central Asia was the cult of the "saints" and the visiting of their sanctuaries (mazars) (for more detail on this see [119; 170; 388; 404]). There were many such mazars sometimes honored by the inhabitants of one or two villages or districts,

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and in certain instances known throughout the region. They existed in virtually every town district or village, and there could be several of them in some.

Among the mazars honored by the Moslems, there were many which were directly related to the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Central Asian peoples, but in Islam their existence was linked to the names of Moslem (Biblical) saints and prophets such as Suleiman (Solomon), Ayub (Job), Daud (David), Danier (Daniel), and others. Particularly famous were the numerous mazars related to the name of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Moslem clergy in every possibly way supported the legends and spread rumors about miracles, and so forth. And the population deprived of an opportunity to receive regular medical aid and believing blindly in the rumors about "miracles," in many instances was unable to distinguish falsehood from the truth, and regularly visited the "holy" places.

Along with visiting the local "holy" places on a rather broad scale there was the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. This long and often dangerous journey was made predominantly by wealthy persons, basically the clergy. Those who made the pilgrimage, the hajj, had the greatest authority and respect among the believers, and this was often used for their own enrichment.

With the annexation of the region by Russia, the pilgrimage began to have an "organized" character. The tsarist government, in pursuing political and economic aims, encouraged and supported the pilgrimage. It helped to set up the Society for the Care of Moslem Pilgrims, giving it the exclusive right to receive and care for pilgrims in Odessa. Through travel was organized from Tashkent to Odessa, and special railway cars were assigned for this. The persons involved in the organizing and serving of the pilgrims were granted various benefits. Due to such "concern," the number of pilgrims from Russia increased and annually was about 20,000, with a majority being pilgrims from the Central Asian regions [186, pp 165-170].

The two annual Islamic holidays provided a great contrast in the uneventful life of the Moslems. The "holy month" or Ramadan during which the believers were to observe the fast was considered to be a month of prayer and penitence and the forgiveness of sins (see [365]). This greatly intensified religious life as the believers in addition to saying prayers five times a day in the evening performed one other namaz; in many of the main and parish mosques, hatmi-Koran were held (the reading of the entire text of the Koran over several evenings), and so forth.

The fast was observed by all adults, including girls from the age of 9 and boys from the age of 12, with the exception of those who were permitted not to do this under the Koran. Those who did not observe the fast also endeavored to convince those around of their piety by complaining of weakness in the body and the hardship of the fast.

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Eleven months from the year since the last namaz (an hour and a half after the setting of the sun) until the predawn namaz (when an hour and a half remained before the rising of the sun), in Bukhara life came to a complete stop and the inhabitants were prohibited from leaving the house. During Ramadan, the population was permitted to walk through the streets freely after midnight. During Ramadan, studies were halted in all the Bukhara medrese, and the students were let out for holidays [87, pp 813-825].

The fast ended with a great holiday prayer held in the main mosques or in special places under the open sky, and sometimes also in the district mosques. For this day the believers wore their holiday clothing, they put the house and courtyard in order, they congratulated each other on the holiday, they paid visits, and visited the homes of recently deceased neighbors and relatives and cemetaries. In certain cities in the holiday bazaars organized in covered courtyards of certain mosques, women were also allowed to gather [404, p 22].

Another holiday of Islam, the kurban-bairam, was also celebrated by all the people [see 366 for this], and this was related to the biblical legend of the sacrificing by Ibrahim (Abraham) of his son Ismail (Isaac) to God. On this day, after the holiday prayer in the mosques, each Moslem, if he had the means, was to sacrifice an animal. The poorer could join together and a goat, sheep or cow could be sacrificed by a family, and in certain instances by 70 people. Each believing family dreamed of making the sacrifice at least once in life and carrying the skin to the mosque.

One other significant day in Islam used to strengthen religious influence and being an important pretext for social contact among the believers was the mawlud or the birthday of Muhammad which was widely celebrated chiefly by women. The women (and in some places the men separately) assembled in the house of one of the faithful during the month of the Prophet's birth, and after a feast read the tales about the birth of Muhammad (Mawlud-in-nabi). During the reading candles were lit, and with each mention of the name of Muhammad, everyone stood up and reverentially bowed [404, p 23].

We have already written that the mosque was not visited by women. However, this does not mean that organized forms of religious life did not exist for them. In each district there were literate, religiously educated women (otin, otinbu, otincha), in many instances the wives of the mosque imams or other religious leaders. They performed the functions of "guardians" over the carrying out of the standards of Islam by the distaff side of the district, they conducted services, and read the Koran and other books of religious content. They had great authority among the women of the community, and they were often turned to for advice or with a request to perform one or another religious rite. This was also aided by the cults of female dieties which could be traced back to the pre-Islamic beliefs and who had become Moslem "saints": Momo-Kul'durok (Lady Thunderer, or the name given to thunder), Bibi-Seshanbi (Mrs. Tuesday) and Bibi-Mushkilkusho (Mrs. Resolver of Difficulties) (see [404, p 40]).

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The cult of Ali which was developed exclusively in Shiism, was also widely found among the Sunnites of Central Asia. Chiefly the Uzbek women celebrated the traditional days of the month muharram--the ashura, related to the cult of Husein, the son of Ali (in somewhat different forms than among the Shiites).

The cult of Fatima (Bibi Fatima), the mother of Husein and the daughter of Muhammad, was a typically female one and very popular. She was considered the protectress of births and the newborn as well as the patroness of spinning [314, Vol 2, p 231].

Even the holiday of the New Year (nawruz) which existed in Central Asia long before Islam and was widely celebrated by the population had been canonized by Islam. Legends "in honor of the New Year's holiday" were created in the name of the Prophet Muhammad [87, pp 825-826].

In conclusion we would point out that Islam carried out communicative functions in the life of the Central Asian nations and nationalities both in the performing of religious rites (related to funerals, funeral feasts, circumcision, and so forth), as well as nonreligious domestic ones (birth of a child, wedding, and so forth).

What has changed in the position of Islam in Central Asia after it was annexed by Russia? The correct answer to this question largely determines a correct understanding of the social functions of Islam on the eve of the October Revolution, and this, in turn, provides an opportunity to correctly assess the process of the secularization of Islam in the given region during the years of Soviet power. In Turkestan, the theocratic system of administration was eliminated, the link between political and religious awarenesses was weakened, and certain of the functions performed by religion were restricted, although insignificantly. But it seems to use that there are no grounds for speaking about an essential change in the role of Islam in the life of the indigenous population.

In order to correctly assess the attitude of tsarism to Islam and its organizations in Central Asia, we feel it is important to consider the following factor. Long before this area was conquered, tsarist Russia had collided with the "Moslem question" in the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Here the Islamic clergy made up 2-2.5 percent of the entire Moslem population. They had a major weight in the life of society, they possessed significant real estate, and they had a serious influence on the morals and life of the population, and the tsarist authorities were forced to define their attitude toward such a noticeable force as Islam. Moreover, the extended armed struggle of the mountaineers in the Northern Caucasus, as is known, assumed the nature of a unique and very strong movement, Muridism, which had a religious overtone (for more detail on the policy of tsarism vis-a-vis Islam in the Caucasus, see [383, pp 74-103]).

The following fact shows that tsarism ultimately correctly assessed the benefits which would come from an alliance with the clergy. In 1872, the

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tsar approved a regulation on the administration of clerical affairs for the Moslems in Transcaucasia, and established the Transcaucasian Mohammadan Clerical Administration of Sunni Teachings and the Transcaucasian Mohammadan Clerical Administration of Shiite Teachings.<sup>10</sup> The tsarist government gave great advantages to the Moslem clergy, in putting the spiritual life of the population under their control.

In showing concern for the clergy, the government proceeded from its size and the important place held by it in the spiritual and civil life of the Moslems. Having granted the clergy the right to examine family and inheritance matters on the basis of the shariat, and thereby creating for it an influential position in society, the government simultaneously ensured the "moral competence and loyalty" of all levels of Islamic leaders. The staffs of the clerical boards as well as the bodies intermediate between them and the communities were supported from the state treasury.

In approving a document which established the status of the Moslem clergy in the Transcaucasus, the tsarist government set for itself the task of ensuring supervision and control over the persons who could act against it, to limit the activities of the clergy among the population, and put the most influential part of the clergy in direct dependence, having linked it by material interests, and, finally, to control the work of the confessional schools and keep account of the property of the Moslem organizations.

This set aim was furthered by a number of advantages provided by the regulation and to be received by the Moslem clergy: the Islamic officials and their children were released from the paying of treasury taxes, and the children of members of the superior clergy who had served 20 years had the rights of children of the personal nobles and personal honored citizens. In the event of official trips, the clergy received money from the treasury, and it could also hope for decorations. In brief, the clergy became an estate which had definite advantages and status in society [362, pp 8-10].

The attitude of the tsarist government toward religion as a dependable support was fully reflected in the position of the Moslem organizations located on Russian territory. The population was required to regularly observe the rites prescribed by Islam. In certain regions the employees were dismissed from work for the nonfulfillment of religious rites. For example, Moslem workers in the Urals and Donets Basin were dismissed for the failure to observe the uraza [247, p 50].

The state was also concerned with the building of new mosques. According to the State Charter "On the Construction of Mohammadan Mosques," the construction of mosques was to be carried out under plans and under the supervision of special state institutions. The construction of new mosques was planned in population points where the male population reached 200 persons.

In the military districts there was the position of a military mullah who was to keep watch over the loyalty of the Moslem servicemen. The Islamic officials working in the troop subunits received special benefits. They

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had the right to a pension, and in the event of their death the pension was paid fully to the family.

In Kazan' there was the Eastern Printing Plant which at one time had been moved from St. Petersburg, and right up to the October Revolution it printed the Koran in large editions, as well as its individual parts and other religious literature.

The private Tatar printing plants which published similar literature were supported by governmental bodies as well. From 1853 through 1859, they published 82,300 copies of the Koran, 169,900 copies of its individual parts, and 77,500 copies of "Iman Sharti" or a list and commentary on the basic demands of Islam on the believer [186, p 169].

For this reason the tsarist authorities from their first steps in Central Asia, even when military force had to be used, in every manner emphasized their respectful attitude toward the local religion, "addressing local public opinion and endeavoring to carry out their measures with the help of its representatives" (the ruling upper clique, the kulakry and the clergy.--T.S.) [112, p 350].

Upon the admission of a tsarist bureaucrat who made a special study of the status of Islam in the Kazakh steppe, during the first years of rule here "political interests demanded the assurance of the inviolability of their faith in the Kirgiz people and throughout all of Central Asia. This factor, along with the desire to win over the khans, sultans and generally the influential people of the steppe, led to a situation where at first our government not only showed complete toleration for Islam, but even certain patronage" (quoted in [108, p 69]).

The same thing is shown in the activities of Gen Chernyayev, the first military governor of Turkestan, the troops of whom conquered Southern Kazakhstan and Tashkent. In July 1865, soon after the capturing of Tashkent, he concluded a treaty with the leaders of the nomadic tribes and the representatives of the city headed by Ishan-Hoja Kazi Kalian. The treaty formulated the conditions for the behavior of the Russian authorities vis-a-vis the people of Tashkent and the people of Tashkent vis-a-vis the Russians. The text of the treaty, in particular, stated: "...The residents of the city of Tashkent...should obey...the commands of all-mighty God and profess the religion of Muhammad...and not deviate one iota from the laws established by Him.

"Let everyone, to the degree that they can, act for the benefit and good of this country. Let them everywhere say their prayers five times a day, without missing the designated time, hour or even minute. Let the mullahs constantly go to their schools and introduce the laws of the Mohammadan faith....

"The Mohammadan religion prohibits you from drinking bouza [a millet beverage] and vodka, to play games of chance or be immoral, and for this reason

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be on guard against any innovation which runs counter to the laws of religion."

Chernyayev in his activities as the governor general began by visiting the places most honored by the Moslems, and was the guest at the house of Ishan-Hoja Kazi Kalian. Moreover, he became acquainted with those "ghazi" who had distinguished themselves in the battles against the Russian detachment, he voiced his respect for them, and presented official safeguards to them as a sign of recognition of their bravery [393, pp 167-170].

Under Chernyayev, the former structure for directing religious life was preserved. By an official order he affirmed Kazi Kalian. He was given the right as before to issue the corresponding instructions for the appointing of a number of clerical and court figures. The position of sheikhul-islam was also kept. In truth, soon thereafter these positions were completely eliminated, but the kazi of the individual parts of Tashkent still elected by the population continued to function.<sup>11</sup>

However right up until the October Revolution, the tsarist authorities had not approved an official document which would regulate the activities of the religious organizations in Turkestan. In the two "Regulations Governing the Administration of the Oblasts in the Turkestan Region" (1867 and 1886), the question of clerical affairs was not taken up at all. The idea of subordinating Turkestan to one of the existing clerical administrations of the Moslems was rejected immediately after the annexation of the region by Russia. The question was raised of setting up a special clerical administration, and a commission was formed for working out a draft, but the draft was not carried out.

After the Andizhan Revolt of 1898, the question was again raised of a clerical administration for the Moslem area, and a draft was worked out for the "Provisional Rules on the Administration of Clerical Affairs, Institutions of Learning and Waqf Properties of the Moslems in the Turkestan Region." These rules, among other things, proposed that the imams and mosque officials be elected with their subsequent approval by the district chiefs. But this draft proposed to the Chief of the Main Staff remained blocked.

In 1905, the Committee of Ministers came out in favor of setting up a special administration for the Turkestan region on matters of the faith. This question was discussed specially at a separate meeting on the questions of faith. The meeting did not find any reasons for altering the established procedure for managing clerical affairs in the region or for intervening into the religious life of the population [362, pp 33-37].

Let us take up how the tsarist authorities settled the vitally important question for ensuring the integrative function of Islam, namely the question of the waqf or the enormous land holdings of the Moslem organizations, due to which they played a major role in the economic life of society.

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The tsarist government, in defining its attitude toward the waqfs, proceeded from the fact that their existence went back for many centuries and was closely tied to the life of the indigenous population, and consequently, any move against them would be perceived as a move against the age-old basic principles and traditions (see [431, pp 94-95]).

For a long time after the annexation of the region, the waqf lands remained untouched. Only after 1886 did the tsarist government resolve to attack the economic might of the religious organizations. All the settled waqf lands were declared to be the property of those who worked them, and the unsettled were to be free of the land tax. And although the taxes paid by the landowners were now to go to the state treasury, this did not mean that the religious organizations completely lost their benefits from the waqfs. The treasury, proceeding from that amount which had been previously collected by the waqf holders, began to allocate funds for the support of the mosques, the mazars and medrese. The number of waqfs was significantly reduced. Moreover, the establishing of new waqfs was permitted in exceptional instances and only with the permission of the governor general [176, p 21], and also they could be confiscated by the state and landowning restricted.

As a result of the demarcation of the territories which went to Russia and the Bukhara Emirate (1868), difficulties arose related to collecting the income from the waqf properties in the Bukhara Khanate which was to go to the medrese located in the Turkestan Governor Generalship, and vice versa. Thus, in 1869, it was prohibited to collect income from property within the Karsha Bekate for the Samarkand mazar Haja-Ahrara. After this the Russian authorities prevented the Bukhara institutions from collecting income from their property located within the Russian frontiers. But the two main medrese of Samarkand--Tillyakari and Shirdar (their income exceeded the income of all the remaining 16 Samarkand medrese taken together)--under special permission to the emir of Bukhara, succeeded in gaining permission to collect the income owed them within the emirate [112, p 297].

Thus, a definite blow was struck against the economic might of the religious institutions, but this was not substantially felt on their economic position. Right up to the October Revolution, the problem of the waqfs had not been finally resolved by the tsarist authorities either in legislation or in practice.

Thus, in Central Asia up to the October Revolution and the establishing of Soviet power, religion continued to exist as organically intertwined in a complicated and diverse hierarchical system characterizing the relations of personal dependence and noneconomic coercion in a feudal society. It is exceptionally important to emphasize that the fundamental changes which had occurred in the status of religion under the conditions of a capitalist society had not touched Central Asia, Kazakhstan or the Northern Caucasus. By the October Socialist Revolution, "Central Asia and Kazakhstan in terms of their economic development stood on a level customary for colonial countries" [69, p 12], and represented a raw material

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base and partially a market for the large Russian and certain Western European monopolies.

The development of capitalist relations in Central Asia gave rise to a national working class, a force capable of eradicating exploitation, and aspiring to spiritual and material liberation and to an understanding of the world and the objective laws of its development. The living conditions of the working class were such, wrote F. Engels, that they "give it a sort of practical education which not only replaces all school-learned rubbish, but also neutralizes the related stupid religious notions and even puts the workers at the head of the nationwide movement of England. Need teaches one to pray and, much more importantly, to think and act. The English worker who is almost unable to read and even less to write, still is perfectly aware what are his own interests and the interests of the entire nation; ...for him the questions of the celestial world remain completely unclear, regardless of all the efforts of the priests, but on the other hand the temporal, political and social questions are all the clearer for him" [34, pp 346-347].

However, in prerevolutionary Central Asia, a number of factors were at work not allowing the national working class to carry out its historic mission vis-a-vis religion, and to finally escape from the dominating influence of Islam and break with it.

The national working class was very small. In 1913, the number of industrial workers in Turkestan reached 34,000, including 10,000 employed at the cotton ginning factories. More than 70 percent of the workers were representatives of local nationalities [218, p 24]. In 1916, among the Turkmen there were just 242 workers, and virtually all of them were employed on the railroad [93, p 40].

Russians comprised a predominant majority of the skilled workers in the region (70-80 percent), and workers from the indigenous nationalities were used basically in subsidiary jobs and received significantly lower wages. The national working class grew up from yesterday's illiterate peasants who had strong ties with the village, as well as from the artisans and craftsmen. In the characteristics of the national working class in pre-revolutionary Turkestan one could feel that it could not be considered "exclusively linked with factory life, and other occupations existed for it. Many of the Turkestan enterprises operated only a portion of the year, and during the remaining time a majority of the workers was released from work at the plants and factories, and engaged either in agriculture or some other trade" [197, p 29].

Yesterday's peasant indoctrinated in patriarchal traditions for a definite time at an industrial enterprise perceived the authority of any superior as something requiring unswerving obedience. The psychology of the peasant weakened his will to resist arbitrariness. Being linked to the working of the land, at an industrial enterprise he viewed his job as

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something temporary, and this also impeded his awareness of the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat. It must not be forgotten that an ignorance of knowledge and differences in religion and everyday life prevented the national workers from drawing closer to the Russians.

Thus, the inhabitants of Central Asia were "typical representatives of the working masses and not workers who had gone through the schooling of the capitalist factories and plants, rather they were typical representatives of the working, exploited mass of peasants who suffered from medieval suppression" [39, p 329].

As is known, precisely capitalism discloses exploitation, and removes the veil covering it by patriarchal and religious illusions. In the "Communist Manifesto," K. Marx and F. Engels wrote: "The bourgeoisie has played an extremely revolutionary role in history.

"The bourgeoisie everywhere that it achieved power destroyed all the feudal, patriarchal and idyllic relations.... It turned the personal dignity of man into a value of exchange, and put in the place of the numerous granted and acquired freedoms the *one* unconscious freedom of trade. In a word, it replaced the exploitation concealed by religious and political illusions with an outright, shameless, direct and callous exploitation" [19, p 426]. V. I. Lenin saw the progressive historical work of capitalism, in particular, in the fact that it "destroyed the old separateness and exclusiveness of the economic systems (and consequently, the narrowness of spiritual and political life)" [53, p 57].

The replacing of extra economic coercion by economic under capitalism was directly related to the breaking down of the barriers between estates. The "traditional" forms of social production which over the centuries had been handed down virtually unchanged from generation to generation were replaced by machine production. It was a question not only of a fundamental change in the methods of production, but also the ensuing revolutionary break in social relations and the entire way of life. The social conditions of human life which were subordinate to age-old traditions and customs were destroyed and changed with unprecedented speed. While in the past the population, as a rule, lived in one place, under capitalist conditions it became mobile.

The development of material production led to the development of science, to the growth of its effect on the awareness of people and on their ideology and value orientations.

The national bourgeoisie in Turkestan arose only with the annexation of the region by Russia, and in the period preceding the October Revolution was in a stage of development. It consisted predominantly of middlemen who had grown rich in the cotton trade, usurers, and yesterday's merchants and feudal lords. The local bourgeoisie from the very outset of its rise, due to the existing economic ties between Turkestan and Russia, was dependent both economically and politically upon the Russian bourgeoisie.

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On the one hand, in Russia they had a dependable market, and on the other they grieved over their dependence and longed to be free of it. But the national bourgeoisie of Turkestan was far from that "extremely revolutionary role" which the bourgeoisie played in the history of the European nations. "Many traits of the old way of life survived in the everyday life and psychology of the Central Asian bourgeois. He was an orthodox Moslem at home, he was strict with his wife (wives.--T.S.), and was the uncontested authority in family matters; the household situation, dress, and the forms of amusement--the imprint of national traditions lay everywhere" [234, p 23].

The persons expressing the interests of the national bourgeoisie, in assessing all the phenomena of social, political and economic life, openly defended and protected the foundations wreathed with the spirit of Islam. They saw precisely in religion the ideology around which the population of the Moslem borderlands of Russia must be united. The party created by the Uzbek national bourgeoisie was also viewed by them primarily as a party of like-believers united on a basis of the economic and ideological dogmas of Islam (see [146, pp 26-38; 165, pp 17-28]).

They, in endeavoring to play on the national feelings of the masses, condemned the Moslems who preferred to buy goods from Jews, Hindus and not other like-believers. "For the progress of the nation," wrote the Dzhabid newspaper HURSHED, "it is essential to boycott the merchants of other beliefs and purchase goods from our fellow believers." They sometimes brought up for criticism the ignorance of the Moslem clergy and the confessional schools, and were in favor of a reform in the educational system. They spoke of the necessity of having their own physicians, lawyers and economists, but felt that the preservation of the nation depended upon the level of training among the Moslem personnel and proposed that this personnel be trained in foreign universities [422, pp 44-47].

The following factor was also important. The industrial enterprises in prerevolutionary Central Asia were built only in the "new towns," and consequently the capitalist relations were very slow in penetrating the old feudal towns and the rural localities. The way of life in the old towns and the rural localities, even after unification with Russia, remained virtually unchanged, and relations among people also essentially had not changed. The countryside continued to live its monotonous life which was little subject to the influence of the times.

The developmental process of capitalist relations in Central Asia did not lead to a decisive break in feudal relations. The level of economic, social and political development in the country did not contribute to the development of national self-awareness, and as a result of this national cultures were little developed and they still had not become distinct from religion.

After annexation by Russia, definite changes occurred in economic and cultural development and the way of life of the Central Asian peoples.

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In certain localities, the people began to use the services of Russian physicians, and special consulting offices for women were open in some places. In agriculture, certain rational methods of farming, better methods of tilling the soil, and more advanced implements of production began to be employed, and certain previously unknown crops were introduced in the region such as potatoes, tomatoes, oats, sugar beets, new varieties of cotton, and so forth. Previously unforeseen means of locomotion such as the streetcar, bicycle and railway began to be introduced into the life of the local population. Houses appeared with wooden floors and glazed windows looking out onto the street, and kerosene lamps, stoves, beds, tables, chairs and so forth appeared. The shape and pattern of clothing and footwear changed slowly and gradually, but it did change. But, as was emphasized by I. Dzhabarov, the Moslem clergy and the fanatic portion of the population had an extremely negative attitude toward any changes in customs and the traditional forms of life, even if they brought convenience, benefit and usefulness to man. The violating of the generally accepted standards of conduct and a deviation from all that was deeply rooted was considered a heresy (bid'at) and strictly punished. For a long time the broad masses did not use the new type of transport which was called "shaytan-arboy" ("the devil's cart"), while the railroad up to the October Revolution was used only by pilgrims to Mecca and merchants [178, pp 48-50]. It was considered a sin and bad for the health to eat potatoes and tomatoes. The wearing of rubber galoshes was considered a great sin, since there were letters (the trademark) on their sole, and according to Islam sacred writing must not be trod under foot [404, p 74].

The annexation of Central Asia by Russia had an objective progressive importance, and one must not deny all the positive that followed behind this. The incipient collapse of feudal society and the growth of the material bases of capitalism were undoubtedly a progressive phenomenon. "Recognition of the progressiveness of this role," in the words of V. I. Lenin, "is completely compatible...with a full recognition of the negative and gloomy aspects of capitalism..." [53, p 597].

At the same time, it would be wrong, in following certain modern authors, to uncritically use the information found in prerevolutionary sources that in the regions of Central Asia annexed by Russia, "religion little by little for many began to be turned into a vestige and into a formality required solely by the code of social decorum, into an overcoat without which it was inconvenient to go out on the street" [311, pp 115-116; see also: 463, p 337].

In actuality, after annexation by Russia, in Turkestan the position of the rais was eliminated, and one of their duties had been to supervise the observance of religious rites by the population. As a result for a certain period there was a decline in the number of persons praying in the mosques and the number of medrese, and a definite indifference was noted among the people toward the performing of other religious rites. Does this not speak of the secularization of Central Asian society and of the

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loss by Islam of the integrating function inherent to it? In order to answer this question, it is essential first of all to analyze the class relations in society. It is possible to speak of secularization only with the presence of a class interested in this.

Marxist philosophy does not deny the dependence of secularization upon a change in the social structure, upon a broadening of the communicative ties, a rise in the role of science and the mass transformation of culture, or upon the greater mobility of people, and other phenomena in a society contributing to the process of its "industrialization." At the same time, it points to the particular importance of a specific social system, under the conditions of which the basic factors of secularization are to be manifested. Precisely the social system provides the answer to the question of why the factors operate slowly in some instances, and more rapidly in others.

With the annexation of Central Asia by Russia, the social system and its class essence remained unchanged. Here no forces appeared interested in the complete weakening of the positions of Islam. Tsarist Russia, proceeding from its own colonial aims, undertook everything to strengthen religion. Individual measures related to weakening the positions of the Moslem organizations did not pursue the aim of secularizing various aspects of social and personal life, or to destroy the dominance of religion. For this reason, these can be assessed only as an incipient process of weakening the regulative influence of religious organizations in the various spheres of social life and on man himself.

None of the legislative acts consistently proclaimed and reinforced even one of the principles of secularization, although the ratification of one or another act in no way meant the practical implementation of secularization. It is essential that the socioeconomic conditions and the cultural conditions of life contribute to a situation where the masses themselves grow up to these ideas and are ready to accept the process of their legislative enactment and actual implementation. In Central Asia these conditions did not exist before the revolution, and for this reason the individual acts of the tsarist authorities (for example, on the right to select between the kazi and Russian court) remained on paper. The same is presently occurring in Turkey which is a secular state, where the principles of secularization have been stated in the constitution more than 50 years ago. However here even now "the influence of the traditions and standards of Islam continues to remain the dominant trait in the way of thinking of the Turkish peasant and in the life of the Turkish countryside" [337, p 187].

In prerevolutionary Central Asia, Moslem law continued to operate, and this contributed to the reinforcing of the dogmatic prescripts and moral-legal standards of Islam which, as had been the case over many centuries, the population was to follow.

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There was no fundamental change either in the property and social status of the clergy. The partial reform carried out in the waqf in no instance meant secularization or nationalization. The reform was calmly accepted by the population, since it did not involve the interests of either the people or the clergy who lost little.

The main thing, the school, which could have made the most serious blow and led gradually to the decline in the influence of religion and to a victory of the secular nature of the state, did not undergo any essential changes. Europeization did not have any essential influence either on the lower or middle strata, or even on the upper clique of Central Asian society. Fundamental changes did not occur in the traditional way of life.

All of this made it possible for V. I. Lenin, in studying the situation of religion and the spread of the ideology of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in Turkestan, in the course of his work on "Notebooks on Imperialism" to make the following resume: "Islam reigns here. Freedom of religion is complete. Pan-Islamism" [57a, p 513].

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The bird among the ancient Arabs was the symbol of fate.

<sup>2</sup>The tabut among the Moslems was a coffin without a lid in which the deceased was carried to the grave.

<sup>3</sup>Words of the medieval Moslem poets and philosophers Ragib, Isfahani, Ibn Sina, Imam Gasali, and Jalaluddin Rumi [374].

<sup>4</sup>It must be pointed out, in the first place, that Islam also played a similar role in other regions where it was spread. And secondly, Islam in this was not an exceptional phenomenon. Religion has served as one of the factors in strengthening an awareness of belonging to a definite nationality, and also played a definite role in the formation of the Slavic nationalities such as the Russian, Bulgarian, Moravian, and so forth (see [158a]).

<sup>5</sup>The existence of different schools within Islam also influenced the spread of various names. For example, among the Shiites the name of Ali was popular, and it was encountered even more often than the name of Muhammad. Among them were many names which in etymology had nothing related to Shiism but had been brought in from Iran such as: Riza (Reza, Rza), Sekina, and others.

<sup>6</sup>Here M. F. Akhundov is wrong in using the term "sect," in speaking about the schools of Islam.

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<sup>7</sup>The ideas of organizing a people's court under the chairmanship of a Russian official were proposed by individual figures in the colonial administration. But out of the fear that the people would perceive this as a violation of the shariat and the official might not observe it or, even worse, fall under the influence of the kazi and "thereby humiliate Russian power," this was rejected. In leaving the traditional forms of the court for the local population, the Russian authorities proceeded from the view that to touch these courts would "mean to touch their religion," and this was recognized as "very dangerous." At the same time, it was considered impossible to leave them inviolable, "since no one doubted that this court was a source of all sorts of stubbornness and ignorance for the people" [183, pp 4-5].

<sup>8</sup>The people's court in Turkestan always had greater rights and powers than in the other regions of Russia inhabited by Moslems. For example, in the Caucasus they were concerned only with suits and litigation (up to 100 rubles) and minor misdemeanors (the dirtying of water in streams, canals or wells, the selling of spoiled products, an offensive word, a blow not involving maiming, theft, and swindling up to a total of not over 30 rubles). In interior Russia and the Transcaucasus, the people's courts could give sentences only of public work up to 6 days, monetary fines up to 3 rubles, arrest up to 7 days, and whippings up to 20 blows [183, p 51].

<sup>9</sup>By the word "mosque" in prerevolutionary Central Asia, one understood not only the place of social prayer, but also an inferior administrative and fiscal unit. For example, the Khiva Khante was divided into a number of bekates headed by the feudal beks. The bekates, in turn, were divided into naibates, and these consisted of mosque societies led by aksakals and kethuds. Around each mosque were grouped from three-four to several score households or farms. The mosque imam, in being an inferior official in the Khiva administration, along with performing religious duties, kept account of the taxpayers and collected the taxes. Often he also carried out the function of a mirab or distributor of water. The mosque gave the name to the territorial unit. Where there was still a kinship-tribal organization (among the Turkmen, Karakalpaks and Aral Uzbeks), mosques did not exist at all as primary administrative units. But in the regions of the khante where the Uzbek population still preserved its tribal organization, there was an unique transitional form. Here the mosques that were administrative units were not connected to the mosques which were religious institutions, and were called after the names of the elders or mirabs, and so forth [424, p 11].

<sup>10</sup>By this time the Orenburg Clerical Assembly already existed and this was in charge of all Islamic affairs on the territory of Russia, with the exception of Tavrida Province which had its own Clerical Administration. There were also the corresponding regulations on the Moslem clergy and the affairs under their control.

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<sup>11</sup>However, V. V. Bertol'd notes that "regardless of the elective procedure of the position of kazi, a recognition of the hereditary right to this position had not disappeared even under the Russians, and sometimes determined the outcome of the elections, although certainly not always" [112, p 360].

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#### ISLAM IN A SOCIALIST SOCIETY

One of the important tasks confronting the young socialist state immediately after the victory of the October Revolution was the task of disseminating the socialist ideology, and creating a new man who possessed a socialist awareness which fundamentally differed from the social awareness of capitalist and feudal societies. Among the broad masses of workers it was essential to instill an intolerant attitude toward any forms of exploitation, suppression and injustice, a socialist attitude toward labor, a feeling of friendship among peoples, and socialist internationalism. It was a question of creating all the essential conditions for the all-round development of the Soviet man, and for surmounting the previous gap between city and countryside.

The shaping of a socialist awareness based on a scientific ideology required a decisive struggle against religious ideology.

The fundamental questions of the attitude of the Marxist party and the socialist state to religion were formulated by V. I. Lenin long before the October Revolution in such works as "Socialism and Religion," "On the Attitude of the Workers Party to Religion," "The Clergy and Politics," "Classes and the Party in Relation to Religion and the Church," and others. Any religion is a deceiving of the people, any religion is hostile to the workers, reactionary and antiscientific at its base--this was the essence of the attitude of the Communist Party to religion. For this reason the Communist Party considers the struggle against religious prejudices as one of the most important areas of work in shaping the materialistic ideology of the workers. At the same time, the party clearly distinguishes its approach to religion as to an antiscientific ideology, and to the carriers of religious views, that is, the believers.

For the Communist Party, the struggle against religion is not an end in itself, but rather a component part of the class struggle of the proletariat. The source of religion, Marxism teaches, is rooted in the social suppression of the masses, and the overcoming of religion is directly linked to changes in social conditions, to a transformation of everyday life, and a rise in the culture of the masses of people. For this reason, the party has always waged the struggle against religion with great tact and patience, and has demanded that there be no insults or disdainful attitude

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toward the religious views of the workers and peasants. "...It is essential to *know how* to combat religion," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "and for this it is essential to explain *materialistically* the source of faith and religion among the masses" [50, p 418].

V. I. Lenin emphasized that the party is to struggle for complete freedom of conscience, and is to show respect to any sincere conviction in questions of faith, if this conviction is not carried out by violence and deceit. V. I. Lenin also formulated the principle of separation of the church from the state and the school from the church, meaning that in terms of the state which brings together all citizens regardless of their religious convictions, the question of whether or not to believe in God is their private matter. "The state," wrote V. I. Lenin, "should not be involved in religion, and the religious societies should not be related to state authority. Each person should be completely free to profess whatever religion he wishes or not to recognize any religion, that is, to be an atheist..." [57, p 143].

From the very first days of its existence, the Soviet state began consistently to carry out measures aimed at the secularization of society, and above all its political life. In November-December 1917, a series of decrees were promulgated (on land, on the dissolution of marriage, on civil marriage, on children and on keeping records for vital statistics, and so forth), and these became the preparatory legislative measures for publishing a basic document on the attitude of the state to religion, the church and the believers.

This document was the Decree of 23 January 1918 "On the Separation of Church and State and the School and Church" drawn up with the active participation of V. I. Lenin and signed by him. The decree delimited, on the one hand, the activities of religious societies to satisfying the purely religious needs of the believers, and on the other, guaranteed all the necessary conditions for these activities, having excluded them from the political sphere, and having thereby settled in a negative manner the question of the possibility of any participation whatsoever by religious societies in the political organization of a socialist society.

The decree deprived the church of an economic base. It stated that no church and religious societies had the right to own property. They were also deprived of the right of a legal entity. All the property of the church and religious societies which had existed in Russia were declared to be the property of the people, and the compulsory collections and taxes for them were repealed.

The document decreed a separation of church and state. Henceforth the actions of the state and other public legal institutions would not be accompanied by any religious rites and ceremonies. No one could refuse to carry out civil duties by referring to his religious views. The religious vow or oath was repealed. The vital statistics records were now kept exclusively by civil authority, that is, by the departments for the

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recording of marriages and births. The school was also separated from the church. The teaching of religious views was not permitted in any state or even private institutions of learning where general educational subjects were taught. The decree put all the church and religious societies under the general provisions concerning private companies and unions, and established that they did not have any advantages and would not receive any subsidies either from the state or from the local autonomous and self-managing institutions. The decree prohibited any coercion of the conscience of the citizens both by the representatives of state power and by the religious societies. Each citizen could profess any religion or not profess any.

The separation of church and state and school and church helped to fully break the tie between the exploiting classes and the organization of religious propaganda, and to actually free the working masses from religious prejudices.

But under the conditions of Central Asia, the actual implementation of Lenin's decree and the freeing of the conscience of the workers from the sway of Islamic ideology had its particular features related to the development level of the region and its historic past.

Ignorant and backward and politically undeveloped, the people saw the clergy and the local rich as their leaders, and followed them blindly. In speaking at the Eighth Party Congress, V. I. Lenin said that "the Kirgiz, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Turkmen completely...are under the sway of their mullahs," and for this reason "it is essential to wait for the development of the given nation and the differentiation of the proletariat from bourgeois elements" [58, pp 158-159].

Here it was essential to work out strategic and tactical concepts, implementing ways, procedures and means which would combine the unswerving party line of deepening the revolutionary victories, the greatest possible strengthening of the solid alliance between the working class and the basic masses of the working peasantry with maximum circumspection for the religious feelings of the population, its traditions and family relationships.

On 20 November 1917, just two weeks after the victory of the October Revolution, the Appeal of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars [SNK] "to all the working Moslems of Russia and the East signed by V. I. Lenin was promulgated, and this clearly formulated the basic principles in the policy of Soviet power. In particular, it stated: "Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are declared to be free and inviolable. Organize your national life freely and without obstruction. You have the right to this. Know that your rights, like the rights of all the peoples of Russia, are defended by the entire might of the revolution and its bodies, the Soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies" [184, p 34].

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The very fact that the appeal contained as one of the most important guarantees of the revolution the inviolability of the beliefs and customs which had existed over the centuries shows the profound understanding on the part of V. I. Lenin and the party of the great complexity of the situation in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as the realistic approach to defining the ways for building socialism in the region. In addressing itself precisely to the Moslems, the appeal proceeded from the fact that here religious affiliation meant more than an ethnic one, and the representatives of all nationalities were aware of themselves primarily as Moslems. At the same time, the Soviet government, in considering the rudimentary class self-awareness, addressed itself not to the Moslems generally, but precisely to the working Moslems.<sup>1</sup>

V. I. Lenin and the Soviet state proceeded from the view that the question on the attitude toward Islam under the conditions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan which had not undergone the capitalist path of secularization was primarily a political question, and the strength of the victories of the revolution and the attitude of the working masses to it depended largely on the skillful solution of this question. A rapid process of secularization unusual for the indigenous population and extensive atheistic propaganda could cause sharp political tension and be utilized for counterrevolutionary purposes.

In defining their line vis-a-vis Islam, our party and state proceeded from the fact that the basic political divide ran not between the believers and nonbelievers, but between the exploiters and the exploited. V. I. Lenin emphasized that the communists "should not prohibit the proletariats which have preserved various vestiges of old prejudices from siding with our party. We will always propound a scientific ideology...but this in no way means that the religious question must be put in the forefront..." [57, p 146].

The program of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] approved in 1919 demanded that special caution and particular attention be paid to the vestiges of national feelings among the working masses of the suppressed or disenfranchised peoples.

The RKP(b) Central Committee constantly demanded that the party committees and political departments working among the peoples of the East proceed from a consideration of the basic factors playing the major role in their life, namely the religious and the national. Religious prejudices, the Central Committee pointed out, occupy a much larger place in their lives and are more strongly manifested than among the economically more developed peoples, and act in a close tie with civil and family life. Proceeding from this, in the Islamic areas, the Central Committee prescribed "great caution in the struggle against religious prejudices. One must struggle against them not by the outright negation of religion, but by sapping it through the spread of literacy, the opening of schools, clubs and reading rooms, the spreading of knowledge in the area of the history of the earth

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and man, and mainly, in pointing to the class nature of the organization of the Moslem clergy..." [63, pp 146-147].

The situation in Central Asia and Kazakhstan during the first years of the existence of Soviet power did not make it possible to conduct mass anti-religious propaganda or to criticize Islam, its teachings and dogmas.

The Communist Party of Turkestan [KPT] during the first years of the existence of Soviet power, considering that "among the suppressed nationalities the strength of religious prejudices is to be explained by national suppression," and that "religious affiliation on the part of the representatives of the previously dominant nation in a colony to a significant degree serves as a manifestation of suppressive chauvinism," felt that freedom from religious prejudices was an indispensable condition for the occupying of responsible positions by Europeans. The same demand, emphasized the Fifth KPT Congress (September 1920), "should be made on the fully aware and responsible Moslem workers. As for the rank and file and less responsible Moslem party members, the struggle against religious prejudices in their ranks should be carried out exclusively using the development of class self-awareness" [358, p 66].

The question of antireligious propaganda among the indigenous peoples of Turkestan was directly and decisively raised for the first time at the Seventh KPT Congress held in March 1923.

During these years the task had not been set of criticizing the teachings and dogmas of Islam or disclosing its social essence, and the origin of its rites and holidays. Antireligious propaganda was subordinate to the task of strengthening the class awareness of the workers from the indigenous nationalities, and further strengthening the influence of Soviet power in their midst. The task was set of not putting outright antireligious propaganda in the forefront, but doing this only in those conditions when religious propaganda was being used to conceal political slogans which obviously contradicted the interests of the workers. Considering this, antireligious propaganda should be aimed at surmounting "those artificial barriers which the clerical reactionary clergy (ulema) in the name of religion endeavor to erect for the workers on their path to free sociopolitical and ideological development," and at the gradual emancipation of the workers from the influence of the ulemas. Particular significance was given to the spiritual emancipation of the youth [358, pp 176, 177].

"The main and basic task in antireligious propaganda in the immediate future," said the congress, "should consist in the eradication of religious traditions, prejudices and convictions among the Communist Party members of the indigenous population.... Without achieving this basic task, it is difficult to speak for the wide organization of antireligious propaganda among the village masses" [358, p 179]. The RKP(b) Central Committee and its Sredazburo [Central Asian Bureau] recommended that primary attention be given to the indoctrination and education of the communists and Komsomol members. The Sredazburo supported the instructions to the local party

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bodies to observe strict caution in working among women, considering that a majority of the peasantry was contaminated by patriarchal views. Special caution, the Sredazburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee demanded, must be shown for the religious feelings of the population. In particular, it was proposed that all the mosques occupied as facilities in Eastern Bukhara be immediately vacated. But this in no way meant that the party was to permit the possibility of the coexistence of communist and religious ideologies or the propagandizing of the ideas of socialism and communism on a religious basis. Thus, during the years when even believers were admitted to party ranks, the First KPT Congress (June 1918) decisively rejected the "theory" proposed at the congress of a basic unity between communism and the teachings of Islam and that the way for influencing the Moslems should be a religious one [358, p 6].

Beginning with the first years of the existence of Soviet up to the middle of the 1920's, chief attention was paid to unmasking the class essence of Islam, the close link of the Moslem clergy with the exploiters, and their antipopular activities. For example, this was the aim of the theses sent out to all party cells and written by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the KPT entitled "On Antireligious Propaganda Under the Conditions of Turkestan" and containing extensive factual material. In another letter from the same department entitled "On Combating Ishanism and Other Religious Currents," the religious essence of ishanism was unmasked, and the true face of the hoj respected by the believers was revealed.

Upon instructions of the Sredazburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee, in rural localities mass antireligious propaganda was not initiated until the middle of the 1920's; to a certain degree this involved only the rural activists.

Party organization in Central Asia also had its particular features. The Second Conference of the KPT (March 1919) set up a regional Moslem Bureau (Musburo) which with the rights of a department of the party kraykom and under its leadership, was to carry out party work among the Moslem population. It was given the mission of finding the ways to bring the party closer to the working masses of the indigenous nationalities, and to conduct propaganda in their mother tongue. The Musburo and its departments set up on the spot carried out a good deal of work to involve the indigenous population in setting up and strengthening the bodies of Soviet power, in training national cadres and in mobilizing for the struggle against the Masmach [Central Asian Bands]. Agitation-propaganda and cultural-educational work held the leading place in the activities of the bureau. Particular attention was given to increasing the ranks of the Communist Party from the most aware representatives of the local working nationalities. Considering the role which religion continued to play in their lives, the party also admitted believers. For many years believers comprised a significant part of the members of the KPT.

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Thus, feudal Central Asia began to build socialism, bypassing capitalist relations (for this see [93; 140; 209; 240; 251; 266; 269; 303; 329; 352, and others]). Naturally, the precapitalist social and production relations could not immediately be transformed into socialist ones, and here the question was "to understand what *implementing* ways, procedures, means and aids would be needed for turning *precapitalist* relations into socialism" [51, p 228]. Here it was essential to find the forms which, in combining in a dialectical unity the elements of old and new quality, would thereby give the old forms familiar to the population a new content, and ensure a victory of the new over the old. In the first stages of socialist construction, in the region such transitional and intermediate forms were widely used in the various areas of political, socioeconomic and ideological life [266, pp 16-18]. They were also used in solving the religious question, and this had an impact on the uniqueness of the secularization process for various aspects of the life of the indigenous Central Asian population.

The process of secularization in the Central Asian republics was closely tied to the specific features and successes of socialist construction, and consisted of a number of stages.<sup>2</sup>

#### Basic Stages and Particular Features in the Secularization of Islamic Regions after the October Socialist Revolution

True secularization of the various aspects of Central Asian life began with the Great October Socialist Revolution. Its first stage encompassed the period of socialist transformations in the area of spiritual life in the course of the proletarian revolution and the transition from capitalism to socialism, and ended in the middle of the 1930's, when socialism had been basically built in the USSR. During this period the economic and political rule of the exploiting classes was destroyed, the landowners and the capitalists were eliminated as a class, and the proletariat had become the ruling class. In the countryside the number of middle peasantry had grown, and the number of poor peasantry had declined, although it still remained.

The most important result of the stage was that a significant majority of the population had been reached by the political ideology of the proletariat in the course of socialist construction. The spiritual life of society was now organized on a new socialist basis, and religion had ceased to have the decisive influence on shaping the awareness of the working masses.

In turn, the given stage, in accord with the successes of the socialist secularization of Islam, can be divided into a number of stages.

At the beginning of the first such period (1917-1920), when socialist changes in the region began, the most important legislative acts were approved which were to become the basis of secularization for all aspects of the life of the indigenous Central Asian population. The Constitution of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR) repeated an article on freedom of conscience from the Constitution of the RSFSR of

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which Turkestan was a part. On 20 November 1918, the SNK of the TASSR approved a decree on the separation of church and state and church and school which repeated the Decree of the RSFSR SNK of 23 January 1918.

On the basis of this decree, the property which had belonged to the Moslem organizations was proclaimed to be the property of the people, and a waquf department was established under the Commissariat for Nationality Affairs of the TASSR for managing this property.

The state-approved legislative enactments separated the school from the church, and eliminated the teaching of religion in the school. In Turkestan, for the first time in history state bodies of public education appeared on a republic level and on the spot. Regardless of exceptional difficulties, the Soviet state even during the first years of its existence opened more schools here than in the 50-year rule of tsarism in the region. By the end of 1920, Turkestan had over 2,000 primary schools, with more than one-half of the students (98,656) made up of children of the citizens of the indigenous nationalities [422, p 66].

The years 1917-1920 were characterized by the first attempts made to create a culture free from the influence of religion and the ideology of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Newspapers appeared in the languages of the local nationalities, and secular books began to be published, including the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and popular scientific literature, new libraries were opened and the existing ones were nationalized. During these years literary works were published which unmasked the anti-popular intrigues of the clergy, and a professional national theater was born which did a great deal to educate the people; a people's conservatory was opened.

In Turkestan, the civil law relations began to be organized on a basis of the civil law enactments of the RSFSR introduced by special decrees of the Turkestan TsIK [Central Executive Committee] or the SNK. The congresses of Soviets and the Turkestan TsIK were given the right to alter certain points in the decrees of the central Soviet government considering local economic and domestic particular features of a republic.

The decrees of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and the RSFSR SNK approved immediately after the victory of the October Revolution such as "On Civil Marriage, on Children and the Keeping of Vital Statistics" (18 December 1917) and "On the Dissolution of Marriage" (19 December 1917) undermined the dominant position of religion in the area of family law and family life. The first of the decrees abolished the previously existing compulsory order for the concluding of church marriages. Only civil marriage was recognized as valid and compulsory and concluded in the corresponding state bodies, the departments for the registering of marriages and births, which had been specially set up under the local state bodies. A church wedding was declared to be a private matter for persons entering marriage and did not entail legal consequences.

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The Decree "On the Dissolution of Marriage" transferred the keeping of the acts of civil status exclusively to the state institutions, removing this fully from the hands of the church bodies, it proclaimed the principle of the voluntary entry into marriage and the freedom of divorce for both spouses, it prohibited polygamy, and also set a marriageable age of 18 years for men and 16 years for women.

V. I. Lenin, in commenting on the enormous role of the first Soviet laws on marriage and the family for strengthening socialist relations, wrote: "Soviet power has been the first and only in the world to fully destroy all the old, bourgeois base laws which put women in an unequal position with men and gave privileges to men, for example, in the area of marriage law or in the area of relations with children. Soviet power has been the first and only in the world, as the power of the workers, to eliminate everything related to the property and advantages which survived in family law for men in all, even the most democratic, bourgeois republics" [43a, p 157].

All the general court institutions which had existed in the kray from previous times were eliminated. In the first stage (in 1919), the kazi and biya courts which had remained unchanged up to this time were abolished (see below).

In Soviet Turkestan, on the basis of the decree of the VTsIK and the RSFSR SNK of 24 November 1917 "On Abolishing Estates and Civil Ranks," all the privileges which the Moslem clergy, the saids and hoji had were eliminated.

Thus, in the first years of its existence, the Soviet state approved all of the necessary legislative enactments which could lead to the secularization of all aspects of social life without exception, and to the loss of many functions by Islam.

However, in the first period the principle of the separation of church and state and school and church in practice was carried out only in relation to the European population living in Turkestan. Because of numerous objective reasons, this principle could not be fully carried out in relation to the indigenous population.

The local population could not benefit from those opportunities which were provided to them with the introduction of the separation of church and state and church and school. This required a high level of secularization of social awareness and the proper conditions for fully utilizing freedom of conscience.

Immediately after the establishing of Soviet power in Turkestan, the Civil War began. The counterrevolutionary forces in their plans gave an important place to the participation of the Moslem clergy on the side of the reaction, and counted on a war against people's power under the flag of Islam, representing it as a religious war. And during the first years of the revolution, the Moslem clergy openly proclaimed its antipopular essence,

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in directly supporting the exploiting classes, it condemned Soviet power as "objectionable to Allah," and called upon the believers to fight for its overthrow, and became the ideologue of the counterrevolutionary Basmach detachments. These detachments portrayed themselves as the "army of Islam" and the "national troops of Turkestan" fighting "in the name of our Creator and Prophet Muhammad, the shariat, the honor and good of religion and the nation." They convinced the people that Soviet power did not recognize "any religion and the shariat," it made everyone unreligious, and eliminated the difference "between men and women" and the various religions. "If you do not take measures for your liberation from this filth," stated the appeal by the leaders of the Fergana Basmach to the workers of Turkestan, "then you swerve from your centuries-old faithful path, you forget your religion, nationality and history. You will then be morally responsible for such a crime and be subject to the wrath and spite of our God" [350, pp 134-135].

The heads of the Basmach took the title "amir-al-Muslimin" ("the sovereign of the orthodox"). The Basmach, a movement based on an armed protest against everything on which the new, Soviet way of life was to be built, fought against Soviet power as "a struggle against the infidels" and for the "defense of Islam." Both the leaders as well as the rank and file Basmach everywhere acted as the zealous defenders of Islam, and they dealt mercilessly with the proponents of the new and with people who in any way dared to depart from the precepts of Islam. They murdered the teachers of the Soviet schools, the party and Komsomol activists, the Soviet workers, and terrorized the population.

The anti-Soviet propaganda of the clergy at first had a certain success explainable by the low level of political development among the indigenous population, as well as by the trust which the clergy had. The counterrevolutionary elements also made use of the leftist extremes which had been committed in Turkestan against Islam, its organizations and the religious feelings of the believers. In 1919, in spite of the party's instructions, the waqf lands were confiscated, the kazi and biya courts were banned, and the Moslem schools, the maktabas, were eliminated. All these measures could not be fully carried out everywhere in those years, but they evoked irritation among the indigenous population and played into the hands of the enemies of Soviet power.

The economy of Central Asia, as a result of the Civil War and the operations of the Basmach detachments, experienced a complete collapse. The gross product of all Turkestan industry in 1920 scarcely reached 20 percent of the prewar level, and the number of operating enterprises was cut in half. The size of the working class was reduced by 65 percent. Many workers were forced to go into artisan trades and agriculture.

The planted area on irrigated lands declined by 47.6 percent in comparison with the prewar level. A significant portion of the irrigation network became unusable, and the number of livestock declined sharply [219, pp 71, 72].

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The following major factor also contributed to the preservation of the influence of not only the clergy but also the feudal rulers. Soviet power from the first days of its existence had established the basis of the socialist economy with the nationalizing of the banks, the large enterprises, mines, private railroads, and so forth. The indigenous population took an active part in establishing the new, socialist economic system, and as a result of this its political awareness rose, forming the basis for further successes in socialist construction in the region and for the spiritual transformation of all life. But these transformations involved primarily the life of the urban population. The situation was quite different in rural localities.

The assumption of power by the proletariat under Russian conditions was marked by a rapid solving of the agrarian question in the interests of the broad masses. The Land Decree approved on 26 October (8 November) 1917 immediately and without any compensation eliminated private ownership of land, and turned it over to the volost land committees and the district soviets of peasant deputies.

From the first days of the victory of October, not only was a democratic agrarian reform consistently carried out in the Russian countryside, but also measures were implemented making a tangible attack against the economic and political positions of the rural bourgeoisie (the nationalization of all land, the solving of the food question in the interests of the workers and poorest peasants, the struggle for the socialist education of the peasantry, state production and distribution of agricultural machinery and implements, the setting up of leasing points, and so forth). As a result of carrying out these measures, the peasantry of Soviet Russia received enormous material gains. This made it possible for V. I. Lenin in a report given on behalf of the SNK to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 11 January 1918, with full justification to state that the Russian peasantry had already begun a transition to socialism. "In the peasant land," noted V. I. Lenin, "the peasantry generally were the first to win, to win the most, and to gain immediately from the dictatorship of the proletariat.... *For the first time* under the dictatorship of the proletariat the peasant was working for himself and *was eating better than the city dweller*" [61, p 276].

After the October revolution, work began to be carried out in Turkestan to provide the landless and small landholding peasants with land and eliminate the nonworking farms. But in the first period nationalization involved only the large landholdings which were basically of industrial significance. A significant portion of the lands continued to remain in the hands of exploiting elements. The incipient liquidation of the nonworking farms and the distribution of surplus land among the poor did not make essential changes in the life of the village.

Objective factors impeded the secularization of the most important aspects of life in Turkestan in 1917-1920. For example there were not enough

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school buildings, ideologically correct textbooks and teaching aids for secularizing the public education system, and most importantly there was a catastrophic shortage of teachers who agreed with the tasks confronting the Soviet school.

In the conscience of the indigenous population there was also a definite prejudice against the new schools as the instruction of the children in the Soviet schools was largely associated with the abandoning of Islam and this could not be permitted, all the more as the new schools were being attacked constantly by the clergy, the beys and manaps who still maintained their influence on the Moslems.

The years 1917-1920 were characterized by the start of an offensive against the dominance of Islam in the cultural life of the people. The first successes were achieved in this area, but it was still early to speak of the complete secularization of spiritual life. The Moslem organizations still had rather impressive opportunities for influencing the awareness of the region's workers. It was not only a question of the sparsity of secular cultural institutions, their inaccessibility to the broad strata of workers, particularly in the countryside, or in a definite predisposition of the indigenous population against still unfamiliar phenomena in cultural life and related to the dominance of traditions of the past. Rather it was a question that the politically defeated national bourgeoisie had not been ideologically defeated. The intelligentsia was under its strong influence, including the journalists, writers and teachers who during the first years of the existence of Soviet power intensified the propagandizing of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ideas. Many of the nationalistically inclined representatives of the intelligentsia held important positions in the People's Commissariat of Education and on the editorial staffs of newspapers and magazines. Because of this in the Soviet newspapers and magazines works appeared which idealized the feudal past and called for the unification of all Moslems and the creation of a unified Moslem state, and so forth. In many instances, they conducted overtly anti-Soviet propaganda, and sowed hate for other peoples of the nation, and above all for the working Russian people and Russian culture.

During this period Islam largely continued to control the civil law relations of the local population. The decisions taken to destroy the kazi and biya courts and replace them with people's courts conducting the cases on a basis of Soviet laws were not carried out in practice and were not accepted by the indigenous population. A gap of many years lay between the proclamation of the possibility of organizing civil law relationships on the new principles which fundamentally differed from Moslem ones and the use of these laws by all the population. During the first postrevolutionary years, the designated decrees, in our view, played more a political than a practical role under the conditions of Central Asia, particularly in the countryside. For example, in proclaiming new principles for relationships in the family, and informing the population of them, Soviet power disclosed the prospects for the people and prepared them to abandon the observance of the standards of Moslem law.

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The difficulties of implementing the new standards in family and marriage relationships were related not only to the rabid resistance of the clergy or to the actions of the Basmach gangs and counterrevolutionary elements who endeavored to restore the old orders. The population itself had not yet grown to an understanding of them, and was at a level of development which did not allow it to benefit from the granted rights. In many instances the population simply did not know of them. The most important new legal documents, including the marriage and family code, had still not been translated into the local languages.

In the first stage the departments for recording vital statistics were set up only in the cities. In Zakaspiyskaya Oblast (present-day Turkmenia), for example, in 1919, such departments existed only in Poltoratsk (now Ashkhabad and Merv (now Mary). In 1919, they recorded just 431 civil acts, including 211 marriages and 21 divorces. Here there was not a single instance of the Turkmen population turning to these departments. The workers of the department did not have experience in working among the indigenous population, and their employees were only men, in individual instances mullahs, with whom women could not converse.

In contrast to other regions where the use of the laws of overthrown governments was categorically prohibited, the RSFSR Regulation Governing the Unified People's Court put into effect (with amendments) on the territory of the TASSR in 1919, provided that in the absence of the corresponding decree, the people's courts could be guided by socialist legal awareness and by existing law (the shariat and adat). Thus, the shariat and adat continued to remain sources of civil law [330, p 40].

But it would be wrong to feel that in 1917-1920 there were no changes in the status of the Moslem organizations or in the functions performed by Islam. Islam fell into a new sociopolitical and ideological situation which was unusual for all the centuries of its existence. Now the Moslem organizations did not have the support of the state, they did not occupy any place in the political bodies of the state, they became one of many private societies and unions, and did not have any advantages and privileges. The religious affiliation of a person or his lack of belief ceased to influence his position in society, and any indication of this was eliminated from all documents.

For the first time in legislation the principle was proclaimed according to which a person gained freedom from the complete regulation of his life by Islam, and an opportunity himself to determine his attitude toward religion. Along with the religious community which at first largely determined the positions of a person's life, other collectives, organizations and institutions appeared which were free from Islam and at the same time socially important for him.

The very fact of the proclamation of a decree on the separation of church and state and church and school was a crushing blow to the most important

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function of Islam, the integrating function, and this was the most essential change in the social role of Islam. One thing can be said with confidence: for a significant portion of the Central Asian population, immediately after the October Revolution Islam ceased to be the force which determined their political sympathies and their attitude toward authority. It is not a question of atheism among this portion of the population (the abandoning of religion and atheism are not identical concepts), but rather the secularization of their political awareness.

Our assertion is based on historical facts which show the growth of political awareness and the social activeness of many representatives from the indigenous Central Asian nationalities on the eve of and after the October Revolution. The actions of the peasantry and artisans which, for example, previously had a spontaneous nature, after the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution, assumed an organized political nature. During this period class organizations of the Turkestan workers appeared in the form of soviets, committees and unions of local workers, and in Tashkent a Soviet of Moslem Worker Deputies was organized and this worked in close contact with the city soviet of worker and soldier deputies, and was against the local exploiting elements. We should point out that both this soviet as well as the worker organizations created on the spot not only did not have contact with the reactionary Moslem organizations (for example, "Shuroi-Ulamo"), but also acted against them, that is, they were free of political influence by the Moslem clergy. The "mardikers" during this period contributed largely to a revival of class actions among the rural and urban poor. These were representatives of the local nationalities who had returned from rear service in various oblasts of Russia. Among those who marched with red banners on the May Day Demonstration of 1917 in Tashkent and who spoke at meetings were many local workers, including women. The workers of the local nationalities actively participated in the overthrow of the Provisional Government in the region.

With great enthusiasm they set to strengthening the young Soviet state.

Here are a few of the most vivid examples. In May 1920, in Turkestan a call-up was announced for the Red Army of 30,000 men who were representatives of the local nationalities from 19 to 35 years of age. Soon the army had recruited 31,113 men [224, Vol 3, p 216]. By January 1920, the representatives of the indigenous nationalities comprised one-third of the soldiers in the Turkestan republic [343a, p 78].

The regular units of the Red Army constantly felt the active support of the local population. They refused fodder and food to the Basmach, they informed the Red Army of their location, and unmasked persons involved with them. Volunteer Moslem detachments were set up on the spot, and these sought out the Basmach bands and had a great moral influence on the members of these bands. The local population set up volunteer brigades, detachments of police and self-defense, and these resisted the Basmach and protected the foundations of Soviet power. Moslem companies and national divisions were organized in the army.

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The local population also took an active part in the activities of the party and soviet bodies. By the end of December 1918, 40-50 percent of the members of the KPT were representatives of the local nationalities; they comprised up to one-half of the delegates at the Third KPT Congress (June 1919) [358, pp 15, 27].

With each passing year there was a rise in the number of workers from the local nationalities participating in the elections of the local Soviet bodies. In individual localities, for example, regardless of the fierce resistance from the clergy and feudal lords, the number of persons participating in the 1920 elections, in comparison with the 1919 elections, rose by over 2-fold. There was also a sharp increase in the number of deputies. Suffice it to say that of the 200 female deputies on the Tashkent Soviet, 167 were Uzbek women [224, Vol 3, pp 233, 234].

This was due to the fact that, as K. Marx emphasized, the socialist revolution itself was a process of the direct and immediate mass transformation of people, since "a revolution is necessary not only because it is impossible to overthrow a *ruling* class by any other method, but also because the *overthrowing* class only in a revolution can throw off all the old abomination and become capable of creating the new basis of a society" [20, p 70].

The years of the revolution were marked by unprecedented activity by the masses. It is essential to recall, wrote V. I. Lenin, that the revolution possessed "an enormous educating and organizing force...when powerful historical events force the Philistines from their lairs, attics and basements and require them to become *citizens*. The months of the revolution more quickly and completely indoctrinate the citizens at times than do decades of political stagnation" [54, pp 339-340].

Gradually the new invaded the life of the Central Asian village, involving the peasant in the watershed of political and economic events, developing his social activeness and helping to liberate his social awareness from the influence of the reactionary Moslem clergy. Here an important contribution was made by the land-water committees, the committees of the poor (kombeds), the communes and kolkhozes which were set up in various regions of Turkestan starting in the spring of 1918. There were few of them, they operated under the hardest conditions, but the very existence of new, unknown forms of organization, when the individual peasant who in the not distant past was forgotten and completely dependent upon the feudal lord, gained an opportunity to participate in the solving of important questions which involved many people was of enormous significance. The land and water committees elected at the general meetings of the peasantry were concerned with the confiscation of absentee estates, they assessed the Bey estates for contracting, they registered them, they apportioned the confiscated land among the peasantry, and, what was important under Turkestan conditions, allocated water and directed community projects including the hilling of cotton and gardens, the harvesting of fruit, building of roads, and so forth. In many instances the population widely publicized the

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activities of the land and water committees, and for this the minutes were hung up in populous places and were read in the bazaars and other large assemblies.

In the past the mosque in essence had been the only "ideological" institution, and the sermon of the priest had been the only form of propaganda. A believer in all situations of life turned to the religious community and to the priest, he sought out their support and sympathy, and his vital interests coincided with the interests of the other parishoners. With the victory of Soviet power, a differentiation occurred in the interests of the people. They took a differing attitude toward the occurring events, they viewed them from different viewpoints and, naturally, heeded different authorities. With the establishing of Soviet power, along with the mosque, movie theaters, libraries, clubs, attractive teashops and reading rooms began to become part of life, although these as yet were very few in number. Such forms of propaganda as lectures, meetings and assemblies of different professional associations also appeared. The believer learned of the existence of nonreligious holidays and began to celebrate them. All of this to a definite degree contributed to the eroding of religious awareness and albeit still insignificant but nevertheless real loss by the religious community of its function as the sole source of information and the form of intercourse among people. In the mosques they were already discussing questions which went far beyond those customary for the parishoners including authority, revolution, the distribution of land, and so forth. Considering the local traditions, during this period the mosques began to be used also for propagandizing the ideas of revolution, and for explaining to the masses the essence of Soviet power, its attitude toward various aspects in the life of the indigenous population, and various documents of the superior and local authorities. For this purpose the five-a-day prayers were particularly often used as these brought together a large number of believers, and in addition the solemn services organized on the days of Moslem holidays.

As before the clergy played an important role in social life. But the first Soviet teachers, the party and soviet workers, the agitators and cultural and educational workers became equal to them and in many ways even superior to the clergy in authority. With the consolidation of Soviet power, a differentiation also occurred among the clergy, particularly over the question of the attitude toward the new power. While the superior clergy which was closely tied to the national bourgeoisie and the large feudal lords held a firm anti-Soviet position, among the rank and file clergy there appeared persons ready to recognize Soviet power and collaborate with it. The Fifth KPT Congress held in September 1920 noted, for example, that "among Islam there is also a progressive part," and considered possible the "technical use of it in Soviet institutions" [358, p 65].

The years 1921-1924 in Central Asia, as throughout the nation, became years of a transition to peaceful construction and the rebuilding of the national economy. The land and water reform carried out here in 1921-1922 ended the remnants of colonial rule. All the lands of the Russian and

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Ukrainian kulaks taken away from the local population by the tsarist authorities were returned to it. As a result, as a whole for Turkestan, 15,799 farms changed tenure, and these were predominantly Kirgiz and Kazakh [91, p 52].

The planted area expanded, primarily under cotton. Beginning with 1921, water began to be distributed among the peasants following new rules which eliminated the former advantage which the farms of the feudal lords had. At the end of 1920, in Turkestan there were 912 agricultural associations with over 233,000 members. State crediting was begun for the cotton-growing farms. The output of industrial product increased.

But as yet no sharp improvement had occurred in the living conditions of the peasantry who comprised a predominant majority of the indigenous population, since the agrarian changes carried out during this period did not make decisive changes in the agrarian relations predominating in the region. Up to the end of 1925, the repeatedly announced nationalization of land and water had in fact not been carried out [176, p 104]. As was pointed out in the resolution of the Seventh KPT Congress (March 1923), "the social change which has occurred among a portion of the urban population of Turkestan has little involved the Central Asian villages, although the peasantry comprises almost three-quarters of the entire population of Turkestan. Among the nomadic and seminomadic Kirgiz and Turkmen population, land relationships have been only partially settled (on the level of resolving this question between the indigenous population and the migrant peasantry). But in all the rest, land-water, livestock and other property relationships in Kirgiz and Turkmen society itself have changed little. Among the settled Uzbek, Tadzhik, Taranchis and Tungans population, property relationships, particularly on the land question, with a certain exception also remain as before. In line with the NEP [New Economic Policy] and the growth of commercial and usurious capital, undoubtedly the situation of the native poor had deteriorated even more" [358, pp 145-146]. The severe years of the struggle also were felt. Everywhere chaos reigned, there were not enough vital necessities, and the work of the entire economy and transport was disorganized.

The designated difficulties were felt by the population of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BNSR) and the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic (KhNSR) which were formed in the place of the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates in 1920.<sup>3</sup>

During the first half of the 1920's, there was an advance by the private capital and feudal elements related to the beginning of the party's NEP. The feudal-bey and kulak elements extended their farms, they strengthened their influence on the middle and poor peasantry, in endeavoring to solve the question of "who controls whom" in favor of the bourgeois landowner farms [358, pp 130, 153, 184-186; 255, pp 218-219]. At the end of 1921, in Tashkent there was a secret meeting of underground bourgeois-nationalistic organizations in Turkestan, and at this they decided to

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continue supporting the Basmach and at the same time begin active operations to disorganize economic and political activities in the region [343a, p 182].

In April 1922, the counterrevolutionary nationalistic organizations illegally held a "Moslem Turkestan congress" in Samarkand, and this approved a manifesto which proclaimed the creation of a Turkestan-Turkic Independent Republic, and put forward a sociopolitical program which demanded the preservation of private property (including of land) and a restoration of the laws of the shariat [361, pp 23-24].

Everywhere the Basmach detachments became more active, causing enormous political and economic damage, terrorizing the local inhabitants and dealing cruelly with the party and soviet workers. They attacked the newly created cooperatives, they murdered the activists, they drove off draft animals, and in every way prevented the establishing of the new standards of life in the village. In the Basmach movement they basically wagered on the religious fanaticism of the population. The "troops of Islam" often had the sympathy and sometimes the support of the peasantry.

A particularly threatening situation developed in Eastern Bukhara which had been completely occupied by Basmach detachments. At the beginning of 1922, these detachments which numbered some 10,000 men began decisive actions against Soviet power.

In Central Asia during these years it had been essential first of all to continue the struggle for the consolidation of Soviet power everywhere, to let the indigenous population feel the advantages of the socialist system, and strengthen their social activeness. The party directed the efforts of the local party organizations at winning the trust of the working masses, at a decisive and consistent struggle to destroy all types of national inequality, and at unifying and rallying them for the final elimination of patriarchal and feudal relationships and for becoming accustomed to communist construction. The party gave particular attention to the necessity of considering the particular features of the class structure, the culture, way of life, and the historic past of the peoples in the Eastern borderlands in this.

Of important significance was the work against the great-power chauvinists and the national bourgeoisie, and for establishing friendly relations between the representatives of the various nationalities of Turkestan and the RSFSR. As was particularly pointed out at the 11th RKP(b) Congress, it was essential to achieve the establishing of complete trust among the previously suppressed peoples for the measures coming from the Russians [63, pp 253-255].

Among the complex problems which required great caution and flexibility and which could influence the future of Soviet power in Central Asia, the religious question held a leading place. It was an issue of a phenomenon

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which permeated all aspects of the life of the region's population and in many ways served as a core around which family standards and the relationships of people were woven. The attitude toward religion on the part of the new power ultimately had a serious impact upon the attitude of the believers to the new power as a whole, to its policy, and to the measures taken by it in all areas. In the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the enemies of all hues, the basic emphasis was put precisely on religion. The believers were frightened by asserting that the new power would destroy the mosques, would not allow them to believe freely, or exercise one's religious needs. It was also essential to consider the important role played in the life of the believers by the clergy and who determined their political sympathies and antipathies. All of this required the elaboration of special measures for Islam and its organizations which would differ from those employed in the Central Regions of Russia and the Ukraine. "In considering," stated the resolution of the 12th RKP(b) Congress, "that the 30-million-strong Moslem population of the Union up to now has kept its numerous religious-related medieval prejudices almost intact and these are being used for counterrevolutionary purposes, it is essential to elaborate a form and methods for eliminating these prejudices, considering the particular features of the different nationalities" [63, p 471].

Such a situation was thoroughly considered in the Decree of the RKP(b) Central Committee "On Turkestan-Bukhara Affairs" of 18 May 1922 which stemmed fully from the most important Leninist principle on the attitude of the Communist Party toward religion. For the party the struggle against religion was never an end in itself, but always was subordinate to general political tasks of fighting for the victory of socialism and communism and to the specific practices of the class struggle aimed at eradicating the social roots of religion.

The decree, aside from all else, provided for the return of the waqf lands to their former possessors and the reestablishing of the local courts (meaning the kazi and biya courts), and the legalization of confessional schools.

On 20 May 1922, the Plenum of the Sredazburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee approved specific decisions in developing this decree of the Politburo. It was decided to time the returning of the waqf lands to the clergy and the restoration of the old courts familiar to the people to the holidays related to the end of Ramadan (in 1922, Ramadan occurred in the period from 28 April through 27 May) [361, p 25].

The waqf lands with the structures erected on them (booths, stores, baths, and so forth), as well as the orchards, and plowed areas located within the city limits and which the medrese had possessed prior to the October Revolution were to be returned to the mosques and the medrese. Property which was owned by the waqf was declared to be "social and state property of the indigenous population of the Turkestan republic," and was viewed as a distinct inalienable type of state property [370, pp 18-21]. It was

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planned that the money received from the use of all this property would go fully for the support of the medrese, the mosques and schools under them, for the repair of buildings, for the support of the priests and service personnel and students, for the training of mullahs, and for the payment of state taxes. All the schools of the indigenous population which previously had been supported by the money of the waqf as before were to remain supported by them.

All the waqf lands of agricultural use were considered to be used by the peasantry, and the questions concerning them should be regulated on the basis of the Soviet laws concerning labor land tenure. The mosque waqf, regardless of their composition, were to be left completely to the use of the mosques.

Under the People's Commissariat of Education there was set up the Main Waqf Administration and its departments on the spot which were supported from waqf funds. These were concerned with the questions of the establishing of new waqf, they monitored the advisability of spending waqf funds and the activities of the mutawalli who directly managed the waqf property.

Consequently, in 1921-1924, the Moslem organizations played a definite economic role in the life of the socialist society, although on a different basis than in the past. The existence of the waqf, naturally, tied those people who were involved in the working of the waqf lands and serving them to the mosques and medrese, and the fact that the children studied in religious schools or schools subsidized by the Moslem organizations strengthened the positions of Islam as a whole.

Under such conditions among the believers definite illusions might arise related to the degree of religion's influence on the economic life of society and on the educating of the younger generation.

In Bukhara and Khorezm, little had changed in the economic status of the Moslem organizations after the establishing of people's power here.

The constitutions of the BNSR and the KhNSR did not mention the separation of church and state; they merely limited themselves to proclaiming "freedom of conscience effective for each citizen," and the recognition of each citizen's right of "free profession of the chosen religion" and "free performance and carrying out of his religious rites" [167, pp 6, 22].

The Islamic priests in Bukhara and Khorezm were deprived of the right to vote. They were also released from service in the army. In the KhNRS the representatives of the clergy spoke at the kurultais (congresses of soviets) in approving from the shariat viewpoint the decrees approved at them concerning the most important questions of state development. They also sanctified individual measures by the republic government; nor was party membership closed for them, and in the ranks of the Khorezm Communist Party in 1923, the clergy comprised 10 percent [225, pp 39-40, 169, 219].

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The Moslem clergy in the BNSR was in the same situation. At the beginning of 1924, around 70 percent of the members of the Bukhara Communist Party were believers, and if one excludes the European communists, the believers in the party ranks were 90 percent and more (211, pp 134, 135, 136, 139].

In the BNSR, repeated attempts were made to transfer the waqf to the state, but all the decrees on this score remained unfulfilled, as they "did not have a viable ground under the conditions of Bukhara.... The religions waqf remained under the full control of the mosques and the other religious institutions. The procedure for collecting the waqf fees also remained unchanged" [91, pp 131-132].

The Provisional Constitution of the KhNSR (1920) put all affairs relating to waqf property under the Nazirat (Commissariat) of Education "for their correct disposition" [225, p 44], but in actual terms the status of the waqf remained unchanged up to 1923.

The Constitution of the KhNSR approved by the Fourth Kurultai of the Khorezm Soviets (October 1923) proclaimed the separation of church and state, the establishing of people's courts and the preservation of the kazi courts only on voluntary bases. All the clergy was deprived of the right to vote, and the waqf lands were nationalized [225, pp 251, 257]. The peasantry which worked these lands was freed from any obligations vis-a-vis the clergy, and at the same time were to pay their taxes to the state.

The Kurultai approved these decisions under conditions when the Khorezm economy was in decline as a consequence of the destruction brought about by the Civil War and the situation of the peasantry had deteriorated sharply. There were no funds to support the schools, hospitals or transport, or to pay the employees. Under such conditions effective measures were needed to strengthen the state apparatus and the party organization, to put the economy in order, so as to eliminate the dissatisfaction of the people, unite them around the party and the Soviet government, and strengthen the revolutionary front, including the vacillating strata of the national bourgeoisie, and only then move on to a changeover to a socialist path of development. However, in actuality everything occurred differently, and the second step was taken before the first.

The decisions of the Fourth Kurultai, having turned even the loyal strata of the national bourgeoisie and clergy against the revolution, did not gain strong support even from the workers. Moreover, confiscation of the waqf lands in fact was a blow against the peasantry. Religiousness did not allow it not to pay the "legitimate" payments to the clergy. At the same time it had to pay the taxes to the state. As a result there was a very tangible increase in peasant taxes (on 23-24 percent of the land worked in the republic), that is, the interests of virtually a quarter of the peasantry were substantially affected. The depriving of the clergy of voting rights was also viewed by the peasantry as the "persecution of Islam."

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Simultaneously with these hurried decisions, individual "leftist" communists and representatives of the authorities prohibited the population from performing religious rites, they forced the women to go about without the veil, they introduced joint instruction of girls and boys, and closed down the mosques and mazars. All of this insulted the religious feelings of the population, and evoked dissatisfaction with Soviet power and its measures.

All of this turned significant strata of the peasantry against the Khorezm government, and became a reason for the sharp increase in the size of the Basmach detachments, and largely served as the cause of the major counter-revolutionary coup which broke out on 13 January 1924.

After suppressing the coup and decisive intervention by the Sredazburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee, in March 1924, the voting rights of the clergy were extended, the waqf lands were returned, and the kazi and biya courts were reinstated [361, pp 63-69].

Beginning in June 1922, for the indigenous population of Central Asia, in parallel with the unified people's courts, the kazi courts began to function, presiding over cases on the basis of the shariat and the adat. Initially their functions were restricted to reviewing a small range of questions, but later on they were given the "cases of the indigenous local population" stemming from the provisions of marriage law, all civil cases with the exception of the cases based upon acts carried out or witnessed by the Soviet bodies, as well as all inheritance cases such as: establishing the right of inheritance, disputes over it, the dividing of property, and cases on guardianship, with the exception of the cases related to the inheriting of land. This provision was also extended to the biya courts [167, pp 516, 517].

The cases subject to review in the kazi courts should be carried out in conformity to actions under the provisions of the 1922 RSFSR Criminal Code, but often these courts, in exceeding their powers, handed down sentences and rulings following mainly the provisions of the shariat and the adat. This was felt even in the evaluation of evidence as the testimony of one man was considered equal to the testimony of two women.<sup>4</sup>

The kazi courts often applied the shariat standards for condemning actions which were not criminal under Soviet law such as the appearance of women on the street without their veil, the conversation of a woman with an unknown man, the refusal to marry a man to whom she had been betrothed in childhood, and so forth.

At the same time, the kazi did not consider as a crime phenomena which contradicted the standards of Soviet morality and law such as the marrying of underage girls, forcing the wearing of the veil, prohibiting women and girls from attending school, the payment and acceptance of bride money, polygamy, the beating of wives, and so forth [220, Vol 2, pp 75-77].

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The question of such important prescripts of Islam as polygamy and bride money was settled in a specific manner under the conditions of Turkestan. By a decree of the Turkestan TsIK of 14 June 1921, bride money was prohibited, and criminal liability was established for persons guilty of violating this. The local authorities were instructed to keep strict watch over the observance of the demands of the decree, under the threat of criminal liability. Initially it was assumed that the same decree would provide criminal liability for polygamy, but in its discussion the corresponding points were omitted, since such a reform was premature. Criminal liability for polygamy and for coercing a woman to marry against her will was established in October 1924.

The internal legal content of the shariat court remained unchanged in the KhNSR. New codes for neither criminal nor civil law were approved. The Nazirat of Justice would not examine questions that did not conform to the prescripts of the shariat and did nothing on the cases going beyond the limits of the shariat [225, pp 202-203, 234, 244].

During this period the Soviet state gave a great deal of attention to the development of public education. Measures were taken related to improve the material support for the teachers and schools. A network of unified labor schools was developed, and these were set up on Soviet principles, and the number of institutions of learning training pedagogues was increased. A reorganization was started for turning the old-method religious schools into waqf ones which represented a form transitional to the Soviet schools. They operated according to curricula drawn up by the People's Commissariat of Education, and from the summer of 1924, according to the curricula of the unified labor schools.

The development of the Soviet school in Central Asia was accompanied by an acute struggle against it. This struggle was waged by the Islamic officials, by the reactionary representatives of the intelligentsia and the kulakry. Intimidated by this agitation, the representatives of the local nationalities did not want their children to attend these schools, in trying in every possible way to save them from such a "calamity."

For this reason the first Soviet schools were filled by requisition, where each district ["aksakal'stvo"] was to assign two boys to a school. The rich Turkmen in order to protect their children from the "calamity" purchased the children of poor and orphans, and sent them to study in the place of their children. For example, in Tashauzskiy district, the children of the poor could be purchased for 200 batmans of wheat which the beys collected. At the Kunya-Urgench boarding school, 8 Turkmen students out of the 24 had been purchased from widows and the poor by 100-150 puds of wheat collected from the population [153, pp 338-339].

In Turkestan, where 6.5 million persons lived, in 1923 there were 955 primary schools with 78,000 students. Of these schools, 867 were in rural localities, however 632 of them were located in Dzhetyysuyskaya and Syrdary'inskaya oblasts, that is, in regions where the Russian population

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was concentrated. In Ferganskaya and Samarkandskaya oblasts with 2.3 million rural and basically indigenous inhabitants, here there were just 18 schools in the same year.

In 1924, in the BNSR a little more than 3 percent of the school-age children were studying in schools [361, pp 44-58].

By 1923, in the KhNSR, there were just 29 Soviet schools with 1,442 students. The general educational level of the pedagogical personnel was extremely low, and because of this the schools could not satisfy "even the minimum needs" [225, pp 219, 293-294].

Only the first steps had been taken in the subsequently developed work of eliminating illiteracy among the adult population. In 1923, Turkestan had just 57 likbez [elimination of literacy] schools with 28 being located in Tashkent. Of the 6 rural likbez schools, 5 operated in Dzhetyysuyskaya Oblast [361, pp 44-45].

At the same time there was a dense network of religious schools. In Khankinskaya Volost alone, in 1924, there were over 8,000 children studying at the 180 mosques, and there were 500-1,000 students studying in the 3 medrese during the winter time, and 300-400 fewer in the summer [391, No 3, pp 11, 14].

Consequently, in the given period education in the national countryside as before remained virtually the monopoly of the clergy and religion. For this reason one is surprised by assertions that in Turkestan "the confessional schools by 1923 had basically been abolished. This was a serious blow to the clergy which by the act of eliminating the confessional schools had not only been removed from the ideological influencing of the children, but also lost an important source of income since the religious schools or maktabas were one of the forms for the mullahs to fleece the working masses" [201, p 130].

Under the then existing conditions, naturally it would have been premature to pose the question of eliminating the religious schools. For this reason by a decision of the Turkmen TsIK it was decided to permit the legal functioning of the Moslem schools including the inferior (maktabas) and secondary (medrese) ones, but the local bodies were given a directive to prevent their organization [167, p 375]. Their network was much more extensive than the network of secular schools.

In explaining this approach by the Soviet state, A. V. Lunacharskiy, the USSR people's commissar of education, said that as yet there often were no secular schools in those points where the Moslem school did exist, and to prohibit the operation of the latter would mean to take away their Arab writing and leave the population in complete ignorance and illiteracy. He emphasized also the political importance of such a step: "The mullah says: 'I will teach you to read, to pray, I will open the book for you, but

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Soviet power gives nothing and prohibits me from teaching you; it wants you to be in total darkness and illiterate people!" [73, pp 236, 316].

Considering the specific conditions, the local authorities during the designated years undertook a number of practical steps. Within the Turkestan republic in January 1921, Friday was proclaimed to be the day of weekly rest required for those who worked in the soviet, social and private institutions, enterprises and farms [167, p 274]. In a number of places the authorities renewed and repaired the mosque and replaced the necessary furnishings in them [195, p 68].

During this period, in Tashkent, for the first time in the history of the district, a Clerical Administration (Mahkama-i sharia) was organized, and this was headed by prominent Islamic figures. It had a secretariat and departments which settled questions related to inheritance and marriage and divorce questions, the preparation, training and appointment of the clergy, religious schools, and so forth.

The creation of the Clerical Administration led to the unification of the imams, and introduced a definite system in their appointment and removal which had not been previously observed. Traditionally well-regarded persons of the district were elected as the imams and they were not accountable directly to anyone. According to the new procedures, they could not begin work without having official permission from the religious center.

The Clerical Administration also put the old-method schools under its direct influence and previously these schools had represented themselves. Courses were organized for the teachers of these schools and attendance was considered compulsory. In some places on the day of a religious holiday, even demonstrations were organized for the students and teachers of these schools in front of the buildings of the offices of the Clerical Administration at which feelings of loyalty to the latter were expressed.

The sphere of activities of the Clerical Administration extended predominantly to the religious societies in the cities of Tashkent, Fergana, Andizhan, Namangan and the adjacent rural localities.

The creation of the Clerical Administration and its bodies on the spot was viewed by individual soviet workers as proof of the common interests of the state and religion and the existence of direct ties between them. There were instances when the soviet workers entered into far from business-like relations with the representatives of the Clerical Administration [202, Vol 1, pp 285-286, 301]. All of this objectively helped to strengthen the positions of the Moslem organizations.

The measures undertaken by the Soviet state vis-a-vis Islam and its organizations were not a concession but rather party tactics [202, Vol 3, p 301]. To a significant degree these tactics contributed to the strengthening of a mood among the working masses in favor of the Soviet state, they aided the secularization of the political views of an absolute majority of the

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indigenous population, the departure of deceived believers from the counter-revolutionary struggle, and the weakening of the positions of the enemies of socialism, and in particular the Basmach movement.

All of this posed serious problems for the rank and file Islamic clergy. They understood that the position of the leaders who stubbornly refused to recognize the new forms of socialist life and endeavored to halt the course of history was not supported by an absolute majority of the people and led to further isolation from the masses of believers and to a loss of their trust. For this reason the basic portion of the clergy was forced to go over to positions of recognizing Soviet power and cooperating with it. Subsequently many representatives of the higher clergy followed them to cooperate with the Soviet bodies and grant them actual recognition.

The party bodies of Turkestan gave definite significance to the work among the clergy aimed at separating it from the Basmach movement. The congresses and conferences of the regional Moslem clergy held in these years approved special resolutions emphasizing the loyal attitude of Islam to Soviet power and to the young Soviet state, and prohibiting in the name of the shariat participation in the Basmach movement.

The All-Lokay Conference held on 23 December 1923 played an important role in the effective struggle against the Basmach. This conference was attended by all the mullahs of the lokay tribes. They unanimously recognized that Soviet power did not contradict Islam and, consequently, the Basmach in fighting against it, could not link their actions to the interests of the defense of religion. Such a decision taken by the religious authorities had an enormous impact on the believers of Eastern Bukhara. Of particular significance was the fact that the conference obliged all the mullahs to agitate against the Basmach.

Similar meetings were held in the winter of 1924 in other regions of Eastern Bukhara. At them appeals were approved to the Basmach to return to peaceful labor and these were reinforced by the signatures of the clergy.

A more serious warning to the Basmach was the appeal to the believers signed on the behalf of all the Ulemas of the Bukhara republic by 113 clerics. It stated "Our appeal has one desire, to protect the people against the concern and calamities of the Basmach. If this appeal is rejected by the Basmach, if they further harm the peaceful population, then the most decisive measures must be taken against the Basmach, all the population must help in this question in indicating where the Basmach are hiding, where their weapons are located, and this will lead to the quickest end of the Basmach movement and to the establishing of peace, order and an honest life" [207a, pp 451-452].

The return to the waqufs of their previous possessions, the reestablishing of the shariat courts and confessional schools, and the creation of a religious center combined with the material difficulties undoubtedly contributed to a brief revival of religious life and to a strengthening of

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the positions of the Moslem organizations and prevented the extending and deepening of the incipient secularization process. This was particularly strongly reflected in the life of the Central Asian village. In certain regions of Kirgizia at that time more mosques had been built than over many previous years. The construction of the mosques under the influence of agitation by the manaps, beys and mullahs was carried out by the "self-taxation" of the population from the scores and hundreds of head of cattle collected from the faithful [245, p 88].

But at the same time the tactics of the Soviet state vis-a-vis Islam had prepared a solid basis for the secularization of society in that the tactics had helped develop confidence among the believers in the measures carried out by Soviet power both in the economic and cultural areas of society's life, and without this it would have been impossible to carry out many secularization measures which followed just several years later.

The existence of the parallel people's and kazi courts and the secular and religions schools made it possible for the population to gradually be convinced of the advantages of the former and consciously choose the Soviet way of life. For example, precisely this explains why each year there was a decline in the number of persons turning to the kazi courts. The population began to be confident of the justice of the decisions taken by the Soviet courts and their independence from outsiders, and above all from the so-called authorities, both religious and secular. There was a decline in the range of cases under the kazi courts. Gradually the number of the kazi courts began to decline. Thus, while in 1922 there were 343 such courts in Ferganskaya, Zeravshanskaya, Samarkandskaya and Amudar'inskaya oblasts, in 1924, their number had declined to 71. By the middle of 1925, out of the 8 kazi courts in the Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast, 6 had been abolished [217, p 278].

At the same time there was also a process of establishing in the life of the indigenous Central Asian population new institutions of Soviet labor law unknown to the shariat such as the collective labor agreement, working hours, wages, social security, and the rights and interests of the employees. As a result the functions of the shariat were restricted, many aspects of the life and labor of the Moslems were secularized, and new legal standards became instituted.

The broadest masses began to support Soviet power, and this was expressed not only in the prompt payment of taxes and the refusal to aid the Basmach leaders, but also in numerous instances of the organizing of Saturday volunteer workdays by the peasantry to help the undermanned farms, and in the active work of many thousands of urban artisans in trade unions and the peasantry in the "koshchi" organizations, the sowing commissions, and in the cooperatives and other organizations set up by the Soviet state [218, pp 597-598].

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But the support of Soviet power and its measures still did not mean the breaking with religion or the abandoning of the observance of religious standards and prescripts. Islam continued to hold a leading place in the personal life of the Moslem. The Islamic clergy and the rural kulaks played a significant role in the shaping of public opinion and in the attitude of the population to various problems of life. In the psychology of the peasantry which for centuries had been completely dependent upon them, there was still the deep-rooted conviction of the force and might of the feudal lords, a desire to please them and obey them in every way. Dependence upon the feudal lords, high religiousness and a still low level of class awareness prevented acting against them and working for themselves. "The main thing at present is to say farewell to that bourgeois intellectual prejudice," wrote V. I. Lenin, "that only officials completely dependent upon capital in terms of their social situation can run the state" [60, p 316], just the rich or those who have been schooled by the rich classes.

In a majority of the villages as yet there were no other public buildings with the exception of the mosque where the male portion of the village population could meet. For this reason public opinion continued to be shaped largely in the mosques, and they were the center of social life and the "village parliament" [423, p 20; 391, No 2, p 120, No 3, p 5].

But life had made substantial alterations in the problems discussed in the Moslem community. As was already mentioned, now various aspects of party and state policy were discussed, as well as what was new in the economy, culture and everyday life.

In the mosques lists of homeowners had been drawn up, a household-by-household census was taken, and state-allocated agricultural equipment, tools and seed were distributed. In the mosques were held the open courts for the Basmach heads and their followers during which their evil deeds committed under the cover of Islam were disclosed, while the mullahs read a prayer for a just proletarian court. Instances are known when after the divine services on the occasion of one or another religious holiday, the representatives of the workers were elected at the mosque and they were to represent the questions bothering the village residents before the authorities as well as the delegates to the rural (village) soviet. Sometimes the documents of these soviets concerning the residents of the village were kept at the mosques.

The imam continued to play a rather marked role in the life of the entire village community. He participated in discussing all vitally important problems of the village, and stated his considerations which of course were considered. Often the soviet village activists sought out his advice, and in many instances they themselves were not free of religious influence. It also happened that the aksakal of the village played the role of the deputy aksakal of the mosque.

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The number of Islamic priests declined slightly in the given period in the city, but remained virtually unchanged in rural localities. They were provided for completely at the expense of the village inhabitants [391, No 1, pp 153-154; No 3, pp 128-130].

But in the main question, the determining of political views, the Islamic clergy lost its power over the believers, and ceased being the spokesmen for their attitude toward the various sociopolitical phenomena. For this reason, at the end of 1925, without fearing dissatisfaction by the faithful, the Uzbek TsIK, on the basis of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR TsIK "On the Electoral Procedure for Soviets and Congresses of Soviets," approved the "Instructions on Elections to Soviets" under which the clergy of the religious cults of all beliefs and schools for which this occupation was a profession were deprived of the right to vote and be elected [208a, pp 48-49].

At the very end of the examined period (1917-1925), there was one further noteworthy event which made a major blow against the role of Islam in the life of the Central Asian peoples. At the end of 1924, on the territory of Central Asia there appeared two new independent socialist republics, Uzbekistan (which at that time included the Tadzhik ASSR) and Turkmenia, as well as two autonomous oblasts, the Karakirgiz (Kirgiz) which was part of the RSFSR, and the Karakalpak which was part of the Kirgiz (Kazakh) ASSR. In May 1925, Uzbekistan (with the Tadzhik ASSR) and Turkmenia became part of the USSR as full Union republics.

With the creation of the national states which fundamentally had nothing in common with religion and were isolated from the religious base, the representatives of the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia ceased to see in Islam a factor of their own uniqueness, that is, what separated them from the others. The nations realized that there was much else in addition to religion that linked their representatives, including: a common economy, territory, language, culture, and so forth. They saw that not only religious affiliation distinguished them from the other nations.

After this among the indigenous population there commenced a rapid process of a growth of national self-awareness, and the people began first of all to be aware not of their religious affiliation but their national one. The growth of the economy and culture of the nations which followed the creation of the Union republics contributed to a further awareness of the role of the nation in the past and in socialist construction, as well as to an awareness that not the Islamic affiliation separated it from the others. These factors ultimately led both to the liberation of social psychology from the dominance of Islam, and to a situation where everything related to it was moved to the background in national life and became a strictly internal affair of the nation.

The most intensive process of secularization in the regions where Islam had spread occurred in 1925-1941. In the first 5 years of this period (1925-1929), on the basis of the previously achieved socioeconomic and

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political successes, extensive and complicated work was carried out in Central Asia to basically complete the religious and democratic transformations and to prepare for a full-scale advance of socialism along the entire front.

Along with the general tasks, a number of specific tasks was solved in Central Asia such as the deepening of political differentiation in the national countryside, the carrying out of fundamental agrarian changes, and a cautious line vis-a-vis the Moslem religion. Upon the successful carrying out of these tasks depended the practical implementation of the Leninist policy of separating church and state and church and school and the establishment of the activities of the Moslem organizations within the limits of Soviet religious legislation.

From 1929 socialism began a full-scale offensive along the entire front. The exploiting classes were completely eliminated, and this marked a fundamental transformation in the productive forces and production relations of Central Asia. In Central Asia modern large-scale industry was created and a national working class formed. The old cities grew immeasurably and new ones appeared. From 1926 through 1929, the proportional amount of the urban population in the region (with a significant increase in the population) rose from 14.5 to 23.0 percent [367, p 32]. The proportional amount of industry in the Uzbek national economy which in 1925 was one-third, by 1937 was two-thirds. In 1940, the growth rate of gross industrial product in the republic was 12-fold greater than in 1924 [224a, pp 350, 365, 367].

The land and water reform carried out in the region undoubtedly played a decisive role in the secularization of the Central Asian village. Having eliminated landowner tenure and having confiscated the surplus land from the kulaks, it strengthened the nationalization of land and was a most important step in freeing the village poor and middle peasantry from the influence of the beys, and it created favorable conditions for the further strengthening of the positions of the agricultural proletariat and poor in the villages and for strengthening their alliance with the middle peasantry.

Prior to the carrying out of land reform, the masses of the working peasantry were economically subordinate to the beys and clergy, they followed them and did not dare to openly act against them. Only fundamental changes which came into the village with land and water reform could put an end to this.

Land and water reform began in Central Asia in 1925, and considering the economic development level, the political activeness of the population and the influence of the exploiters, ended in 1929 (with the exception of the Tadzhik ASSR and certain districts of Turkmenia where the reform was carried out somewhat later). The absentee farms were eliminated, and the surplus land was confiscated from those with a great deal of land or those who did not live in the villages and worked it themselves. As a result of the land reform, 144,000 working farms received land plots in the Central Asian republics [266, p 241].

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The return of the waqfs by the state not long before the land and water reform and the legalization of the religious schools and kazi courts largely helped the population to understand the attitude of the Soviet state toward religion, the church and the faithful. The clergy could not help but consider the mood of the peasantry which had received the long-awaited land and water, and for this reason was ready to defend its right to the possession of the land decisively. Coming out against the land and water reform naturally involved a loss of influence on the broad masses of the workers. The clergy could not help but consider the determination of the Soviet government to carry out the land and water reform as well as the decisiveness and consistency of this reform.

During the first stage of the reform, only the large waqfs and lands belonging to the representatives of the higher clergy were nationalized. The largest land plots assigned to the village mosques where the income went to support the mosque and its clergy remained untouched. It was clear that in the event of their nationalization, the expenditures on the support of the mosque would have to be paid by the peasantry. The alienation of such land could also serve as a pretext for great provocations and become the grounds around which the clergy could unite with the beys and carry out active agitation. The question of these lands was settled only after the carrying out of the land and water reform.

As a result the clergy and the Moslem organizations largely supported the reform. In a document approved by the most prominent Moslem figures of Central Asia and the leaders of the Mahkama-i sharia, with references to the "holy books" proof was given for the right to confiscate surplus land from the large landowners and distribute this land to the peasantry which needed land and was capable of working it by its own forces [245, p 79]. In an appeal to the population approved by the clergy of the town of Osh, the reform was judged to be "completely correct and meeting the needs and desires of the population," and "completely legitimate according to the shariat," while persons "who would conceal their land plots and property from the city" were declared to be "the enemies of God and the haters of the Great Prophet and the friend of God, Muhammad" [350, pp 137-139]. On the buildings of certain mosques, the mullahs hung up red slogans such as "Long Live Land Reform!" and "Long Live Soviet Power!"

However there were also numerous instances of the actions of the Islamic clergy against the reform and their condemnation of persons who received land. Under the influence of the clergy in a number of places the agricultural proletariat refused to take the nationalized lands, particularly the waqf lands. In nine rayons of Tashkent district, for example, of the 3,037 redrawn farms, 193 refused the plots and 38 farms returned the land to its former owners [467, p 214]. In some instances the land was also returned by communists [202, Vol 1, p 55]. Here of course one could feel the influence of individual representatives of the clergy who blindly adhered to the standards of Islam, but to a greater degree this was a consequence of the ignorance of the peasantry, a lack of development of their class awareness, and that they continue to consider private property to be sacred and inviolable.

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As a whole, the land and water reform became the most significant watershed marking the true history of secularization in the Central Asian countryside. It was not only a question of the nationalization of the waqf lands, although this meant a great deal. For the first time in many centuries a significant portion of the peasantry was freed from direct economic dependence upon the Moslem organizations. The poor and the agricultural proletariat, having received the land free and being able to acquire agricultural implements under advantageous conditions, for the first time really felt the fruits of Soviet power, and this was the basis for the exceptional growth of their class awareness and political activeness.

Economic independence became the foundation of spiritual independence. The peasant felt his social importance, and felt himself to be not a passive contemplator of life under the power of the well-off and the clergy, but rather an active participant in history and an equal member of society. The land and water reform which marked an end to the feudal and patriarchal relations liberated the peasant from the community which was permeated by the spirit of Islam and led by the clergy and older persons dedicated to religion and which controlled all aspects of his life and activity.

The socioeconomic measures of the socialist state led to a situation where the believers began to doubt the truthfulness of the social teachings of Islam, particularly those concerning poverty as a good and the eternal division of society into rich and poor.

During this period an intensive process was completed in the secularization of social awareness on the questions concerning sociopolitical and economic life as well as the previously commenced process of the peasants' pulling away from the clergy which had shown its antipopular essence.

At the beginning of the period, the Moslem clergy lived fully at the expense of the population and did not engage in absolutely any socially useful labor. As special research conducted in 1926 in various regions of Uzbekistan has shown, in the family budget of the peasant a definite place was held by a compulsory obligation to support the clergy. The Islamic priests were paid both in kind and in money. They also received significant income from the teaching in the old-method schools [391, No 2, pp 134, 137; No 1, pp 97, 158].

By this time, as was already said, along with services, various meetings and sessions of a social nature were held in the mosques. Here members of the local soviets were elected, public opinion was shaped, the population was informed of the decisions of the revolutionary committees, lists of homeowners were compiled and a house-by-house census was carried out. For this reason it was not surprising that along with the village rich, the kulaks, the mullah also was frequently an "authority" who influenced the shaping of public opinion. He was closely tied to the representatives of the inferior-level administration, he participated in the discussion of questions at the meetings, and after prayer often held talks on social questions.

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A similar situation survived in the cities. As before the clergy remained a large group. Thus, in 1926, the Moslem priests were 3.2 percent of the indigenous inhabitants of Bukhara who had an independent income or earnings [297, pp 161-162].

By the end of the 1920's, the priests were in a situation of simple citizens who were little more than informed on the questions of religion. They did not receive permanent material support from the community and did not make their living by performing religious rites. Many of them had begun to participate in socially useful labor.

The secularization process which encompassed many important aspects in the life of the Central Asian countryside grew stronger and broadened due to the collectivization of agriculture where in practice Lenin's instructions began to be carried out that the way to reshape the psychology and habits of the small landowner lies through class struggle and through building the foundation of a socialist economy. "This question in relation to the small landowner can be solved and his entire psychology, so to speak, can be improved," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "only by the material base, by equipment, the use of tractors and machinery on a mass scale in agriculture, and by electrification on a mass scale. This is what fundamentally and very quickly would reshape the small landowner" [39a, p 60].

The scope and depth of the process of secularization in Central Asian society in 1925-1941 would not be fully represented if we did not consider the exceptional intensification of the previously commenced process of the emancipation of women of the indigenous nationalities. Prior to the revolution they were deprived of all rights and lived in the closed-off family world and did not take any part in social life.

The October Revolution gave women a legally protected equality with men in all areas of economic, political and cultural life. The decrees of Soviet power which were promulgated for the conditions of Central Asia eliminated the most important provisions of Islam concerning family and marriage. Polygamy, bride money and forced marriages were prohibited, and a minimum marriage age was set for women at 16 years. Women gained the right of full freedom to marry and the marriage should be concluded only on voluntary bases, with the agreement of both parties. Criminal liability was established for the violation of these provisions.

But equality under the law did not mean equality in actual life. The Moslem woman, illiterate and divorced from social life, never imagined herself to be an independent economic force and was not prepared to use the rights granted her by Soviet power [92, p 76]. The departments for the woman's movement (zhenotdels) set up under the party committees brought together a very insignificant group of working Moslem women in their activities which came down to organizing women's clubs and schools and conversations on Soviet power and the rights of women. In the BNSR and KhNSR, the zhenotdels were organized only in 1923 and 1924, and even later in Tadzhikistan. The following facts eloquently show the situation which

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continued to reign in the former khanates. In 1921, the head of the zhenotdel of the KPT Central Committee, A. Otmar-Shteyn, was arrested for talking with a man on the street. The participants of a meeting of Uzbek women were also arrested here.

Women took virtually no part in the activities of the party and Komsomol organizations. By the end of 1924, there were just 80 women of the local nationalities who were members of the KPT; in April 1925, just 1-2 percent of the total membership were Uzbek women in the ranks of the Uzbek Komsomol [92, pp 112, 188]. But in 1925, the number of Uzbek women communists increased by over 4-fold, and women Komsomol members by 8-fold [332, p 16; 92, pp 114, 182]. During this period the number of women participating in elections and also female deputies increased.

Beginning with 1925, the first major advances were made in the emancipation of the Moslem women. The involvement of women in socially useful labor was the main area of this work.

In the cities, important significance was given to the setting up of women's artisan and trades associations and to creating conditions for female employment such as the organization of nurseries and creches. The women's associations designed for the production of traditional articles for the region such as carpets, silk and cotton fabrics, embroidered Central Asian hats, shawls, kerchiefs and so forth, became a convenient form for carrying out the task of involving them in the management of state and economic affairs without removing the veils. Arising in the first half of the 1920's, the women's craft artels gradually gained strength and involved tens of thousands of women of the local nationalities in the sphere of active production life.

Factory and plant industry became another important way for the emancipation of the Moslem woman. The involvement of Moslem women in plant and factory work began in the first half of the 1920's, but major results were achieved during the period of the industrialization of the country. While, for example, at the beginning of the 1920's Uzbek women comprised only 9.7 percent of the total adult labor force, in 1933, they were 28.6 percent of the total number of industrial workers in the republic. In 1940, the number of female Uzbek workers increased by more than 2.5-fold in comparison with 1935 [92, pp 224, 225, 229].

The land and water reform brought about an enormous change both in the awareness of women and in the attitude toward them in the conscience of the men. The shariat had deprived women of the right to own land; they could not inherit land either from the father or the husband. At best the woman received only one-eighth of such land. This caused the permanent economic dependence of the woman upon her husband. In the Union republic legislative enactments approved for carrying out the reform, it was specially stipulated that men and women were fully equal in receiving a share of land and water, and the restricting of the rights of women was prohibited.

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Farms belonging to women were the first to receive land and water and were provided with credits, seed and implements. Women gained the actual and legal rights of the head of the family, and they gained the right and possibility of participating in the solution to all vital questions of the rural community such as the use of water, pastures, common pasturage, the organization of social work, and so forth.

Thus, the importance of the land and water reform did not end with the blow it made against the shariat standards. Its main role in the secularization of the awareness of women and in altering the attitude of men toward them was that the reform contributed to economic emancipation and ultimately spiritual emancipation. Due to the land and water reform, the previously forgotten Moslem woman gained a sense of her human value, she began to become interested in questions reaching far beyond the family, and began to participate in social life. Women attended various sorts of meetings and assemblies which discussed questions related to the preparation and execution of the reform, as well as in the activities of commissions, and the most active took a direct part in the apportionment of land and water, and discovered land plots concealed by the feudal lords. The organization of special women's meetings was practiced, and women themselves spoke at them.

The special women's artels such as silk raising, dairy, orchard, and so forth, set up in rural localities also contributed to a rise in the social activeness of women and the involving of them in the sphere of sociopolitical life.

The cooperative trade network which was created in the city and countryside specially for women also helped to broaden the viewpoint of women and their economic independence in the family. The share holders of these cooperatives at the same time were members of the general consumer cooperative and had their own local shops which had definite advantages such as deferred payment of the member shares, they received scarce goods first, and so forth. The consumer cooperatives developed management skills in the women, as the women themselves held all leading positions in the cooperative. Many thousands of women were members of the consumer cooperatives, and their number grew continuously.

Of exceptionally important significance for the liberation of women from under the clutches of Islam was the "hujum" ("offensive") movement. This movement which was formally directed against the veil and for its removal by all women was in fact to play a leading role in the struggle against all attitudes dictated by Islam and aimed at the abasement of women, at insulting her human dignity and honor, and against the coercion of the standards of the shariat and adat. The movement started up everywhere in March 1927. On 8 March, in all the cities and major population points of Central Asia, large demonstrations and mass meetings of women were held, and at them the veils and shawls which were the age-old symbols of woman's submissiveness to fate, were burned in bonfires. The "hujum" which in 1927-1928 assumed a mass nature was accompanied by the enrolling of women

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and girls for studies in schools, the likbez schools, and courses for training specialists in the various national economic sectors, by a further involvement of women in social production and a rise in her social activeness.

During the designated period, the specific methods and forms of ideological effect employed in the kray, the activities of the women's organizations and the female deputies, and so forth contributed largely to a strengthening of the sociopolitical activeness of women.

The full collectivization of agriculture played the determining role in the economic emancipation of the female peasant. The converting of agriculture to a socialist footing was the most profound revolutionary measure not only in the economic but also the political and spiritual life of the peasantry as this fundamentally altered the relationships of the peasants in the village. The nationalization of land which was carried out on the basis of universal collectivization of agriculture and which opened up unlimited prospects for the involvement of the female peasant in social production immeasurably accelerated the elimination of the traditions of Moslem law which were humiliating for the women of the local nationalities. Collective labor on nationalized land provided for the creation of a firm economic foundation for the actual emancipation of the female peasant, and fundamentally altered the way of life and psychology of the peasant masses [92, p 253].

In the Central Asian republics, extensive work was done to involve the women in the kolkhozes, in the developing socialist competition, to ease her working conditions, to create a network of nurseries and creches, public dining rooms, and so forth. Also there was the practice of creating special women's brigades. With each year there was an increase in the number of female kolkhoz members participating in kolkhoz social production, and in 1933, there was a 100-percent turnout of the female peasants on the fields. However one must not exaggerate the degree of emancipation for the Central Asian women during the designated period or the secularization of their family life or social position. A number of factors worked against this.

During the short period, of course, it was impossible to alter the psychology of women themselves who viewed their unequal position in the family and social life as God-given. Often the measures aimed at the emancipation of women were rejected by the women themselves; they condemned their friends who removed their veils or participated in the activities of social organizations. There were instances when women (for example, Turkmen women), under the pressure of their relatives and close friends who wished to resell them to another man for a rich dowry, turned to the courts with an application for divorce. There were instances when the women themselves turned to the authorities with a request to register the second marriage of her husband or considered it a normal phenomenon when their joining the kolkhoz was not legally formalized, when they were paid less or the labor-days earned by them were entered in the labor booklets

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of the men. In order that the women could both fully realize and defend their rights, many years were required, and many major political, economic and cultural measures had to be carried out.

We must also point out that often the work of the emancipation of women was carried out in a campaign-like manner, and the achieved successes were not reinforced and extended.

The emancipation of women, of course, encountered outright resistance from the men, a significant portion of whom found it difficult to accept the idea of their equality with women. In the psychology of a majority of the men from the indigenous populations during the described period there was a deeply-rooted attitude toward women as an incomplete being which constantly required the protection of the male. Also among them were numerous religious fanatics who were ready to resort to anything for the sake of maintaining the Islam-sanctified position of women. Social awareness during the designated period was at a stage of development when the abandonment of the shariat standards was perceived as an "abandonment of the laws of our ancestors" and a source of all sorts of calamities. For example, the clergy and the local population directly linked the earthquake which occurred in 1927 in Namangan and Ashkhabad to the "hujum" and the water and land reform. Rumors were spread that the severest earthquakes would occur everywhere that women removed their veils. In the remote villages the intimidated ignorant people demanded that the women wear them again [316, p 88]. Precisely the development level of the people also explains the instances of the murder of women activists who took off their veils by their husbands, fathers or brothers. In 1928, in Uzbekistan alone, 226 cases of abductions and murders of women were recorded [145, p 129]. In 1929, there were even more such cases, and during the first 2 months of 1930, there were as many as in all of 1929 [353, p 109].

The deeply rooted attitude toward women was also felt in the attitude of the representatives of the official bodies toward terroristic acts or instances of violating the legal rights of women. Of the 30 cases instituted over the question of the murders of Turkmen women in Ashkhabad, Merv and Leninsk districts, not one was reviewed. As a whole for Turkmenia, of all the cases received by the people's courts in 1925, just 42 percent was reviewed, and 30 percent ended in acquittals, 46 percent were suspended, 13 percent were returned for additional investigation, and only 11 percent were actually examined. As a result, of the 100 persons brought to court, only 11 were punished [161, p 83].

The specific problem related to the emancipation of women from the standards of Islam was also reflected in the constitutions of the Central Asian republics approved in 1936. They all stipulated that resistance to actual emancipation of women (the marrying of juveniles, bride money, resistance to the involvement of women in education, in agricultural and industrial production, in state administration and sociopolitical life) would be punished by the law.

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Considering the existing vestiges of Islam in the attitude toward women in social conscience during the designated period, a number of major legislative enactments were approved aimed at the actual ensuring of the emancipation of women. For example, in Turkmenia, a decree was approved by the republic TsIK and SNK entitled "On Greater Liability for Crimes Against the Emancipation of Women." According to this the punishments were to be increased for the abduction of women, for the marrying of women not reaching marriage age, for forcing women into divorce and concluding agreements with the parents of juveniles on the future marriage of these juveniles. A separate article established criminal liability for preventing a woman from taking an active part in social work, from attending schools, clubs and other cultural and educational institutions, for accepting the work of her choice, as well as resisting the taking off of the veil and face covering. A punishment was also established for preventing a woman from marrying the man of her choice [332, pp 291-292]. Similar articles appeared in the criminal codes of the other Central Asian republics.

In the secularization processes which occurred in Central Asia in 1925-1941, a prominent role was played by the cultural revolution which began here in the 1920's. It began to be carried out rapidly from the first half of the 1930's, and as a whole the 1930's were the years of its complete victory and the elimination of the age-old cultural backwardness of the local population.

In Central Asia, considering its prerevolutionary cultural level, the cultural revolution was to be carried out both quantitatively, that is, by raising the general educational, cultural and technical level of the people, as well as qualitatively, by the socialist revolution in the area of ideology and culture.

After the victory of the October revolution, a new social environment arose which was capable of shaping a new socialist orientation of man and his new behavior. One of the basic elements in this new environment was the reorganization of the school educational system. V. I. Lenin emphasized that the problem of educating the human individual could be solved only by the socialist school which was inseparably tied to all the workers and exploited persons and which stood not out of fear but rather out of conscience on the Soviet platform (see [55, p 431]).

One of the most important achievements in the secularization of life for the Central Asian population was the full transition of the public education system to a secular path and the elimination of confessional schools, that is, the loss by religion of its age-old monopoly over education. As a result, Islam also lost its age-old monopoly over the cultural life of society as a whole. The transition to a secular education ensured the secularization of public education not only in the designated period, but also placed a firm foundation for a future which would be free of the influence of Islam, having become the basis for reducing the perpetuation of religion in the future. That is, it was a question of children with whom the future of religion has always been linked.

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"...Each step ahead on the path of culture," wrote F. Engels, "was a step toward freedom" [22, p 116]. Precisely this viewpoint should be adopted for the major advances achieved in the organization and development of the secular school in the Central Asian republics during the period of socialist construction.

During this period there was a sharp increase in the number of the new type schools and the number of children studying in them. This became possible due to the significant allocations from the state budget for building new school buildings.

The first tangible advances were also made in the area of female education. Not all girls of the local nationalities studied at school, and there were particularly few in the rural localities. During this period and even much later girls wore the veil to school. But the very fact of the educating of girls in secular schools and also the occurring instances of the joint educating of boys and girls thoroughly shook the age-old foundations and contributed to a change in the attitude of the population to the fate of women and to their liberation from the clutches of religion.

During the designated period great advances were made in the training of teachers from among the representatives of the indigenous nationalities, including women.

Precisely during this period in all the Central Asian schools there was the complete elimination of textbooks which were permeated with a spirit of Islam or had a frankly religious nature.

The introduction of the study of Russian in all the national schools and the languages of the indigenous Central Asian nationalities in the Russian schools was of exceptional significance for the secularization of education.

One must also note the essential change in the social psychology vis-a-vis the secular school. While in the past the educating of a child in a non-religious school was tantamount to a betrayal of Islam for the parents, at present, under the impact of socialist reality, the local population began to understand the advantage of the secular school and the necessity of gaining a secular education.

By the end of 1928, all of this made it possible to basically convert to a secular public education system everywhere in the Central Asian republics, and to eliminate the confessional schools, as the need for them had been eliminated.<sup>5</sup>

Beginning with the autumn of 1930, as throughout the nation, in Central Asia a mass campaign was started to achieve universal compulsory primary education. Great work was done in this area. While in the 1928-1929 academic year there were 270,400 children in the Central Asian schools (not including the KKAO [Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast]), in the 1932-1933 academic year this figure had risen to 1,018,500, and in the 1938-1939 academic

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year to 1,860,100 students. Here girls comprised from 40.6 to 43.8 percent of all the students [397, pp 150, 151].

The struggle to eradicate illiteracy was of exceptional significance in the secularization of spiritual life for the Central Asian nations and nationalities, and this struggle became a component part of the cultural revolution. In 1925, extraordinary commissions to eradicate illiteracy were organized in all the Central Asian republics. Tens of thousands of Komsomol cultural workers were involved in the movement to eradicate illiteracy, and special textbooks and newspaper columns were printed.

The party organizations and the local authorities made every effort so that the work of eliminating illiteracy would assume a broad scope, having worked out measures aimed at raising the interest of the population in this question. Thus, the decree of the SNK of 21 July 1925 established a series of benefits for the peasants who completed the likbez schools. They were the first to be granted a seed loan (with an interest 2 percent below the standard, they were issued machines and tools from the leasing points, and the payment for planting stock from forest nurseries was lowered by 25 percent, and so forth [361, p 198].

Various advantages were also extended to the peasants who enrolled their daughters in schools or their wives in the likbez courses. In particular, they were the first to be granted loans for outfitting the farm [343, p 175].

The work of eradicating adult illiteracy assumed truly revolutionary scope beginning with the autumn of 1929. By the end of 1930, the number of students in the likbez schools had risen by 317 percent in comparison with the end of 1929, and in 1932 over a million persons were already studying in them. In 1931 the first areas of complete literacy appeared. By the end of the decade (1939), the literacy level was 67.8 percent in Uzbekistan, 67.2 in Turkmenia, 70 percent in Kirgiz, and 71.7 percent in Tadzhikistan [272, p 7]. We might recall that in 1926, the literacy level was 10.6 percent in Uzbekistan, 12.5 in Turkmenia, 15.1 in Kirgiz, and in Tadzhikistan illiteracy was 98 percent [271, p 362].

The transition from Arabic script initially to a Latinized and then Russian alphabet played a major role in the final secularization of the educational system of the younger generation. The initiative to change from an Arabic to a Latin alphabet came from the scholars of Azerbaijan who set up a special commission in 1922 for this purpose. V. I. Lenin, having become acquainted with the measures of the Azerbaijani government to convert to the new alphabet, emphasized the importance of the reform having said that "this is a revolution in the East" and "the beginning of a cultural revolution among the Turks" [106, p 112].

Arabic writing was a serious impediment when the struggle to eradicate illiteracy began after the October Revolution. The times urgently demanded a changeover to a writing system which would be accessible for the broad masses.

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"If we do not translate all publications into a Latin alphabet," emphasized the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party (16 September 1931), "we will not become free of the Arab system soon. And from such things as the 'Muhtasar,' 'Kissasul Anbil' (the textbooks of the confessional school.--T.S.), and so forth."

The changeover to the new script was not the usual replacing of one alphabet by another. It entailed the loss of influence by both religion and the clergy on the life of the population. The Arab script in which, according to Islam, Allah himself had written the Koran for many centuries had been the privilege predominantly of the clergy which used it as an important means of spiritual suppression. Among the essentially completely illiterate population which made a fetish out of writing and showed exceptional reverence for the literate man, the priest had enormous trust as the sole interpreter of "God's law." Now, with the changeover to the new alphabet and the universal spread of literacy, the mullah largely lost his power over the spiritual life of the population and ceased being the carrier of the "sacred letter." "The replacing of the graphic basis simultaneously meant the conversion of literacy from a weapon of religious propaganda into a weapon of social progress" [106, p 114].

Regardless of all the difficulties (resistance by religious fanatics, instances of the murdering of teachers who spread the new writing and the absence of trained personnel), the Latin alphabet gradually replaced the Arabic one in the Central Asian republics. In Turkmenia, by 1928, the entire national press had been converted to the new alphabet, and in the 1928-1929 academic year, all the primary schools and institutions (with the exception of a portion of the inferior ones); in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan Latinization was completed at the beginning of the 1930's.

In the 1930's in the Central Asian republics extensive work was done aimed at the mass mastering of modern technical and agrotechnical knowledge by the workers. Mass instruction was carried out for the workers in all the national economic sectors. Hundreds of thousands of workers, peasants and employees each year were trained in various courses, in the circles of technical and agrotechnical training, the schools providing a minimum of technical and agricultural knowledge, and so forth.

During this period there was a colossal rise in the periodic press and in the publishing of scientific and artistic literature in the native languages. New cadres of Soviet writers were formed, and the various types of national art were developed. The diverse culture of the Central Asian peoples which was national in form and socialist in content grew up and became strong. The national intelligentsia and science were developed, and the system of higher education was put on a firm basis.

The cultural and educational institutions also began to play a tangible role in the life of the Central Asian republics. Movies, the radio, newspapers, books, lectures and scientific and political reports became a

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permanent fixture in the life of the people. The mosque ceased being the "cultural center."

The propagandizing of Marxist-Leninist ideology was commenced on a broad scale among the masses as well as work on the fundamental transformation of social awareness. This work was carried out both in the schools where the millions of adults and children were instructed, as well as in other institutions of learning. Everywhere public education and vocational-technical training without fail were supplemented by a study of various political disciplines such as political literacy, the history and policy of the party, the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and so forth. The cultural and educational institutions played a major role in the propagandizing of Marxist theory. In the 1930's, an ordered system of the party's complete influence on the masses was created.

One of the important aspects of the cultural revolution was the beginning of the mass socialist transformation of everyday life.

Along with industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, as was pointed out in the CPSU Program, the cultural revolution was the basic element in building a socialist society, having carried out a great change in the ideological area. The cultural revolution "brought the working masses out of spiritual slavery and darkness, and it acquainted them with the riches of culture acquired by mankind. A nation where a majority of the population was illiterate carried out a gigantic ascent to the heights of science and culture" [62, p 30].

The cultural revolution was a basis for the secularization of various aspects in the life of the population. Due to it not religious but rather secular knowledge moved to the forefront in social awareness. While in the past man had explained the world by religious notions, now he began to explain much proceeding from materialistic knowledge and knowing in practice the truthfulness of the latter. This still did not mean the complete victory of atheistic notions in his conscience, but precisely the cultural revolution created conditions for the further assimilation of atheistic views and for shaping a materialistic understanding of the world.

Atheistic propaganda also played a definite role in the secularization of social conscience and the spread of atheistic knowledge. This propaganda began to be developed beginning with the second half of the 1920's. It was devised considering the historical experience of the nations which professed Islam and that role which Islam played in their lives. The VKP(b) Central Committee constantly stressed that "the methods of antireligious work among the Eastern peoples should be determined considering the forms of their way of life, the presence of the vestiges of semifeudal relationships in certain areas and a kinship way of life, by the degree of their involvement in Soviet construction, and by the state of both the religious organization and religion" (quoted in [214, p 314]).

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For this reason, even in the second half of the 1920's, mass antireligious work was not commenced in the Central Asian countryside; this was carried out only among the rural activists. Even the Union of militant atheists (SVB) which began operating in the nation in 1925, was set up much later in Central Asia, proceeding from the local conditions. For example, it was founded in 1937 in Tadzhikistan. Atheistic work (primarily aimed at dis-closing the social essence of Islam) in the national countryside commenced much later, beginning in the middle of the 1930's.

The propagandizing of atheistic knowledge had its main impact on the urban population. In 1925, in Tashkent, Samarkand and Fergana cells of the SVB arose and these operated under the name of the societies of the friends of the SVB. The SVB was created in Uzbekistan in 1928. By 1941, it had 160,000 members [96, p 13]. In 1928, the journal HUDOSIZLAR (Atheists) began to be published, and somewhat later the newspaper HUDOSIZ (Atheist). The creation of periodicals in the local languages, under conditions where mass atheistic literature was lacking and there was a great need for popular pamphlets and articles accessible to the broad circles of workers, was of enormous significance. These publications, along with unmasking the class essence of Islam and the Moslem organizations, gave a leading place to propagandizing knowledge about natural sciences including the origin of the universe, earthquakes, and so forth.

In the designated period, particularly in the second half of the 1930's, mass atheistic literature began to be published. The following data show the scope of this work: in 1939-1940, 30 titles of atheistic publications with a total run of 470,000 copies were published in Uzbek. During the 6 months of 1940 alone, the newspapers published 170 articles on antireligious subjects [96, p 12].

The socioeconomic successes achieved by the Central Asian republics and the cultural revolution also enriched the mental world of the region's population which in the not-distant past had been totally under the influence of Islam. These factors had enriched its content and led to the creation of new, previously unknown forms of conscious activity and new structures of cognitive processes. They helped to raise human awareness to new levels. The fundamental changes in the mental life of man not only contributed to a broadening of his viewpoint, to a mastering of the principles of theoretical knowledge and to the appearance of new motives for activity related to collective labor, the joint planning of labor activities and the mastery of the principles of school knowledge. This was the conclusion reached by psychologists who conducted an unique psychological study in the remote regions of Uzbekistan and Kirgiz at the beginning of the 1930's (see [282]).

In the conscience of people values were established which not only did not derive from the teachings of Islam but also were directly opposite to them. The virtues imposed by Islam began to retreat in the minds of the believers to the background and were replaced by new values, by the desire to win respect in the labor collectives, recognition of people for successes in labor, studies and deeds aimed at the good of people.

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All of this contributed to the moving of the standards and demands of Islam in personal life and the everyday life of the population to the background. Links with the religious community ceased to be the chief ones for the population, and the labor collectives, the party and social organizations and the mass information and propaganda media began to have the determining influence on the believers. The clergy also ceased to play the dominant role. But, we feel that in the designated period true spiritual emancipation of the individual had not yet occurred, as has been asserted by individual authors [104, pp 34-35]. It is a question precisely of the secularization of individual aspects of the life of the believer, and this certainly is not tantamount to the forming of atheistic views in him.

The true emancipation of the indigenous Central Asian population from the influence of Islam required and still requires many very important socio-economic, political and cultural changes as well as extended time.

The active process of secularization which had occurred, as everywhere else, in the regions of the spread of Islam to a definite degree was checked by the Great Patriotic War which started in 1941.

Regardless of the fact that Central Asia and Kazakhstan were deep in the rear, the population of these regions fully felt the consequences of the war. A large number of men who left for the front were killed, and the material conditions of life deteriorated. During this period work in the area of the atheistic indoctrination of the workers was noticeably lessened. The SVB ceased its activities, atheistic literature ceased to be published, and antireligious lectures and conversations were not held.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Moslem organizations and clergy held a patriotic position. This position was the logical conclusion of the loyal position vis-a-vis Soviet power held by them in the 1920's and which had been further developed and deepened during the years of industrialization and collectivization, the building of socialism and its strengthening. The congress of representatives of the Moslem clergy held in Ufa in 1942 approved an appeal to all the Moslems of the USSR to fight mercilessly against the Nazi murderers and tyrants, for unstinting labor in the rear, and to organize the collecting of money and goods for the defense front. The appeal was read in the mosques of the nation and at meetings of believers.

In 1943, the Clerical Administration for Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) was organized with headquarters in Tashkent. At a congress which formed this religious center, an appeal was also approved to believers to fight along with all the Soviet peoples for the great motherland, for their liberty and flourishing, for faith and truth, for honor and glory. The Soviet government showed respect for the patriotic position of the Moslem clergy as well as the believers. This can be seen in the publication of a series of documents coming from them on the pages of the central press including PRAVDA. Thus PRAVDA published the appeal of

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the participants of a congress of representatives of Moslem clergy of the Northern Caucasus to Mar SU I. V. Stalin, the chairman of the SNK and commander-in-chief. In particular, it stated: "The Moslem clergy of the Northern Caucasus, like the other republics and oblasts of the USSR, since the first days of the Patriotic War has explained to the believing Moslems that the defense of the motherland is their sacred duty" [481, 3 June 1944].

During the war years the mosques collected money, clothing and food for the needs of the front and for supporting the families of frontline soldiers. They sold the notes of the state loan and also lottery tickets. Moslems of the region participated in the collecting of money to build a tank column.

The mufti of the Central Moslem Clerical Administration, Abdurakhman Rasulev, sent a message to I. V. Stalin about this. The mufti's telegram and the reply to it were published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA [472, 3 March 1943].

The SADUM collected among the faithful the religious zakat and fitr, the donation in honor of the uraza, and in 1945 issued a fetwa which made these donations obligatory for the believers. On the spot numerous "activists" the Islamic clergy which was materially interested in its activities (it received one-eighth of the collected money) were engaged in collecting the donations. All of this continued until 1947, when the activities of the Moslem organizations were confined to the limits of the religious legislation.

The cause of atheistic indoctrination was greatly harmed by individual workers from the local authorities who incorrectly viewed the fact of setting up the SADUM. They housed the representatives of the Clerical Administration in the buildings of the executive committees, they issued credentials to them and on the basis of these the clergy demanded the opening of mosques and controlled the payment of religious taxes by the faithful.

The operating mosques often were involved in affairs that went beyond their functions as defined by the religious legislation. They collected and distributed food products and clothing among the population, and offered material aid to the families of killed frontline soldiers.

In the awareness of an individual part of the believers and among certain Soviet workers there was the notion that religion had "aided" the state and the state itself supposedly was concerned for the conditions under which the religious organizations worked. In addition the Islamic clergy constantly asserted its contributions.

In a number of places the question of religion was discussed at general meetings of the workers, and resolutions were adopted "recognizing the usefulness of religion for mankind" and urging "heeding the advice of the clergy." For example, a general kolkhoz meeting was held at the Baynal Minal Kolkhoz in Varzobskiy Rayon (Tadzhikistan), and this was attended by

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over 100 persons. There was one question on the agenda: "on the significance of the domullo-imam." The chairman of the meeting, the actual chairman of the kolkhoz, explained the importance of the domullo-imam. In its decree the meeting appointed the village imam and requested the kazy-kalan (the chairman of the SADUM for the republic) to approve his candidacy. The minutes of the meeting and the appeal to the kazy-kalan were signed by the kolkhoz chairman and secretary and validated by the kolkhoz seal [356, p 195].

In 1944, a regular pilgrimage of the Moslems from Central Asia and Kazakhstan began to Mecca and Medina.

During the period of the Patriotic War and during the first several wars after its end, the number of mosques increased.

After the war, a journal published by the SADUM began to come out, and medrese, the secondary clerical Moslem schools, began to function in Tashkent and Bukhara.

All of this combined with the hardship which the war had brought the people, of course contributed to a strengthening of the role of Islam in the life of the people. In religion the people who had lost relatives or dear ones found consolation; the people who were unable to scientifically explain the occurring events sought help and protection in God; persons who had lived through material hardships turned to Him. This is clearly seen from the following example.

On 19 June 1941, upon a decision of the scientific institutions of Uzbekistan, the grave of Tamerlane was opened for study. On 22 June, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Moslem superstition immediately explained that in the ancient books it was predicted that when the grave of Tamerlane was opened, the spirit of war would be let loose. And this had happened!

The war, like any calamity, causes an outburst of religiousness. The rumor that the scientists had released the spirit of war found favorable grounds in the backward strata of the population, it aroused them, and turned them against the Soviet intelligentsia (if it weren't for the Academy of Sciences, there would be no war!).

How to counter this? It was decided to solemnly return the remains of Tamerlane to Gur-Emir, having widely publicized this and having turned the event into a grandiose spectacle. Special delegations arrived. Speeches were made, the scientific reason for the opening and the scientific results were explained.... And the remains of Tamerlane on 20 December 1942 in the presence of a great crowd of people were returned to the earth. And at this time the Battle of Stalingrad had started. And when Paulus was captured, there was again the "explanation." See for yourselves: the spirit of war has been buried and Hitler took a licking [155, pp 95-96].

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The communicative function of Islam had also grown. There were more mosques and more persons praying in them, the role of the [religious] community had increased in the life of the population points, and people more often began to organize various religious rites such as funeral feasts, sacrifices, and so forth to which neighbors, relatives and close friends were invited. Attempts were made to organize the group instruction of children in religion.

The greater activity of religious life, and the strengthening of the religiousness of the population to a definite degree also contributed to the more noticeable manifestation of the regulative function of Islam, and to the attempts to resurrect the standards of the shariat. There were more frequent instances of terroristic acts against female activists. Such cases were observed in Namanganskaya and Bukharskaya oblasts of Uzbekistan. Here individual judges underestimated the political and social significance of the struggle against the vestiges of the past and their social danger, applying mild sentences or completely halting the case, thereby creating the notion of the impunity of such crimes. For example, in Bukharskaya Oblast the people's courts, in reviewing cases on attempts on the life or murders of emancipated women, on the marrying of adolescent girls, bride money, the prohibiting from studying and so forth, did not give a political evaluation to these crimes, they did not explain the social appearance of the crime or the reasons for the commission of the crime [220, Vol 3, p 257].

During the war years, the elements hostile to Soviet power and particularly from the clergy became more active.

However, during the war years, religion acquired new followers not from the atheists but only from among those who previously did not possess an immunity to it or a scientific ideology. Prior to the war, as a result of the successes achieved in the process of socialist construction and the atheistic indoctrination of the workers, secularization achieved previously unknown depth and breadth. The number of mosques was significantly reduced and the operating ones began to be attended by a small portion of the population. But this did not mean a sharp decline in the number of believers, which because of many objective factors was still too early to expect. Because of various circumstances (the remoteness of the mosques, the influence of the community and young family members) many believers continued to observe the rites at home. A certain number of uncounted mosques, particularly in rural localities, continued to function.

But the war contributed not only to the strengthening of religiousness or to the strengthening of the positions of Islam. The Great Patriotic War became simultaneously the reason for the further secularization of life in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. During the war years processes occurred here which objectively led to the liberation of the conscience of hundreds of thousands of people from the influence of Islam, and these became a basis for further secularization. Industry developed intensely due to the enterprises evacuated from the west and due to the construction of new ones,

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and the size of the working class increased, particularly due to representatives from the local nationalities, particularly women. Women mastered the mass production processes and became skilled workers.

The role of women grew immeasurably in agricultural production. Thousands of them began to lead the kolkhozes, brigades and farms, and sat behind the wheel of the tractor. A greater sense of responsibility, the increase in the sociopolitical activeness and role of women in all aspects of social life undoubtedly contributed not only to their abandoning of religion, but also to the secularization of social psychology and to the loss of a regulative function by Islam.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, there was an increase in the number of urban residents in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, new cities appeared, and there was a sharp change in the national composition of the region, due to representatives from other nations, primarily Russians and Ukrainians. Scores of thousands of representatives from the indigenous nationalities of the region participated in the war along with the other peoples of the country, they saw previously unknown areas, they acquired many new character traits, and broke out of the narrow confines of national life. All of this helped to broaden the viewpoint of all the Central Asian nations and nationalities, and to internationalize various aspects of material and spiritual culture. Ultimately this led to liberation from the fetters of Islam.

And after the end of the war, the Moslem organizations for a certain time continued to keep their positions, and to a certain degree this was aided by their involvement in the widespread world peace movement. Representatives of the clergy were participants in all the oblast, republic and all-Union conferences for the supporters of peace. They gave speeches, and the most prominent of them were elected to the membership of peace committees, beginning with the local ones and ending with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. The content of their speeches as well as the announcements of their election were printed in the local and central press [481, 19 and 21 September 1950; 6 December 1951; 6 and 21 December 1952; 472, 12 and 13 September 1950, 4 December 1951; 481, 6 December 1951, and so forth]. The Moslem clergy also initiated work to collect signatures for various documents of the world peace movement and statements by the Moslem clerical administrations in support of these documents were also published in the local and central press. Documents were also published by the clerical administrations who condemned the use of bacteriological weapons by the American imperialists against the Korean and Chinese peoples, against the war in Korea, and so forth.

The Moslem organizations also participated widely in the work of the Conference of All Churches and Religious Associations devoted to the question of the defense of peace and held in May 1952 in Zagorsk, as well as in the Asian Conference for a Lessening of Tension in International Relations in Delhi (1955).

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Participation in actions aimed at the preservation and strengthening of peace and in which both believers and nonbelievers were interested to a certain degree raised the authority of the Moslem organizations and led to a larger number of parishoners, mosques and their income. In the mosques documents were read from the conferences on the defense of peace, and the believers were widely informed of this ahead of time. In the mosques they also made it a practice of holding meetings for believers in the defense of peace, and so forth [481, 20 June 1952].

Under the pretext of popularizing the decisions of the conferences, prominent religious leaders traveled to the mosques where the believers flocked to sometimes from very remote localities. The believers were informed of the participation of the clergy in the work of the peace converences and congresses as well as their trips abroad.

How widely the Moslem holidays were celebrated in the postwar years can serve as an indicator of the role of religion in the life of the population. During the months of the fast which at that time occurred in the summer season there were instances of a curtailment of the worked area of cotton and the labor days turned out by the kolkhoz members. In some places the faithful were summoned to evening prayers, the tarawukh related to the fast, by sounds of orchestras located on the roofs of the mosques. The fast was observed largely by elderly people, by a significant portion of the women and even a part of the youth. During the days of religious holidays there were instances of absenteeism and stoppages of equipment.

But all of this in no way reduced the enormous significance of the postwar period in the further secularization of the regions where Islam was spread. The postwar years in the life of the Soviet people were characterized by major advances in all areas of the economy and culture, by colossal achievements in science and technology, by the restoring of the Leninist standards of party and state life, and by the all-round development of democracy and initiative of all the workers.

The Decrees of the CPSU Central Committee approved in 1954 "On Major Shortcomings in Scientific Atheistic Propaganda and the Measures to Improve It" and "On Mistakes in Conducting Scientific Atheistic Propaganda Among the Population" played an important role in surmounting the vestiges of Islam and in developing atheistic indoctrination among the indigenous population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The CPSU Central Committee condemned the erroneous opinion which had been established among certain party and soviet workers that with the elimination of the class basis of the church in our nation, there would no longer be a necessity for active atheistic propaganda, and religious ideology in the course of communist construction would die out spontaneously, by its own force. The Central Committee demanded a decisive end to passivity in terms of religion, the unmasking of the reactionary essence of religion and the harm which it brought, in distracting a portion of the citizens of our nation from conscious and active participation in communist construction. It pointed out that antireligious

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propaganda should be carried out systematically, with all tenacity, and by using the method of persuasion [63, Vol 6, pp 502-507, 516-520].

For the Communist Party, the struggle against religious prejudices was a component part in the work related to the communist indoctrination of the workers. "The party uses," the CPSU Program approved by the 20th CPSU Congress stated: "the means of ideological influence for indoctrinating people in a spirit of a scientific materialistic ideology, for overcoming religious prejudices, without permitting the insulting of the feelings of believers. Scientific atheistic propaganda must be conducted systematically, in patiently explaining the inconsistency of religious beliefs which arose in the past on the basis of the subjection of people by the spontaneous forces of nature and by social suppression, as well as from an ignorance of the true causes of natural and social phenomena. Here it is essential to rely on the achievements of modern science which ever more fully disclosing the picture of the world, it is increasing the power of man over nature and leaves no room for the fantastic inventions of religion about supernatural forces" [62, pp 261-262].

Islam Under the Conditions of a Developed Socialist Society

For the first time in history, a developed socialist society has been built and is functioning successfully in the USSR. It has under it a strong material and technical base which has been created on the foundation of a balanced and developed national economy, and the introduction of the most recent scientific and technical achievements into production, and ensures high and steady growth rates for production and labor productivity. In sociopolitical terms, a developed socialist society is marked by the overcoming of class and national antagonism, by the uniformity of the social structure in each socialist nation and society as a whole, and by the strengthening of the state of all the people which embodies the profoundest democracy. Inherent to it are the broad development of public education, the universal distribution and establishment of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the strengthening of the relationship and unity of the national and international in the labor, culture and everyday life of the Soviet peoples.

The successes of the Soviet Union and autonomous republics which have skipped the capitalist path of development in socialist construction have amazed the entire world. Central Asia which in the recent past was a backward borderland of Tsarist Russia and which in its development was significantly behind not only the European capitalist nations but also the states of the foreign East, has turned into a region of highly developed industry, advanced agriculture, complete literacy and high culture. "If we compare our prerevolutionary region with the Uzbekistan of today," wrote Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party, "we are confronted with a picture of the starkest contrasts: a region of feudal ways with the dominance of patriarchal production and a sovereign Soviet republic with firmly established socialist

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relationships; a region where industry was represented by several-score semiartisan enterprises based on primitive technology and a republic of powerful industry equipped with the most modern equipment; a region with small impoverished peasant farms where the hoe and wooden plow were the basic implements of labor, and a republic of highly developed agriculture with large, technically equipped and economically strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes; a region of ignorance where the population was almost completely illiterate, and a republic of complete literacy in which a broad network of schools, institutions of higher learning and scientific institutions has been created and a diversified and flourishing culture; a region where epidemics of terrible diseases which carried off thousands of human lives raged, and a republic in which the socialist system of public health has been widely developed; a region of complete inequality for the working people, where the life of people and their interpersonal relations were regulated by the laws of the shariat and the dogmas of the Koran, and a republic where the people of all nationalities are equal, and are united by inseparable ties of fraternal friendship, by the common communist ideals, by noble feelings of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by feelings of national Soviet pride" [78, p 44].

Present-day Central Asia is a region with highly developed industry. Here virtually all sectors of modern industry have developed including machine building, chemical, petroleum, power, textile, and so forth. In the region an enormous number of enterprises equipped on a level of modern technical progress is functioning. The republics which 50 years ago imported even primitive farm implements now produce textiles and gas, automatic machine tools and gold, tractors and chemical products, powerful cotton-harvesting equipment, excavators and radio electronic equipment. The growth rates of industrial production in the kray are known in no other nation in the world. Suffice it to point out that during the years of the existence of the USSR, gross industrial product has risen by more than 500-fold in Tadzhikistan, by more than 400-fold in Kirgizia, by 130-fold in Turkmenia, and by almost 240-fold in Uzbekistan.

The unprecedented successes of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan are convincing proof of the enormous advantages of socialism. "The much more meager achievements in the capitalist world," commented L. I. Brezhnev, "are often termed a 'miracle.' But we, the communists, do not see anything supernatural in what has occurred in Soviet Central Asia and Soviet Kazakhstan. This, so to speak, is a natural miracle, natural for Soviet power, for socialism, and for those relationships of friendship and fraternity among peoples which have been established in our country" [69, pp 14-15].

The successes achieved by the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan in socialist and communist construction have become the foundation and objective source contributing to a liberation of various aspects of the life of society and the individual away from religious influence. The present-day development level of these republics also determines the unprecedented pace of secularization, its depth and scope.

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The most important areas of economic, political and spiritual life in the socialist society in their essence have become free from religious effect. Islam, like the other religions, has been unable to influence the activities of the state and social organizations and institutions on all level, to participate in the political life of the state, and it does not play any role in economic life. Science, the public education system, culture and art not only are fully free from the influence of Islam, but also actively propagandize antireligious ideology, and shape a scientific and materialistic viewpoint among the younger generation and the broadest masses of workers.

The growth of industry has led to the appearance of two most important social factors which play a leading role in secularization and have become its foundation. A numerous national working class has grown up and this differs from the peasantry "in another way of life" and "another system of family relations, and a higher level of needs, both material and spiritual" [53, p 547]. This most international class in its essence plays a decisive role in the process of bringing all nations and nationalities closer together, in freeing all life from the influence of religion, and in shaping an atheistic awareness and atheistic social opinion.

The working class has made an even greater blow against religion because a significant number of women are now in its ranks and they have been exposed to the beneficial influence of the most advanced class of our society.

Industrialization and the increase in the number of workers in industry, construction and transportation have been accompanied by a sharp increase in the size of the urban population and the appearance of new cities and urban type settlements. While in 1913, in Central Asia the proportional amount of the urban population was 14 percent, by 1970 it had reached 38 percent. In comparison with 1926, in 1970 there was an increase of 371 percent in the number of urban settlements, while the number of their inhabitants increased by 646 percent [367, pp 27, 32]. The cities have become multinational.

The city surpasses the countryside primarily in the cultural level of the population. The largest number of intelligentsia and cultural, educational and scientific institutions is concentrated in the cities, and this cannot help but influence the shaping of the awareness of the population. In the given instance of substantial importance is the more highly organized life of the population and the fact that in the cities peoples from the most diverse nationalities live and work side by side and they have a reciprocal influence on one another. In this regard of interest are the conclusions drawn by a group of Tashkent sociologists who studied religiousness in the various parts of the city inhabited by Uzbeks. They established that in the mahalle of Yangikhayat and other mahalle of the city where a predominant majority of the citizens lives in their own homes, has farm-yard plots, orchards, and so forth, the percentage of believers and the number of religious rites performed by them are much higher than among the Uzbek population living in the newly built regions. As is known, an

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important role in the survival of religious vestiges is played by national exclusiveness and restrictedness. According to the observations, the percentage of believing Moslems among the Uzbeks living in the new regions of the city next to representatives of other nationalities is several-fold lower than in the mahalle where a population that is uniform in terms of national composition lives [480, No 12, 1965, p 10]. Similar conclusions were reached by Tatar scientists who conducted sociological research in various parts of the town of Al'met'yevsk [232, p 95].

The appearance of the Central Asian villages and the appearance of their inhabitants were fully changed. The sharp opposition between city and countryside caused by the exploiting system gave rise, as K. Marx wrote, to a cultural and domestic backwardness, to the dulling of the masses of rural inhabitants, and "the idiocy of village life," dooming them to a lack of culture, spiritual impoverishment and illiteracy.

The main social task of the party in the countryside consisted and consists in eliminating the essential differences between city and countryside, between the working class and the peasantry, between mental and physical labor, and building a classless communist society. "Clearly," said V. I. Lenin, "for fully eliminating classes it is essential not only to overthrow the exploiters, landowners and capitalists, and not only eliminate *their* property...but it is essential to destroy both the difference between the city and the countryside and the difference between the people of physical and mental labor" [37, p 15].

The Central Asian kolkhoz countryside has taken an enormous step ahead along the path of socioeconomic and cultural progress. Industrialization of agricultural production and the development of the scientific and technical revolution have led to qualitative shifts in the entire social appearance of the countryside and its workers, to a change in the vocational structure of the rural population, to the appearance and spread of new professions, and to a situation where workers assume an ever greater proportional amount in the social structure of the countryside. The rural intelligentsia plays an ever more important role in the social structure of the Soviet countryside, and its numerical size has been continuously growing. The process of turning agricultural labor into a variety of industrial labor has been accompanied by a continuous rise in the general educational and cultural levels of the rural workers.

The achieved successes have fundamentally altered the way of life and the psychology of the rural population, they have immeasurably increased its material well being, they have raised spiritual culture to a new level, and shaped a socialist way of life, consciousness and psychology among the peasantry. For the first time in history a new social type of peasant has been formed with a high educational and cultural level, with a socialist psychology, and with new moral traits and qualities based upon a Marxist-Leninist ideology [256, pp 4-8].

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The unprecedented growth of the productive forces in agriculture has given rise to conditions where man has ceased to feel his complete dependence upon the arbitrary forces of nature. The growth of the material prosperity of the rural workers and the sharp rise in the cultural level have eliminated the situation whereby man linked his hopes to religious convictions.

In speaking about the role of industrialization and collectivization in the previously backward borderlands of Tsarist Russia in altering religious awareness, we must particularly bring out the role of the scientific and technical revolution. In a socialist society which "opens up opportunities for the extensive and planned development of scientific research in the interests of the working man and for successfully solving the social problems posed by the scientific and technical revolution" [67, p 30], the views and convictions of people are exposed to the powerful influence of science and technology.

Scientific and technical progress, as a social phenomenon, is linked to the spiritual world of people. Equipment increases the opportunities for man to transform surrounding reality. The technical devices created by people and scientific discoveries clearly show the flimsiness of religious views. As was aptly pointed out by G. V. Plekhanov, "the boundaries of the unknown are narrowed as experience is broadened, and as the power of man over nature increases. When a man is able to influence without prayer and rather by a technical effect, he ceases to pray" [75, p 61].

The greatest force contributing to the liberation of the consciousness of the workers in the Central Asian towns and villages was the elimination of their cultural backwardness. The Central Asian republics in essence became republics of complete literacy. At present here, as throughout the nation, a transition is being carried out to a universal secondary education. At present it is impossible to imagine even the most remote village where there were no schools.

The broad spread of public education has served as the basis for the training of a large army of specialists from among the indigenous Central Asian nationalities, and has contributed to the colossal development of science which has eliminated religion both from various spheres of social life and also from individual awareness. In all the Central Asian republics there are national academies of sciences which possess large scientific forces, and they are outfitted with the most modern instruments and equipment and conduct major research.

In the propagandizing of atheistic knowledge among the workers, an important role is played by the cultural institutions, that is, by the scores of theaters, philharmonics, and many thousands of clubs, mass libraries, motion picture projection units and film studios.

The newborn intelligentsia is an offspring of Soviet power, and occupies a special place in the struggle against religious prejudices among different

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strata of the population. The members of the intelligentsia help to educate the masses, they disseminate their knowledge and ideas, and take an active part in shaping the atheistic ideology of the workers.

Universal literacy and the presence of a large national intelligentsia open up an opportunity for the broad masses to take an active part in the creation of a new culture. Culture which is national in form and socialist in content, in being widely introduced into the daily life of the people, helps to indoctrinate them in a materialist viewpoint, and contributes to the modernizing of life and the establishing of socialist moral standards.

The mass propaganda and information media such as the press, radio and television have been rapidly developed in the Central Asian republics. All of this combined with the presence of a large detachment of intelligentsia, scientific workers and specialists in the area of religion and atheism, has created an unprecedented situation for the development of atheistic propaganda, and has raised the role of the subjective factor in the overcoming of the vestiges of Islam. Atheistic indoctrination has become an inseparable part in the ideological activities of the party, state and public organizations and institutions. Systematic propaganda of atheistic knowledge is carried out on the pages of newspapers and magazines and with the aid of radio and television.

The freeing of the population from the influence of Islam has been largely aided by the growth of the sociopolitical activeness of the urban and rural workers, and by the diverse forms of their involvement in the management of enterprises and in state construction, as well as by a feeling of social importance.

In the secularization of all aspects of life in the Central Asian republics, a leading role has been played by the emancipation of women who have become a full member of socialist society. At present there is not a single sphere of economic, political and spiritual activity in which women do not play a leading role.

The participation of women in social production has played a particularly important role in ensuring the actual equality of men and women today. In 1971, the number of women employed in Turkmen industry was 40 percent of all the employees, in Kazakhstan the figure was 47 percent, in Tadzhikistan 38 percent, and in Kirgizia 48 percent [390, pp 110-111]. In all the republics exceptional attention is given to involving women in broad social activities and state administration. For example, women comprise more than one-third of the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet from Kirgizia and deputies to the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet, while among the deputies of the local republic soviets over 11,000 are women [432, No 16, 1974, p 24].

These are certain irreversible objective factors which have brought about the unprecedented scope and depth of the process of secularization in the regions where Islam has spread. They brilliantly affirm the notion that precisely a socialist society is capable of creating the most favorable

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conditions for secularization, since the economic, sociopolitical, cultural and ideological conditions which are engendered by it instill atheistic convictions in a person and help to free him from the influence of religion.

At present (relying on the results of sociological research conducted in the various areas where Islam was spread), one can boldly say that a majority of the population both in the city and the countryside has abandoned religion [257, p 194; 104; 105; 304, pp 77, 89, 91 and elsewhere].

Having lost support in the leading areas of the life of Soviet society, Islam has now become a matter of personal conscience and influences only the sphere of personal life.

Social progress and the unprecedented growth of the economy and culture have entailed a fundamental change in the appearance of a present-day believer. In the past the Moslem was ignorant, without rights, and suppressed by class oppression and poverty. At present the believer is a citizen with full rights and a worker in a socialist state, he feels his place and responsibility in life, and receives all the goods which are provided him by a highly developed socialist society. All of this has become the basis for secularizing many aspects of life and the believer himself, and for changing his attitude toward religion. Instead of a believer who meekly accepts the dogmas of Islam and who carries out its prescripts and requirements without fail, a believer has developed who does not completely put his life in the hands of faith, who does not allow coercion of his own conscience, who selectively observes the rites of Islam, and is not guided by it in questions extending beyond religion. As is shown by the results of concrete sociological research on the state of religiousness among the peasantry, the five-prayers-a-day which are one of the five "pillars of faith" are performed only by 30 percent of the older generation of believers, and this figure drops by 2-fold in the peak season of field work. Another "pillar of faith," the month-long fast, is observed by only 40 percent of the older generation of believers, while a majority of the believers from 16 to 39 years of age restrict themselves to fasting 3 days at the beginning, middle and end of the month [105, pp 85-86].

At the same time, the various characteristics of society as a whole, including its complete freedom from religion, must not be automatically transposed to the individual. Social relations on the individual level which are formed under the direct affect of the aggregate of social relations also must not be considered as identical to these latter. Society is an aggregate of "all" social relations, and the individual is an aggregate of only "certain ones" [396, p 196]. For this reason it must not be thought that ideals free from religion, the materialist philosophy or world view shaped by society are automatically assimilated and, most importantly, perceived as vitally significant by each person. It must be remembered, as F. Engels pointed out, that in religion "the relationship of ideas with their material conditions of existence is more and more confused and more and more obscured by intermediate links" [28, p 312].

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As was already said above, the transition from socialism made by the Central Asian republics in bypassing an entire socioeconomic formation (capitalism), cannot occur without a trace. Below we will take up how this specific feature of their development was reflected in the manifestations of religiousness among the population. Here we would merely like to point out that religiousness among the Soviet peoples who have skipped the capitalist path of development everywhere is noticeably higher than among the peoples of our nation which underwent the capitalist path of development. The past is also felt where the social structure, the cultural level and life of one or another people which in the past professed Islam (for example, among the Tatars) were comparatively equal with the peoples which did not profess Islam [399, p 135].

In terms of the degree of intensity in the secularization process, all the objects studied by sociologists are divided into three groups: the first with features of the most intensive secularization, the second with features of intensive secularization, and the third or less secularized regions. The regions where Islam spread are classified in the last type. Such a division is based upon the results of concrete sociological research. Thus, while on the virginland sovkhoses of Kustanayskaya Oblast, the level of atheism among the population and religiousness shows a ratio of 9.0:1.0, in the Karakalpak ASSR it is 4.5:5.5. The ratio between the nonreligious, intermediate and religious groups of the population in Penzenskaya and Voronezhskaya oblasts which are in the first group is 7:1:2 and 8:1:1, while in individual areas of Uzbekistan it is 6:2:2 and in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, 5:2:3.

In the regions where Islam has spread, in contrast to other territories of the nation where women comprised a predominant majority of the believers, religiousness is somewhat leveled by the increased religiousness of men. In these regions religiousness is also much "younger."

The regions where Islam spread comprise an exception in another, very important indicator for the level of religiousness. Everywhere this is inversely proportional to the educational level. In the central oblasts and autonomous republics of the Middle Volga, in the Ukraine and Belorussia, among the persons questioned with a higher and secondary education, the number of believers varies between 1-1.5 percent. Where the vestiges of Islam continue to exist, in the same educational group, the average level of religiousness varied between 10-15 percent [89, pp 73-76].

The higher level of religiousness in the Islamic areas, in comparison with the other regions of the nation, and the particular features of the structure, demography, and cultural development of the nations which in the past professed Islam are also reflected in the functions carried out by religion in their lives. It is a question of the specific manifestations of the same functions which other religions fulfill.

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The Illusory-Compensatory Function of Islam

In a developed socialist society, Islam continues to fulfill not one function but rather a whole series. As before, the main one remains the illusory-compensatory function. While in the past, when Islam was a force integrating all life of society, to a certain degree this function operated in a veiled form, while at present precisely it has become the core around which all the remaining Islamic functions are superimposed.

The reason that the "earthly base separates from itself and moves into the clouds as a certain independent realm," is explained by Marxism primarily by the very earthly basis, by the actual process of life, and by the conditions of the existence of society [16, p 2]. The socialist base which is characterized by public ownership of the means of production, and by the complete elimination of the exploitation of man by man, not only does not engender a religion, but serves as the basis for the gradual elimination of its influence on the members of society. The economic, socio-political and ideological life of society is under control, it is regulated and developed according to specific plans.

But at the same time, as its basis, has inherited the vestiges of the previous levels of economic development such as capitalism, and in a majority of the Islamic regions, also feudalism, and with this all of the related social (production) relations. Socialism "is still a young, growing social organism in which not everything has taken root, and in many regards bears the impression of previous historical eras" [65, p 13]. Socialism has not yet created the conditions which would lead to the final destruction of the factors which caused people to seek consolation outside of the social institutions and organizations and which impelled them to a religious "compensation" of reality. Certainly it is again a question of individual weakness, but since this is inherent not to the individual but to many people, the reason for it must be sought in the overall level of social development and not in the particular features of an individual person [429, p 146].

The importance of the compensatory function of religion can be explained only by an investigation of the present development level of socialist society, its achievements and unsolved problems. Only such an approach will make it possible to elucidate those aspects in the life of individuals which necessitate a religious compensation.

What has been said is applicable to any religion. But when it is a question of Islam, then in our view it is essential to emphasize first of all those aspects which out of objective reasons intensify its compensatory functions in comparison with other religions. These factors are related to the level of social development among the indigenous population of the Islamic regions and derive from the feudal past.

The national working class in the Central Asian republics is still young, and it was and is formed from the peasantry and former artisans. And at

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present a definite portion of the workers at industrial enterprises continues to live in rural localities. This is reflected in the production skills of the national working class, and the degree of its satisfaction with its labor, and creates major difficulties in adapting to the new, unfamiliar conditions. For example, at the Uzbek industrial enterprises 28.8 percent of the workers of the indigenous nationalities are engaged in skilled labor, and 36.5 percent of the nonindigenous nationalities, while the figures for unskilled labor are, respectively, 40.1 and 29.3 percent [81a, p 327]. The unsatisfied demand for interesting, skilled and creative labor can serve as a reason for human pessimism, for alienation from the collective and exclusiveness, and in certain instances also lead to the acceptance of a religious "compensation" for life.

The level of religiousness depends upon the degree of labor skills. Unskilled and creatively unsatisfying labor more often creates the conditions for the survival of religiousness. Sociological research has shown that among the workers who do not have skills or are little skilled, the percentage of believers is 6-fold more than among the skilled (20 and 3.2 percent). Among the workers with high professional skills, for example, specialists involved in the running and adjusting of automatic equipment, believers were not discovered at all [275, p 167; 249, pp 155-156].

The specific features of the manifestation of Islam are also influenced by the fact that a rather large portion of the Central Asian national working class is engaged in the traditional sectors of industry (artistic trades, weaving, the finishing of blades, ceramic work, and so forth). This contributes to the preservation of the vestiges of professional cults which are supported predominantly by the workers of the older generation. According to the observations of ethnographers, the primary motive among youth involved in the observance of various rites having a religious spirit is a respect for elders and a desire to achieve and maintain a good reputation in the social opinion of the production collective and the community or district. Such traditions have more often survived in small towns and rayon centers, and less so in the large industrial centers.

The foundation of the professional cult of the past, that is, a serious attitude toward the help of feasts in work, has been recorded only among the masters of the older generation, and they predominantly know also the names of the feasts. As a rule, the youth no longer has this knowledge, with the exception of the children of the hereditary masters among the workers of the artistic trades and the weavers. The youth also does not know the risalia. Its systematic reading was halted 30-35 years ago.

But up to the present, the rite of the fotiha is performed and this is the blessed permission of a master to allow the apprentice to work independently, although the religious aspect does not play an essential role in the relationships of the apprentice and the master, and has been replaced by relationships developed in the production process. In two instances--the illness of the master or production breakdowns--the organizing of

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sacrificial meals is encountered. These sacrificial meals have traditionally a social nature. They involve several persons related by common professional interests; out of respect for the elders they are also attended by the youth.

The professional cults which have survived among the male craftsmen have also penetrated the female milieu in line with joint work in a single production collective and the apprenticeship of women under male masters. Thus, with the turning of the female household trades into trades for the market, the rite of the fотиha has spread widely among the female workers (embroiderers, carpet makers, platers, gold embroiderers, and others), and previously this was not observed.

Curiously the completely new professions for the region, under the influence of lasting traditions in individual instances, have also "acquired" or "assimilated" the already known patrons of the crafts. Thus Khazrati Dowud, the patron of the craftsmen involved in working iron, has become the patron of drivers; the "saint" Lugmon, who in the past was the patron of sorcerers, has become the patron of physicians; certain believers consider chemists among the dyers shop, and Shishi Nabi is considered their feast [195, pp 178-179].

Everywhere throughout the nation it has been noted that in rural localities, the respect shown for religious traditions is much higher than in the city. For example, in Penzenskaya Oblast the share of believers and vacillators was 35 percent in the rural localities, while it was 15.5 percent in Penza. The same thing is true of Voronezhskaya Oblast, with 26.8 and 15.4 percent [249, p 267; 416, p 123].

The highest percentage in the nation of rural inhabitants, 62 percent of the entire population, continues to remain in Central Asia. An absolute majority of the Uzbeks (77 percent), Tadzhiks (76.5 percent), Turkmen (75 percent) and Kirgiz (86.6 percent) lives in rural localities. The most widespread are small- and medium-sized rural points (from 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants) [367, pp 54, 55, 93, 97, 99].

The elimination of the opposition between city and countryside under socialism still does not mean that the essential differences between them have been eliminated. The working class in the city is linked by its labor activity to the state form of socialist ownership, and the peasantry is linked with its cooperative and kolkhoz form. The level of organization and technical equipping of agricultural production still continues to lag behind industrial production.

Under the conditions of Central Asia, the past is also felt in the number of skilled workers among those employed in agricultural labor. Thus, while among the Russians as a whole for the nation the figure for these is 15.7 percent, among the Uzbeks it is 6.5 percent, 7.1 percent for the Turkmen, 5.3 percent for the Kirgiz, and 4.5 percent for the Tadzhiks. The same can be said about equipment operators which, as is known, are the portion

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of rural inhabitants freest from the influence of religion. Among the Russians as a whole for the nation, they comprise 11.2 percent, while the figure is 4.3 percent for the Uzbeks and Turkmen, 3.0 for the Kirgiz and 2.5 percent for the Tadzhiks [99, p 85].

The presence of a large number of workers who do not possess high agricultural skills is one of the reasons for the increased religiousness of the rural Central Asian population in comparison with the other regions. Up to 95 percent of the atheists in rural localities are found among the agricultural specialists and equipment operators.

The personality of a modern kolkhoz member is characterized by a socialist awareness and by the dominance of a Marxist-Leninist ideology in his spiritual world. At the same time it must be pointed out that under the conditions of a socialist society, the political and economic changes have outstripped the changes in the area of everyday life, and for this reason they have primarily involved political awareness. But changes in the area of moral awareness represent a more protracted and complicated process. The factors predominating in the awareness of today's peasantry are collectivistic feelings, moods and views, but the vestiges of petty bourgeois ideology and morality continue to survive. This is aided by a number of particular features in his life and labor, including the presence of peasant private farms which are an important additional source of their family budget [379, pp 297, 106]. In the Central Asian republics, the role of the private farms of the rural workers is even of greater significance than in the other regions of the nation. Here, correspondingly, more agricultural product is sold on the market than for the nation as a whole.

Trade on the kolkhoz market is classified as socialist relationships in the sphere of exchange. But here, as was emphasized by G. L. Smirnov, one cannot help but note certain differences in the status of the workers who do not have a private farm and those which do. "In the first instance, the family works at a socialist enterprise, it lives in a state-furnished apartment and the only source of its income is wages. In the second instance, the family members, in working at a socialist enterprise, have their own house, garden and orchard, a certain water supply system, and so forth. In a word, the status and the concerns of worker families in the first and second instances decidedly differ. In the second instance there is a greater opportunity than in the first for the rise of individualistic and egoistic aspirations and for the development of a private property psychology [383, p 147]. And a private property psychology and petty bourgeois individualism are a force which actively supports and preserves religious feelings and moods.

One other important factor which preserves religious traditions and contributes to their handing on to the new generation is the insufficiently strong production ties for a part of the population with the socialist production collective or the complete absence of these.

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In the Islamic regions the persons employed on the private farm and in housework and who are not involved in socially useful labor, due to objective and subjective factors continue to remain a rather marked part of the population. In a number of oblasts of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan, for example, the proportional amount of persons employed solely in housework and the private farm comprises up to 25 percent of the labor resources (see, for example [452, p 15]). There are particularly many people not involved in socially useful labor among the women of the indigenous population.

Where the production ties with the socialist collective are lacking or are not sufficiently strong, religious traditions, views and habits are more easily preserved and passed on. The data of sociological research indicates that a significant portion of the believers is people who have lost their link, who are poorly linked or have no relationship to the production collectives of our society or with their vital sociopolitical life. Among believers are numerous pensioners, housewives, inactive kolkhoz members, persons who live by individual gardening, resellers of food products, guards, cleaners, employees of small service enterprises, and so forth [257, pp 140, 147, 177; 274, p 94; 150, p 150].

The structure of the nations which professed Islam in the past comprises another group of factors why Islam maintains a compensatory function. Small in comparison with the nations which followed the capitalist path of development, the number of employees at industrial enterprises, including those engaged in highly skilled and rewarding labor, and the presence of persons not involved in socially useful labor are the basis for the search for compensation outside the social values of a society (see below). Religion is a self-awareness and self-realization of a person who either has still not established himself or who has already lost. Reality determined by the historical past becomes a part of the individuals under such conditions so that they are unable to benefit from the rights and opportunities granted by society for self-assertion, for gaining social recognition and so forth. For this reason a part of the believers finds in Islam a compensation for their unrealized plans and hopes for life, while another consciously retreats into the area of religious illusions away from society, where it is unable to understand or accept many ideals and values because of insufficient education, the lack of thorough ideological influencing by society, or because of indoctrination in a spirit of religious traditions, the power of which cannot be substantially shaken by practical life. Due to the fact that Islam, along with a belief in the real existence of an unreal and omnipotent Allah, also contains a belief in the possibility of establishing direct or indirect "contact" with Him and seek His help in resolving arising difficulties, the illusion may appear that Islam "resolves" them. Due to the historical past of the peoples which professed Islam, in comparison with other religions, this capacity is more strongly apparent. Let us take this up in more detail.

To understand the surrounding world, to recognize the mechanisms driving it, to establish the causality and interrelationship of phenomena in

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nature and society are a natural need for each person. For him it is very important to understand the driving forces of economic, political and cultural events, and the changes directly related to him, his family, relatives and near ones. Every hour, every minute he is confronted with an infinite number of questions requiring an answer. The increased capabilities of the mass propaganda media and particularly television contribute to the constant multiplying of these, and the coming into contact with various, previously unknown aspects of life. Upon how a person is able to correctly analyze the arising question will largely depend his psychological mood, his relationships with the world, and the determining of his position in life.

Naturally in order to understand the world, a person should possess a certain store of knowledge, and an ability to analyze what is occurring and grasp the contradictory nature of development in human society. A low educational or general cultural level among the population is a fertile ground for the survival of ideas linked with Islam.

As has already been said, religiousness is the lot of predominantly little educated persons. Even in regions of the nation which are marked by indications of more intensive secularization, among persons with a low general educational level, believers comprise 75-85 percent. There is no essential difference in the general educational level of the representatives of the indigenous Central Asian nationalities and the Russians who live here in the age groups of 16-19, 20-24 and 25-29, and this is explained by the carrying out of a universal compulsory education and by the greater educational qualifications.

But in the older groups, one is struck by the noticeable difference in the educational level of the indigenous Central Asian population and the Russians. In the age group from 40 to 55 years, the educational indicators of the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Turkmen are almost 3-fold lower than for the Russian population, and among the Kirgiz it is 3.5-fold lower, while in the age group of 60 years and older, the difference is 16- and 13-fold for the Kirgiz and Turkmen, and 6.5-fold for the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks [181, p 173].

The indigenous Central Asian population as a whole lags behind the other peoples of the nation for such an important indicator as the number having a higher and secondary education. In 1959, per 1,000 persons 5.9 percent of Uzbeks had a higher and secondary education, 2.6 percent for the Kazakhs, 5.1 percent for the Tadzhiks, and 5.4 percent for the Turkmen, while among the Russians the figure was 12.2 percent, 10.1 percent for the Ukrainians, 22 percent for the Georgians, 14.9 percent for the Armenians, 12.7 percent for the Latvians, and so forth [98, p 19].

There is also a rather noticeable difference between the educational level of the rural and urban population with an obvious advantage for the second group. As a whole for the region, the percentage of the population with a specialized secondary education is 2.2-fold higher in the city than among the rural population.

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The desire to satisfy one's need to understand the world through religion was particularly strong among women of the indigenous Central Asian population, since their general educational level was much lower than among the men, particularly in rural localities.

In the Central Asian republics, the indicator for higher education among women in the city approached that of the indicator among men. But in the countryside, the level of higher education for women sharply lagged behind the urban one. While for the region the level of higher education among the male rural population was 1.5-fold behind that of the urban population, for the women of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia the figure was 7-fold, in Tadzhikistan it was 11-fold, and in Kirgizia it was almost 4-fold less. The proportional amount of women having a general secondary education is almost 1.3-fold lower than among men [367, pp 129-130, 135-137].

The insufficient store of scientific knowledge about the world and often the complete lack of such were precisely compensated for by Islam. It, like all other religions, did not stop merely with a declaration of the existence of a link between man and Allah, but, starting from this, provided a special interpretation or explanation of the human relations not related to religion, and an explanation of true reality, and endeavored to represent itself as a complete system of views concerning the development of nature and society, or, as K. Marx pointed out, "a general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, and its logic in a popular form" [6, p 414]. In the Islamic regions due to the factors mentioned above there were many more people needing a religious explanation of the world, as this did not require knowledge, it excluded the search for the sources of occurring events, and provided an accessible and pat answer for all questions which arose or might arise.

Because of this, various phenomena which were incomprehensible to the believers were hyperbolized by them and represented in a close relationship of man and Allah. As an example, take natural disasters.

In Soviet literature, there is no unanimous opinion on their influence on the believers. Certain researchers feel that under the conditions of a developed socialist society, the vestiges of man's impotence when confronted by the phenomena of nature do not play an essential role in the survival of the remains of religion. In their opinion, at present such a factor has ceased being a force which suppresses man. In a socialist society, according to their view, the contradictions between man and nature are resolved on a new, socialist basis, and the forms of human dependence upon nature begin to die away even during the first stages of the development of the communist formation [275, pp 144, 166, 171; 253, pp 33-34].

In actuality, a highly developed socialist society with its colossal material and technical base and its high level of scientific development, is capable of resisting any natural phenomenon and achieve a situation where

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"what previously ended as a catastrophe now becomes only a difficult but still surmountable obstacle on the path of our development" [69, p 49]. However one must not deny the fact that such phenomena do enormous material harm to society as a whole and individuals, and some of them such as the 1972 and 1975 droughts are reflected in the economy of the entire nation. Moreover, the freedom of society from natural phenomena and the possibility of predicting them does not mean in any way that the individual conscience of Soviet people is completely free from them. For people who are unable to explain what is occurring scientifically, any vicissitude remains a threatening and incomprehensible force. This is particularly apparent for that portion of the population which is directly involved in agriculture and feels the consequences of a natural disaster (in Central Asia, this is a majority of the indigenous population).

When surrounding nature in no way threatens the believer, he perceives it calmly, he does not wonder about the relationship of its various phenomena, and does not attempt to explain them through his own religious views. But when a bad situation arises, the religious understanding of the world residing in him is felt and is manifested in his deeds and actions. "Weakness," as K. Marx noted, "has always been saved by a belief in miracles; it considered the enemy vanquished if it succeeded in overcoming the enemy in its imagination by incantations, and lost any sense of reality due to the ineffective exalting to the heavens the future awaiting it and the feats..." [3, p 123].

The validity of the idea that believers during a period of natural events compensate for their fear by connecting the event with the might of Allah and His anger is substantiated by the change in the religious situation during the period of earthquakes in Tashkent and other Islamic regions.

Prior to the 1966 earthquake, the organizing of mass ritual sacrifices in public places such as streets, cemeteries and so forth was virtually a thing of the past, as well as the giving out of the ritual dish of khalim and plov to passersby and specially invited persons. Such a rite was performed only for a narrow group of friends and relatives by some believers on the occasion of an event in the life of the family. But during the first months after the earthquake, particularly in April-May 1966, religious life revived sharply, in being manifested in the organizing of long-forgotten religious rites.

In 1969, during the period of flooding in Beruniyskiy and Khodzheyliniski rayons of the Karakalpak ASSR, instances of mass sacrifices were observed as well as a definite revival in religiousness [104, p 136]. There were instances of making offerings with a request for rain or the preventing of natural disasters in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, in Severo-Kazakhstanskaya and Semipalatinskaya oblasts of Kazakhstan, in the Byupskaya Valley of Kirgizia, in Bukharskaya Oblast of Uzbekistan, and in Tadzhistan. In Dagestan, after the earthquake which occurred in 1970, there was a significant increase in the number of persons praying in the mosques located at

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the epicenter and not far from it. Among believers gossip began circulating about the end of the world, and a great deal of energy and money was spent on organizing sacrifices, and there was also a revival in the activities of the believers and clergy [323, p 153; 349, pp 53-54, 56].

An ignorance of the nature of the occurring phenomena is the reason why believers as well as persons who do not possess a strong immunity against religion turn to Islam in those instances when misfortune or grief befalls them or certain hopes are crushed. In Islam, as in any religion, at present there remains "a *practical* side...the search for the better, protection and aid," the importance of which was emphasized by V. I. Lenin, in noting that people "in religion seek *consolation*" [46, pp 53-54]. We feel that for the Islamic regions one can apply the results of sociological research conducted in other areas and which indicate that religiousness among a certain portion of the population is related to their search for consolation in religion [468; 156a, p 102].

Sociological research conducted in various regions of the nation provides reason to speak of a link between the level of material life and religiousness, and that material difficulties can become a component element in a situation where religious views conform more to the moods, thoughts and hopes of a person. Where the material situation is worse, there is the more frequent resorting to God and there are stronger hopes linked with religious convictions [249, p 73; 275, p 171].<sup>6</sup>

Definite material difficulties in the families of the representatives of the indigenous nationalities in the region are also created by the large number of children in them. This is reflected in the load on the working-age population (parents) who support the children. In the Central Asian republics, where the share of children is high, the load factor (the ratio of the number of children to the total number of the population within the working age) for the working-age population is very high. The load factor per 100 persons of working age in the Central Asian republics is approximately 2-fold higher than the USSR average.

Here it must be remembered that the family bears the basic expenditures for the support of children (in contrast to expenditures on the support of the elderly who are basically supported by society). Naturally, many children combined with other factors are reflected in the family budget of the indigenous Central Asian population. For example, in the families of Uzbek workers in one of the towns of Uzbekistan, per family member there was almost 2.5-fold less income than in the families of Russian workers [81a, p 339].

Above it was the question, so to speak, of the illusory-compensatory function of Islam in a "pure" form, that is, its ability in an illusory manner to resolve problems which nature and society pose for an individual. But here it is important to make two stipulations. In the first place, the given function of Islam is not limited to what has been said. Islam not

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only compensates for the weakness of man, but can also satisfy his needs not related to religion such as helping him to express himself, to "find" himself among others, to feel membership in a nation and its history, to satisfy the needs for intercourse and so forth. These last particular features of Islam will be taken up in the following sections of the book. Here we will merely note one of the aspects of the compensatory function of Islam.

There is also a definite group of persons who find in religious activities an application of their own organizational abilities. The so-called "activists" of religious communities in many instances consist of persons not without charm and intelligence and who possess the gift of convincing others, and sometimes these are resourceful and enterprising persons. Many of them for a long time have been employed at state enterprises, organizations and institutions, they receive pensions, but in the search to employ their own abilities take an active part in religious life. There are also persons who continue to be employed in social production among the "activists."

As a whole the social environment is favorably disposed to persons who regularly perform the religious rites and prescripts and who attend mosque. Such people are more often invited to various sorts of ceremonies and assemblies for various reasons, they are shown attention and put apart. Consequently, religious behavior to a certain degree aids the self-assertion of a person in the surrounding milieu and provides definite moral satisfaction.

For another part of the population, including for nonbelievers, a vehicle of self-affirmation in the view of the people around is not only the performing of religious rites but also the ostentatious organizing of lush ceremonies on the occasion of carrying out various prescripts and rites of Islam such as circumcision, the evening breaking of the fast during the month of the fast, and so forth.

Secondly, none of the functions of Islam operates in a form divorced from the others, but is expressed only due to the other ones, in a close interaction and unity with them. All the functions of Islam to a certain degree have a nature which is subordinate to the illusory-compensatory function, they complement it, they broaden the limits of its effect, but here do not lose their independence or own place in the life of the believers. For this reason, all the functions of Islam in our times require individual analysis.

#### The Destruction of the Integrative Function of Islam

Under socialism there has been a definite adjustment in the functions of Islam. Thus, its integrative function has lost its dominant significance. Islam has ceased to be a factor capable of unifying and integrating the life of society around its ideology. In a socialist society, a Marxist,

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scientific ideology is the dominant one, and this not only has nothing in common with a religious ideology, but is openly directed against it and is aimed at overcoming the influence of religion. The state does not need the organizational function of religion as a means of unification and solidarity. All aspects in the life of society--the economy, politics, law, culture and the educational system--are fully free from the affect of religion. The standards and prescripts of Islam have nothing in common with the current social standards, and continue to exist solely in the form of vestiges of the past. The USSR Constitution guarantees the citizens not only the right to profess any religion, but also the right not to recognize any religion. Islam, being an ideology alien to a socialist society, in impeding the social activeness of the believers, and in putting them in opposition to the representatives of other beliefs and atheists, carries out a disintegrating function.

It is important to note that the loss by Islam of its most important function occurred gradually, and was not accompanied by a sharp break which could bring about a destabilization in the life of the population in the Islamic regions.

Many aspects of the social and personal life of the Moslem are free from the influence of Islam. An absolute majority of the present-day believers does not permit the clergy or the religious community to encroach on its civil rights, and resists the attempts by individual fanatics to force life into the framework dictated by the ideas of Islam.<sup>7</sup>

Islam ceased being a force that was capable of integrating society as a whole. This assertion is indisputable for socialist reality. However, Islam, as one of the forms of social conscience, continues to preserve its integrative function vis-a-vis the believers, in uniting them along religious lines. Due to the phenomenon widespread in social psychology where religious and national affiliations are identical, Islam operates as a force uniting the believers and nonbelievers within one nation and creating a feeling of community between the representatives of the peoples who in the past professed Islam. The latter, of course, has nothing in common with the true community which exists between the peoples of the Soviet Union, but one cannot help but note this, particularly as it is manifested in daily life.

In our days a number of factors contribute to the preservation of ideas about the community of peoples which professed Islam in the past. All the peoples which in the past professed Islam speak in related languages comprising several language families. The Turkic linguistic family includes around 25 closely related languages and dialects. Regardless of the large-size and extremely wide distribution, a majority of them to a significant degree has kept the common traits, and because of this the speakers of individual languages as a rule can understand those speaking in a whole series of related languages. The Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, Uighurs, Azerbaijani, Kumyks, Karachais and Balkars, the Nogai, Tatars and Bashkirs are Turkic speaking. The languages of the Abkhassians,

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Abazinians, Kabardins comprise the northwestern (or Abkhasian-Adygei) group of Ibero-Caucasian languages. The Chechen and Ingush languages comprise the Nakh group of the Ibero-Caucasian languages. These languages have so kept their former commonness that their speakers can understand each other, although the essential differences make it possible to consider these languages as independent.

The nearly 30 languages in which the nationalities of Dagestan speak can be divided into two large groups: Avaro-Andocesian and Lezghian, with only Lak and the Darghin languages remaining outside. All the nationalities of this autonomous republic use the following five languages as literary languages: Avar, Lezghian, Darghin, Lak and Tabasaran.

The Tadzhiks as well as the nationalities living in Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Oblast of Tadzhikistan comprise the Iranian group of the Indo-European linguistic family. A majority of the languages of the Pamir peoples are so similar that they are often termed dialects [106, pp 44-47, 50-55, 64-71].

The commonness of the historic destinies and socioeconomic conditions has produced in all these peoples similar character traits, psychology, customs and traditions. But the ethnic community often works in the form of a Moslem community. This feeling is materialized in the extensiveness of mixed nationality marriages. In Central Asia among such marriages there is a predominance of marriages between the representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the region, and everywhere it is rare to have marriages between the women of the indigenous nationalities and representatives of the "non-Moslem" peoples [390, pp 465, 473, 475, 476]. The given view is affirmed by data for other regions of the nation as well [399, pp 279-302].

But in our times there is no longer the primacy of the religion over the ethnic which existed under conditions where national self-awareness was underdeveloped. Regardless of the ethnic closeness of the Moslem peoples, even in the past Islam had assumed a definite local or specific cast. Islam on the territory of our country has and does differ markedly from the religion which the Arabs brought in, since its followers were always specific people who embodied the traits of their people, tribes and nationalities who transposed onto Islam, its cult and organization their own notions dictated by the conditions of life, that is, by the natural geographic environment, by the particular features of economic life, by ideology, and so forth. In each nation Islam acquired numerous elements which had a frankly ethnic nature, and at present the difficulty of overcoming its vestiges is related largely to this.

Religion is not only a definite ideological and cult system, but also a specific community of people. This community on the gnoseological level is illusory, for such is the nature of the objects forming it, but on a social level it is completely real.

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The religious community is the place of the social intercourse of believers and since for many of them confessional affiliation operates as an indispensable attribute of national affiliation, this community is also a place of national intercourse.

Thus, national self-awareness on the part of individuals in the given instance is expressed through a religious form which is alien to it, and "the religious community...operates as a distinct, expressed form of the national community" [427, pp 47, 49].

Such a situation creates among the believers a view of the mosque as a place of assembly for the representatives of a single nation. Under conditions where one or another point is populated by representatives of the same tribe, as is encountered in a number of regions of Kazakhstan, the Karakalpak ASSR and Turkmenia, each tribe has its own mullah, place of pilgrimage, cemetery, and so forth [104, pp 139-140; 107, p 90].

It is felt that the relationship between religion and national attitudes survives among the believing part of the population [288, p 92], and this, in our view, somewhat narrows the interpretation of the problem. In our times Islam not only brings together the believers of one nation, but also integrates its believing and nonbelieving parts. In order to demonstrate this let us first turn to the facts evidenced by sociological research.

In a number of Islamic regions the number of persons performing religious rites exceeds by almost 4-fold the number of actual believers [448, p 12]. In Gizhduvanskiy Rayon of Bukharskaya Oblast, the obligation of a religious marriage (nikokh) is recognized by 26.8 percent of the persons questioned, and in Shakhreizabskiy Rayon of Kashkadar'sinskaya Oblast, by 31.2 percent. In three rayons of Uzbekistan, 81.9 percent of the persons questioned essentially supported the rite of circumcision considering it the symbol of belonging to Islam [304, p 74]. Instances were encountered when people called upon to conduct atheistic propaganda and to be an example of an irreconcilable attitude toward religious vestiges were actually under the influence of religion and contributed to a strengthening of its positions. Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, has written: "There are numerous instances when party and soviet workers and economic leaders showed a tolerant attitude toward the activities of the clergy, and some of them were themselves supporters of religious vestiges" [76, p 27].

At a meeting of the republic party activists devoted to the problems stemming from the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of Recruiting and Indoctrinating Ideological Personnel in the Belorussian Party Organization," Comrade V. A. Kunayev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party, sharply criticized the secretary of the Burlyutobinskiy party raykom in Taldy-Kurganskaya Oblast for having stated that "the Moslem religion does not cause harm." Many responsible leaders in

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the rayon were confused and identified the national and popular with the religious. Analogous shortcomings also occurred in certain party organizations of Gur'yevskaya, Aktyubinskaya, Semipalatinskaya and Alma-Atinskaya oblasts [71; 89, p 24].

The reasons for the existence of such phenomena often derive from religion itself which endeavors to act in the role of the preserver and expressor of obsolete domestic traditions and customs which are depicted as national, as well as from the activities of the Moslem clergy who portray religious traditions as national or common to all the people and claims a role of the guardian of national traditions and culture and the national particular features of the so-called "Moslem peoples." Such an explanation has been firmly established in Soviet Islamic studies literature (see [178, pp 159-162; 322, pp 159-162; 369, p 25; 435, p 37; 450, p 39; 122, pp 6-7; 237, p 42]).

Such an approach, in our opinion, in no way explains the real state of affairs, but, on the contrary, leads one astray. In the first place, it is impossible to derive the existing phenomena of social psychology from the activities of the few clergy, that is, from the subjective factor. The clergy in their activities have sway over a small group of people and not the entire population, and they are in contact primarily with the believers, and the latter view the various prescripts of Islam primarily as their religious and not national duty. The supporters of the idea of the commonness of the religious and the national in many instances are persons who are not in contact with the clergy and do not participate in daily religious life, and consequently are not exposed to specific religious influence. If they go to the clergy to perform one or another rite, this is a consequence and not a cause. As for the attempts of the clergy to represent religion as a fixed attribute of a nation, here there is primarily not so much an intentional desire to confuse people as a desire to subordinate the content of religions propaganda to the moods and desires of the believers and nonbelievers. Consequently, proceeding solely from the activities of the clergy in no way can one explain the high level of the observance of religious rites in the Islamic regions or that representatives of the intelligentsia are frequently under its influence.

Secondly, an explanation of the phenomena of social psychology proceeding solely from religion fundamentally contradicts the Marxist-Leninist approach to religion and to its role in social life. "Of course, by analysis it much easier to find the earthly nucleus of hazy religions ideas than it is, on the contrary to deduce the corresponding religious forms from the given relationships of real life. The latter method is the only materialistic one and consequently the only scientific one" [8, p 383]. The existing link between Islam and the national will perish with an eradication of the conditions giving rise to the view of Islam as a national phenomenon and with the development of social relations. Along with further advances in communist construction, here a leading role will be played by indoctrination.

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A correct understanding of why Islam in our times penetrates the life of nations, organically is manifested in their life and to a definite degree operates in a national form is of exceptional importance for both practice and for the theory of atheistic indoctrination, and for a further elaboration of the theory and methods of ideological work. The solution to the problem depends primarily upon an elucidation of the question of what is the main and leading thing in the rise and development of the intertwining of the religious and the national. Is it religion or is it the nation? It is possible to formulate the question differently. Does religion contribute to the rise of the intertwining of the religious and the national in the life of nations or is it the development of the nation, the level of its economy and culture, or the particular features of its history?

The founders of Marxism-Leninism who studied the determining factor in national relations have pointed out: "The relationships between different nations depend upon to what degree each of them has developed its productive forces, the division of labor and internal communication. This notion is generally recognized. But not only the attitude of one nation to another but also the entire domestic structure of the nation itself depend upon the degree to which its production and its internal and external communication have been developed" [20, pp 19-20].

The reason why religion often appears as an element which distinguishes the nation in the life of not only the believing part of nations which in the past professed Islam must be sought, according to Marxism, in their historical past and in the present level and particular features in the development of social relations.

As was shown in the previous chapters, Islam was spread and established in the life of the peoples of Central Asia and other regions in a period when the process of the shaping of nationalities was occurring here with the survival of kinship and tribal relations. Islam not only played the role of an ethnodifferentiating factor, but along with other important features such as language, traditions, values of life, and so forth, it became an important trait characterizing the nationality, its distinguishing feature, and in this quality was incorporated in the self-awareness of the Central Asian nationalities. The standards and prescripts of Islam assumed the character of generally accepted stereotypes of thought and conduct, and they became a portion of the traits and properties of national psychology. For this reason it would be wrong to seek out the sources of the relationship of the religious and the national solely in modern times, all the more in relating such a phenomenon to the activities of the clergy. It should be a question of the manifestations of a relationship which has its roots in the past, a tie determined by the present development level of the peoples who professed Islam.

Consequently, Islam took up its position in the ethnic processes long before the development of the socialist nations. As a result of the enormous sociopolitical changes and the formation and flourishing of the

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socialist nations, the former link between Islam and the nation has been sharply weakened. The Islamic regions have not only been liberated from the suppression of Islam, but have also been thoroughly secularized, and have become areas where the basic mass of the population is free from the influence of religion. Having put a complete end to national suppression and alienation, the process of the merging of the Soviet nations and nationalities is underway, and a new historic community of people, the Soviet people, has formed.

The practices of socialist construction in the republics of the Soviet East have convincingly shown the lack of an organic link between Islam and the nation. Here the religious is gradually dying out and the national is constantly developing. Thus, the religious and national unity have nothing in common, and the common religion of people does not express their national community. The nation in order to realize all its creative potential and its interests should be spiritually free. At present the socialist nations possess enormous economic, cultural and scientific opportunities. They are closely linked by fraternal ties with the other peoples of the nation, they are conquering the vicissitudes of nature, they are controlling their own development, and do not require an illusory compensation for their national life.

In a socialist society the weakening of the complete influence of Islam on the nations and nationalities was favorably reflected in their development, since secularization and the liberation of the national element of society from a link with religion simultaneously weakened both religious ideology and nationalism. The existence of ties between the religious and the national is largely determined by the ability of religion in an illusory and distorted manner to reflect all the most important questions in the life of the nation. In a convenient and comprehensible form Islam through its rites and cult practices expresses the "interests" of the nation and its "uniqueness."

A number of functional and structural features make the interaction of religion and nationalism easier. These include: the mass nature of the object of use or application; functioning basically on the level of the commonplace, not systematized and not "organized" conscience; a particularly strong impact on the psychology of the individual and on the emotional aspects of the psyche. The principles of exclusiveness and conformism are also internally inherent to nationalism and religion, and these are manifested in their functioning in all spheres of society, be it social, political or spiritual [380, pp 152-158; 381, pp 161-167].

An elucidation of the reasons for the existence of ties between the religious and the national again necessitates a consideration of the influence of the past on modern times. Among the Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Turkmen and Tadzhiks, up to now not the working class but rather the kolkhoz peasantry has been the predominant class. Among the designated peoples, workers are, respectively, 27, 22 and 18 percent. Among these nations there are even

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fewer workers employed in industry. Among the Uzbeks, Kirgiz and Tadzhiks these comprise 4 percent, while among the Turkmen it is 5 percent, and for the Kazakhs 6 percent. For a comparison it can be pointed out that in the RSFSR, workers employed in industry are 17 percent, for the Estonians and Latvians the figure is 19 percent, and for the Armenians 17 percent [98, p 13]. Among the industrial workers, there is an insignificant number of women from the local nationalities. For example, in Uzbekistan they comprised only 13.5 percent of the total number of workers [459, p 42].

The urban way of life, in including more elements of international and integrated culture, has a favorable influence on freeing the residents from the traditions of the past. However in Central Asia the proportional amount of the urban population in the entire population is much lower than as a national average (correspondingly, 38 and 56 percent). And in many oblasts, this figure is much lower: 24 percent in Andizhanskaya, 17 percent in Kashkadar'inskaya, 16 percent in Surkhandar'inskaya, 15 percent in Narynskaya, and 13 percent in the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Autonomous Oblast. One-half of the city dwellers lives in small- and medium-sized settlements (from 3,000 to 49,900 inhabitants) [367, pp 35, 39] which are economically underdeveloped and closely tied to agriculture. Many towns continue to keep the prerevolutionary division into mahalle in which the indigenous population lives. Naturally all of this prevents the secularization of life among the urban population and impedes the formation of an atheistic public opinion.

With a decline in the number of the population engaged in agriculture as a whole for the nation, in the Central Asian republics this indicator has been continuously increasing. In Tadzhikistan, in 1965-1974, the number of persons employed in kolkhozes, sovkhozes, subsidiary and other producing agricultural enterprises increased by 6.8 percent, by 12.6 percent in Uzbekistan, and by 25.6 percent in Turkmenistan [273, p 59]. This is largely a result of the fact that with an overall decline in the number of the rural population for the nation (by 8 percent over the designated period), in the Central Asian republics this has increased (by 26 percent over the same period) [313, pp 10-11].

A predominant majority of the rural population points is uninational. As a whole for the region, 83.6 percent of the Russians dwelling in the area live in the city and only 16.4 percent in the countryside. Of the total number of Russians in Uzbekistan, only 11 percent live in the countryside, and even less in Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia with figures, respectively, of 6.2 and 4.4 percent. One-third of the Russians living in Kirgizia lives in rural areas. But a larger share of the latter lives in large European-type rural population points which were founded even before the October Revolution. There is a similar situation with the Ukrainians and representatives of the other European peoples [367, pp 94, 102, 104].

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A majority of the rural families is uninational and the nationally mixed families comprise an insignificant number: 5.7 percent in Uzbekistan, 3.4 percent in Turkmenia, 6.5 percent in Tadzhikistan and 11.9 percent in Kirgizia [227].

The life within "national limits" is an essential factor influencing the survival of religiousness among the peoples which in the past professed Islam. Where a uninational environment is preserved, religiousness in all age groups is higher than among inhabitants of villages with a mixed and sometimes with a predominantly Russian population [399, p 137; 434, p 81; 89, p 76].

Each new generation of people inherits social conditions which were created by the previous activities of mankind and from which they proceed in their activities. Today's man who belongs to a certain group or class objectively assimilates the thoughts and feelings of these groups and classes and in a ready-made form also accepts religious views.

The awareness of a child in early childhood is devoid of any longing for religion. In entering a society, a person must correctly orient himself in it, understand it and act. But the process of the cognition of the world by an infant and his entry into life are directed by the adults surrounding him. This is why the family is the main transmitter of religious traditions to the coming generation. Even French materialists in the 18th century pointed this out (see, for example [169, p 265]).

The role of the Central Asian family in the religious indoctrination of the youth is increased due to its structure. Although here the families which consist of two generations (father--son) predominate, three-generation families (spouses, their parents and adolescent children) continue to exist, and this is explained by the existing traditions. It is considered reprehensible when the children, particularly the elder or junior sons, leave their parents. Thus, while the average size of a family as a national average in 1970 was 3.7 persons, in Uzbekistan it was 5.3 persons, 4.6 in Kirgizia, 5.4 in Tadzhikistan, 5.2 in Turkmenia and 4.3 in Kazakhstan [227, p 4].

We share the opinion of demographers who see an influence of Islam on the stereotypes of national conduct in such a phenomenon as large families. Here is the indicator for the number of children for the basic nationalities of the USSR in 1959. Per 1,000 women 20-49 years of age there were the following number of children under the age of 9: 864 among the Russians, 740 among the Ukrainians, 612 among the Latvians, and so forth. These same indicators for the peoples who professed Islam are as follows: 1,700 among the Azerbaijanis, 1,876 among the Kazakhs, 1,874 for the Uzbeks, 1,809 for the Turkmen, 1,763 for the Tadzhiks, and 1,908 for the Kirgiz. In 1970, in Uzbekistan, the national birthrates per 1,000 persons were: 19.3 for the Russians, 23.0 for the Ukrainians, 25.1 for the Belorussians, 36.9 for the Kazakhs, 39.2 for the Uzbeks, 34.2 for the Tadzhiks, 31.6 for the Kirgiz, 32.8 for the Turkmen, and 33.5 for the Karakalpaks.

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Certainly the birthrate factor is influenced by a multiplicity of objective causes such as education, employment and material well being, urbanization, and so forth. An important role is also played by the socioeconomic backwardness of these peoples in the past and by the little development of capitalist relations among them. But undoubtedly the fact that Islam considers children to be one of the greatest blessings of Allah and surrounds mothers with many children with honor and respect creates the prerequisites for a high birthrate. The tradition of many children among the Moslems is reinforced by a belief that Allah Himself will care for the children which have been born into this world by His will. Abortions (particularly after the fetus has already begun to move) are strictly prohibited by one of the holy tenets of Islam [252, pp 122, 129, 140].

Ethnographers who have studied family relations in the Central Asian republics emphasize that the presence of a large number of children (often reaching seven-nine) leads to the existence of a multiplicity of diverse religious rites both directly linked to Islam as well as going back to pre-Moslem beliefs. In family life many religious ideas are encountered related to the "protection" and "treating" of children, to honoring the souls of the deceased, and so forth. In the organizing of a number of family religious ceremonies, the leading role is played by elderly women with many children [178, p 188].

The uninational environment, the family and family relations are one of the important reasons for the continuous reproduction of established stereotypes of conduct and an objective and very strong base for the existing relationships of the national and the religious. Precisely in the family, due to its traditions, a person inherits a feeling of the unity of religious and national belonging. The family provides access to the most important features of the nation, that is, to language, customs, morals, traditions and everyday life [302, p 215].

In the preservation of the customs and rites of Islam an important role is played by the direct contact with one another, the coexistence of generations, elderly and young, and their reciprocal "intertwining." Young people assimilate the experience of elders which has been dictated by the dominance of Islam in the not-distant past, they accept them automatically, without questioning, in the form of traditional types of activity, since "a custom, as a method of transmitting culture, does not allow variation in the established standards. This is its simplicity and accessibility.... The question of what is the purpose of a prohibition or from what it derives never confronts the individual" [351, p 217].

The environment does not provide ready-made or fully developed formulations of the standards which the individual must adhere to, but instills an attitude toward them as being moral, worthy of respect and approvable. The standards of Islam which are closely interwoven into the ideas of human life attract a person primarily because they operate as value symbols. In being set in customary patterns of behavior, they operate as moral guidelines for moral conscience. These customary patterns (stereotypes) hold a

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firm place in thought, and particularly in the emotional life of an individual, and are difficult to change. A person often demonstrates his allegiance to religion not because he actually is such, but because he is forced to consider the opinion of people around, and does not wish to set himself into opposition to the surrounding milieu.

Modern man, of course, is not only under the influence of the family. To a significant degree his development is influenced by the information provided by word or image, including ideological influence which shapes his political conduct and socially useful activities. The most essential aspects of his ideology--sociopolitical views and culture--are largely formed under the influence of the socialist system.

But the information which reaches a person from specific ideological work is correlated by him to his own actual experience and observations of life. In defining the actual positions in an individual's life, direct experience in a majority of instances is predominant, and a person is more inclined to trust his own experience, although this does not guarantee the absence of error. A person's own activities in life are the foundation on which "indirect experience" is formed; precisely these activities largely determine the selective approach to social knowledge. This is the very prism through which all social information is reflected and which determines the positions and views of an individual in life [see 149].

Socially significant information, in coinciding with the indirect experience of the individual, is assimilated by him and assumes its place in the system of his views. As for the firmly established values of the individual created by Islam, the information coming through the mass information media and through the living word as yet is unable to decisively change them and shape new values which are free from religion.

However, a natural question arises. Why do religiously inclined "authorities" and inhabitants of the village and mahalle not free of the influence of Islam continue to hold sway over people who in terms of educational and cultural level at first glance should not only be above the understanding of Islam as a national value, but also carry out propaganda work aimed against such an attitude toward religion? Certainly, here one acutely feels the conformism of these people, and a desire "not to stand out" and not to be different from the nation. In observing the generally recognized religious rites, in doing like the "others," and being "like everyone else," the individual is lost in the nation and society, and obtains a freedom of action in more important vital questions for him such as selecting his way in life, a profession, establishing a family, and so forth.

A person can feel a need for Islam and not be a believer independently of his own personal faith in God. In being raised in a religious family, from early childhood he constantly repeats the same prayers and becomes a witness and involuntary participant in the performing of various religious rites. As a result he acquires definite habits which gradually grow into a need.

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BY T. S. SAIDBAYEV  
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It must also be considered that a person is forced to turn to religion in instances which are not directly related to religion (the ceremony on the occasion of the birth of a child or a marriage; actions related to a desire to show respect to the memory of deceased near ones and relatives, and so forth). In satisfying such needs religion does not hold a dominant place, but acts in the role of a requisite element which contributes to the given process.

A characteristic trait in the life of the nation and the Soviet people is the internationalization of all aspects of life of Soviet society, of all nations and nationalities. All the basic areas of communist construction (socialist industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution and the solution to the national question) contribute to this process and serve as its accelerators. As a result of socialist internationalization, all forms of contact and intercourse between peoples are broadened, and there is an intensive process of exchange in personnel and material and spiritual values. Each Soviet citizen, regardless of his nationality, has obtained an opportunity to enter into direct and immediate ties with the material and spiritual wealth of all the peoples of the country and the world, to choose their best achievements, and to entertain broad and diverse social ties. The common traits and traditions of all the Soviet nations and nationalities are developing and growing stronger with the simultaneous development of truly national values and progressive traditions in each people.

Internationalization is an unconditional factor establishing the progressive and promising in national life, culture, and so forth. In summing up the results of the development of the nations and nationalities in our country, L. I. Brezhnev stated that "the breaking down of national barriers, the importance of which was repeatedly mentioned by V. I. Lenin, and the forming of prerequisites for the further merging of the peoples of the USSR occur both in material and spiritual spheres" [69, p 22].

At the same time, internationalization cannot be viewed as a phenomenon which occurs painlessly and uniformly for all nations and nationalities. The given process is manifested differently in the various spheres of social life, in the economy, politics, social structure, spiritual life, and so forth, as well as in the various social milieu, that is, in the city and countryside, in the large and small town, and among representatives of physical and mental labor. Internationalization occurs differently in the life of the peasantry and the workers, or in a multinational or ethnically uniform environment. The level of the internationalization of social life in one or another nation is manifested considering its historical experience, the present development level, the demographic situation, social structure, and so forth. The higher the level of socioeconomic development in a nation the more fully and thoroughly the international processes are manifested.

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Of important significance in evaluating this process is a correct establishing of what aspects of social life this process has touched most. Certain researchers feel that the social forms of social and personal life, the social and cultural experience of people, the forms of intercourse, traditions and social institutions are the first to be internationalized. We share the opinion of those students of the question who note the intensive internationalization of the material basis of culture and everyday life, in emphasizing that the psychological adjustment often lags behind. National sets and the stereotypes of individual and group conscience do not change automatically after changes in culture. With poor organization of indoctrinational work, caution and even resistance to an international culture can arise as this supposedly threatens the preservation and development of the unique culture [472a, No 10, 1974, pp 11, 15].

The tendency for the integration and merging of all nations and nationalities, the internationalization of various aspects of their life, and the rapid development of society make probable the loss of certain valuable forms and phenomena along with the actually obsolete phenomena and forms, and a certain leveling in the development of the economy and culture and the national limits. In some people who are unable to scientifically perceive the occurring national processes, all of this gives rise to the fear of the disappearance of the nation, and the loss of its qualities, customs, traditions, and so forth. The desire of such people to maintain the uniqueness of the nation is largely responded to by Islam which has always operated in a national form. In their notion Islam assumes the form of one of the most important manifestations of the uniqueness or ineffability of a nation, and loyalty to Islam and the observance of its rites and precepts show a respect for the nation itself and is a contribution to the preservation of its originality.

The existence of a link between Islam and the national to a certain degree is related to the high level of spiritual development in the nations and nationalities which previously were suppressed and without rights, which were culturally backward, and the related interest in the past, to the desire to find in it the echoes of today, to strengthen the present by the past and to the search for historical and cultural traditions which would be capable of strengthening national self-awareness. This process has been accompanied by the active selection of historical and cultural facts and by their transformation. Islam does not represent an obligatory form of past culture which must be transferred to modern times, but without it there is no historical past, and any idealization of the past or the extolling of the old and archaic involuntarily leads to an apology of Islam. However in the given instance Islam is only a form of the expression of the national, and not its essence. The reason for this phenomenon is found not so much in the intrigues of the Moslem clergy as in the particular features of the manifestation of present-day national self-awareness.

Precisely this explains the presence of unique aspects in the activities of Moslem organizations in our nation. Certain mosques have material support not only from their own parishoners but also from the surrounding

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population. A portion of the population in certain Central Asian cities, and including representatives of the intelligentsia, have strongly supported the restoration of the mosques which are of architectural value. The fact of the support and preservation of many religious monuments by the state is viewed as proof of the state's recognition of the contribution made by Islam to the development of human culture.

Individual publications in the mass periodicals and inept propaganda carried out by the cultural institutions have also contributed to the confusing of the religious and the national in social awareness (see, for example [99a, p 134]).

The indigenous population of the Islamic regions has also been irritated by the inept introduction of new nonreligious traditions and rites devoid of any national overtone, although they should eradicate aspects cast over by the historical past. Such actions evoke the opposite response and an emphatic interest is shown in the old customs and traditions.

However, it is wrong to reduce the functions of Islam in national life solely to the integrating one. This function itself, in associating religious and national affiliation in the minds of people, undoubtedly helps to preserve elements of national exclusiveness and ethnocentrism in the views of the believers and nonbelievers, it preserves nationalistic and religious prejudices, that is, it plays a disintegrating role. In supporting the community of people on a religious basis, at the same time Islam serves to isolate the nation, and becomes the reason for its separation from the other "non-Moslem" nations.

Religious and nationalistic ideas, in holding a definite place in the conscience of the individual, weaken the leading role of class and international self-awareness, and this can create the grounds for opposition among the workers along national and religious lines, and impede the strengthening of the ideas of proletarian internationalism and an atheistic view of the world.

The ideology of any religion is disintegrating.

Islam, in the expression of K. Marx, reduces the geography and ethnography of various peoples to the simple and convenient formula of dividing them into two countries and two nations: the orthodox and the infidels [12, p 167].

The disintegrative function of Islam is equally apparent in our nation. For today's Moslem, confessional affiliation largely serves as the basic feature which disunites or unites the representatives of one or many nations.<sup>8</sup> In organizing family life and in determining sympathies and antipathies, the believer undoubtedly proceeds from the attitude of the other party to his religion. This can be demonstrated with particular clarity from the example of the processes occurring among ethnically close peoples inhabiting the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Autonomous Oblast of Tadzhikistan.

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The successes achieved during the years of Soviet power have helped to root out the former economic and cultural exclusiveness of the Yazgulemi, Vanchi, Rushans, Shugnans, Vakhans and other Pamir nationalities, and to bring them closer amongst themselves and with the Tadzhiks. Among the Vanchi who in the past century became Moslems of the Sunnite sect, under the influence of religion there was a change in social and family relationships, moral standards and the way of life as a whole. As a result of the close economic and cultural integration with the Tadzhiks which, in our opinion, was aided by the commonness of religion, they lost their language and ultimately merged with the Tadzhiks. The Yazgulemi, although being able to keep their language, were strongly influenced by Tadzhik culture and the standards of Islam in their economic, family and social life. They also consider themselves Tadzhiks, and a religious commonness with the latter is largely the reason that they consider themselves such.

Ethnic processes have occurred differently among the Pamir nationalities which have been traditionally the followers of the Ismailite sect of Shiism. They call themselves Tadzhiks, but they are Pamir Tadzhiks, thereby separating themselves from the basic mass of the Tadzhiks in the republic. Often the national self-awareness of the Pamir peoples is manifested in their own name for themselves, "Pamirians." This term used previously more as a geographic concept designating a place of residence has presently assumed an ethnic significance. At the same time, they, the Pamir peoples, distinguished themselves from the Vanchi and Yazgulemi who profess Sunnism [306, pp 156-167; 111, p 17].

## The Communicative Function of Islam

The historical past of the peoples which professed Islam is most vividly manifested in the role which Islam played in the process of the communication of people.<sup>9</sup> This was largely aided by the fact that the indigenous population of the Central Asian republics lived primarily in villages, in a uninational environment, and by the place which was given to Islam in social psychology.

The traditional family, kinship and community ties have largely survived among the workers of the local nationalities who are city dwellers. Out of the total amount of free time among the workers of the Uzbek nationality the time spent on domestic forms of nonfamily communication such as meetings with relatives, neighbors and acquaintances of the household and in paying visits is more than 2.5-fold more than among the Russian workers. Among the workers of the local nationalities 40 years of age and older, these expenditures are almost 70 percent of the total time of their nonfamily communication in comparison with 15 percent among the workers of Russian nationality in the same age group. Here the nonfamily contacts among the former are strongly localized to a group of relatives and neighbors [81a, pp 342-343]. There is every reason to assume that this is also characteristic for the workers of other indigenous Central Asian nationalities.

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One must also consider, as was already mentioned, the presence of a significant portion of the population which is not involved in the life of socialist production collectives, which is closed in a narrow world of personal interests and family life, is not engaged in political activities, and is less involved (or not at all involved) in the work of the trade union and other social organizations. All the peoples who have not gone through the capitalist stage of development must rethink the established forms of traditional communication, give them a new content which corresponds to the modern times, and critically select the most valuable from them, that which reflects the true interests of the nation.

The weakness of real communication in society and the fact that people do not go with sufficient depth into the process of economic, political and cultural life and are little involved in sociopolitical life, and the necessity of satisfying the need for contact--all of this leads to the search for fictitious communications on a religious basis. Islam which often is manifested in a national form and as the expresser of national uniqueness is able to satisfy such a need.

The influence of Islam is most noticeably felt in everyday life, and precisely here people are most often in contact. The performing of Islamic rites becomes a pretext for amusement, for rest, for universal merriment, it reduces the strain of working life, it makes the commonplace into a holiday or an event which is significant for a person, and gives a social character. In such a situation, one or another Islamic rite often is not an end in itself but rather merely a pretext for getting together. For example, the rite of circumcision is presently accompanied by a large number of various activities which have no bearing on it.

At present, other Islamic rites related to various events in family life, to Ramadan and the Moslem holidays have a communicative force.

The month-long fast prescribed by Islam is not observed not only by a majority of the population but also by a significant part of the believers themselves. But the beginning of the fast is accompanied by a definite intensification of religious life among the indigenous population, and by an increase in the size of the congregations of the mosque services particularly on Fridays.

Another reason for the assembly of people and their contact is the so-called iftar or evening rite of breaking the fast. A Moslem who has organized a repast for other believers can count on forgiveness of sins and a place in paradise. But at present the iftar is organized not only by believers and not only for believers. Having completely lost its religious nature, it has assumed a semisecular nature. It is organized for relatives and close friends, neighbors and coworkers even by people who are indifferent to religion but who adhere to the "generally accepted" rules. Naturally in such instances persons who do not observe the fast and non-believers are participants in the iftar. But in many instances among the

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invited guests is a person who is able to recite prayers and fragments from the Koran (usually by memory). Often the invited guests break up into two groups. One reads the Koran, and the deeds of Allah and His Prophet Muhammad, the origin of the fast, the delights of paradise and the tortures of hell are described, but alternately there are conversations of a purely secular nature on the affairs of the family, the kolkhoz, the life of the state, and so forth. In the other group religion is present only at the very outset and end of the meeting, when a brief prayer is read, but for the remainder the talk has no bearing on it and is of a purely secular nature. However, because of this the iftar has not ceased being a religious rite and has not lost its religious affect on the persons present, up to a third of whom are young people. Here it is important to remember that precisely the Moslem fast serves as the pretext for bringing people together, and this is known by those who comprise, according to our definition, the "second group" of the participants in the iftar.

It is considered that the fast will not be counted if the believer does not pay the so-called zakat-al-fitr or "purification" tax which is collected on the day of breaking the fast and is the holiday on the occasion of its end. And in our times believers often pay it not only for themselves but also for the remaining family members.

Ramadan makes changes in the daily life of the population. During this period there is a decline in the number of marriages concluded between the representatives of the indigenous Central Asian populations, as well as weddings and other ceremonies. Attendance of public dining places is less, and the number of persons attending the movies and concert halls declines insignificantly.

On the eve of urza-bayram (aid-al-fitr), the holiday on the occasion marking the end of the fast, a portion of the indigenous population exchanges traditional dishes with nearby neighbors, and the believers endeavor to assemble all the members of their families and not let them out of the house, because it is considered that on this day the souls of the dead return to the house.

On the day of the holiday the services at the mosque are attended by many more believers than on regular days or even Fridays.

After the service the believers and a certain portion of the nonbelievers go to the cemeteries to remember the dead. Then the adult males of the district or village, in assembling together, visit the houses of all the recently deceased. This visit is brief and includes the reading of prayers and a symbolic repast. The families of the persons who have died during the last year on the day of urza-bayram organize feasts inviting the priest, relatives and close friends.

On the day of the holiday it is the custom to congratulate one another, to pay visits and receive acquaintances, close friends, to present gifts and feast. In some places improvised bazaars appear for selling sweets and

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souvenirs. Believing parents dress their children in holiday best and give them holiday money.

Another Moslem holiday, the kurban-bayram or holiday of sacrifice, is celebrated in the same manner. But it must be pointed out that the rite of sacrifice has ceased to be a mass one, although the beginning of the holiday is still accompanied by higher prices for cattle, goats and sheep. In the opinion of researchers, in rural localities the kurban-bayram and urza-bayram are celebrated by a marked portion of the inhabitants [107, p 44; 105, p 114].

In some places individual workers from the state cultural institutions have endeavored to present the kurban-bayram as a national holiday. On this day they build large swings which attract holiday-attired boys and girls and young women, and the areas where these swings are located are equipped with loudspeakers [107, pp 44-45].

Both religious holidays are accompanied by an increase in the pilgrimages to so-called "holy" places. Pilgrimage during all times has served as a traditional form of communication among people. It, we feel, in the past served as an event which distracted people from the even and monotonous life as it was an unique holiday. Certainly the visiting of "sacred" places has always had a religious character, and has also openly pursued the "practical" aims of recuperation from various illnesses, sterility, and so forth. But it cannot be denied that it was also a high point in an otherwise eventless life.

In our times pilgrimage to "sacred" places continues although far from the former scale. Many "sacred" places have ceased to exist, a portion of them has lost its "sanctity," and so forth.

Pilgrimage occurs in all seasons, but intensifies in the summer and autumn, particularly during the days of religious holidays, mourning (magerram), and the Moslem month-long fast.

The following fact shows the strength of the traditions in the survival of religious vestiges. A number of mausoleums of previously famous Islamic leaders as well as the families who reigned here, in being respected by the believers and being of great architectural value are protected by the state, and atheistic museums have been set up in some of them (the mausoleum of Bakhauddin Nakshbandi near Bukhara, "Shakhi-Zinda" in Samarkand, and so forth). Regardless of this, pilgrimage to them continues.

Sometimes a pilgrimage is made under the pretext of collective trips "for rest," since many "sacred" places honored by the indigenous Central Asian population are located in mountains and picturesque areas ("Arslanbob" in Oshskaya Oblast, "Shakhi-Mardan" in Ferganskaya Oblast, and others). The "rest" is accompanied by sacrifice, the reciting of prayers, and so forth.

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The Moslem rites, particularly the rite of circumcision and burials, play an important communicative role in the life of the population of the Central Asian republics.

The communicative function is performed not by the rite of circumcision itself, but rather the ceremony related to it. As a rule, the rite is accompanied by a wedding timed to this occasion. Many score and even hundreds of people are invited to it, and large amounts of money are spent. The wedding has an emotional influence on the younger generation, and there is a sort of appraisal of the parents. There is a tacit competition to see who has conducted a better and richer wedding. For individual persons this is a method of self-affirmation, and for others an easy opportunity to demonstrate their belonging to the national and respect for traditions.

The rites of Islam related to funerals play a particularly important communicative role. In many instances in areas with a population which previously professed Islam the funerals are performed according to the canons of Islam at Moslem cemeteries [105, p 116; 107, p 90].

The person is accompanied on his last journey, and the deceased continues to live in the memory of relatives and close friends. The rites and traditions related to this are largely intertwined with religious ones. They still remain rather strongly in the everyday life of the Central Asian peoples. After the funeral, relatives and close friends without fail call on the house of the deceased on the 3d, 7th and 40th days. Prayers and fragments from the Koran are recited. In a number of places, the relatives of the deceased invite the mullah to recite a prayer on Fridays for a year.

The visiting of the house of the deceased by relatives and close friends, by neighbors and coworkers for expressing condolences is also, as a rule, accompanied by the reciting of prayers and the Koran. Under conditions where a nonreligious equivalent has not been found for the age-old rites, Moslem prayers continue to remain the form of expressing condolences for people who are far removed from belief.

As in the past, the religious community (the mosque) plays the leading role in the carrying out of a communicative function by Islam, although the influence of the mosque on the population has been noticeably restricted and many of its functions forgotten. In the not distant past the power of the religious community was largely related to the fact that it operated under the conditions of a village or town of believers. Nothing could offset the effect of the community on the minds and hearts of the people, and the mosque was the center of all spiritual life for any population point.

At present the situation has fundamentally changed. There is no "Moslem" village or town, but there is a village or town in which believers and non-believers live. While in the past in essence no one, except the religious organizations, participated in shaping the manner of thinking or ideas of people concerning society and nature, at present the party, state and

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social organizations, the school and cultural institutions play the leading role in shaping the ideology and in determining the most important guidelines in the life of the population. The mosque has also completely lost its economic role. The community meeting at it does not influence any of the essentially important aspects in the life of the village or district. It has become primarily a place of religious practices for the believing portion of the population. It does not represent anyone, and does not have the right to intervene into the affairs of the state, the production collectives or the local bodies. Nor does it have the right to supervise the observance of the standards or prescripts of Islam even by believers. The religious community cannot publically discuss the actions of one or another parishoner, demand that he raise his children in a religious spirit, or apply any secular or religious penalties against him.

The general decline in religiousness has also involved a sharp curtailment in the number of mosques and the religious associations of believers operating under them. But the particular features of the cult of Islam do not require a compulsory service at the mosque for the believer or permanent contacts with the clergy. For this reason the absence of mosques in one or another point still does not mean the absence of religious life there.

The Moslem communities which have permanent buildings, their own clergy and represent something similar to the religious communities of the past, according to our observations, consist of three unrelated groups of believers. The first group, which is not the largest, is comprised of persons living near the mosque, who are well acquainted, and maintain personal and often kinship relations which go beyond the limits of religiousness. Among them are also persons having religious training. There are very few believers in this group, but they represent a close-knit cell, they regularly participate in services, they maintain contacts with the clergy, they frequently attend the mosque and turn to the mullah for the performance of religious rites.

The second group of believers is made up of those who live a short distance from the mosque and visit it on Fridays. They do not maintain regular ties with the community, they are not linked to the believers in the first group, they do not participate in the running of mosque affairs, and are not interested in the appointing of the imam, restricting themselves to whatever material support they can give to the community.

The third group is made up of parishoners who live a great distance from the mosque and visit it only on religious holidays. Naturally, they are not at all interested in the concerns of the community, they do not know any of its leaders, and limit the time spent at the mosque to just the holiday services.

The Moslem community is now comprised no longer of all adult males, but only the believing portion. Moreover, in our times even the persons who consider themselves to be believers do not find it compulsory to attend

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mosque not only daily, but even on Fridays, limiting themselves to just the holiday services. Only believing pensioners and persons not engaged in socially useful labor remain constant visitors.

The social functions of the mosque have also been fundamentally changed. In the past the believer spent all his free time at the mosque, surrounded by people devoted to Islam, discussing public and private affairs with them. Before deciding on any action, he thought how the community would view this, and how his actions would be judged from the viewpoint of Islamic dogma. Belonging to the Moslem community largely determined the life of the believer, his attachments, and had a serious affect on his family and social life.

In our days the believer spends a portion of his time in the community, systematically coming into contact with the followers of religion and listening to the sermons and talks of the clergy. Naturally the believer subordinates his life to the requirements of Islam, he regularly performs the rites, and observes the customs and traditions stemming from religious convictions. The community fosters in the believer a definite attitude toward various phenomena in life, and influences his morality.

However, a significant portion of the believers, as was already said, do not feel compelled to visit the mosque regularly, praying basically at home. An insignificant number of believers, predominantly pensioners living nearby, assemble for daily prayers at the mosque. And the believer who regularly attends the mosque does not consider it necessary to inform the other members of the association of his personal affairs, since now espousing Islam is not the determining factor in all his actions.

At present the believers consider neither the opinion of the community nor the opinion of the mullah in settling vitally important questions, seeking advice only from close relatives or comrades at work. Nor do they turn to the mullah for determining the destiny of children. The believer is also completely free of the influence of the religious community in determining his political and economic views and in judging the changes occurring in life. A majority of the believers is not interested in the internal life of the religious community, and they are indifferent as to who leads it. They do not maintain an acquaintance with the clergy.

At present the parishoner of a mosque is a person exposed to the all-round effect of socialist reality and who is influenced by the mass information and propaganda media. He is not only a member of the religious community but also a member of a socialist production collective; he is exposed to effective ideological work and lives for the interests of the enterprise. Hence the change in the forms of his religiousness and his attitude toward Islam and the community. His attitude toward the world largely differs from the ideas of Islam, completely different internal needs have been shaped in him, and his ideas about everything have changed. And after a change in the conscience of the believer, the traditional judgments made by him about various phenomena of reality also change. At present it is

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not the community which dictates to the believer, but rather it is the believer who largely shapes the opinion of the community. And if it demands from him what does not conform to his desires or ideas, he protests, he may show dissatisfaction, he may break with it (of course, remaining a believer), or acts in his own way without considering the opinion of the community.

A revival of mosque activities is observed on Fridays and with the approach of the fast and religious holidays. On Fridays the number of participants in the services increases in comparison with ordinary days, and on holidays attendance is several-fold more than on Fridays. On holidays the mosques are attended by a few young people who do not always pray, but who come here out of tradition, under the pressure of elders, in paying tribute to the "national" traditions.

However, it would be wrong to judge the attitude of the population to the mosque solely from the number of persons attending services. The identification of the religious and the national in social conscience is also reflected in the attitude of the people, including the nonbelieving portion, to the mosque. The mosque is often considered one of the attributes of national life to which one must show respect, and if possible support it. For this reason the mosques have definite respect not only from their own parishioners.

At present the mosque is not only a place for satisfying religious needs, but also a place for the intercourse of persons, particularly pensioners, and for those who for various reasons are not involved in social production. Here there are talks not only of a religious nature, but also various sociopolitical problems are discussed, the affairs of surrounding enterprises and kolkhoses, the family affairs of individuals, and the current events. Thus, the communicative function of the mosque is maintained, although in a greatly reduced form.

Let us take up a new aspect related to the broadening of the communicative function of the mosque. This is the question of the involvement of women in the services held at the mosque. In order to correctly judge the importance of this phenomenon, let us make a slight digression into the past.

The prohibition for a woman to be an imam or priest (to conduct a service) and to attend the mosque for participation in a service was one of the many prohibitions established by Sunnism. In truth, this prohibition is not found in the Koran, and facts show that during the lifetime of Muhammad, women with uncovered faces participated in services equally with the men. Much later, in Baghdad and other cities, women priests appeared [300, pp 267, 268], and history knows even one mother superior of a Dervish community [440a, No 10, 1972, p 106]. The historical sources also show that in Samarkand, at the beginning of the 13th century, women attended the mosque on Fridays on an equal basis with the men [117, p 239]. Even at the beginning of our century, in certain mosques of Bukhara, in rooms specially assigned for this, the women assembled separately from the men

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on the days of religious holidays. In Tashkent before the revolution there was a "khotin-machit" ("mosque for women").

But all of these are merely individual facts. Historically a situation developed whereby over many centuries on the territory of our nation the Moslem woman did not participate in the services held at the mosques. This was a logical conclusion to her inequality in social and personal life.

Up to the October revolution, the question of permitting women to attend services at the mosque was not raised. The developing Tatar bourgeoisie raised the question (among others) of the participation of women in social life, including religious, but the congress of Moslem clergy which discussed this problem imposed a prohibition on women attending the mosque.

However, the congress of Moslem clergy held after the October Revolution, in 1925, decreed that women should be admitted to the mosque. At this congress one well known female religious leader, Mukhlisa Bubi was elected a kazi or member of the Central Moslem Clerical Administration. At the end of the 1920's, she arrived in Central Asia and took an active part in reviving religious life among local women.

The change in the position of the Moslem clergy vis-a-vis women undoubtedly was a reaction to the great measures of the party and the Soviet government aimed at the actual emancipation of women. During this period the clergy openly called for women to be admitted to the mosque simultaneously with the men, and demanded official recognition of women's right to study divinity, and also an equal right with men to participate in the affairs of the mosque electoral bodies.

During the period of the industrialization of the national economy and the collectivization of agriculture, a small number of women appeared in the mosques of Bashkiria and Tataria. But, regardless of the efforts of the clergy which endeavored to increase the number of parishoners, such democratization of the cult did not spread widely and did not take root. This was explained evidently by the fact that during this period the consciousness of the female believer herself did not assume equal rights with the male in religious life. For this reason she did not use the opportunity given her to attend the mosque. In Central Asia the situation generally remained unchanged.

The greater activity of women in religious life commenced during the years of the Great Patriotic War. On the one hand, this was explained by the greater religious mood as a whole, and on the other, by the fact that women, having taken over for their husbands and sons who had left for the front, began to take a more active part in all areas of social life.

Religious life was not an exception. In Tataria women were the initiators of opening previously closed mosques, and in certain localities special areas in the mosques were assigned to them. However they remained regular participants of the services at the mosques, without playing any role in

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the other affairs of the community, let alone claim leadership of religious life.

The mosques of Tataria at that time were no exception. Precisely during the war years and in the first postwar years, women began to attend the mosque in Bashkiria, in Astrakhanskaya, Ul'yanovskaya and other oblasts, where a significant Tatar population lives, as well as in Moscow and Leningrad.

In recent years, this geography has been significantly broadened. Along with the men women participate in services at the mosques of Azerbaijan, and in individual mosques of a number of oblasts and autonomous republics of the RSFSR.

Individual facts show that at present women do not limit themselves to the passive role of supplicants, but are endeavoring to play a definite role in the life of the religious associations. We feel that this is largely aided by the religious awareness of the believing men who permit such an "invasion," as well as the clergy interested in increasing the number of parishoners.

In certain mosques up to one-third of the congregation is made up of women and they have special prayer quarters. At present they do not stand on the sidelines of the affairs of the community.

Up to now no unity has been reached among the Moslem clergy of the nation on the question of the participation of women in the mosque services. The leaders of the religious centers and associations of those regions where women for a number of years have attended the mosque consider such a situation normal and have made an effort to increase the number of parishoners. The opposite opinion is supported by leaders of the Moslem Clerical Administration of the Northern Caucasus who have prohibited women from attending the mosque [79, 2, p 31]. But, regardless of this, in Dagestan where the administration is located, women attend the mosque and participate in services [287, pp 35-37].

In Checheno-Ingushetia and in certain other regions of Dagestan, there are women's murid (sectarian) groups which are also headed by women who perform the role of tamada (sheikh), and this has never existed in Islam before. These groups continue to exist in spite of the fetwa of the Clerical Administration which prohibited women from leading a community of believers.

In the 1950's, as far as we know, in Central Asia special services were organized for women in individual mosques. On the second floor of one of the Tashkent mosques, for example, during the uraza an evening service of "tarawuh-namaz" was held. On one of the evenings this second floor on which 60 women were seated collapsed on the heads of the men sitting underneath. There were no casualties, but the most fanatic believers explained the event in their own way and secured a prohibition for women attending the mosque.

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At present in Central Asia and Kazakhstan women attend the mosque on the days of religious holidays. In a majority of the oblasts of Kazakhstan women in individual groups participate in services before the end, and they make sacrifices. But in the Central Asian republics the women do not enter the mosque, they stand on adjacent streets, but read the concluding prayer of the service along with the men.

The fact that in our nation the traditional position related to the discrimination against women in religious life has changed is the result of the emancipation of women in all areas of social and economic life. The Moslem woman, although under the influence of religion, considers herself in the right to break the established ideas and to subordinate religious views to her own personal ones. But it must not be forgotten that the participation of women in religious life, in broadening the communicative functions of Islam, strengthens the influence of the religious community on the family and on the younger generation.

The social changes which occurred in our country have involved fundamental changes in the role which the clergy plays in the life of the religious community and the believers. In the past their authority was exceptionally high, and the sphere of influence ran far beyond religion. The clergy not only directed services in the mosque, but were also one of the executors (and in many instances the only one) of its financial and economic affairs.

The social status of the clergy in a socialist society has been significantly reduced. Primarily this has involved its functions not directly related to religious activities. The clergy no longer is the most authoritative person in the district or village whose opinion is obeyed in all situations of life. Of course, out of tradition the imam is a respected person, however his advice is sought in exceptionally rare instances, and then only by the elderly (and sometimes only pro forma, to listen and then do as you will). Most often the believers turn to him when the question has already been settled (a purchase has been made, the bride chosen, a certain rite is to be performed, and so forth), and only a formal blessing is required. Thus, the imam is no longer an advisor on various questions in life, but merely the stater of facts who merely reinforces what has already been done, and supports the choice made without him and sometimes against his views, a choice which from his viewpoint is not to the liking of God.

The mullah has ceased to be virtually the only person able to write in a population point. Moreover, often this was a person whose interests were very limited to a narrow range of questions which did not go beyond the limits of ordinary awareness and the visible and tangible reality. The circle of his followers is also limited to a small number of permanent parishoners of the community, but for them he is no longer the only source of information and knowledge. Nor can there be any question that he would perform the role of a commentator on the very complicated domestic and external economic and political phenomena. Many functions which belonged to the Islamic priest over the centuries have completely been removed from

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his competence, and have been put under the ideological workers, the teachers, the cultural workers and the mass information and propaganda media.

No one seeks the advice of the priest on questions concerning the economic life of the kolkhoz, sovkhoz or enterprise where the believers are employed. He has absolutely no influence on the elections of local and superior bodies, or on the activities of the economic, state or social organizations and institutions. The priest does not influence the political views of the believers, and does not determine their sympathies and antipathies for various aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the state, or the economic, political and cultural life of the nation.

His opportunities have also been restricted in shaping public opinion in the village or district. In the life of the citizens, even the believers, matters going far beyond the ideals of Islam have assumed value. The circle of interests and concerns of the people are so broad and diverse and their daily affairs have so little need of blessing that the priest simply has no role to play in solving them. The educational and cultural level of the people has risen immeasurably, and for advice the people turn to competent and well educated people.

The final victory of secular education has led to a situation where the priest has lost an opportunity to directly influence the upbringing of the younger generation. The youth receives a secular, materialistic education, and does not permit interference by the priest into their affairs. The school discloses the objective patterns in the development of nature and society, it acquaints the students with the real, scientific picture of the world, and arms them with effective knowledge. The only way by which the clergy can influence the youth is through believing parents, adult relatives and close friends.

In the past the imam was virtually the uncontested master of the religious community and association. He was responsible to no one, he individually directed the life of the association, he was free in his actions and in the content of his propaganda, and he took all the monetary and in-kind gifts from the believers for himself. At present in a registered association he is a hired official who is hired by the founders of the religious association who are not subordinate to him. The role of the priest is limited only to the performing of religious rites, to leading collective prayer, that is, his functions are restricted to the limits of religion. He is deprived of the opportunity to be the sole leader of the community, he cannot influence the choice of workers, and so forth.

At present the priest influences the believers primarily and chiefly through the questions of morality, and this must be considered. The clergy condemns various failings and depicts religion as the zealot of morality, thereby strengthening the authority and influence of religion. But its preaching and statements have a general nature in concerning everyone and no one individually.

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The believers not only do not allow interference by the clergy into their personal affairs, but also voice dissatisfaction with its individual demands which correspond to the standards of Islam but are not to their liking. Such often happens when the imams condemn the parents who do not raise their children in a religious spirit, or the persons who have abandoned the performance of various precepts of Islam, or demand unswerving observance of the month-long fast by persons engaged in socially useful labor.

Undoubtedly there are individuals who cannot tolerate the secularization of all aspects of the life of the believers and society, who endeavor to impede the progressive advance, and use all their authority and influence to preserve the rule of Islam. There have been instances when the representatives of the Moslem clergy, proceeding from a literal understanding of religion and without considering today's needs, have endeavored to impose their conditions in various situations in life. They have impeded the burying at the local cemetery of communists who in their lives were known as propagandists of atheism or representatives of the "non-Moslem" nations, and condemned women who against the standards of Islam did not cover their face and took an active part in social life, and so forth. At times they even succeeded in carrying out their demands [480, No 12, 1974, p 21].

But as a whole present-day Moslem society in its practical activities considers the altered conscience of the believer and his reticence to consider the demands of religion which run counter to reality.

At present the Moslem clergy of the nation consists predominantly of persons of the older generation who do not possess a high level of either theological or secular education. A significant portion, before beginning to be involved in religious activities, for an extended period worked in various spheres of the socialist economy and culture, and many of the imams even today continue to work in social production. Consequently, all of them have been and are under a definite ideological influence of socialist reality, they are permeated by a perception and understanding of the world inherent to the modern believers, and are persons dedicated to the socialist system. Great experience in life and a good knowledge of the inner world of the believers combined with their own favorable attitude toward socialist reality make it possible for them to painlessly adapt Islam to the spirit of the times.

The Moslem organizations of the nation unconditionally support the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and are actively involved in the peace movement. In recent years they have been the initiators for the holding of a number of conferences which discussed the vital questions of the modern world. In 1970, an international conference was held devoted to the strengthening of peace throughout the world and eliminating the conflict in the Near East. In 1973, an international conference was held in Tashkent on the problems of a political settlement for the Near Eastern crisis, and the necessity of an immediate withdrawal of

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Israeli troops from the captured Arab lands. At a conference held in 1976 devoted to the 30th anniversary of the SADUM, the questions of the strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples also held an important place.

Also surviving is the tradition coming down from the postwar years where the Moslem organizations of the nation act in the defense of peace together with the centers of other religious groups and conduct common measures with them. Thus, in 1962, they were among those who attended a meeting of religious leaders participating in the World Peace and Disarmament Congress which was being held at that time in Moscow. The Moslem leaders took an active part also in the Second Conference of the Representatives of All Religions of the USSR (July 1969) which discussed the question of religious responsibility for peace and cooperation among peoples. They also attended a meeting of religious leaders participating in the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces held in October 1973 in Moscow.

The national Moslem clerical administrations also took an active part in the world conference on "Religious Leaders for Strong Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations Between Peoples" held in Moscow in June 1977. Participating in the congress were around 650 prominent representatives of Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and other religions from 107 countries. The SADUM chairman, Mufti Ziyautdinkhan ibn Ishan Babakhan was among the honored sponsors of the conference, and spoke at a full session on the subject of the forum where he supported the proposals of the Soviet government to hold a world disarmament conference, and he pointed out the importance for lasting peace of concluding a number of important agreements in the area of disarmament and the restraining of the arms race, mentioning, in particular, a series of agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States. He also stressed the increased role of the followers of various religions in a broad movement of the peace-loving community for a lasting peace, disarmament and just relations between peoples [472b, No 8, 1977, pp 24-42].

The political loyalty of the Moslem clergy vis-a-vis Soviet power and its domestic and foreign policy is an indisputable and convincingly proven fact. For this reason we consider as contrary to reality the conclusions of individual scholars regarding the danger of the political loyalty of the Moslem clergy, and that their actions for socialism, for communism and for the friendship of peoples are not voluntary but rather forced, dictated by the fear of "a rebuff by the aware people and the community," and also that "a predominant majority of the Moslem clergy holds old positions" [436, pp 19-20].

The role of the Islamic priest in our days cannot be belittled. Undoubtedly the identification of the religious and the national existing in the social psychology and the attitude toward Islam as a component part of a nation's life have an influence on his unique position in the life of the peoples who professed Islam. This explains the frequently encountered attitude toward the priest as a person defending national interests and the integrity of the national culture. Even persons who in their own eyes are

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completely free of religion show an emphatically respectful attitude toward the priest, they argue with him exceptionally rarely, and do not show their atheistic convictions in his presence. For a definite portion of the population, the imam still remains the interpreter of what is "good" and what is "bad" from the viewpoint of the interests of the nation. Not everyone as yet realizes that his ideas are directed to the past and do not contribute to the development of the nation.

The Islamic priest takes no part whatsoever in social measures carried out in one or another population point, but rarely in the life of the population is there an event in which he would not be involved. Because the influence of Islam is manifested particularly strongly in family and domestic relations and many of the Islamic rites are observed not only by believers, the priest has been turned into one of the essential figures in daily life.

Many family events in the life of the indigenous population in the Islamic regions involve a specially invited priest. He always holds an honored place and is offered food and gifts first. But in many instances he is given the role of the "wedding general" whose presence is essential, although in no instance should he influence the course of events, and it would be wrong to feel that the imam at present has been turned merely into the performer of religious rites for the believer. His functions in the life of the population have been sharply restricted, but he still remains an indispensable figure in national life.

The Religious Control of Family and Domestic Relations: Illusion and Reality

In order to function normally and ensure the daily coordinated interactions of people, in addition to all else a society needs the means of social control. This task is carried out by an integrated system of social standards or an aggregate of standards which govern social relations and the actions of people, collectives and social groups.

A most important aspect in the system of the social standards operating in a developed socialist society (established in a definite procedure by the competent state bodies and put down in legal enactments) is their freedom from any influence of religion, including Islam. In expressing the legal awareness of the working class and the working masses, socialist law has fully abolished the standards of the shariat aimed at defending the interests of the propertied classes and preserving the vestiges of the feudal past.

The legislation of the Union republics where the believing portion of the population follows Islam is created on the basis of the national legislation. The legislation reflects also national traditions related both to the uniqueness of the historical past as well as to their contemporary development level.

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The civil law of these republics which governs a broad range of property relations not only does not have anything in common with the shariat which supports the dividing of society into rich and poor in the name of God, but also is fundamentally opposed to it. The legislation proceeds from the view that in a socialist society the most important implements and means of production, land, mineral wealth, water and so forth are the property of the socialist state, and the operating pace, the relationships of the industrial enterprises, transport, and agricultural cooperatives are governed on the basis of Soviet legislation. The Union republic civil codes at the present stage in no way contain concepts of private ownership, but merely speak of the personal property of the citizens which is derived from the socialist and serves as one of the means for satisfying the needs of the citizens.

The labor, land and water law of all the Union republics in which the followers of Islam live is also completely free of any influence whatsoever of the shariat.

In the recent past, family law in the Islamic republics had a noticeable difference from the family codes of the other republics. The differences concerned marriage age, the settlement of property relations between the spouses, alimony procedures for children and other relatives, and so forth. Some of these distinguishing features were dictated by the historical past of the peoples in whose lives the standards of Moslem law had prevailed over a long period.

The current family law of these republics virtually does not differ from the codes of the other republics, and is based upon the "Legislative Principles of the USSR and Union Republics on Marriage and the Family" approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 27 June 1968 and put into effect as of 1 October of the same year. The legislation is aimed at a final elimination of the vestiges and customs established by Islam in family relations, and it reinforces the full equality of men and women in family relations. The marriage and family codes of the Central Asian republics have established the equality of citizens in family relations regardless of nationality, race and attitude toward religion. They pursue the aim of reorganizing family relations on the basis of a voluntary matrimonial union of man and woman, and on the basis of feelings of mutual love and respect and free from any material consideration.

In Islam, a marriage accompanied by the birth of a child is a religious duty for a man. The performance of this did not require public announcement and was a simple verbal agreement between the representatives of the parties entering matrimony. At present the entering of matrimony has become a solemn act involving the formation of a family which represents the cell of a socialist society and is linked to this society by definite rights and obligations.

The current laws recognize only a marriage concluded in the state vital statistics registry offices, and thereby nullify the legal importance of a

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religious marriage. In Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia, the same marriage age of 18 years has been set for both men and women. The marriage and family codes of Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan in exceptional instances provide for the possibility of reducing marriage age by one year for both parties, and in Kirgizia by one year for women alone. Uzbekistan is an exception, where for men the marriage age has been set at 18 years, but for women it is 17, and no provision is made for reducing marriage age. We feel that the lawyers are correct who have asserted that such an even insignificant tribute to the shariat-related traditions of the past impedes the struggle against the vestiges of Islam, it helps to preserve them, and serves as an impediment to the growth of the sociopolitical and labor activeness of women, and their general educational and cultural level [172, p 257].

The family and marriage codes set standards which directly counter the shariat and are aimed at eradicating the instances of forcing women into marriage and establish the equality of the spouses in settling property disputes, as well as the equality of male and female children in inheriting. They provide that the dissolution of a marriage is possible only through the state vital statistics registry offices and the people's courts.

The constitutions of the Central Asian republics on which socialist law (including criminal) is based, in considering local features, have incorporated articles according to which any resistance to the actual emancipation of women is to be punished under the law. In accord with this, the criminal law of these republics provides criminal liability for obstructing the emancipation of women.

Thus, socialist law not only has nothing in common with the shariat, but also provides for an elimination of its standards surviving in the form of vestiges in family and domestic relations. The successes achieved in the course of socialist and communist construction, combined with socialist law, have created favorable conditions for the secularization of these relations. In our times, the everyday life of a predominant majority of the representatives of the indigenous population in the Central Asian republics is organized on a socialist base. This is largely the result of the fact that during the years of Soviet power, there has been a complete change in the spiritual makeup of women. At present they are well aware of their place in the life of society, they possess a developed sense of their own dignity, and are ready to defend their rights. Proof of the latter is the high level of labor and sociopolitical activeness among the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Karakalpak and Kazakh women, and their noticeable role in the economic, political and cultural life of society as well as their leading role in a number of areas.

The relations of husband and wife, their understanding of various aspects of family life and the raising of children are also free of the influence of Islam. This is apparent in the greater number of marriages where husband and wife are from different nationalities. In 1959, in Tashkent and

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Samarkand marriages between different nationalities were over 35 percent of the total number of concluded marriages [321, pp 32-33]. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia, international marriages involving representatives of the indigenous nationalities comprise from 30 to 40 percent of the nationally mixed marriages [466, p 465].

Another indication of the secularization of family and domestic relations is the present popular names among the peoples who previously professed Islam. A portion of the names common to all the Turkic-speaking peoples has been reduced at the expense of Moslem names. New names are also appearing. While in the past the most widely found woman's name was Fatima (Patima, Batima, Patma, Batma, and so forth), among the newborn children of Samarkand in 1965, this name was at the end of the third score, and among Kirgiz women in 1969, there was one such name per thousand, and so forth. At present much more rarely found are names with the components "abd" or "slave," "din" or "religion," "ulla" ("alla") or "Allah."

But at present is it possible to speak of the complete secularization of all aspects of the life of the indigenous Central Asian population?

Both in the legal and Islamic studies literature there is the opinion that with the elimination of the kazi and biya courts, the shariat and its standards had been completely eliminated and had disappeared from the scene as a phenomenon of the superstructure [172, p 257; 336, pp 52-53]. If by the shariat one understands only the legal standards set down in it as well as a definite system of judicial proceedings, then one can agree in principle with this claim. But, in the first place, the shariat, along with the rules and standards governing human relationships (the legal standards), also places on a person a number of demands based on faith and related to his religious duties, to his relation with God, and the shariat lacks a clear dividing of standards into legal and nonlegal, since from the viewpoint of Islam any violation should entail a religious punishment. Consequently, in speaking of its departure from the historical scene, we reduce the shariat merely to the standards governing human relationships, and this is essentially incorrect.

Secondly, socialist law, in governing social relations, operates not in a pure form but rather in interacting with morality, has many common traits with it. Both socialist law and morality are a part of the socialist superstructure which is based upon a single economic foundation, a sociopolitical and ideological base, and they serve a single goal and, in possessing a normative content, play the role of the regulators of human conduct. Completely secularized, socialist law as a whole corresponds to the moral views and convictions of people, but this does not exclude the possibility of the rise of contradictions between its standards and the standards of morality. If law represents standards which are established in a definite procedure and are set down in legal enactments, morality includes not only the standards but also the ideas, views and feelings of people, and can be expressed in public opinion and passed on from generation to generation. Here the sphere of relationships governed by morality is much

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broader than the sphere of law. Thus, many human relationships in everyday life, in the collective, the family, and so forth are not subject to legal regulation. They are the concern of morality. Due to this in a socialist society the motives of behavior among the citizens continue to be influenced not only by socialist law. The behavior of people and social discipline are also supported by customs, traditions and rites [414, pp 357-361]. Without considering this important factor, we are convinced it is impossible to correctly determine the regulative functions carried out by Islam in our times. Islam (its organizations) is not supported by the official bodies, its standards have ceased to be compulsory for performance, and their observance or rejection of them (with the exception of those which are prohibited by state enactments) is a matter of personal conscience of the Soviet citizens. Islam maintains a regulative function due to the presence of believers as well as public opinion which is not ultimately free of the influence of Islam and, consequently, the standards of the shariat.

The shariat, as the dominant form of legal ideology and the psychology of society and social awareness generally, left a profound trace in the psychology of the peoples professing it. Many of its standards and precepts assumed the nature of popular or traditional ones, and became established as customs. Under conditions where a predominant majority of the indigenous Central Asian population lives closely together in rural localities and virtually without mixing with the representatives of other unrelated ethnic peoples, these standards have a profound effect on a person in the process of his development and entry into the social milieu. A person assimilates the shariat-related standards in the form of pat formulas (which are used by him as a guide in social reality), and he views them as something valuable and conforming to his own interests. The assimilation of the experience acquired by the older generations and the example of conduct most often occurs without a clearly expressed goal or motive for such conduct. If one endeavors to establish the reasons why the various standards of the shariat are observed, then as a rule one merely hears: "That is the command of God," "That was what our grandfathers and fathers did, and that is what we must do," because that is the Uzbek (Tadzhik or Turkmen...) way, and so forth.

Out of simplicity and continuity, many Islamic rites and precepts have been turned into habits. In being continuously repeated, they acquire the nature of lasting vital needs or a dynamic stereotype. The traditional standards of religious actions in terms of the member of the community operate as definite moral requirements, in the form of duty. Such a demand felt by the individual, in participating in the motivation of his conduct, helps not only to regulate his actions in accord with custom, but also largely determines his awareness of the world, creating favorable grounds for the assimilation of religious ideology.

It also happens that the motive of an action is determined by a desire to maintain "good relations" with believing relatives or neighbors, or by the

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necessity of following the traditions, customs and habits in one's immediate environment. An indifferent attitude toward religion and the fear of remaining outside social relations, under the conditions of the predominance of a religious general opinion, lead to a situation where a person behaves in accord with the requirements of those around him and becomes a conformist.

What has been said, we feel, provides reason to assert that it is still too early to talk about the complete loss of the shariat's regulative function in our times. This involves primarily family and domestic relations which have been exposed to a significant influence of the ideas and traditions related to the historical past and to the force of their inertia. The same can also be said about the shariat demands stemming from the religious obligations of a person.

In an absolute majority of instances, girls from the indigenous Central Asian nationalities marry at an age stipulated by the law. However, comparatively young marriages for both young men and girls are still characteristic here, particularly in rural localities [227, Vol IV, pp 383-385]. A portion of the marriages involves individuals who have not reached their maturity. There are instances also of the marrying of girls 16-17 years of age. In such an instance the marriages are formalized only under the shariat.

Up to now in the life of the Central Asian peoples other vestiges related to the shariat have also survived. These are the prohibition against women studying in the specialized secondary and higher institutions of learning, the inferior status of women in the family, the domination of the husband over the woman, bride money, and so forth.

The marrying of minors, the withdrawal of them from school, in being reflected generally in the level of a nation's development, of course are not to be explained by the coercion of the legal provisions of Islam which concern such an act. And this does not happen (as certain authors have asserted) because the parents are not concerned "with the happiness of the daughter" and they "do not experience a parent's attachment to the daughter and view her as a chattel" and are merely concerned with "obtaining a fair gain" for her [85, pp 41-42]. It is difficult to agree with those authors who assign an active role to the Moslem clergy and their sermons in the survival of the social and domestic inequality of women, as well as certain other provisions of the shariat [445, p 14].

In focusing on the main and basic thing, like all Soviet people, a definite portion of the indigenous population in the Islamic regions adheres nevertheless to a whole series of guidelines dictated by the age-old dominance of the provisions of the shariat. At present we encounter a reality in which advanced ideas and the values of a developed socialist society are intertwined in the moral conscience of a portion of the people with backward conservative ideas, as a result specific moral collisions occur.

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The reason for the survival of the shariat standards, in particular in terms of women, must be seen primarily in the survival of the Moslem values of life in the social psychology of the peoples which previously professed Islam. In giving a minor daughter into marriage, a person acts in accord with this own views of her happiness and these go back into the distant past and concern family life, the birth and upbringing of children, and obedience to the husband. As for the young age, a girl 16-17 years of age, from the viewpoint of a person under the influence of Islam, is already considered completely prepared for family life. Such an action does not give one the right to dispute the loyalty to the social system or the political convictions of the person who committed it. In the given instance, as a rule, we encounter people who have a highly developed communist commitment in the sphere of political or socioeconomic awareness, but this "does not penetrate the area of moral awareness and moral feelings" [395, p 228].

It would be wrong to reduce the reason for the survival of the vestiges of the shariat solely to men, the fathers and brothers, who are under the sway of the traditions of the past. It must not be forgotten that a significant portion of the women from early childhood imbibe Moslem ideas and consider early marriage and the choice of the husband by relatives or parents to be quite natural. Often the struggle for the happiness of a woman is waged by the representatives of social organizations and pedagogues without her participation, since she sees them merely as the enemies of her own "happiness."

Largely due to the meekness of women and due to the fact that they are under the sway of the Islamic concept of good, one continues to encounter, although extremely rarely, one other standard of the shariat, bigamy. It is encountered in various forms. Most often the man is officially married to one woman, and enters into actual matrimonial relations with the other. He can have children by both and provide equal help to them in running the household and raising the children. Such marriages are condoned by the Moslem clergy on the basis of the shariat.

In our times a predominant majority of the marriages is concluded in accord with current Soviet laws and are registered with the vital statistics bodies. However a significant portion of them is also sanctioned by the shariat, and this can be explained by various reasons.

For a believer, a marriage assumes legal force only when concluded under the shariat. The survival of a religious marriage among a significant portion of the population is explained primarily by the fact that such a marriage, like the other rites of Islam, is frequently perceived as a requisite national rite. A definite portion of the youth goes through this under pressure from the family, not wishing to spoil relations with relatives and close friends, that is, out of purely conformist considerations. But in a predominant majority of instances, a shariat marriage marks the beginning of the conjugal life of the married persons, that is, it maintains its regulating function.

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Soviet family law does not recognize any type of divorce performed under the shariat as legally binding. However, in the Islamic regions, divorce under the shariat up to now often keeps its regulative significance for the believers. The spouses consider themselves divorced and do not live together since the requirements of Islam have been observed. At present there have been numerous problems caused by the Moslem divorce formula which is still encountered. A modern believer who angrily says the formula of divorce puts himself in a difficult position. In wishing to preserve the family, he also does not want to observe the provisions of the shariat fully,<sup>10</sup> and at the same time does not see a way out of the situation created. Considering the altered situation and not desiring that the provisions of the shariat be directly in conflict with socialist law, the religious centers have permitted a number of "concessions" for the believer and these fundamentally contradict the shariat but their performance creates the illusion of the observance of its standards. Thus, the spouses who consider themselves finally divorced under the shariat, write out a statement describing the situation in which the divorce formula was uttered, emphasizing the mental state of the speaker, and in conclusion ask for advice as to how they should proceed further. Sometime later they receive a reply which states that in accord with the "holy" books (the shariat and others), the three repetitions of divorce must be considered as one, and after the appropriate rite the spouses are permitted to consider themselves husband and wife.

The regulative function of Islam in divorce cases is expressed in the fact that the spouses in the cases similar to the one described do not turn to the registry bodies, but settle everything in accord with the prescripts of Islam.

Under conditions where an absolute majority of the population is free from religion, and the attitude toward religion is a question of the personal conscience of the citizen, there have also been fundamental changes in the observance of the standards of the shariat relating to the religious duties of a person. There has been a fundamental change in the person of the believer and in his attitude toward an understanding of his own religious duty. Under such conditions the prescripts of the shariat have ceased to fully govern even the life of the believers. Let us examine this from the example of the most important obligations set down by the shariat.

Religion has a regulating affect on the behavior of people "in creating a certain system of values and standards sanctioned by it and operating a the motives of conduct among believers. The religious cult itself, in shaping the corresponding customs and traditions, also has a regulating affect on the conduct of the believers.... In order to bring out the particular features of the regulating affect of religion, it is essential to elucidate the content and focus of religious values and standards. In this instance we inevitably return to the main function of religion, the compensatory" [429, pp 147-148].

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According to the shariat, the person who willfully disregards prayer is considered an infidel (kafir) [293, p 111]. Among the duties of the Moslem to Allah the shariat assigns a leading place to the prayers recited at various times during the day and year on various occasions. This pre-script of Islam has maintained its force only for an insignificant portion of the believers, predominantly those who are not involved in socially useful labor. Among the believers of the middle generation, particularly among men, it would be difficult to find persons performing the five-prayers-a-day, let alone any young people. Basically unemployed believers and pensioners are also involved in the joint prayers conducted on Fridays at the mosques. The present-day believer considers it enough to participate in prayers at the mosque held twice a year on the occasion of religious holidays.

The istikhara or prayer preceding the taking of an important decision, in the form in which it is set down by the shariat is also observed by a small portion of the elderly believers. Among the representatives of the middle generation and even more among the youth, it is virtually unknown. In our times, before undertaking one or another matter, the believer limits himself to a brief prayer, more often the first surah of the Koran. It is rare for anyone to perform the additional prayer out of an excess of piety.

The prayers recited in eclipses as well as those containing a request for Allah to send rain, and so forth, have maintained their significance. With natural disasters such as earthquakes, drought and inundations, as research has shown, the believers as well as people not fully free of the influence of Islam recite prayers. However such a prayer is not viewed by a modern believer as the only possibility for altering an unfavorable situation, and does not exclude his effective actions. In the given instance the prayer acts more often not as a factor regulating the relations of the believer with Allah, but rather is performed automatically, in compensating temporarily for arising difficulties.

The prayer which is a duty toward a deceased Moslem continues to maintain exceptionally important significance for virtually the entire population (see "Communicative Function").

As yet much related to funerals and funeral feasts in the life of the indigenous Central Asian population continues to maintain a close tie to religion. The reading of verses of the Koran and other rites of a religious nature are obligatory on the days when the living recall the departed. Here the regulating significance of the provisions of Islam is manifested in the fact that the people involved in the funeral feasts and funerals and who have come to express their condolences, regardless of their religious convictions, are related to religion.

"By ritual a society in a way directs individual experiences into a single channel, bringing them into accord with a certain situation. Thus, the manifestation of grief accompanying the mourning rites is not a spontaneous expression of individual emotions. People do not always experience a

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feeling of personal loss. But the rite arouses grief in them, thereby shaping the moral unity of the members of the group and strengthening its solidarity. The compulsory force of the ritual consists in the capacity to evoke a state of social awareness among the individuals participating in the rite..." [351, pp 231-232]. Here one can clearly see the close tie and complementariness of the various social functions of Islam, in particular the regulative and communicative. In socializing in the process of performing religious rites, people are not restricted to merely exchanging information, but also largely satisfy their emotional need, they "empty their soul," and thereby reduce the emotional tension which arises in daily life. At the same time there is an exchange of experience, ideas and happenings. The funeral prayers largely lose their initial sense, and are perceived quite differently by modern people, but because of this they do not lose their regulative effect or influence on people, since they have acquired strength and become generally accepted etiquette.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>It must be pointed out that subsequently in appeals to the indigenous population of the region, proceeding from local conditions, the party and soviet bodies often employed the term "Moslems." Thus, after the announcement of the amnesty of the captured Basmach members, the Turkestan TsIK, the SNK and the People's Commissariat of Nationalities on 9 May 1919 made a special appeal to the "working Moslem population of Fergana" explaining the essence of the amnesty granted. On 24 May 1920, an appeal "To the Moslem Population of Ferganskaya Oblast" signed by M. V. Frunze was again published [224, Vol 3, pp 193-194, 214]. At the same time in various documents one can also encounter the phrases "Moslem languages," "Moslem proletariat," and "Moslem communists."

<sup>2</sup>In the periodization of the secularization process in Central Asia, we have partially used the periodization of spiritual life of Soviet society proposed by M. T. Iovchuk (see [205, pp 19-34]), as well as the works of Central Asian scholars [216, p 131-144; 422, pp 33-34, and others].

<sup>3</sup>These two republics began the path of noncapitalist development under different conditions than Turkestan, and in the first stage their system could not be termed socialist, as neither the economic nor the psychological conditions had matured for this. Although communist parties were in power in both places, the situation in them fundamentally differed from the situation in Turkestan. In Khorezm the bloc of peasants, artisans, national bourgeoisie and feudal-tribal nobility were in power, and in Bukhara a bloc of workers, peasants, artisans and national bourgeoisie. But here power was seized by the Uzbek national bourgeoisie which was more organized than the peasantry. In the government of the BNSR there was not a single worker representative, but there were many merchants, mullahs and representatives of the old intelligentsia. In both places the inferior administrative apparatus consisted basically of mullahs and

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former emir and khan officials. But the overall trend--the movement toward socialism--was inherent to both states.

<sup>4</sup>The ideas of the rightlessness of the Moslem woman in this period were so deeply rooted that individual Soviet people's courts during the first period of their existence deprived women of the right to divorce, and illegally refused to dissolve a marriage, applying the provisions of the shariat instead of Soviet laws [220, Vol 1, p 270].

<sup>5</sup>The schools operating under the mosques continued their existence in some places at the beginning of the 1930's. Thus, the bureau of the Karakalpak party obkom in September 1929, having discussed the question of the old-method Moslem maktab, ruled "to refrain temporarily" from closing them. At this time all religious schools were under the mosques (see [104, pp 51-59]).

<sup>6</sup>Here we are far from the idea of directly linking the material status and level of religiousness in a person. There are families where there is great material sufficiency based on private entrepreneurship, speculation, and so forth, but nevertheless high religiousness survives. At the same time in many families which are sufficiently provided for, the influence of religion is much less felt. But the level of material prosperity indirectly influences the shaping of the individual and the formation of his vital guidelines and views, and is reflected in the relations within the members of one family and between different families.

<sup>7</sup>Such attempts are exceptionally rare but they are encountered. Thus, a certain time ago a small group of believers who lived in the suburbs of Tashkent formed the sect "Akhli Kur'on" ("People of the Koran") which had as its aim a struggle for the "purity of belief." They demanded the unconditional observance of the five daily prayers by everyone, the halting of education for girls after grades 7-8, and the preservation of bride money as compensation for expenditures by the parents on upbringing. The members of the sect were against the activities of the religious centers, accusing them of deviating from the standards of Islam and of concessions to believers who did not observe the legacy of the Koran. Another sect which operated in the city of Osh was in favor of the observance of all the rites of Islam, they demanded that the parents raise their children in a religious way, and try to organize instruction for young people in the principles of religion. In a number of places there have been instances of the group instruction of children in religion. But, as a rule, none of these attempts was supported by the believers who demanded a halting of the propagandizing of ideas incompatible with their views of life [359, p 66; 413, p 20; 484, 29 January 1969, and others].

<sup>8</sup>Similar things are found in other religions. Among the immigrant population of the United States, for example, Catholics marry members of the same faith in 84 percent of the instances, for Protestants the figure is 80 percent, and Jews 94 percent. The percentage of ethnically endogamous marriages here is much lower (see [141, pp 353-355]).

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<sup>9</sup>The feudal past is also reflected in the communicative function of religion in certain European socialist nations (see [100, p 204]).

<sup>10</sup>The author actually knows of an instance when spouses divorced under the shariat decided to carry out the prescripts of the shariat fully, and only after this again began to live together.

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#### CONCLUSION

The study of the functions carried out by Islam in the past and under the conditions of the developed socialist society convincingly proves the accuracy of the Leninist views to the effect that in the country of the victorious proletarian revolution, atheism becomes possible not as a result of banning religion (which would only contribute to the strengthening of religious fanaticism) but thanks to the systematic persuasion of the believers, and their involvement in active social work, as well as a result of socioeconomic and cultural changes. Such an attitude toward religion has been reflected also in the new USSR Constitution which proclaims the freedom of conscience as one of the basic rights of the Soviet citizens.

The comprehensive and complex problem of interrelationships between society and Islam, naturally, cannot be resolved within the limits of a single study. However, even this has enabled us, it seems to us, to express some preliminary suggestions affecting the further application of the comprehensive approach to practical atheistic work conducted by party, state, and public organizations and establishments.

We consider important the problem of the correlation between the comprehensive approach and the other principles and methods of atheistic education of the working people. We believe that the comprehensive approach is not merely one of the principles of this education, as some researchers believe, the way we cannot consider it separately and apart from the specific-historical and differentiated approach and from the other principles and methods. The application of the comprehensive approach would be impossible without the observance of all these principles and methods, and without their integration within the organization and content of the work aimed at surmounting the influence of religion.

The comprehensive approach must be based on scientifically substantiated data on the needs of the citizens living under contemporary conditions and the results of the established "vacuum" which religion fills, and so on, in order to earmark and implement measures for the elaboration of the true earthly requirements and substitute them for the religious requirements. An all-round concept of the functions fulfilled by Islam in modern society will enable us, above all, to make more extensive use of the entire organizational, technical and socioeconomic factors for surmounting its vestiges

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and use more purposefully and intensively the public environment in exerting an atheistic influence on the individual. Thus, the steady increase in the strength of the national working class, the development of the educational and cultural standards of the working people, and the migration of the population, as a result of which republics, oblasts, and rayons become ever more multinational, leading to the appearance of multinational production collectives, and so on, could greatly influence the narrowing of the functions of Islam.

Knowledge of the characteristics of Islamic dogma and cults and the specifics of their manifestations today are contributing to the practical utilization of a number of additional requirements related to the adoption of a comprehensive approach. One of them is familiarity with the object of atheistic education to be influenced. The proper determination of the object of atheistic propaganda largely determines the proper determination of its content, objectives, and tasks, and the singling out of the main and leading direction which is the mandatory requirement of adopting a comprehensive approach to surmounting religious prejudices.

In this matter, it seems to us, some as yet unresolved problems exist. Let us take as an example the problem of religious faith and its criteria. Many studies consider as objective indicators of religious faith external manifestations of the attitude toward religion: attending mosque services, praying, fasting, fulfillment of other religious ceremonies, and so on.

Islam, as we pointed out, confronts the believers with a number of requirements dealing with the observation of ceremonies. Nevertheless, it does not require their mandatory implementation and grants a number of indulgences. Therefore, such criteria of religious faith could, on the one hand, lead to belittling it, should the believers fail to fulfill a number of religious ceremonies, and, on the other, to overemphasizing it, since, for a variety of reasons some Islamic ceremonies are observed even by non-believers.

However, nor could we agree with researchers who suggest that people who observe religious ceremonies as national ceremonies should not be considered as faithful. It is well known that atheistic education should not be limited to separating people from religion. Its purpose is to mold a scientific outlook, an atheistic conviction, and an immunity to all religious influences.

Along with the believers there exists a rather numerous group of people who lack a strong immunity against religion or the principle-mindedness and convictions needed to oppose religious people. In our view, this calls for broadening the influence of atheistic propaganda. This complicates the tasks of propaganda and confronts it with specific problems. The latter does not mean that in the areas of the spread of Islam propaganda must be different in its final objectives and tasks from work conducted among the followers of other faiths. It is a question merely of the special ways, means, and methods used to attain the same objective.

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For example, a head-on criticism of the Islamic doctrine, ceremonies, unseemly actions by its clergy, and so on, would be hardly effective. In many cases it leaves the people indifferent and, sometimes, merely irritates them. A propaganda structured regardless of the characteristics of the attitude of the believers toward Islam and its clergy or of the position of Islam in the public mind could not yield expected results.

It is precisely in the areas where Islam is widespread that what V. I. Lenin considered the most important fact in atheistic propaganda becomes particularly important, i.e., developing in the masses a conscious attitude toward religious problems and a conscious criticism of religion. Naturally, this task must be implemented on a differentiated basis, in accordance with the characteristics of the various groups of working people, paying particular attention to the upbringing of the young people and the intelligentsia. The molding of a proper understanding of most important concepts of the Soviet person such as patriotism, love and respect for one's own nation, and understanding its true interests and that which indeed ennobles and glorifies it, must hold a leading position in the atheistic and internationalist education of the latter. The combination of atheistic with internationalist education must contribute to the realization not only of the ideological harm of religious ceremonies but also of the fact that identifying them with national customs pulls the nation back, to the past, rather than contributing to its development.

In our view, a considerable role should be assigned in propaganda work to the Marxist interpretation of the reasons for the spread and establishment of Islam, its true position in history, the role which Islam plays in the preservation of obsolete concepts, and the distinction between religious ideology and cultural values presented in a religious guise. In order to develop a proper attitude toward national values, a depiction of the unity of human history and the general nature of the laws governing the development of human culture, emphasizing in propaganda work common features, traditions, and customs of different nations, and showing the social base for their appearance and strengthening in the life of one or another nation, could greatly help the development of a proper attitude toward national values. Let us emphasize that historicism in propaganda means not only the depiction of the way, under the pressure of social progress, the development of science, technology, culture, and education, religion has been gradually losing its most important functions and becoming a matter of merely individual conscience. Historicism calls for considering propaganda in terms of the future as well--the interpretation of inevitable doom of religion and of its total elimination from all realms of social and human life.

The study of the functions performed by the ceremonies and prescriptions of religion in the life of the nations which had accepted Islam in the past poses, it seems to us, yet another problem. The introduction of new, Soviet ceremonies has been and is considered, unquestionably rightly, one of the most important means for restricting Moslem religious ceremonies.

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However, their application encounters certain difficulties, since a certain segment of the population is opposed to the new forms of life and is supporting the old. A number of reasons hint at the success of the new and the restriction of the old, linked with Islam. In our view, among the many there are two most important reasons for such difficulties. The first is that, frequently, the main purpose of the new ceremonies is reduced to the lowering of essentially material outlays. The educational and ideological content they should have does not hold a proper position or is totally neglected. The second is that it is forgotten that the new ceremonies will have their desired educational influence only if efforts to apply them become a structural part of a thoroughly planned and well organized ideological process, aimed at changing values related to Islam, and promoting a new world concept. This is a process aimed at developing true and durable life values, free from the influence of religion and of the feudal past.

We have considered merely several possibilities for upgrading the effectiveness of work to surmount the vestiges of Islam and develop the theory of atheistic education made possible by the study of its social functions. The theory of atheistic education will become a necessary manual for action only when it is imbued with the results of the specific-historical study of the role of religion in the past and the present, closely linked with the development of society. A theory based on this analysis could provide groundwork for the contemporary religious circumstances, bring to light the objective and subjective reasons for Islamic vestiges, point up the means for reducing the reproduction of Islam in the new generations, and upgrade the effectiveness of atheistic propaganda.

All this calls for the further development of the sociology of religion and the involvement of the effort of specialists in many related scientific sectors in the study of its social functions. The topical nature of the significance of this work is dictated by the attention which the Communist Party pays to the education of the new man, the builder of the new society. "In all realms of life and development of our society," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his report "The Great October and the Progress of Mankind," "the level of conscientiousness, culture, and civic responsibility of the Soviet people will play an ever greater role. Promoting in man an aspiration toward lofty social objectives, ideological convictions, and a truly creative attitude toward labor is one of the primary tasks. This is one of the important fronts in the struggle for communism. The course of economic construction and of the sociopolitical development of the country will depend to an ever greater extent on our victories on this front as well" [476, No 16, 1977, p 11].

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